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Abstract 
The chevauchée, a fast-moving raid, was a common feature of English campaigns during 
the Hundred Years War and late medieval warfare more generally.  These were highly 
complex, organized, and focused operations rather than unfocused raids with no other 
purpose but pillage and ravishment. The model of the army “living off the land” is 
untenable; some system of supply was necessary, even for an army pursuing a raiding 
strategy like that of the Prince of Wales’ 1355 campaign in southern France.  The 
logistics of supply and the realities of geography and human topography helped 
determine the route the army followed and what it could accomplish.  The success of the 
chevauchée depended on the pre-existing system of purveyance and recruitment in 
England, rested upon an efficient supply train that accompanied the army, and relied on 
resupply from England.  The Prince employed this raiding strategy to accomplish his 
aims, namely the punishment of the duke of Armagnac for his encroachments on English 
Gascony and disruption of the enemy’s ability to provision a military force.  Moreover, 
the actions of the Anglo-Gascon army effectively demonstrated to the inhabitants of 
Languedoc that the French king and his lieutenants could not protect them from the 
English.  Thus, the Prince also achieved Edward III’s larger strategic goal: the re-
enforcement and projection of English royal authority and power in Gascony and France.
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
On 19 September 1356 Edward of Woodstock (1330–1376), the Prince of Wales and 
often called the Black Prince,1 and his Anglo-Gascon army defeated King Jean II (1319–
1364) of France at the Battle of Poitiers.2  In many ways, this victory was the culmination 
of the Prince’s expedition that began in 1355.3  The Prince could not have anticipated 
                                                
1David Green, Edward the Black Prince: power in medieval Europe (Harlow/New York: 
Pearson/Longman, 2007); idem, The Black Prince (Charleston: Tempus, 2001); Richard 
W. Barber, The life and campaigns of the Black Prince: from contemporary letters, 
diaries and chronicles, including Chandos Herald’s Life of the Black Prince (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1986); idem, Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine: a biography of 
the Black Prince (London: Allen Lane, 1978); John Hooper Harvey, The Black Prince 
and his age (London: Batsford, 1976); Barbara Emerson, The Black Prince (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976); Hubert Cole, The Black Prince (London: Hart-Davis, 
MacGibbon, 1976); M.S. Coryn, The Black Prince (London: A. Barker, ltd., 1934); Henry 
Dwight Sedgwick, The life of Edward the Black Prince (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril 
company, 1932); R.P. Dunn-Pattison, The Black prince (New York, 1010); Louise 
Creighton, Life of Edward the Black Prince: Historical Biographies (London: 
Rivingtons, 1877); G.P.R. James, A history of the life of Edward the Black Prince: and of 
various events connected therewith, which occurred during the reign of Edward III, King 
of England, from the second edition (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1842); William 
Shirley, Edward, the Black Prince (London, 1825–1827); Arthur Collins, The life and 
glorious actions of Edward prince of Wales (commonly call’d the Black Prince) eldest 
son of King Edward the Third…also the history of his royal brother, John of Gaunt 
(London: Printed for T. Osborne, 1740); Samuel Clarke, The life and death of the thrice 
noble and illustrious Edvvard, surnamed the Black Prince son to our victorious King 
Edward the Third, by whom he was made the First Knight of the most honourable Order 
of the Garter (London: Printed by William Birch, 1673); 
2Christian Teutsch, Victory at Poitiers: the Black Prince and the medieval art of war 
(Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2010); David Green, The Battle of Poitiers, 1356 
(Stroud/Charleston: Tempus, 2002); Donald Featherstone, Poitiers, 1356 (London: C. 
Knight, 1972); Hilaire Belloc, Poitiers (London: H. Rees, 1913). 
3Peter Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince: The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356 
(Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011); H.J. Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition of 
1355–1357 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1958); Jean-François Jeanjean, La guerre de cent 
ans en Pays Audois. Incursion du Prince Noir en 1355 (Carcassonne: Les Imprimeries 
Gabelle, 1948); M.L. de Santi, “L’expédition du Prince Noir en 1355,” Mémoires de 
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such a triumph when he and his army left Plymouth in September 1355 and sailed to 
Bordeaux.  His campaign was Edward III’s (1312–1377) response to the Gascon lords’ 
appeal for help in resisting the French, specifically the military actions of Jean I, count of 
Armagnac (1311–1373).  The Prince campaigned through southern France—from 
Bordeaux to Narbonne and back—in the fall of 1355, but his success in 1355 is often 
overshadowed by the victory at Poitiers in 1356.  The 1355 chevauchée is typically cast 
as the prelude to Poitiers.  Indeed, a recent title states this relationship explicitly: In the 
Steps of the Black Prince: The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356.4  While the two campaigns 
of 1355 and 1356 were part of the same expedition, each needs to be assessed and 
examined individually.  The chapters that follow, then, focus on the 1355 chevauchée, 
not as the prelude to Poitiers but rather as a case study of the logistics of a chevauchée 
and fourteenth-century warfare more broadly.  It is useful as a case study because there 
were no extraordinary events.  It was typical in that the Prince's army had to be 
transported across the Channel and cross through lands held by the English, Gascons, 
potential allies, and enemies, which necessitated that the army pursue a variety of 
strategies for aquiring supplies.  This campaign demonstrates that a chevauchée needed 
logistical support; moreover, the logistics speak to the Prince’s goals for this specific 
campaign and more generally to Edward III’s grand strategy.  Thus, the logistics are a 
                                                                                                                                            
l’Académe des Sciences de Toulouse, series 10, vol. 4 (1904): 181–223; J. Moissant, Le 
Prince Noir en Aquitaine (Paris, 1894); other studies that address the campaign in detail 
include Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Fire (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); Clifford Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000). 
4Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince. 
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method for understanding decisions made during a campaign, decisions that might 
otherwise remain opaque. 
The Prince’s grande chevauchée of 1355 should be understood in the context of the 
Hundred Years War and its progress up until the Gascons appealed to Edward III for 
assistance. 
The Hundred Years War 
The roots of the Hundred Years War arguably date to the Norman Conquest, which 
established the curious situation in which William the Conqueror was both sovereign 
king of England and duke of Normandy, a vassal of the French king.  The marriage of 
Henry II and Eleanor of Aquitaine aggravated the state of affairs.  However, the English 
kings did not perform homage for Aquitaine until Henry III conceded that in the 1259 
Treaty of Paris.  By the time Edward III assumed the English throne in 1327 English 
territory in France was only a small part of Aquitaine along the Atlantic coast and 
Bordeaux and Ponthieu. 
 Then King Charles IV (1294–1328) of France died without a male heir.  After 
much discussion about whether the French crown could be passed through the female 
line, Philip de Valois (1293–1350) became King of Philip VI of France in April 1328.  
Edward III’s claim as the closest male relative of Charles IV and King Philip IV (1268–
1314) was overlooked.5  Within a month of taking the throne, Philip VI called upon 
Edward III to perform homage for his lands in France.  Philip VI had to threaten the 
                                                
5Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 9–10; Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years 
War: Trial by Battle (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); Edouard 
Perroy, The Hundred Years War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), 33. 
Chapter 1 4 
confiscation of the duchy to make Edward III offer homage in 1329.  Even then, the 
English king offered only ‘simple’ homage instead of ‘liege’ homage, thereby 
acknowledging Philip VI as his landlord but not his sovereign.  Philip VI accepted this, 
and the tensions, while not resolved, were for the time being smoothed over. 
Various small quarrels arose between 1331 and 1336, when Philip VI began 
making plans to invade Gascony and Edward III searched for alliances in the lands along 
France’s northern border.  This was exacerbated when Philip ordered Edward III to 
surrender Robert of Artois, the French king’s brother-in-law.  The English king refused, 
and French officials attempted to seize Saint Macaire,6 just upriver from Bordeaux, in 
February 1337.  Philip VI officially confiscated Gascony, and letters to that effect 
reached the English seneschal in Gascony by 13 June 1337.7  Edward III issued his own 
manifesto: “[Philip] striving by all means that he could to undo the King of England and 
his people, so that he could keep what he had wrongfully withheld [i.e., Gascony] and 
conquer more from him, refused all offers, but, seeking his opportunities, busied himself 
in aid and maintenance of the Scots, the enemies of the king of England, attempting to 
delay him by the Scottish war so that he could would have no power to pursue his rights 
elsewhere,”8 i.e., in Gascony.  Thus the first phase of the war opened with no mention of 
a claim to the throne of France but rather focused on Gascony. 
                                                
6The same Saint Macaire was used as a supply depot in the Black Prince’s 1355 
campaign. 
7Anne Curry, The Hundred Years War: British History in Perspective (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 279. 
8TNA, C 54 (Close Rolls), 1337. 
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The French military actions of 1337–1338 were centered in Gascony, and the 
French had made significant gains by 1339 because of the lack of English 
reinforcements; Bordeaux was besieged for a week.  French naval forces raided the 
English coast in 1339, and only the mutiny of the Genoese seamen prevented the English 
situation from becoming truly precarious.  Edward III was pursuing other aims in 1339, 
namely alliances with the northern princes and Holy Roman Emperor.   When the French 
and Anglo-Imperial armies met in October at Buironfosse, there was no battle, and the 
campaigns ended inconclusively.9 
The 1340 campaign also involved alliances for England and included the Flemish 
burghers.  The English sailed in June and defeated the French naval forces in the Zwin 
estuary at Sluys.  The French lost 90 percent of their ships and up to 18,000 men.10  
Edward laid siege to Tournai shortly thereafter, and a nine-month truce was agreed upon 
in September.11  Over the next two years, Edward III focused on Scotland, and then, in 
1341, there was a succession crisis in Brittany.  Both kings involved themselves, each 
supporting a rival candidate: John of Montfort supported by England and Charles of Blois 
supported by France.12  The truce of 1343 was supposed to last until 1346, but Edward 
repudiated it in 1345. 
                                                
9Curry, The Hundred Years War, 31–35. 
10The French defeat was a result of several factors: wind, sun, a confined anchorage, and 
the unwillingness of the French admirals, Hugh Quiéret and Nicholas Béhuchet, to listen 
to the advice of Pietro Barbavera, an experience corsair in command of the Genoese 
galleys. 
11Curry, The Hundred Years War, 36. 
12Sumption, Trial by Battle, Perroy, The Hundred Years War, 114.  What is particularly 
interesting is that Charles of Blois’ claim was through his wife, who, according to the 
principles established in 1328, ought to have been excluded from the inheritance.  John of 
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This marked the beginning of the great English victories.  English and Gascon 
forces led by Henry of Grosmont (1310–1361), the earl of Lancaster as of 1345, retook 
Bergerac, La Réole, and Aiguillon in Gascony during Lancaster’s campaigns of 1345–
1346.  Edward III’s forces took Caen on 26 July 1346 and pulled off a stunning victory 
over the French at Crécy on 26 August of that year.  Furthermore, and more important for 
Edward’s future goals, the English captured Calais on 4 August 1347.  In Scotland, too, 
the English were successful at Neville’s Cross (14 October 1346).  Then Philip VI died 
on 2 August 1350, and Jean II (1319–1364) became king of France.13   
Jean II faced many of the same problems his father had, as well as the additional 
concern about the loyalties of Charles of Navarre (1332–1387), his son-in-law and an 
important lord in Normandy.  During the 1354 peace talks, hosted by the papacy, Edward 
III insisted “that the English king should hold the entire duchy of Aquitaine, himself and 
his heirs, in perpetuity, freely and quietly, without performing homage to any king of 
France.”14  Naturally, the French refused, and the English planned a tripartite invasion for 
1355.  The King would lead an army in Picardy, Lancaster (duke of Lancaster as of 1351) 
would lead forces in Normandy, and the Prince of Wales, Edward of Woodstock, would 
lead a combined Anglo-Gascon force in Gascony in response to the Gascons’ appeal for 
aid.   
                                                                                                                                            
Montfort was the nearest male relation, and argued that Joan’s claim was invalid.  The 
Breton civil war continued until 1364, when Charles of Blois was killed in the Battle of 
Auray. 
13Curry, The Hundred Years War, 37–41. 
14Robert of Avesbury, De Gestis Edwardi Tertii, ed. Edward Maunde Thompson 
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1889), 420–21.  “quod rex Anglorum habuisset 
integrum ducatum Aquitanniae, sibi et heredibus suis, imperpetuum, libere et quiete, sine 
homagio cuiquam regi Franciae faciendo.” 
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Anglo-Gascon Relations 
A few words about the relationship between Gascony and England are necessary.  The 
Gascons specifically requested English military aid, and they participated actively in both 
the 1355 and 1356 campaigns.  H.J. Hewitt describes the Gascon leaders as “active and 
resourceful.”15  Knighton’s chronicle claims that Gascons made up part of the infantry.16  
This is hardly a surprise, given that English armies had campaigned in France during the 
reign of Edward I (1239–1307) and in the 1340s, and the Gascons’ military service is 
reflective of the relationship between England and Gascony, and Gascon soldiers fought 
in England in Edward I’s armies. 
England and Gascony had a long political relationship and strong economic ties.  
Gascony was not always the top priority for the English kings, but that changed as land in 
Normandy and Anjou was lost to the French kings.  Gascony became England’s foothold 
on the continent—and its main supplier of wine.  The actions of the English kings were 
intended to secure its frontiers, assert their will, and settle the question of sovereignty 
over the duchy.  The continuing English campaigns were unsuccessful, and the Treaty of 
Paris (1259) left Henry III with only Gascony and the obligation of homage to the French 
king.17   
Edward I (1239–1307) met this obligation to the letter—if not the spirit—of the 
treaty.  Of all the English dukes, Edward I was the one who “most involved himself in the 
                                                
15Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, viii. 
16Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle, ed. G. H. Martin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
136–37.  “pedalibus absque numero.” 
17Prestwich, Edward I, Yale English Monarchs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1988), 8. 
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affairs of Gascony.”18  He received the grant of the duchy from his father at the age of 
ten, although Henry III kept the title of Duke of Aquitaine.  Edward I spent several years 
there and aided the duchy by promoting commerce and building and maintaining 
fortifications.  He also used Gascon soldiers in his wars against the Scots and the Welsh 
as they were good soldiers and skilled with crossbows.  His forces in the 1282 campaign 
against the Welsh included 533 foot soldiers, 21 knights, and 52 mounted crossbowmen; 
these numbers increased the following year.19  In addition to troops, Gascony also 
provided provisions: 1000 quarters of oats, 2000 quarters of wheat, 1000 pigs, 300 
quarters of beans and peas, and, unsurprisingly, 500 tuns of wine.20  Gascony remained an 
important source of supply for some years; however, Gascony, particularly when English 
troops served there, still depended on English grain and victuals to supply these extra 
troops.  Despite Philip IV’s efforts—pressure on the frontiers and declaring the duchy 
forfeit—Edward I’s hold on Gascony was as strong at the end of his reign as it had been 
in the early years.21  This did not last during the reign of Edward II (1284–1327), who 
faced military problems in Wales, Scotland, Ireland, and Gascony, not to mention 
political problems with the English baronage.  Charles IV (1294–1328) seized the 
opportunity and confiscated the duchy.22 
                                                
18Christopher Turgeon, “Bacchus and Bellum: The Anglo-Gascon Wine Trade and the 
Hundred Years’ War (987–1453 A. D,” (MA Thesis, College of William and Mary, 31 
March 2000), 58. 
19Jean Paul Trabut-Cussac, L’administration Anglaise en Gascogne sous Henry III et 
Édouard I de 1254 à 1307 (Geneva/Paris: Droz, 1972), 69–70. 
20CWR, 214–16. 
21Turgeon, “Bacchus and Bellum,” 58–60. 
22Turgeon, “Bacchus and Bellum,” 60–62. 
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Politically, Gascony had chosen to align itself with England and the English 
kings.  This served the political interests of the Gascons, namely their desire to maintain 
their independence.  No doubt this helps to explain England’s minimalist approach to 
governing the duchy.  This approach left local government predominately in the hands of 
locals because that was what England could afford and, more importantly, was what the 
Gascons would allow.  England made no attempt to defend Gascony in its entirety, 
counting on the Gascons to take care of their own.23  It was a political partnership that 
served the interests of both England and Gascony. 
Economically, the Anglo-Gascon relationship was also profitable, particularly in 
terms of the wine trade and, to a lesser extent, the salt trade.24  By the beginning of 
Edward III’s reign in 1327, Gascony was the favored supplier of wines to the English 
court.  Seventy-five percent of the wine imported in England came from Bordeaux, and 
England was importing some eighty thousand tonneaux (twenty million US gallons) of 
wine per year.  Duties and taxes on wine brought in £13, 000 in 1324.  The wine trade 
was second only to the wool trade in terms of royal revenue.25  Gascony supplied most of 
this wine.   
Gascony had been involved in the wine trade since the Romans had recognized 
the significance of the river system, and Bordeaux was a thriving port by the fourth 
century; in the late Middle Ages Bordeaux had approximately thirty thousand people, 
                                                
23Turgeon, “Bacchus and Bellum,” 62–65. 
24Frank McLynn, Richard and John: Kings at War (Cambridge: De Capo Press, 2007), 
16. 
25Turgeon, “Bacchus and Bellum,” 4–6. 
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only ten thousand fewer than London.26  The rivers “made England, the Low Countries 
and Scandinavia nearly as easy to reach as other parts of France,”27 so it is no wonder that 
England and Gascony developed strong economic ties that only strengthened over the 
decades.  In 1240, the king received £600 from the wine trade; by 1300 this had increased 
to £6000 and double that by 1307.28 
This wine trade picked up particularly after John lost the port at La Rochelle in 
1203, and the main source of wine for the English shifted south from the Loire valley to 
Gascony.29  While this necessitated a change in taste for the English, it also forced an 
agricultural shift upon the Gascons who converted their fields into vineyards, not to 
mention an expansion of the labor force.  In less than fifty years, the Gascons took over 
the wine trade from the German merchants.  The Gascon merchants at first used only 
Gascon ships, although the sheer volume of the trade made it necessary to bring in 
foreign—English—shippers, not to mention the adoption of larger vessels, such as the 
cog, to deal with the massive October shipments of new wine to England.  English 
merchants also started shipping other goods to Bordeaux, particularly grain, which was 
much needed because the expansion of the vineyards had reduced the amount of land 
available for the cultivation of grain.  This valuable trade required royal protection and 
resources, and the English kings certainly benefitted from providing these, including the 
right of prisage for royal use, which “encompassed personal consumption and the use of 
                                                
26Kenneth Fowler, The Age of Plantagenet and Valois, the Struggle for Supremacy, 
1328–1498 (New York: Putnam, 1967), 41–42. 
27Turgeon, “Bacchus and Bellum,” 51. 
28Ibid., 60. 
29Ibid., 70. 
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wine for his own armies.”30  Furthermore, the king and his armies would also benefit 
from the experience and familiarity of merchants, captains, and mariners with this trade 
route, as well as the way the wine trade used the Gascon river system to transport goods 
to Bordeaux. 
The English clearly saw Gascony as important, not only because it provided a 
base for English operations in France but also because of close economic ties.  By the 
reign of Edward III, it was England’s second largest trading partner; the biggest trading 
partner, naturally, was the Low Countries because of the dependency on English wool.31  
England and Gascony were economically inter-dependent: England needed Gascon 
wines, and the Gascons needed English grain.  Politically, they also depended on each 
other.  Gascony had chosen England and an oft-absent duke and needed protection from 
the encroachment of French armies and administrators; the English kings, hoping and 
planning to reclaim their lost territories in France, had to maintain this foothold on the 
continent, and so it behooved them to keep the Gascons, particularly the residents of 
Bordeaux, happy.  Given these considerations and the history of Anglo-Gascon relations, 
it is hardly a surprise that the Gascons requested English troops and that Edward III 
responded positively. 
This, then, is where Anglo-Gascon relations stood at the beginning of the 
Hundred Years War.  As discussed above, the war opened in Gascony with the 
confiscation of the duchy in 1337.  Even when Edward III was occupied with events in 
England or Normandy, Gascony was never ignored.  
                                                
30Ibid., 71–85. 
31Ibid., 91. 
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The Expeditions of 1355 
The Prince’s 1355 expedition was part of a multi-pronged strategy.  The traditional 
understanding of Edward III’s plans for 1355 argues that three campaigns were planned.  
Lancaster would lead an army in Normandy; the Prince would lead his forces from 
Bordeaux, and Edward III himself would lead a third army from Calais.  Clifford Rogers, 
however, argues that there were only two campaigns planned for 1355.32   Regardless of 
whether there were two campaigns or three campaigns planned, the Prince’s expedition 
was competing for resources, funds, soldiers, and shipping. 
 Among the many reasons for using this particular campaign as useful test case for 
examining the broader question of fourteenth-century military logistics three stand out in 
greater importance.  First, there are the problems of cross-Channel transport and supply; 
the prince’s army had to cross the Channel, with their horses and enough comestible 
supplies for the eleven-day voyage.  If Avesbury’s numbers are correct, the prince had to 
arrange for transporting more than three thousand men, with their animals, across the 
English Channel.  It took eleven days, which means that the ships, in addition to men, 
including the sailors, and animals, had to carry enough food and fresh water for the 
voyage.  The ships had to carry equipment as well.  This suggests the existence of the 
necessary naval technology, i.e., ships with adequate carrying capacity and capable of 
sailing the English Channel and transporting horses.  
Secondly, the prince’s expedition through southern France passed through lands 
held by the English, lands belonging to English allies—or potential allies—and lands 
                                                
32Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 293, n.38. 
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held by enemies, which allows for a discussion of differences in the means and methods 
of resupply at various stages of the chevauchée.  His army also had to deal with the 
Landes, numerous river crossings, adverse weather, and lack of water.  Examining the 
logistics of the Prince’s chevauchée helps explain how the army managed these 
difficulties. 
Thirdly, the prince operated in conjunction with the Duke of Lancaster’s planned 
campaign in Normandy, which suggests that England had the resources for a bipartite 
invasion.33  The planned operations emphasize the economic, administrative, and human 
resources of England and its ability to pursue and support two parallel invasions.  It also 
speaks to the larger question of Edward III’s larger strategic aims.  The Black Prince’s 
expedition is significant not only because it was the only successful campaign of the 
planned tripartite invasion but also in light of its aftermath: the disruption of the French 
economy and logistics, the destruction of economic resources and infrastructure, and the 
terrorization of the populace. 
The Black Prince’s expedition was a thoroughly planned military operation not an 
ad hoc raid.  The logistical requirements of the expedition necessitated a highly 
developed administration capable of arraying, equipping and transporting the Black 
Prince’s forces, and the relationship between Gascony and England and Gascony and 
France required that the diplomatic situation and niceties be preserved.  The campaign 
also was not a disorganized rampage by an undisciplined mob without any clear 
objectives.  Rather, the Black Prince had a specific agenda, and while plunder was part of 
                                                
33Sumption, Trial by Fire, 168. 
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it, it was not the only goal.  Looking at the logistics of the campaign suggests that the 
Prince’s actual goals were in keeping with his stated aims, namely bringing Armagnac to 
battle, punishing those who had left their allegiance to Edward III, and restoring and 
extending English royal authority in Gascony and France more generally, which certainly 
speaks to the grander strategic aims of Edward III. 
Edward III’s “grand strategy”34 and ultimate goal in 1355 was the re-
establishment and, if possible, extension of English royal authority in Gascony.  
Fundamentally, the Hundred Years War was a conflict about authority, not only Edward 
III’s (and later English monarchs, as well) efforts in Gascony but also the French kings’ 
endeavors in France.  The conflict in Gascony, after all, was at heart a dispute over who 
was the final, ultimate source of authority in the duchy.  Edward III meant for it to be him 
and him alone.  Considering the Prince’s stated aims, not merely the words but also the 
ensuing action, makes it clear that he and Edward III intended to restore English royal 
authority, through force if necessary.   
Examining the logistics of this campaign, particularly in the preparations and 
aftermath, re-enforce this interpretation of Edward III’s strategic goals.35  Even the 
northern campaign led by Lancaster can be understood in this light.  Lancaster’s 
campaign, while it did not enjoy the success that the Prince’s did, still advanced Edward 
III’s aims.  If it did nothing else it disrupted the French logistics, hindered France’s 
                                                
34For further discussion, see Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire 
from the first century AD to the third (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
35It could be argued, of course, that the Prince overstepped his stated aims by leaving the 
duchy and taking the war to France.  However, his actions had the desired effect, in that 
they disrupted France’s and Armagnac’s ability to mount an effective response. 
Chapter 1 15 
ability to produce comestible supplies and wealth, and forced the French to split their 
troops and resources to deal with Lancaster in the north, the Prince in the south, and a 
possible third arm of the invasion led by the king. 
The Prince’s logistics tell us that this was no ad hoc raid; rather it was a carefully 
planned and considered expedition with specific aims and strategic importance.  This is 
more than an argument that people in the Middle Ages were intelligent and had 
intelligible reasons for what they did.  I argue, rather, that the Prince’s 1355 chevauchée 
was part of an overall grand strategy that governed Edward III’s conduct of the war with 
France, that his ultimate aim was full sovereignty in Gascony, and that the logistics 
provide concrete evidence as to the Prince’s intentions on campaign, which in turn speak 
to the aim of his expedition and how that expedition fit into Edward III’s grand strategy.  
Therefore, this dissertation is also an argument for logistics, and by extension military 
history, as a method for illuminating what otherwise might appear to be opaque decisions 
made in the course of campaigning or battle. 
Outline of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is best considered in three parts: introductory material, preparations, and 
the campaign itself and its aftermath.  Chapter Two discusses the historiography, sources, 
and methodology.  The second pair of chapters covers the preparations and the Prince’s 
army.  Chapter Three addresses when the decision to send an expedition was made, when 
the planning began, and the actual preparations in England. Sending an army across the 
Channel was no simple matter and required considerable care and due consideration. The 
success of the campaign, particularly ensuring that the army arrived “in fighting trim,” 
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rested upon a sophisticated system of supply and purveyance that already existed in 
England.  Chapter Four discusses the Prince’s forces.  It includes recruitment, wages, 
“paperwork,” and a prosopographical survey of the key men of the Prince’s command 
staff, both English and Gascon.  England’s system for recruiting men was as well 
established and highly organized as the purveyance structures.  This is evident in the 
meticulous accounts of wages, lists of men excused from military service, and deserters, 
as well as the ability of England to recruit, equip, and transport an army (more than one, 
in fact, that same year) in a matter of months less than a decade after the Black Death.  
The final three chapters cover the campaign and winter operations.  Chapter Five covers 
the route from Bordeaux to Narbonne, and specific logistical problems, such as crossing 
the waterless Landes, and how logistical considerations affected the decision making 
process of the Black Prince and his commanders at key junctures of the campaign, such 
as at Toulouse.  It shows that the Prince and his army could not simply ‘live off the land.’  
Even troops engaged in a chevauchée, the fast-moving raids that were a common feature 
of English warfare in this period, had to have a supply train, and the Prince’s army was 
no different.  Moreover, the manner in which the army acquired supplies varied.  While 
in Gascony and when crossing the lands of the Count of Foix, a potential ally, the army 
purchased the majority of its supplies.  Even deep within enemy territory, the Prince’s 
purveyors continued to pay for certain items.  Certainly the army raided towns and 
manors for provisions; however, many of these targets were strategic and chosen for the 
store of supplies, a store the army could and did transport with them.  Chapter Six follows 
the return march from Narbonne to Bordeaux and demonstrates how the logistics of 
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supply and the capabilities of men and horses not only allows for a re-examination of the 
route itself but also helps understand the Prince’s objectives.  One of the key questions 
about this campaign considers whether the Prince sought battle with Armagnac, 
particularly as November progressed, or meant to make for Bordeaux with all speed.  The 
route that matches the sources most closely suggests that the Prince and his army chose 
the most difficult path, logistically speaking, which would mean the army was in definite 
pursuit of Armagnac.  Chapter Seven examines the winter operations of the Prince’s 
captains, resupply and re-enforcement from England, and the financial picture of the 
campaign.  Resupply by sea from England, both in terms of men and provisions, was 
crucial for keeping the Prince’s army supplied and ready to campaign throughout the 
winter months and early spring.   
Conclusion 
Based on the care with which this campaign was planned, it is clear that this was not a 
disorganized undertaking.  Furthermore, the fact that the decision to send an expedition to 
Gascony was not made suddenly but rather deliberately, with due consideration given to 
the choice of commander and command staff, it is also clear that Edward III wanted this 
expedition to succeed.  He certainly did everything reasonably in his power to ensure its 
success by making certain that the Prince had the funds, an able staff, soldiers and 
archers, supplies, a fall back plan, and the authority to carry out the king’s commands.  
This further suggests that the Prince’s expedition had specific goals, goals that the Prince 
and Edward III were both cognizant of, and Edward III gave the Prince the tools 
necessary to achieve them.  
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 Given the Prince’s stated goals, the means with which he was provided to pursue 
them, and the time remaining to campaign in the fall of 1355, a chevauchée was the best 
option.  It was fast, covered more than 600 miles in a short period of time, and inflicted 
the maximum damage on the enemy in that time.  In these terms, the Prince’s campaign 
was a typical English chevauchée, and like other campaigns of this type, it rested upon a 
sophisticated and established system of purveyance, recruitment, and transport in 
England, depended upon a mobile supply train that was restocked at regular intervals, and 
relied upon resupply by sea from England when the army remained in France at the 
conclusion of the campaign. 
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Chapter Two: Historiography, Sources, and Methods 
 
This chapter provides a basic survey of the historiographies necessary to this study and 
then moves on to examine the sources available.  The final section outlines the methods 
used.  The historiography section has several parts.  The first covers the recent work on 
military logistics, as this study fits into and draws upon these works.  The second deals 
with the historiography of the Hundred Years War, both general and specific studies.  
The latter include works on broad regions, individual cities, and institutional 
developments, e.g., the administration of English Gascony.  The final sub-section 
addresses the Prince’s campaign itself, including the debate about whether the Prince 
went north or south around Carcassonne, which is significant as it speaks to the Prince’s 
motivations: was he avoiding or seeking battle, particularly during the later stages of the 
campaign?1  The section on sources examines the major types of sources and addresses 
specific problems with each group, e.g., narrative sources.  It also highlights some of the 
most relevant unpublished sources for the Prince’s campaign, such as the financial 
journals of John Henxteworth, the Prince’s cashier during the campaign.  The final 
section, methodology, discusses the basic theories and methods used in subsequent 
chapters, such as Donald Engel’s equation for determining the carrying capacity of a 
military force. 
The Historiographic Tradition 
                                                
1For a summary, see Peter Hoskins, “The Itineraries of the Black Prince’s Chevauchées 
of 1355 and 1356: Observations and Interpretations,” Journal of Medieval Military 
History VII, The Age of the Hundred Years War (2009): 12–37, at 15–17. 
Chapter 2: Historiography, Sources, and Methods 20 
Logistics 
Building a logistical model requires a clear understanding of what, precisely, is meant by 
logistics and, by extension, what elements will be incorporated into the model.  
Therefore, a definition of logistics is needed.  Definitions of logistics, however, are 
complicated, particularly when looking for one that is epistemologically necessary and 
sufficient.  Most military dictionaries define the term as “the organization of moving, 
housing, and supplying troops and equipment” and “logistic support” as “the support that 
encompasses the logistic services, materiel, and transportation required to support” a 
military force.2  Although this is necessary and sufficient, it misrepresents the 
fundamental importance of logistics by referring to it as only one part of military science 
when it undergirds all military action.  Strategy, tactics, and combat techniques depend 
upon the resources available and a society’s ability to allocate and efficiently distribute 
those resources to its military.  The logistical system determines both the capabilities and 
effectiveness of a military force.  Karl von Clausewitz’s definition of military science 
incorporates this.  It is “the totality of those branches of knowledge and those appliances 
of skill occupied with material things,” which includes “the pattern and preparation and 
the mode of using arms, the construction of fortifications and entrenchments, the 
organism of an army, and the mechanism of its movements.”3  Clausewitz’s 
contemporary, A. Jomini, succinctly defines logistics as “the art of moving armies,” 
                                                
2“logistics” The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military (New York: Berkley 
Books, 2001).  “logistic support” The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military 
(New York: Berkley Books, 2001) Oxford Reference Online. 
3Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1976), 
133.  Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), 106–107. 
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limiting the term to “the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy 
and tactics.4 
These nineteenth-century definitions are both descriptive and functional, but they 
are, perhaps, overly general and fail to enumerate those specific elements that must be 
considered when constructing a logistical model for premodern warfare.  Donald Engels, 
Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (1978), is one of the 
modern school of historians to build a logistical model and apply it to an actual 
campaign, particularly the relevant geography and climate.5  Engels, in contrast to the 
expansive definitions above, limits his study to provisioning: “supply is the basis of 
strategy and tactics.”6  Before considering individual campaigns and the logistical 
problems unique to each of them, he presents his basic model based upon the real 
physical needs of men and animals for food and water, the weight of the comestible and 
non-comestible supplies, and the carrying capacity of the supply train.  He also uses this 
information to determine how many pack animals would be needed to carry the grain 
supply.  This equation allows him to account for some climatic and geographic 
differences, especially the availability of fodder and water.7  The application of this basic 
                                                
4A. Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Westport, 1971), 
69.   
5Donald Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army 
(Berkeley, 1978), 4. 
6Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, 2. 
7Ibid, 19–22.   For discussion of Engels’s work in reference to Carolingian warfare along 
rivers, see Charles R. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, and Magyars: The Struggle for the 
Middle Danube, 788–907 (Philadelphia, 1995), 25–30. 
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model to the terrain covered by Alexander the Great’s campaigns reinforces Engel’s early 
claim that planning was absolutely necessary for the efficient provisioning of the army.8   
Although Engels deals with the logistics of ancient warfare, his model has value 
for studying the logistics of medieval warfare.  The physical realities of supplying an 
army remain relatively constant, e.g., pack animals will consume a portion of their 
burden each day.  While his basic model does take water supply and the availability of 
fodder into account, it does not expressly lend itself to analyzing the impact of water 
transport, and it lacks the nuances of Jonathon Roth’s later study (1999).  Roth takes 
Engels’ model and applies it to the Roman army, thereby demonstrating its applicability 
in markedly different terrain.  He agrees that supply affects both strategic and tactical 
decisions and defines logistics as the supply and transport of provisions, i.e., food, fodder 
and firewood, to the army.  Like Engels, Roth considers the needs, resources and 
technology of the Roman army; however, he also explicitly addresses the administrative 
aspects of supplying the legions.9  Roth refines Engels’ calculations, basing his own upon 
the minimum caloric requirements, which are lower than the recommended levels that 
Engels used.  Additionally, he factors in the average age, which affects caloric 
requirements, and size of the soldiers, as well as the importance of nutrition rather than 
simple calories.10  The basic model, however, remains applicable. 
Roth’s analysis begins with the men and animals, but he does not limit his study 
simply to the legions.  He examines the political ramifications of requisition and pillage, 
                                                
8Ibid., 9. 
9Jonathon P. Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 B. C. – A. D. 235) 
(Leiden/Boston, 1999), 2–3.  
10Roth, Logistics of the Roman Army, 7–9. 
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the primary purpose of which is “to strike terror into an enemy.”11  The importance of 
infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and canals, is emphasized, as a state needs “a 
certain level of economic development, technology, infrastructure and administrative 
skill to supply its armies at a distance.”12  Furthermore, he considers logistics not merely 
as a factor influencing decisions but also as a strategic and tactical weapon; cutting off 
the enemy’s water supply, for example, is “the most effective logistical weapon on a 
tactical level.”13  The logistically stronger army also has the ability to postpone battle, as 
an undersupplied army can only grow weaker, further underscoring the importance of 
logistics in warfare, whether premodern or modern.   
Both Roth and Engels have shown the viability of this type of study for the 
Roman and Macedonian armies.  Bernard S. Bachrach has done the same for 
Merovingian and Carolingian warfare; aside from his application of these basic models, 
his work is especially pertinent to this study because it deals explicitly with warfare in 
southern France.14  Additionally, his work considers administration, medieval 
technology, and the logistics of siege warfare.15  Charles Bowlus (1995) also includes 
logistical considerations in his study of Carolingian campaigns against the Magyars, 
                                                
11Ibid., 134, 142, 305.  
12Ibid., 214, 244. 
13Ibid., 279, 307. 
14Bernard S. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire (Philadelphia, 
2001), passim.  Bernard S. Bachrach, “Logistics in pre-Crusade Europe,” in Feeding 
Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present, ed. John A. 
Lynn, 57–78 (Boulder, 1993). 
15Bernard S. Bachrach, “Animals and Warfare in Early Medieval Europe,” in Armies and 
Politics in the Early Medieval West, ed. Bernard S. Bachrach, 708–51 (Aldershot, 1993), 
passim.  Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, passim.  Bernard S. Bachrach, 
“Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff,” The Journal of Military History 66, 
no. 2 (April, 2002): 313–57.   
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although it is not his focus.  Particularly relevant for this project, given the fluviatile 
geography of southern France, are his remarks upon using rivers for resupply, notably 
that this requires not only a ship and a trained crew but also a place to unload supplies 
safely and men to defend it.16 
Unfortunately, there has been little systematic work done on logistics for the later 
Middle Ages, although there are exceptions.  For example, John Haldon has dealt with 
the Byzantine material,17 and David Bachrach has written on both the administrative and 
technological capabilities of medieval armies.18  Yuval Harrari’s 2000 article, “Strategy 
and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion Campaigns,” explicitly 
addresses military logistics.  He supplies a basic model for armies using land, river, and 
sea transport.  While he alludes to specific fourteenth-century campaigns, he does not 
systematically apply his model to any single campaign.19   
Other recent work on fourteenth-century logistics includes Bryce Lyon’s 2003 
article, which addresses the expenses of Edward I and Edward III while campaigning in 
France and Brabant,20 and A. Carr’s 2004 article, “War in Fourteenth-Century Europe,” 
                                                
16Bowlus, Franks, Moravians and Magyars, 27. 
17John F. Haldon, Byzantium at War, AD 600–1453 (New York, 2003), passim.  John F. 
Haldon, The State and the Tributary Mode of Production (London, 1993), passim. 
18David S. Bachrach, “The Military Administration of England: The Royal Artillery 
(1216–1272),” The Journal of Military History 68, no. 4 (Oct., 2004): 1083–1104.  David 
S. Bachrach, “Crossbows for the king: the crossbow during the reigns of John and Henry 
III of England,” Technology and Culture: The International Quarterly of the Society for 
the History of Technology 45, no. 1 (2004): 102–19. 
19Yuval Noah Harari, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European 
Invasion Campaigns,” The Journal of Military History 64, no. 2 (April, 2000): 297–334. 
20Bryce Lyon, “What were the Expenses of Kings Edward I and Edward III When Absent 
from their Realm,” Journal of Medieval History 29, no. 4 (2003): 331–45. 
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which discusses logistics during the Hundred Years.21  Of especial significance is Craig 
Lambert’s book, Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the 
Fourteenth Century (2011).  He focuses on the administration of English sea transport, 
the methods of procuring shipping, and the size of English fleets.  One of the fleets 
Lambert specifically addresses is the one that transported the Black Prince, his troops and 
horses, and their supplies to Gascony in September 1355.22 
The more theoretical aspects, as well as both the difficulties and rewards of 
applying modern theories, such as linear programming, to medieval warfare, are 
addressed in General Issues in the Study of Medieval Logistics: Sources, Problems and 
Methodologies (2006).  Helen Gaffney’s article, “Superiority of numbers: methodologies 
for modeling the behavior of armies,” explores logistical models from a methodological 
standpoint rather than providing a case study of one theory, as the other essays in the 
volume do.23  Strategy is “the art of the possible.”24  By extension, then, it is the result of 
what is logistically possible, particularly in light of two of her comments: armies are 
usually short of money, and foraging will work for only a short period of time.  Her 
description of logistics includes the needs of the force, the available and expected 
                                                
21A. Carr, “War in Fourteenth-Century Europe,” in Power, Violence, and Mass Death in 
Pre-Modern and Modern Times, ed. Joseph Canning, Hartmut Lehmann, and Jay Winter, 
67–89 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). 
22Craig L. Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the 
Fourteenth Century, Warfare in History (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011), esp. 
152–55. 
23Helen Gaffney, “Superiority of numbers: methodologies for modeling the behavior of 
armies,” in General Issues in the Study of Medieval Logistics: Sources, Problems and 
Methodologies, ed. John F. Haldon, 251–72 (Leiden, 2006). 
24Gaffney, “Superiority of numbers,” 253. 
Chapter 2: Historiography, Sources, and Methods 26 
supplies, the organization and administration of the army, and supply, transport, and 
communications.25  
The Hundred Years War 
The historiography of the Hundred Years War can be divided into two general categories.  
There are the synthetic works which present the larger narrative of the war from the 
initial succession crisis in 1328 to the English and Gascon surrender of Bordeaux in 
1453.  Juxtaposed with these broad studies are those that focus more narrowly on a 
specific aspect of the war, e.g., a specific campaign such as that of the Black Prince in 
1355, although accepting the general narratives presented in the surveys.  These broad 
works follow the same general format and are structurally similar.  They begin with a 
description of England and France before the war and then move on to the succession 
crisis before advancing to the war itself.  Of late, however, there has been a shift in 
studies of the Hundred Years War to move beyond France and England.  The most recent 
example of this trend are the volumes edited by Villalon and Kagay, The Hundred Years 
War: A Wider Focus and The Hundred Years War (II): Different Vistas, which are 
collection of essays that examine, for example, the effects of the war in Spain or 
geopolitics.26 
                                                
25Ibid., 253–55. 
26Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew Villalon, eds., The Hundred Years War: A Wider 
Focus (Leiden, 2005).  For the relevant essays, see Donald J. Kagay, “The government 
besieged by conflict: the parliament of Monzón (1362–1363) as military financier,” 117–
50; Maria Teresa Ferrer Mallol, “The southern Valencian frontier during the War of the 
Two Pedros,” 75–116; Clara Estow, “War and peace in medieval Iberia: Castilian-
Granadan relations in the mid-fourteenth century,” 151–75; Sergio Boffa, “The duchy of 
Brabant caught between France and England: geopolitics and diplomacy during the first 
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The classic narrative history of the Hundred Years War remains Edouard Perroy’s 
La guerre de cent ans (1945).27  Notably, he rejects what was then the contemporary 
textbook explanation of the war’s cause: a dynastic quarrel.  Rather, Perroy finds the 
roots of the conflict in the struggles of the French and English kings for control of 
Gascony and describes the war as “a conflict feudal in its origin.”28  There is no question 
that Gascony, and the difficulties presented by Edward III’s unique status as both king of 
England and duke of Gascony, is among the central causes of the Hundred Years War, 
but perhaps it would be better to characterize the conflict in terms of seigniorial rights 
and sovereignty rather than feudalism.  Additionally, it is, at times, difficult to resist 
reading Perroy’s personal experiences into his narrative, particularly as he wrote much of 
his account of France as an occupied country while evading the Gestapo in German-
occupied France.29 
Among the studies that embrace a broad scope are the more recent works of 
Christopher Allmand30 and Jonathon Sumption,31 both of which rely upon Perroy for the 
narrative of the war and accept his general interpretations of the causes and events.  
                                                                                                                                            
half of the Hundred Years War,” 211–40.  Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon, 
eds., The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas (Leiden/Boston, 2008). 
27Edouard Perroy, La guerre de cent ans (Paris, 1945).  Edouard Perroy, The Hundred 
Years War, trans. W. B. Wells (Oxford, 1951). 
28Perroy, The Hundred Years War, 69. 
29Perroy, The Hundred Years War, xxvii.  This is also the likely reason for the lack of 
notes and real bibliography. 
30Christopher T. Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War, c. 
1300–c. 1450 (Cambridge, 1988). 
31Jonathon Sumption, Trial by Battle; Trial by Fire; Divided Houses (Philadelphia, 2009).  
These three volumes cover the Hundred Years War to 1399.  If the remaining volumes 
are equally detailed, his history of the war will be, if not the definitive narrative, certainly 
the most extensive. 
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Allmand also finds the origins of national identities in the war.32  The other important 
general history of the Hundred Years War is Alfred Higgins Burne’s two-volume military 
history.33  The first volume in particular is relevant because he chooses to consider 
Edward III’s campaigns of 1337 to 1360 as a unit and focuses on campaign strategy and 
battlefield tactics, although he fails to locate adequately the war in its political, social, 
and economic contexts.  His periodization is important when examining the Black 
Prince’s expedition of 1355 as part of Edward III’s larger military policy. 
Since the publication of Perroy’s work in 1945 and its English translation in 1951, 
works related to the war have proliferated.  One area that has received significant 
attention is the administration of society, particularly a society at war, and military 
service.  Works on England include those of Michael Prestwich (1996),34 A. Ayton 
(1994),35 and Herbert James Hewitt (1966).36  Among the scholars focusing on France 
are Jacques Miquel (1981),37 Philippe Contamine (1972),38 and John Bell Henneman 
                                                
32Brian G. H. Ditcham, “Mutton guzzlers and wine bags: foreign soldiers and native 
reactions in fifteenth-century France,” in Power, Culture and Religion in France c. 1350–
c. 1550, ed. Christopher T. Allmand, 1–13 (Woodbridge, 1989). 
33Alfred Higgins Burne, The Crécy War: A Military History of the Hundred Years War 
from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360 (London, 1955); idem, The Agincourt War: A 
Military History of the Latter part of the Hundred Years War from 1369 to 1453 
(Westport, 1976). 
34Michael Prestwich, Armies and warfare in the Middle Ages: The English experience 
(New Haven, 1996); Plantagenet England, 1225–1360 (Oxford, 2007, 2005); The Three 
Edwards: War and State in England, 1272–1377 (New York, 1980); War, Politics and 
Finance under Edward I (London, 1972).  
35A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military service and the English Aristocracy under 
Edward III (Woodbridge, 1994). 
36Herbert James Hewitt, The Organization of War under Edward III (Manchester, 1966). 
37Jacques Miquel, L’architecture militaire dans le Rouergue au Moyen Age et 
l’organisation de la défense (Rodez, 1981). 
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(1971, 1976).39  Directly related to these works are studies of military demography, such 
as those done by Bernard S. Bachrach.40  Although these focus on an earlier period, they 
are useful for the method of determining the order of magnitude of a medieval army.  
More pertinent, perhaps, to the Hundred Years War is Claudine Billot’s article on 
mercenaries as migrants.41  Additionally, there are recent articles on the recruitment of 
the armies.  For example, Bertrand Schnerb looks at the changing structure of the French 
army following the defeat at Crécy (1346),42 and Neil Jamieson has examined recruitment 
practices in northern England, albeit for a slightly later period.43  The two most recent 
studies on the medieval English soldier are The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth 
Century (2011), edited by Adrian Bell and Anne Curry,44 and The Soldier in Later 
                                                                                                                                            
38Philippe Contamine, Guerre, état et société à la fin du moyen age. Étude sur les armées 
des rois de France, 1337–1494 (Paris, 1972). 
39John Bell Henneman, Royal Taxation in Fourteenth Century France: The Development 
of War Financing, 1322–1376 (Princeton, 1971); idem, Royal Taxation in Fourteenth 
Century France: The Captivity and Ransom of John II (Philadelphia, 1976). 
40Bernard S. Bachrach, “Early medieval military demography: some observations on the 
methods of Hans Delbrüch,” in The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on 
Medieval Military and Naval History, eds. Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon, 3–
20 (Woodbridge, 1999); idem, “The siege of Antioch: a study in military demography,” 
War in History 6, no. 2 (1999): 127–46. 
41Claudine Billot, “Les mercenaires étrangers pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans comme 
migrants,” in Le Combattant au Moyen Age, 2nd edn., 279–86 (Paris, 1995). 
42Bertrand Schnerb, “Vassals, allies and mercenaries: the French army before and after 
1346,” in The Battle of Crécy, 1346, ed. Andrew Ayton and Philip Preston, 265–72 
(Woodbridge, 2005). 
43Neil Jamieson, “The recruitment of Northerners for service in English armies in France, 
1415–50,” in Trade, Devotion and Governance: Papers in Later Medieval History, ed. 
Dorothy J. Clayton, Richard G. Davies, and Peter McNiven, 102–15 (Stroud, 1994). 
44Adrian R. Bell and Anne Curry, eds., The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century 
(Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011). 
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Medieval England (2013).45  The latter draws extensively on the The Soldier in Later 
Medieval England, a multi-year project funded by the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (UK). 
Works on military demography depend, in part, upon larger studies of 
demography.  This is particularly relevant to this project, as the expedition of 1355 had to 
draw upon a population depleted by the Black Death.  Lawrence Poos has conducted a 
demographic study of Essex in the wake of the plague, in which he delineates the socio-
economic relationships of the population, relying mostly upon quantitative data.46  
Among the works on the demography of France are Edouard Baratier’s La démographie 
provençale du XIIIe au XVIe siècle (1961) and Jacques Dupaquier’s Histoire de la 
population française (1988).47 
There are regional studies of the relationship between the French crown and the 
French peers, particularly in regards to the Low Countries, Brittany, Burgundy, and 
Gascony.  The general narrative in these works is one of a struggle for independence 
from the French kingdom and state formation.  Two recent titles reflect this trend in the 
scholarship of the Low Countries: Samuel Kohn’s Lust for Liberty: The Politics of Social 
Revolt in medieval Europe, 1200–1450: France, Italy and Flanders (2006) and Jean-
                                                
45Adrian Bell, Anne Curry, Andy King, and David Simpkin, The Soldier in Later 
Medieval England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
46Lawrence Poos, A Rural Society after the Black Death: Essex, 1350–1525 (Cambridge, 
1991), passim. 
47Edouard Baratier, La démographie provençale du XIIIe au XVIe siècle, avec chiffres de 
comparaison pour la XVIII siècle (Paris, 1961).  Jacques Dupaquier, Histoire de la 
population française, i, Des origines a la renaissance (Paris, 1988). 
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François Nieus’s Un pouvior comtal entre Flandre and France (2005).48  Michael Jones 
has explored Breton history as a process of state formation during the later Middle Ages, 
although the earlier work of M. Armand Rébillon suggests a history of support for the 
central government.49  For Burgundy, the focus is very much upon the formation of the 
duchy.  The classic work is Jean Richard’s Les ducs de Bourgogne et la formation du 
Duché du XI au XIV siècle (1954), and Bert Lambert’s recent work, The City, the Duke 
and their Banker: the Rapondi Family and the Formation of the Burgundian State (2006), 
continues this theme.  Even Richard Vaughn’s biography of Philip the Bold (1962) 
focuses upon state formation.50   
Especially relevant for this project are the works on Gascony.  As with the Low 
Countries, Brittany, and Burgundy there has been attention drawn to the relationship of 
Gascony with the French crown, but there is little discussion of Gascony as a late 
medieval state.  Both these areas have been overshadowed by the uniqueness of Gascony 
as a duchy held by the English king, and this relationship has often dominated works on 
                                                
48Samuel Kline Kohn, Lust for Liberty: the politics of social revolt in medieval Europe, 
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pouvoir comtal entre Flandre et France: St. Pol, 1000–1300 (Brussels, 2005). 
49John Bell Henneman, Olivier de Clisson and political society in France under Charles 
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Gascony.  For example, Eleanor Constance Lodge published her Gascony under English 
Rule in 1926; nearly sixty years later Margaret Wage Labarge produced Gascony, 
England’s First Colony.  Nor is the English-Gascon connection of interest only in the 
Hundred Years War, as Jean-Paul Trabut-Cussac’s work, published posthumously and 
unfortunately incomplete, on the English administration of Gascony under Henry III and 
Edward I is fundamental for understanding the duchy’s role in the Black Prince’s 
logistics, particularly for the discussions of centralization and the origin and roles of the 
duchy’s permanent officers.51   
There are also economic works dealing with the Hundred Years War.  The 
original work is that of Shulyer B. Terry, Financing the Hundred Years War (1914).  It 
presents a somewhat Marxist interpretation, i.e., the Hundred Years War is the period of 
transition from the feudal to national economy with a system of taxation and the rise of 
the merchant class, and the successful picture he suggests lays the groundwork for later 
debate regarding the costs of the war.  This is most clearly expressed in the 1962 and 
1964 articles of K. B. McFarlane (“War, the Economy and Social Change”) and M. M. 
Postan (“The Costs of the Hundred Years War”), respectively, in Past and Present.  
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McFarlane holds the position that England profited from the war, but Postan, while 
agreeing that perhaps certain individuals profited, argues that England as a kingdom 
suffered economically, albeit not as severely as France.  Other economic histories have 
focused more narrowly, such as Christopher D. Turgeon’s thesis (2000) on the Anglo-
Gascon wine trade.52   
There have been social and cultural surveys, such as Denise Baker’s Inscribing 
the Hundred Years’ War in French and English Cultures.53  Women other than Joan of 
Arc, e.g., Jeanne de Montfort, also had significant military roles, particularly in terms of 
defending towns and cities.  James Gilbert’s essay in The Hundred Years War: A Wider 
Focus (2005) specifically addresses the importance of women in defense and in 
perserving supplies, which shows women as more than victims of violence.54  Nor should 
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27 (Apr., 1964): 34–53.  E. B. Fryde, The Wool Accounts of William de la Pole: a study 
of some aspects of the English wool trade at the start of the Hundred Years War (York, 
1964).  K. B. McFarlane, “War, the Economy and Social Change,” Past and Present 22 
(Jul., 1962), 3–18. 
53Denise Nowakowski Baker, Inscribing the Hundred Years’ War in French and English 
Cultures (Albany, 2000). 
54Aline S. Taylor, Isabel of Burgundy: the duchess who played politics in the age of Joan 
of Arc, 1397–1471 (Lanham, 2001).  Monique Sommé, Isabelle de Portugual, duchesse 
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southern England during the Hundred Years War,” in The Hundred Years War: A Wider 
Focus, ed. L. J. Andrew Villalon and Donald J. Kagay, 489–507 (Leiden, 2005).  Jean 
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the numerous biographies of the major actors, such as Charles V,55 and minor figures like 
William de la Pole, be overlooked.56  The studies on the Black Prince, himself, and a 
number of his advisors are discussed below. 
In addition to these are the studies that examine walled towns as independent 
military actors, such as Paul Solon’s 2005 essay on Toulouse, which does discuss the 
Black Prince’s actions at Toulouse in some detail.  The walled town is of especial 
relevance to understanding the prince’s logistics because he had to account for fortified 
towns and their role in French logistics.  The articles of Philippe Lardin, “Le financemant 
des fortifications en Normandie orientale à la fin du Moyen Age” (1996), is useful for 
understanding the relationship of building fortifications and the fisc, if only for 
comparative purposes.  It should also be remembered that the Duke of Lancaster was 
leading another English force through Normandy and would have had to face walled 
cities.57         
                                                                                                                                            
Verdon, “La femme et la violence en Poitou pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans d’après les 
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Perspective, ed. James D. Tracy, 88–116 (Cambridge, 2000).  Josiane Treyssot, “Les 
villes d’Auvergne pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans,” in La Guerre, la violence et les gens 
au Moyen Age, II: Guerre et gens, ed. Philippe Contamine and Olivier Guyotjeannin, 49–
57 (Paris, 1996).  Philippe Lardin, “Le financement des fortifications en Normandie 
orientale à la fin du Moyen Age,” in Les Normands et le fisc: XXIXème Congrès des 
Sociétés Historiques et Archéologiques de Normandie, Elbeuf-sur-Seine, 20–23 octobre 
1994, 47–58 (Elbeuuf-sur-Seine, 1996).  Michael Wolfe, “Siege warfare and the Bonnes 
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There have also been studies of mercenaries more closely related to the military 
action of the Hundred Years War, such as William Caferro’s work on John Hawkwood 
and the White Company.58  Of particular importance to a logistical study of the Hundred 
Years War are works on military technology.  The longbow has received attention, as has 
the possible role of gunpowder and canons in late medieval warfare.59  More recently, 
maritime technology has been examined.  As Bachrach’s article on William the 
Conqueror makes clear, any army wishing to cross the English Channel with their horses 
had to possess, borrow, or develop the proper naval technology.60  There also is the work 
                                                                                                                                            
Villes of France during the Hundred Years War,” in The Medieval City under Siege, ed. 
Ivy A. Corfis and Michael Wolfe, 49–66 (Woodbridge, 1995).  Jacques Gardelles, Les 
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in England, Wales and Gascony (New York, 1967). 
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battle of Crécy,” in The Battle of Crécy, 1346, ed. Andrew Ayton and Philip Preston, 
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redefinition of «effectiveness» in premodern military technology,” War in History 4, no. 
4 (1997): 454–70.  Kelly DeVries, “The impact of gunpowder weaponry on siege warfare 
in the Hundred Years War,” in The Medieval City under Siege, ed. Ivy A. Corfis and 
Michael Wolfe, 227–44 (Woodbridge, 1995). 
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War,” in War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, ed. John B. Hattendorf and 
Richard W. Unger, 53–67 (Woodbridge, 2003).  Francis Davey, “What happened to the 
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of John Pryor on ships and naval warfare,61 and, as is discussed above, Craig Lambert’s 
book on English maritime logistics places the transport of English troops during the 
Hundred Years war squarely into this tradition of cross-Channel campaigning. 
The Prince’s Campaign 
Most relevant to this project are the studies dealing with the individual campaign.  First 
among these studies is Herbert James Hewitt’s The Black Prince’s Expedition of 1355–
1357.62  While he addresses the question of supply, his focus when dealing with the 
preparations is upon the indentures and recruitment, and the discussion is, perhaps, too 
narrowly focused on Cheshire, particularly in regards to recruitment, which are important 
for his discussions of military demography and the structure of the prince’s army.  
Hewitt’s study is also more qualitative than quantitative, and the latter approach, while 
still incorporating qualitative evidence, would serve to illustrate more concretely the 
sheer volume of economic and human resources designated for military consumption.  A 
possibly more serious shortcoming is his uncritical reliance upon Froissart and the other 
chroniclers, who, as discussed below, need to be read critically with an eye to their 
personal agendas, rhetoric, and literary style, and checked by Sachkritik, the use of the 
material evidence to critique the written sources.  Since the publication of his book, there 
have also been numerous studies of both Cheshire and military recruitment that 
                                                
61John Pryor, Commerce, shipping and naval warfare in the medieval Mediterranean 
(London, 1987).  John Pryor, Geography, technology, and war: studies in the maritime 
history of the Mediterranean, 649–1571 (Cambridge, 1987). 
62Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition. 
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supplement his work.63  Furthermore, specific questions of supply and military logistics, 
discussed more fully above, have begun to be asked only in the last decade.64   
The Black Prince’s 1355 campaign has been the subject of renewed interest, as 
two recent pieces in the Journal of Medieval Military History: VII. The Age of the 
Hundred Years War, and the Black Prince has been the subject of new biographies and 
studies of how the Prince exercised power, such as David Green’s Edward the Black 
Prince: Power in Medieval Europe (Harlow, 2007).  Peter Hoskin’s article, “The 
Itineraries of the Black Prince’s Chevauchées of 1355 and 1356: Observations and 
Interpretations,” is among the most recent works on this campaign, and he uses the 
itineraries provided by Geoffrey the Baker and Thomas of Malmesbury to “shed light on 
the nature of the operations” and “resolve differing views of the conduct of the prince’s 
campaign.”65  He focuses on the route between 13 and 15 November and the dispute as to 
whether the Prince and his army passed north or south of Carcassonne, which is 
significant as this choice speaks to the Prince’s intentions: avoiding battle or pursuing the 
French with the purpose of seeking battle.  Hewitt, as well as four French historians of 
                                                
63For example Philip Morgan, War and Society in Medieval Cheshire, 1277–1403 
(Manchester, 1987).  Paul Howson and Willson Booth, The Financial Administration of 
the Lordship and County of Chester, 1272–1377 (Manchester, 1981).  Philip Morgan, 
“Cheshire and the Defense of Aquitaine,” Transactions of the Historical Society of 
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64Specifically for the Hundred Years War, see Yuval Noah Harari, “Strategy and supply 
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the campaign—Henry Mullot and Joseph Poux,66 J.F. Jeanjean,67 and Tourneur-Aumont68 
all argue for the northern route and battle avoidance, but Clifford Rogers makes a case for 
the southern route and pursuit of the French.69  Hoskins convincingly argues for the 
southern route based not only on toponymy and topography but also on the letters of the 
Prince and John de Wengefeld and “an assessment of time and distance.”70  His book, In 
the Steps of the Black Prince: The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356, builds on his previous 
article and relies on his personal experience walking the campaign route, primarily 
following the itinerary laid out in Geoffrey the Baker’s chronicle (discussed below).71 
Another area in which there has been renewed interest is in recruiting and 
accounting (see the works by Bell and Curry above).  Nicholas Gribit argues that 1337–
1360 was a “period of transition in terms of the methods of recruitment used and the 
means by which they were administered.”72  It is particularly difficult during the early 
years of the war to determine payments to individual soldiers, especially on an expedition 
not led by the king, and the indenture system was a response that allowed multiple 
English armies to campaign in France simultaneously.  The accounts of James Audley’s 
contingent that served with Henry of Grosmont (later Duke of Lancaster) in Gascony in 
1345 shows that this was “a fully contract army.”  It is also clear that experienced 
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travers les pays de l’Aude (Toulouse, 1909), 14 
67Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans, 42 
68J.M. Tourneur-Aumont, La Bataille de Poitiers (Paris, 1940), 85–87 
69Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 310, 318. 
70Hoskins, “Itineraries of the Black Prince,” 22. 
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Heighley,” Journal of Medieval Military History VII, The Age of the Hundred Years War 
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professional administrators would be needed, and Gribit argues that administrative 
pressures “may have acted as a catalyst and added impetus towards the use of indentures 
as the normal method of recruitment from 1356.”73  The Black Prince’s campaign of 
1355–1356, then, was part of this shift to the indenture system. 
One significant lacuna in the American, English, and French historiography of the 
Hundred Years War is a general unawareness of the German scholarship.  Some of it is 
admittedly dated; for example, Wolf Stechele published England und der Niederreihn bei 
beginn der regierung Eduards III. (1327–1337) at the beginning of the twentieth 
century.74  Helmuth Weiss’s study of French relations with the Rhineland has a similarly 
early date.75  However, there are more recent works, such as Angelika Heinricks’s work 
(2004) on Duke Raynauld II and his role in the English alliances with the Holy Roman 
Empire and Georg Jäger’s examination (1981) of Froissart’s depictions of the war and 
knighthood.76  Additionally, there are German historians that deal with war more 
generally, such as Hans Delbrück in Geschichte des Kriegskunst in Rahmen der 
politischen Geschichte.77  The works of Marcus Junkelmann should also not be 
overlooked because, even though the focus is mostly upon the Roman military, they 
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Chapter 2: Historiography, Sources, and Methods 40 
address the physical capabilities of the soldiers.78  Sumption’s work has clearly benefited 
from the proliferation of work on the myriad aspects of the war, as his wide-ranging and 
detailed narrative, extensive notes, and bibliography can attest; however, he includes but 
one German title in his bibliography of scholarly works,79 and his basic interpretation of 
events remains markedly similar to Perroy’s.  Nor has he availed himself to the recent 
work on military logistics.  
Sources 
A study of the military logistics of the Hundred Years War has to draw creatively on a 
wide variety of sources.  These fall into three broad types: narrative and literary sources, 
record sources, and archaeological evidence.  Included among the narrative sources are 
the numerous chronicles, such as the Anonimalle Chronicle and the Chronique des 
quartre premiers Valois.80  Works like Robert of Avesbury’s De gestis mirabilibus regis 
Edwardi tertii would also be included under narrative sources.81  Literary sources include 
such works as Christine de Pizan’s Le livre des fais et bonnes meurs du sage roy Charles 
V,82 as well as contemporary poems, such as the Chandos Herald’s French poem, La vie 
du Prince Noir.83  The chronicles provide the narrative of events and specific 
interpretations of them, and they describe the general context in which to interpret the 
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record sources.  The potential difficulties inherent in using the chronicles are the remove 
at which most of the authors write, the impact of rhetoric, and their personal agendas.  
For example, Geoffrey the Baker, the principal chronicler of this campaign, wrote at a 
certain distance.  It is unlikely he served personally; thus, he had to rely upon a campaign 
diary and the reports of others who may or may not have actually been in Gascony in 
1355 and 1356 and who would have had their own purposes in speaking with the 
chronicler.  Baker had connections to the earl of Warwick’s household, and his chronicle 
gives significant attention to the earl and the movements of the column he commanded.  
Moreover, while Baker does an admirable job reporting the events of 1355, his style 
changes for the 1356 campaign.  Suddenly, the Prince of Wales and the French king 
make grand speeches on the eve of battle; yet even in the more quotidian narrative for 
1355 there are a few dramatic gestures and declamations, such as the Prince’s statement 
that he came "not for gold but for justice, not to sell but to take cities."84  While the 
Prince did, indeed, refuse to accept a ransom to spare Carcassonne, these words are likely 
Baker’s invention. 
 The literary sources, e.g., the works of Christine de Pizan and the Chandos 
Herald, which make no claim to historicity, are also useful for the descriptions of settings 
and for contemporary attitudes toward events, but author and authorial intent need to be 
remembered.   
The record sources can be further divided and sub-divided into national and 
municipal records; the strength of these sources is that they are more quantitative in 
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focus, which allows for the gleaning of the data necessary for a logistical study.  
However, they are sometimes incomplete, and the records do not necessarily include the 
information being sought. 
Narrative Sources   
The most well known of the chroniclers is Jean Froissart.85  Given how often his work is 
cited, it is especially important to treat his works with caution and subject his writings to 
rigorous criticism, using both the record sources and Sachkritik.  Peter Ainsworth, Jean 
Froissart and the Fabric of History: Truth, Myth, and Fiction in the Chroniques (1990), 
is among the most recent critical work in English decoding Froissart to re-evaluate 
Froissart’s value as an historian.86  He fits into a growing corpus of literature that has 
moved away from Johan Huizinga’s summation of Froissart’s reliability, namely that 
“Froissart, himself the author of a super romantic epic of chivalry, Méliador, narrates [in 
the Chroniques] endless treasons and cruelties without being aware of the contradictions 
between his general conceptions and the contents of his narrative.”87  Ainsworth, in his 
book, has outlined a useful critical method for reading Froissart; he recommends, first, 
that Froissart must be understood as working within the romance tradition, one feature of 
                                                
85Jean Froissart, Chroniques, ed. George T. Diller (Geneva, 1991–1998) is the most 
recent edition.  For an English translation see Jean Froissart, The Chronicle of Froissart, 
trans. John Bourchier, Lord Berners (New York, 1967).  Idem, Oeuvres de Froissart, ed. 
Joseph Marie Bruno Constantin Kervyn de Lettehove, Baron, and Auguste Scheler 
(Brussels, 1867–77.  
86Peter F. Ainsworth, Jean Froissart and the fabric of history: truth, myth, and fiction in 
the Chroniques (Oxford, 1990). 
87Johan Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life (London, 
1924), 56–57.  More nuanced accounts of Froissart can be found in George T. Diller, 
Attitudes chevaleresque et réalitées politques chez Froissart (Geneva, 1984) and John 
Palmer, ed., Froissart: Historian (Woodbridge, 1981). 
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which is the blurring of the line between history and fiction.  Ainsworth also notes 
Froissart’s efforts “to provide moral exempla.”88  In addition to placing Froissart within 
an historiographic context, Ainsworth delineates the distinctive features of Froissart’s 
writing: he was a poet, and portions of the text can be read alternatively as narrative 
history, exempla, or romance, making his text literary in ways that other chronicles, such 
as those of Jean le Bel, were not.89  He follows this with an examination of the 
relationship between history and ideology in the fourteenth century and the chronicler’s 
relationship with contemporary institutions and ideas and subjects the Chroniques to 
philological and literary criticisms to understand Froissart’s methods, such as including 
himself as a participant.   
There are a few major chronicles that detail the Black Prince’s campaign, as well 
as several smaller snippets that appear in other chronicles.  The most important of these 
chronicles is Geoffrey le Baker’s Chronicon.  It is possible that, given the day-to-day 
account he provides, he may have had access to an eyewitness,90 and Hoskins’s work 
demonstrates the accuracy of Baker’s chronicle.  The manuscript (Bodley 761) dates to c. 
1400, so the extant copy, if not the original, was written roughly fifty years after the 
events it describes with regards to the Black Prince’s campaigns.  Barber’s Life and 
                                                
88Ainsworth, Jean Froissart, 6, 23–31. 
89Ibid., 46–50. 
90Barber, Life and Times, 41. Caille, “Nouveaux Regards,” 90. M. L. de Santi, 
“L’expedition du Prince Noir en 1355, d’après le journal d’un de ses compagnons,” 
Memoires de l’Academie des Sciences, Inscriptions, et Belles-Lettres de Toulouse, series 
10, vol. 4 (1904): 181–223. 
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Times of the Black Prince suggests that Baker was writing about 1357–1360, which 
would make him a contemporary of the events.91   
Giles’ preface identifies Baker as a monastic writer, most likely from Swinbroke, 
as his name, Geoffrey le Baker of Swynbroke, suggests, in Oxfordshire, and there is 
widespread agreement on this point.92  Barber agrees with this, and moreover suggests 
that Baker had contacts in high places, although instead of quoting documents, as Adam 
Murmimuth and Robert of Avesbury do, Baker tends to re-write them.  Barber does 
suggest the changes “consist largely of questions of style” with “a fondness for rhetoric at 
moments of high drama.”93  There is a large difference, for example, in Baker’s account 
of the Battle of Poitiers (1356) and the campaign of the previous year.  Barber suggests 
that “the dry, terse narrative of the day’s marches of the 1335 campaign” indicates that 
Baker “is clearly using a campaign diary.”94  This section of the Chronicon is distinct 
from the rest of Baker’s writings; it details the daily marches, as Baker writes “in order to 
make these matters clearer, it will be of interest to put in the individual day’s marches of 
the prince in Narbonnese France.”95  Rogers concurs with Barber’s assessment, namely 
that Baker had access to a campaign diary,96 which is no longer extant. 
Baker’s account of Poitiers, according to Barber, represents an eyewitness 
account, most likely from a soldier serving with the earl of Warwick.  Baker does put 
                                                
91Barber, Life and Times, 41. 
92Baker, Chronicon, vii–ix. 
93Barber, Life and Times, 41. 
94Ibid.  A campaign diary is extant for 1356 in the Malmesbury chronicle; however, 
Baker does not use this; his account of the campaign through the Loire is rather general.  
95Baker, Chronicon, 226–27. 
96Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 317–18. 
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words in the Prince’s mouth, the spirit of which Livy’s Cloelia and Scaevola would 
recognize, but such rhetorical flights are absent from the account of 1355.97  That said, 
Jacqueline Caille’s article, “Nouveaux regards sur l’attaque du Prince Noir contre 
Narbonne en Novembre 1355,” and use of French sources does show that Baker is, 
despite his occasional high rhetoric, accurate in his description of Narbonne.98 
The manuscript presents a particular difficulty, and that is the ability, or lack 
thereof, of the copyist.  Giles describes the manuscript as “one of the worst written and 
most unsatisfactory volumes that they have ever tried to decipher.”99  This is most clear 
in the issue of proper names, which becomes significant when attempting to plot the 
Prince’s itinerary, as more than one reading is possible. 
The Brut continuations in Corpus Christi College Oxford MS78, which may be 
derived from William Pakington, treasurer of the Black Prince’s household in Gascony 
during the 1360s, provides a brief description of the 1355 and 1356 campaigns.  This 
account in French, according to Clifford Rogers, “certainly appears to be based on 
eyewitness accounts” and describes how the Prince presented himself and established his 
claims to authority in Gascony.  It further gives details of the council meeting prior to the 
Battle of Poitiers (1356).100 
                                                
97Barber, Life and Times, 60–61; Baker, Chronicon, passim. 
98Caille, “Nouveaux regards.” 
99Baker, Chronicon, x. 
100Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS 78, edited and reproduced in Clifford J. Rogers, 
“The Black Prince in Gascony and France (1355–1357), According to MS7 of Corpus 
Christi College, Oxford,” Journal of Medieval Military History VII, The Age of the 
Hundred Years War (2009): 168–76. 
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Several campaign letters are extant, including two from the Prince himself.  There 
are also letters from the Prince’s steward, Sir John Wengefeld.  With some exceptions, 
these letters, addressed for the most part to the Bishop of Winchester, head of the 
Prince’s council in England, were public and would have been circulated.  It is no 
accident that the return to Bordeaux is depicted in terms of pursuing French forces when 
it is just as much a prudent retreat.101  Although the letters are not as openly 
propagandistic in tone as those sent during and following the Crécy campaign, that 
element is still present in the public letters.  One of Wengefeld’s letters, though, is more 
private in nature and addressed to Sir Richard Stafford, a member of the Prince’s forces 
who had returned to London to obtain reinforcements.102 
The French chronicles deal with the 1355 campaign in only the most cursory 
manner.  Indeed the Prince’s presence in Gascony appears to be of little note until the 
following year, when naturally the capture of Jean II merited significant attention. 
The literary sources, while they can be treated in a broadly similar manner, 
require a somewhat different approach.  Like the narrative sources, the literary and 
rhetorical techniques of the author need to be acknowledged, as well as personal 
idiosyncrasies and leanings, when using them as evidence.  It is certainly important that 
Sir John Chandos, the patron of the Chandos Herald, author of La vie du Prince Noir, 
was one of the Black Prince’s officers during the campaign of 1355.   
Unpublished Documentary Sources: England 
                                                
101Barber, Life and Times, 49.  For a further discussion of the return to Bordeaux see 
Chapter Six, as one of the debates about this campaign deals specifically with the route 
and what that indicates about the Prince’s motives. 
102Barber, Life and Times, 49. 
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The unpublished documentary sources for England include the Exchequer Accounts, 
Chancery records, and Close and Patent Rolls.  Within the records of the Exchequer are 
diplomatic documents,103 treasury books,104 Pipe and Issue Rolls,105 wardrobe accounts, 
Nuncii, and ordnance documents.106   
The Pipe Rolls are extant from the reign of Henry II (1133–1189), with few 
breaks and are the first source for financial information.  Additional records of the royal 
finances include the Fine Rolls, enrolled annually since John’s reign; Originalia Rolls, the 
Chancery list for the Exchequer of the debts in need of collection; Receipt Rolls, which 
the Exchequer used to record additional income; and Memoranda Rolls.  The wardrobe 
accounts, as well as the debentures, provide useful information on the financing of 
diplomatic and military policy.107  Included among the Chancery documents held at the 
National Archive at Kew are the Gascon Rolls for 1347–1369,108 Treaty Rolls,109 the 
Chancery Warrants,110 and council and parliamentary proceedings.111  
                                                
103Exchequer, E30 Diplomatic Documents. 
104Exchequer, E36/79 Treasury Books. 
105Exchequer, E372/193–212 Pipe Rolls [enrolled accounts] [1347–1368].  Exchequer, 
E403/341–438 Issue Rolls [1348–1370]. 
106Exchequer, E361 Wardrobe Accounts [1257–1548].  Exchequer, E101/312/27-
101/315/40: Nuncii [messengers and diplomatic agents] [1348–1370].  Exchequer, 
E101/25/29–101/29/40, 101/35/1–30, 101/531/36 Army, Navy and Ordnance [1347–
1370]. 
107For the introductory information see Bryce Lyon, A Constitutional and Legal History 
of Medieval England, 2nd edition (New York, 1980), 220–21, 475–77. 
108Chancery, C61/59–82 Gascon Rolls [1347–1369]. 
109Chancery, C76/25–52 Treaty (formerly French) Rolls [1347–1369]. 
110Chancery, C81/325–413 Chancery Warrants [1347-1369]. 
111Chancery, C49/46 Council and Parliamentary Proceedings. 
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The account book of John Henxteworth, the Black Prince’s cashier, is also extant 
in the Duchy of Cornwall Office.112  Little is known about Henxteworth himself; he was 
part of the Prince’s household staff and accompanied the 1355 campaign to Gascony.113  
Most of his work occurs before and at the end of the campaign, although he does make 
payments during the march.114  He is meticulous and precise, and the accounts suggest 
that he was an able cashier and likely a professional administrator, and his journal reflects 
the pace of the campaign: a flurry of activity prior to the army’s departure (e.g., payments 
for the carriage of wheat to St. Macaire, an advance supply depot) and upon the return to 
Bordeaux (shoeing of horses, in particular) and a relatively slower pace during the 
campaign.  His accounts provide detailed information on wages, the cost of horse 
shoeing, the amount of wax purchased (for example, 6£ 13s 4d on 27 September and a 
75s advance on the price of 450lbs of wax candles on 4 October),115 and the Prince’s 
gambling debts (60s on 20 September related to a dice game).116  Henxteworth, in 
addition to details about wages, also records payments for victuals, herbage, carriage of 
equipment, and some of the Prince’s personal purchases, such as 10s paid as an advance 
to William Stratton, the Prince’s tailor, for three pieces of rayed cloth on 4 October.117 
Despite all these details, Henxteworth’s journal does have several important 
lacunae.  First, he only provides the sums paid in wages with no indication as to the 
period for which the wages were paid; he rarely gives figures for how wages of archers 
                                                
112London, Duchy of Cornwall Office, Account of John Henxteworth. 
113Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 23. 
114DCO, Henxteworth accounts, passim. 
115DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 27 September and 4 October. 
116DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 20 September. 
117DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 4 October. 
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and grooms were calculated, or even to indicate how many were drawing pay from the 
same sum.  Second, although Henxteworth records his sums in sterling, he used several 
different types French specie, particularly at the close of 1355 and in early 1356.  
According to Hewitt, one leopard was worth 4s 6d at the beginning and close of the 
journal (Henxteworth dutifully notes a temporary change in value in May 1356).118  
Third, Henxteworth, with a few exceptions, deals almost exclusively with men serving in 
the Prince’s company, which means that the men serving under the earls rarely appear.  
The fourth blank is that, in spite of his meticulous nature, Henxteworth records payments 
for goods and services and does not always record the payee, so it is unclear in these 
instances if the payee is English or Gascon.119  Despite these qualifications, however, 
Henxteworth’s journal remains a valuable source for the Prince’s campaign and military 
finance.120 
Henxteworth also often references a book of memoranda, which has yet to be 
identified with any extant source and may not survive.  Based on the entries in the 
accounting journal, this book of memoranda records specifics about wages and 
indentures.121 
Published Documentary Sources: England 
                                                
118DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for May 1356.  Hewitt, The Black Prince’s 
Expedition, 84. 
119DCO, Henxteworth accounts, passim.  Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 195. 
120Hewitt, however, thinks the journal “has limited value as a source for the study of 
army finance.” The Black Prince’s Expedition, 82. 
121DCO, Henxteworth accounts, throughout. 
Chapter 2: Historiography, Sources, and Methods 50 
The published English record sources include the Black Prince’s register, which contains 
copies and translations of his instructions to his subordinates,122 Anglo-Norman Letters 
and Petitions,123 the Calendars of Close Rolls, Patent Rolls, Fine Rolls, and Letter Books 
of the City of London.124  The letter books, while perhaps more useful for studies of 
London or guilds, contain information that relates to military and logistic concerns: For 
example, there is a “writ to the Sheriffs to make proclamation against the [unauthorized] 
exportation of bows or arrows” in 1357 and another in 1369, which also forbids the 
exporting of grain, gold and silver in addition to the bows and arrows.125  The published 
records also include the Parliament Rolls.126  
The Black Prince’s Register complements Henxteworth’s journal and provides 
additional names of men serving with the Prince.  It also details the arrangements made 
for the governing of the Prince’s council and lands during his absence, as well as the 
actions taken by men serving in his company.127  The Close and Patent Rolls also indicate 
such arrangements made by the earls, e.g., appointments of attorneys and letters of 
protection.128 
Unpublished Documentary Sources: France 
                                                
122Register of Edward the Black Prince, preserved in the public record office, 4 vols, ed. 
Michael Charles Burdett Dawes(London, 1930–1933).  
123Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions, ed. M. D. Legge (Oxford, 1941). 
124Calendar of Close Rolls, 45 vols. (London, 1892–1954).  Calendar of Fine Rolls, 22 
vols. (London, 1911–1963).  Calendar of Letter Books of the City of London, 11 vols., ed. 
R. R. Sharpe (London, 1899–1912). 
125Calendar of Letter Books,  92. 
126Rotuli parliamentorum Angliae hactenus inediti MCCLXXIX–MCCCLXXIII (London, 
1935). 
127BPR, passim. 
128CCR, X, throughout; CPR, X, throughout. 
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The unpublished French record sources in the Archives Nationales include Série J and 
Série JJ for the Trésor des Chartes, Layettes, and Régistres, respectively,129 as well as the 
records of the Chambre des Comptes in Série P.130  The accounts of Barthélémy du 
Drach, the war treasurer for 1348–1350 and 1355, and Jean Chauvel, who held the same 
office 1351–1354, also remain unpublished along with other records of the Chambre des 
Comptes in the Bibliothèque Nationale that deal specifically with war accounts and travel 
expenses.131  The Collection Doat, also at the Bibliothèque Nationale, includes records 
dealing with Languedoc, including specific collections for Guyenne, Carcassonne, 
Montaubon, and Narbonne, as well as the houses of Foix, Armagnac, Albret, and 
Périgord.132  These sources indicate the economic impact of the Prince's campaign, 
specifically tax exemptions to help pay for rebuilding and the region's contributions to the 
royal coffers both before and after the Anglo-Gascon army ravaged the countryside.  
There are also unpublished sources in the départmental archives, which provide evidence 
of the destruction caused by the Prince's army, particularly in terms of rebuilding.  For 
                                                
129Paris, Archives Nationales, Série J Trésor des Chartes, Layettes, 514: Brocard et 
Fénétrange, 636–642 and 654–655: Angleterre, 677: Écosse.  Paris, Archives Nationales, 
Serié JJ Trésor des Chartres, Régistres, 76–117 [1345–1380]. 
130Paris, Archives Nationales, Serié P Chambre des Comptes, 2292–2295: Mémoriaux C, 
D [1346–1381]. 
131Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Manuscrits français, 20684: War Treasurers’ Accounts, 
Barthélémy du Drach, 1348–1350, 20692: War Treasurers’ Accounts, Barthélémy du 
Drach, 1355, n.a. 9421: War Treasurers’ Accounts, Barthélémy du Drach, 1355, and n. a. 
20528: War Treasurers’ Accounts, Jean Chauvel, 1351–1354.  Paris, Bibliothèque 
Nationale, Manuscrits français. 32510: Chambre des Comptes, war accounts, musters, n. 
a. 7412–7414: Chambre des Comptes, war accounts, musters, 20590: Chambres des 
Comptes, travel expenses. 
132Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Collection Doat (Languedoc): 117: Guyenne, 64: 
Carcassonne, 87: Montaubon, 53: Narbonne.  Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Collection 
Doat (Languedoc): 190-197: Houses of Foix, Armagnac and Albret, 243–244: Counts of 
Périgord. 
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example, the archives départmentales des Pyrenées-Atlantiques at Pau contains sources 
dealing with Armagnac and Foix,133 and the Archives communales de Martel, located 
within the Archives départmentales du Lot at Cahors, contain two series of documents 
that deal with accounts from 1349–1362 and war correspondence.134 
Published Documentary Sources: France 
There are many published records for France, such as the Archives municipales de 
Bordeaux,135 Gascogne dans les régistres du Trésor des Chartes,136 and the Inventaire-
sommaire des Archives Communales antérieures à 1790, which includes Ville de 
Toulouse among others.137  There are also published sources that deal explicitly with 
financial matters, such as the Comptes de l’argenterie des rois de France au xive 
siècle.138  Additionally, the published sources from the papacy of Innocent VI (d. 1362), 
such as the edition of the Lettres secrètes et curiales, which provide detail not only on 
papal activities during the Hundred Years War but also on the relationship between 
France and Avignon.139 
Archaeological Sources 
                                                
133Pau, Archives départmentales des Pyrenées-Atlantiques, Série E, 237–287: Armagnac, 
391–484: Foix. 
134Cahors, Archives départmentales du Lot, Archives communales de Martel, CC 3–4: 
Accounts [1341–1343, 1349–1362], EE 1: War (correspondence). 
135H. Barckausen, ed., Archives municipales de Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1890). 
136Charles Samaran and Pierre Rouleau, eds., La Gascogne dans le régistres du Trésor 
des Chartres (Paris, 1966). 
137E. Roschach, ed., Ville de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1891). 
138Comptes de l’argenterie des rois de France au xive siècle, ed. L. Douet d’Arcq (Paris, 
1851). 
139Innocent VI, Lettres secrètes et curiales, 4 vols., ed. P. Gasnault, M. H. Laurent and N. 
Gotteri (1959-in progress). 
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The archaeological material, particularly the evidence for roads, fortifications, and ports, 
is important for reconstructing the Black Prince’s route through Languedoc and for 
criticizing the narrative sources.  The weakness of the archaeological material, however, 
is that it is difficult to interpret without means of the written sources.  The archeological 
sources for England and France include ships, weapons, coins, and fortifications.  There 
are also roads, ports, and bridges, and the Prince and his forces did, indeed, make use of 
the Roman roads and bridges throughout the campaign.140  The coins and weapons can be 
found in museum catalogues and excavation reports, and coins and other artifacts have 
been found along the campaign route.  At Pezens, for example, Julien Courtieu’s 
excavations uncovered a hill that commanded the Fresquell valley and uncovered pottery, 
coins, and “un boulet de bombarde, envoyé par les Anglais.”141  Jean Sarrand’s argument 
for identifying “Alieir” as St-Hilaire depends, in part, on coin finds, specifically the 
discovery of French coinage no longer in use in Languedoc at the time of the Prince’s 
raid,142 and considering Henxteworth’s use of multiple specie it is possible that members 
of the Prince’s company could have carried these. 
Cities and fortifications, which include fortress cities, also have individual 
excavation reports.  For example, Plymouth, the port from which the Black Prince 
                                                
140Baker, Chronicon, 229–45. For a specific example, see Maurice-Rene Mazieres, “Faits 
et gestes de la maisons de Voisins en Languedoc lors de l’invasion du Prince Noir,” 
Memoires de la Societé des arts et de sciences de Carcassonne, series 4, vol. 6 (1968–
1970): 123–26, at 125.   
141Mazieres, “Faits et gestes,” 126. 
142Jean Sarrand, “La chevauchée du Prince Noir dans la region de Carcassonne, 
novembre 1355,” Mémoires de la Société des arts et des sciences de Carcassonne, series 
4, vol. 5 (1963–1967): 155–58, at 158.  The dating of the coinage was determined by 
Maurice Nogué. 
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embarked, has been excavated and several reports have been published.143  
Archaeological work has also been done on Toulouse,144 Bordeaux,145 and 
Carcassonne.146  The basic work on the road system is Raymond Chevallier’s Roman 
Roads.147  Marjorie Nice Boyer has also written on bridges in medieval France, 
considering both their construction and impact on the surrounding environment.148  The 
work on the roads and bridges is important, as the Prince and his forces made use of both. 
Methodology 
The statistical data in Chapter Seven was derived in the main from the information in 
Henxteworth’s journal.  Each entry was entered into a database and the details divided 
into the following categories: date, location, payee (when known), the position of the 
payee (e.g., clerk, archer, minstrel, tailor, among others, when given), the amount paid 
out, and the expense.  The expenses are further broken down into specific categories of 
spending: wages, victuals, horse-related expenses, transport, the Prince’s personal 
expenses, and miscellaneous.  Expenses also are examined according to the offices 
                                                
143Keith W. Ray, Archaeological investigations and research in Plymouth (Plymouth, 
1995). Cynthia Gaskell Brown,  J. P. Allan, and Abhainn Preston, Plymouth excavations 
(Plymouth, 1986).  Barry W. Cunliffe and Paul T. Bidwell, Mount Batten Plymouth: a 
Prehistoric and Roman Port (Oxford, 1988). 
144Musée des Augustins, Archeologie et vie quotidienne aux XIIIe et XIVe siecles en 
Midi-Pyrénées (Toulouse, 1990). 
145Fédération Aquitania, Sites défensifs et sites fortifiés au Moyen Age entre Loire et 
Pyrnées :  
actes du premier colloque Aquitania, Limoges, 20–22 mai 1987 (Bordeaux, 1990). 
146Nicolas Gouzy and Jean-Marie Pesez, Actes de la 3e Session d’histoire médiévale de 
Carcassonne, 28 août–1er septembre 1990 (Berne, 1992). 
147Raymond Chevallier, Roman Roads (Berkeley, 1976). 
148Marjorie Nice Boyer, Medieval French Bridges: A History (Cambridge, 1976). 
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designated by Henxteworth, e.g., the office of the hall.  The cross-tabulations of expense 
categories and offices show how the Prince’s finances were handled during the campaign. 
Logistics 
The following chapters draw on a logistical model based on the consumption rate of the 
army.  This is most simply expressed in Engel’s basic equation.  He expresses this 
mathematically as   
N= d(a + b + c) – (yz + 200x) ,  
  250 – d(e + f + g) 
In this N = the number of animals, a = total weight of grain required, b = total weight of 
fodder required, c = total weight of water required, d = days in the field, e = weight of 
grain for the animals, f = weight of fodder for the animals, g = weight of water for the 
animals, y = number of personnel carrying supplies, z = the approximate weight carried 
by each man, and x = number of cavalry horses carrying supplies.149  The model can be 
adapted to carts by changing the 250 to the carrying capacity of the cart and multiplying 
d(e+f+g) by the number of horses needed to draw the cart. 
Based upon Roth’s work on Roman logistics, the caloric needs of the soldiers 
have been reduced from the recommended 3600 calories per day to 1600–2000 calories 
per day.  However, the rations he reconstructs total 3,390 calories per day.150  The caloric 
requirement has also been divided into different groups of food, as soldiers did not get all 
of their calories from grain.  For example, Roman soldiers received rations that included 
meat, vegetables, and cheese, in addition to grain, and Henxteworth’s journal records 
                                                
149Engels, Alexander the Great, passim 
150Roth, Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 7–8, 43. 
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payments for meat, poultry, cheese, fish, nuts, and other victuals.151  Rations for animals 
have been broken down into “hard fodder,” such as grain, “green fodder,” and 
“pasturage.”  These divisions are similar to the way Henxteworth differentiates between 
grain, hay, and herbage.152  The weight of Roth’s rations comes to 2.8 lbs (1.3 kg).153  I 
have rounded this figure to 3 lbs.  In creating a model of the Anglo-Gascon army’s 
logistics I have also drawn on data from US Army field manuals.  Many date to before 
World War II, although one is considerably more recent: FM-31-27, which is the current 
field manual for US special forces and the use of pack animals.  Comparing the earlier 
data with this new manual shows how little the recommendations and practices for the 
care and use of pack animals has changed.  
 The following chapters make use of these data in a variety of ways.  In Chapter 
Three the needs of men and horses are used to determine the amount of supplies the 
Prince’s fleet had to transport from England to Gascony.  The supply needs, then, help 
ascertain the minimum carrying capacity of the Prince’s fleet.  Once the army reached 
Bordeaux and began campaigning through southern France, the army’s comestible 
requirements, along with the carrying capacity of the pack animals and carts, and the 
speed these animals and carts could achieve and maintain, are used to establish the size of 
the Prince’s supply train (Chapter Five).  These logistical needs and limitations 
                                                
151Roth, Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 18, 25–26, 32–34.  DCO, Henxteworth 
accounts, throughout. 
152DCO, Henxteworth accounts, throughout.  Roth, Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 
61. 
153Roth, Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 43. 
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undergirded the campaign, which began with the preparations in England, the subject of 
the next chapter.
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The 1355 campaign’s success rested upon careful preparations.  As this chapter will 
discuss, these preparations encompassed a wide variety of necessary tasks.  Money had to 
be raised; food had to be purveyed; horses had to be purchased; ships had to be manned.  
Men also needed to be recruited, but the Prince’s soldiers are discussed separately in the 
following chapter.  All of these tasks took time to complete, and as this chapter shows, 
the planning and preparations began well before the Prince and his company sailed from 
Plymouth.  The chapter begins with the decision to send an English army to Gascony, 
followed by discussions of the finances, supplies, and the Prince’s fleet.  All of these 
topics are set within the larger context of the existing purveyance structure in England 
and England’s experience with transporting men, horses, and supplies to France. 
On 1 June 1355 King Edward III addressed the archbishops of Canterbury and 
York, all the bishops of England, the heads of the four orders of friars, and the 
chancellors and proctors of Oxford and Cambridge via letters close.  He requested their 
prayers, and through them the prayers of the people, for himself and his men for the 
upcoming campaigns.  Edward III explains clearly in these letters close that he sought 
peace while King John II of France used the peace negotiations to delay and cost him 
[Edward III] large sums of money even as the French king was “preparing for war.”  
Edward III’s request concludes: “therefore the king [Edward III] is compelled to renew 
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the war.”1  Edward III could have done little else that would have so quickly published 
the upcoming campaign to his subjects.2  He meant for the news to spread.  The request 
to the friars preachers included a clause that directed them to share the information “from 
convent to convent of their visitation.”3  The friars, bishops, chancellors, and others were 
further instructed to make public prayers in the churches for the success of the 
expedition, thus enabling Edward III to reach the majority of his subjects.4  While this 
may have been the first time many of Edward III’s subjects may have learned of the 
expeditions, for others this was old news as the actual preparations had been underway 
for some months.5 
The decision to send an army under the command of Edward of Woodstock, 
Prince of Wales, to Gascony was not made lightly.  It was considered and deliberate; it 
was well planned from the moment the decision was made.  Indeed, it was already being 
planned well before April 1355, when Edward III and his council formally rejected the 
proposal for continued negotiations put forward by Androin de la Roche (d. 1369), a 
                                                
1TNA, C 54/193, m. 19v.  Rymer, Foedera, 236.  CCR, X, 210.  “…guerram resumere 
nostram compellimur ad defensam…”  Edward III’s actions were certainly not original.  
John II of France published his own proclamations about the “guerre contra les Anglais” 
on 17 May 1355.  (Rymer, Trésor des Chartres and Archives de France, 141). 
2Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 14.  There is a long tradition in England of using 
letters close to inform the king’s subjects of military activity.  See, for example, Pierre 
Chaplais, English Medieval Diplomatic Practice Part I, Documents and Interpretations, 
vol. II (London, 1982), “Diplomatic preliminaries to war.”  Like Edward III, Edward I 
and Edward II used such letters to inform their subjects. 
3TNA, C 54/193, m. 19.  CCR, X, 210. 
4Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 14, for his discussion of the use of such requests 
to spread news of the King’s policies. 
5For example, orders for ships and mariners were issued in March, and soldiers were to 
muster in Plymouth in mid-June; therefore, they knew about the expedition before 1 June 
1355.  See below. 
Chapter 3: The Preparations for the Chevauchée 
 
60 
Benedictine monk and Abbot of Cluny (1351–1361), who led the papal legation which 
was trying to persuade Edward III to renew negotiations for the continuation of the truce 
with France.  Once the decision was made, preparations for the campaign began in 
earnest.6   
The pace of the preparations certainly intensified, money was gathered and 
dispersed, men were recruited, and “paperwork” was filed.  The scale—let us not forget 
that Edward III was planning a three-pronged invasion of France7—and efficiency of this 
process demonstrates that the Black Prince’s chevauchée was highly organized and well-
planned; contrary to the tradional view of the chevauchée, it was not a spur-of-the-
moment raid lacking focus and strategic aims.8  The careful attention to the logistics 
necessary to orchestrate the recruiting, not to mention paying and equipping, of soldiers, 
the organizing of supplies, both comestible and non-comestible, and the transport of men, 
supplies, and horses first to Plymouth and Southampton and thence to Bordeaux, show 
not only that those overseeing the process had both the skills and tools to do so but also 
that the start of this campaign was a highly organized operation.  This also indicates the 
importance of this expedition to Edward III’s larger strategy for the 1355 campaigning 
                                                
6It appears that preliminary preparations were already underway early in 1355, but the 
orders, requests, and letters became much more frequent as the campaign’s departure 
neared.  See below. 
7While three separate campaigns seem to have been planned, Clifford Rogers has argued 
that there were only two fleets.  Clifford Rogers, War, Cruel and Sharp, 293, n. 38.   
8Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 13.  He writes that “many campaigns were 
marked by an absence of strategy” and “no clearly defined objective.”  For further 
descriptions of chevauchées as lacking focus and strategy, see A.H. Thompson, “The Art 
of War to 1400,” The Cambridge Medieval History, VI; T.F. Tout, “Medieval and 
Modern Warfare,” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 5 (1919):, 24; and H. Belloc, 
Crécy (London, 1912). 
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season—the multi-pronged invasion of France led by Lancaster, the Prince of Wales, and 
Edward III—and illuminates what the king hoped to achieve through his war with France. 
Furthermore, the meticulous attention to the preparations suggests that the Prince 
and his advisors understood that supply is the basis of strategy.9  They knew that a good 
start to the campaign would establish a firm foundation for the chevauchée, and that men 
and horses had to arrive in Bordeaux healthy and in fighting trim in order to take 
advantage of the campaigning season.  This became especially crucial as the Prince’s 
departure from Plymouth, planned for late July or early August.  No specific departure 
date was given, but the Prince had stated he would be in Plymouth as of 1 July (he failed 
to arrive until 26 July),10 men were to be in Plymouth by mid-June11.  His departure was 
delayed until 9 September and the time available for a campaign in 1355 dwindled (the 
latest date at which a campaign could begin was 1 November, and that only if the army 
stayed west of the Garonne).  Therefore, ensuring adequate supplies for the eleven-day 
journey from Plymouth to Bordeaux was a pressing matter.  Fortunately for the Prince, 
                                                
9C.T. Allmand, The De re militari of Vegetius: the reception, transmission and legacy of 
a Roman text in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 33–41; 
Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, 2. J.F.C. Fuller, 
The Generalship of Alexander the Great (London, 1958), 52. Jonathan Roth, The 
Logistics of the Roman Army at War (Leiden/Boston, 1999), passim. This was also 
widely recognized by ancient writers, such as Vegetius, De Re Militari, ed. M.D. Reeve 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 3.3 and medieval writers, such as Christine de Pizan, 
who was clearly aware of Vegetius’s work, as she quotes from it freely.  Christine de 
Pizan, The Book of the Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry, trans. Sumner Willard (Brig. 
Gen., USA Ret.), ed. Charity Cannon Willard (University Park, PA, 1999), 40–43. 
10BPR, IV, 143; TNA, C 61/67, m. 5. 
11Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 298–99. 
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there existed a highly efficient supply system in England12 that was capable of meeting 
his supply needs, if not his transport requirements.13  The machinery of purveyance 
swung into action once the formal decision to send the Prince of Wales to Gascony had 
been taken. 
The Decision to go to War 
Henry of Grosmont (c. 1310–1361), the Duke of Lancaster, left England for the papal 
court in November 1354 “on the weighty business of the king and his realm,”14 namely 
the negotiation of a suitable peace (pace competenti) with France, before the expiration of 
the existing truce, which was set to end on 5 April 1355.15  Lancaster and his fellow 
legates had the power to negotiate a final peace with France and to establish an alliance 
                                                
12See Michael Prestwich, in particular: Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages, the 
English Experience (New Haven, 1999, 1996), 250–62; The Three Edwards: War and 
State in England, 1272–1377 (New York, 1980), 70–72, 223–25, 265–70; War, Politics 
and Finance under Edward I (London, 1972), 114–36, 151–76; Plantagenet England, 
1225–1360 (Oxford, 2007, 2005), 335–36, 348–49.  Ilana Krug, “Royal Prerogative Gone 
Astray: The Social and Economic Impact of Purveyance of the English Peasantry at the 
Beginning of the Hundred Years War” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2006); Ilana 
Krug, “Peasants and Purveyance at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War: Maddicott 
Reexamined,” in The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas, ed. Donald J. Kagay 
and L.J. Andrew Villalon, 343–66 (Leiden/Boston, 2008). 
13This is not to say that the administration or the system in place was incapable of 
assembling a fleet; rather, there were not enough ships available for two fleets.  See Craig 
Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth 
Century (Woodbridge, 2011) 152–55.  See also, idem, “Taking the War to Scotland and 
France: The Supply and Transportation of English Armies by Sea,” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Hull, 2009), 235.  
14BPR, III, 181.  Letters of protection were drawn up for Lancaster for matters 
concerning him in Chester and Flint. 
15Henry Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle, 1337–1396 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
126–27. 
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between Edward III and Jean II.16  Edward III wanted the entirety of Aquitaine for 
himself and his heirs, no homage required, in perpetuity.  His instructions to Lancaster 
and the rest of the deputation made this explicit: “namely, that the King should have 
freely and as an alod, for himself and his heirs in perpetuity, in recompense for the crown 
of France, the entire Duchy of Guienne as fully as any King of England has ever held 
it…”17  The King further specified in a schedule that he required “the entire duchies of 
Aquitaine-Guienne and Normandy and the county of Ponthieu…and with this Angers and 
Anjou, Poitiers and Poitou, Le Mans and Maine, Tours and Touraine, Angoulême and 
Angoumois, Cahors and Quercy, Limoges and Limousin…”18  The French envoys to the 
papal court (unsurprisingly) rejected these terms in early 1355, and the Duke of Lancaster 
and the Earl of Arundel left for England, minus the third member of their group, the 
bishop of Norwich who had died.19  Papal nuncios followed them to England.20 
Even before the papal legates arrived, the Duke of Lancaster reached England (28 
March 1355) with the news that the negotiations had, to no one’s very great surprise, 
                                                
16Kenneth Fowler, The King’s Lieutenant: Henry of Grosmont, First Duke of Lancaster 
(London, 1969), 134. 
17Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi, 421. “…rex Anglorum habuisset integrum ducatum 
Aquitanniae sibi et heredibus suis, imperpetuum, libere et quiete, sine homagio cuiquam 
regi Franciae faciendo…” 
18F. Bock, “Some New Documents Illustrating the Early Years of the Hundred Years’ 
War,” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library XV (1931): 94––96.  Original in French.  
Clifford Rogers, ed., The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations, Warfare in 
History (Rochester, NY, 1999), 146–48. 
19Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 421. “Tunc, dicto episcipo Nowycensi ibidem morte 
praevento, ceteri nuncii Anglici, infecto negocio, in Angliam sunt reversi.” 
20Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 424; Rymer, Foedera, 297, for the safe conducts 
granted to the papal nuncios. 
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failed to accomplish much beyond the extension of the truce to 24 June 1355.21  The 
papal envoys were not far behind, as indicated by the safe conduct for the abbot of Cluny, 
Androin de la Roche, and Johann, bishop of Elne, which date to 2 April 1355.22  Edward 
III received Lancaster almost immediately upon his return to London; the papal legates, 
on the other hand, arrived only two days after Lancaster but were made to wait for their 
audience with Edward III until mid-April.23 
When the papal legates, led by de la Roche, approached Edward III with their 
proposal, to extend the truce between France and England past 24 June 1355, when it was 
due to expire, the king “heard [the envoys] in person.”24  The king “responded that it was 
not his intention to accept the latest truce” (whether he is referring to the one negotiated 
by Lancaster and due to expire in June or the one being proposed by the current legation 
is unclear) because the French often used papal legates to offer truces and then renounced 
them.25  Despite these reservations, however, the king offered to discuss the proposal 
with the royal Council.26  One can only conclude that Edward III mentioned a truce, 
although it seems clear from his response to the papal legates that Edward III had no 
interest in truces.  According to Avesbury’s account, in the same Council meeting in 
which Edward III conveyed the envoys’ proposal “it was ordained that the lord Edward, 
the oldest son of the king of England, prince of Wales, then in his twenty-fourth year, 
                                                
21Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 421.  “Et eodem tempore inter dicta regna captae sunt 
treugae usque festum sancti Johannis baptistae, contingens anno proximo tunc sequente 
[24 June 1355].” 
22TNA C 66/245, m. 12; CPR, 10, 203.  Rymer, Foedera, III, I, 297.  
23Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 424. 
24Avesbury, Gestis Ewardi Tertii, 424.  “in propria persona audita.” 
25Ibid., 424.  “respondit quod non fuit intentionis suae treugis ulterioribus consentire.”  
26Ibid., 424.  “voluit tamen super his cum concilio sui plenius deliberare.”  
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would cross [the English Channel] into Gascony.”27  It appears, based on Avesbury’s 
account, that the Council voted to pursue the war in Gascony and Normandy before the 
papal legates had even left London, let alone reached Dover to return to France.28 
To Avesbury, or to anyone else observing events from a remove, it may well have 
seemed as though the King and Council had rejected the papal legate’s proposal almost 
before it had been offered, and it certainly appears that way.  I would argue, however, 
that Edward III had already made up his mind to send an expedition to France before 
Lancaster had returned to London.  Edward III, a king renowned for his generalship and 
leadership, was unlikely to have rejected a truce if he did not already have a viable 
alternative in mind.  All questions of character aside, a military leader of Edward III’s 
caliber would not rebuff the offer of a truce if his troops (and logistics) were in disarray 
or insufficient to pursue military action.  He took the time a truce afforded him to rebuild, 
resupply, and finalize the preparations.29   
For that very reason, Edward III—and John II—accepted the original three-month 
truce negotiated by Pope Innocent VI (d. 1362).  The Duke of Lancaster, the Earl of 
Arundel, Bartholomew de Burghersh, constable of Dover castle, Michael, bishop elect of 
London, and Bishop William of Norwich represented Edward III and England at the 
papal court in Avignon.30  The Duke of Bourbon and Chancellor Pierre de la Forêt 
                                                
27Ibid., 424.  “In dicto concilio apud Westmonasterium ordinatum fuit quod dominus 
Edwardus, primogenitus dicti regis Anglorum, princeps Walliae, tunc xxiiijtum annum 
suae aetatis agens, transfretaret in Vasconim.”   
28Innocent VI, Lettres secretes et curiales, nos. 1394–1395.  Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 297.  
Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 423–24. 
29Sumption, Trial by Fire, 142. 
30Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 283. 
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represented John II and France.31  The extended truce would begin 1 April and expire 24 
June.32  Edward III needed that time to complete the preparations for his 1355 invasions 
of France, which had already been set in motion, and he and his advisors and generals 
used that time to their advantage.   
It should be noted that among the English delegation were several high-ranking 
Gascons: Bernard Ezi, lord of Albret; Guy de Bryan, lord of Lagherne; Guillaume de 
Pommiers; Bertrand, lord of Montferrand, and Magister Gerard de Podio.33  This suggests 
not only that the Gascons were involved in the negotiation of the original truce but that 
they also would be able to relay the results—or lack thereof—directly to Bordeaux and 
the rest of Gascony.  This means that the Gascons would have had some knowledge upon 
which to base their own decisions, and, indeed, this information may have prompted the 
Gascon delegation to England in January 1355 and its request for a military force led by 
the Prince of Wales.   
Given the Gascons’ involvement in the negotiations it is hardly surprising that 
they also were involved in the decision to send an expedition to Gascony.34  They 
certainly were interested parties.  The speed with which the raid was assembled after the 
Prince landed at Bordeaux on 20 September—the army left Bordeaux on 5 October—, 
                                                
31On a side note, the extension of the truce was the only accomplishment of the 
negotiating parties.  The main issue, unsurprisingly, was Edward III’s status: king of 
France, sovereign duke, or rebellious vassal.  Neither side was prepared to negotiate on 
that issue. 
32Sumption, Trial by Fire, 142. 
33TNA, C 76/32.  Foedera, III, i, 289.  This is dated 30 October 1354.  Albret, Pommiers, 
and Aymery, lord of Montferrand, all served during the Black Prince’s campaign.  Their 
presence among the delegation is indicative of their status and that they were known to 
Edward III, certainly through the mayor and constable of Bordeaux if not personally. 
34Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, viii, 3. 
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suggests that the Gascons had already prepared for an expedition of some kind and had 
made advance preparations, e.g., assembling their own men and supplies, although there 
are no clear records of this.  Clearly, then, the Gascon commanders knew about the 
expedition early on in the planning process, presumably as soon as a messenger could 
travel from London to Bordeaux after Edward III had agreed to the Gascons’ request for 
military aid.35 
When, then, was the decision to send an expedition to Gascony made?  The latest 
date suggested is Henry Knighton’s claim that the decision was made after 24 May, at 
which time the Prince was given command.36  Knighton’s date is indisputably wrong, 
given an order of 24 April “to Robert de Eleford, steward and sheriff of Cornwaille, John 
de Kendale, receiver there, John de Skirbeek, and Thomas the havener” to “arrest all the 
wines that they can find…” and to “purvey 300 quarters of oats and 100 quarters of 
wheat.”  The order explicitly states they are to do so because the king has granted 
command to the prince, who “must needs be at Plymouth at the octave of Midsummer [1 
July].”  After amassing the supplies, the men are to see that the supplies are taken to 
Plymouth.37   
Furthermore, there is another order, dated 25 May, that instructs Thomas the 
                                                
35The voyage from Plymouth, one of the main English ports involved in Anglo-Gascon 
trading, to Bordeaux took approximately ten days.  Accounting for the time it would take 
for a messenger to reach Plymouth, a message could reasonably reach Bordeaux in two 
weeks. 
36Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle, 128–29. “Post Pentecostem rex tenuit consillium apud 
Londonias, et misit in Vasconiam contra Francos principem Wallie…” 
37BPR, II, 77.  The octave of midsummer, if calculated from the date of the actual 
midsummer solstice, gives a range of 28 June through 2 July.  I have calculated the date 
as 1 July, using the octave of the Feast of St. John on 24 June, which corresponded with 
midsummer. 
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havener and John de Kendale to deliver a tun38 of wine and 10 quarters of wheat to Sir 
Bartholomew de Burghersh or his attorney “as an advance towards his expenses on his 
arrival there [Plymouth].”39  Given the distance of 269 miles (433 km) between London 
and Cornwall, the decision to go to war had to have been made in London before 24 May 
in order for the Prince’s officials in Cornwall to receive such orders on 25 May, orders 
that must have been given prior to that date, especially considering the orders of 24 April 
more than a month earlier than Knighton’s suggested date.40 
There is further evidence that the decision was certainly made no later than early 
May.  A 21 May 1355 order to John de Delves, lieutenant of the justice of Chester, and 
the chamberlain of Chester, John de Brunham, commanded them “to test and array 200 of 
the best and most skillful” archers from the county hundreds, as the Prince, 
understandably enough, “wills that he be supplied before all others,”41 and the Prince’s 
orders specify that he is to have 700 archers.42  What is key here, in terms of when the 
decision was made, was that these orders were in response to a letter Delves and 
Brunham had already sent to John de Wengefeld about archers they had arrayed in 
Chester, which suggests an earlier order to start arraying archers.  Furthermore, 
arrangements were already being made in May for the payment of soldiers’ advance 
                                                
38 I have used 'tun' to indicate the unit of volume equal to 252 gallons.  To avoid 
confusion, I have used the British spelling, tonne, to indicate the unit of weight 
equivalent to 2240 lbs or 1000 kg. 
39BPR, II, 78. 
40Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle, 128–29. 
41BPR, III, 199. 
42TNA, E 278, f. 88; BPR, IV, 143; Cf. Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 424, who gives 
the figure of 2000 archers, and Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle, 128–29, gives a figure 
of 1400 archers. 
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wages,43 which they would receive before leaving for the muster point and use to provide 
for themselves while on the way to the muster point.44  This would mean that the latest 
date for a decision would be early-mid April, given the time needed to send the letters 
and to array the initial archers. 
The decision to send troops to Gascony dates to no later than 10 March, the date 
of the first orders to “arrest ships” to take the Earl of Warwick and unspecified others 
from Southampton to the duchy.  All ships of thirty tuns carrying capacity45 or more were 
to be arrested and mariners found for them expressly to take Warwick “and other 
magnates and men-at-arms” to Gascony.46  Robert de Ledred, Walter de Harewell, and 
Richard de Bosevill were to search a large area (from the mouth of the Thames and 
throughout the liberty of the Cinque Ports which extend south to Hastings, and “in parts 
of Wales”47).  That and the size of the ships they were to arrest suggest that the King 
needed a large number of ships.48  This in turn is indicative of the scale of the operation. 
It is not clear in these orders in March if the Prince had already been appointed 
                                                
43BPR, III, 201. 
44Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 17. 
45Rymer, Foedera III, i, “…ad omnes naves portagii triginta doliorum et ultra.”  Tun and 
ton were originally the same word and used interchangeably.  It is both a unit of ship 
capacity and of weight.  As a weight it could range from 2000–2400 lbs.  However, it is 
possible the source means ships with a carrying capacity of 30 or more wine tuns, as the 
Latin in the source is ‘dolium,’ which is often used to indicate the ‘tun’ as a measuring 
capacity for liquids.  The tun held on average 252 gallons, which was standardized in the 
early fifteenth century.  See Ronald Edward Zupko, A Dictionary of English Weights and 
Measures from Anglo-Saxon Times to the Nineteenth Century (Madison, 1968), entries 
for ton and tun. 
46Rymer, Foedera, III, i., 297.  “ac aliorum magnatum et hominum ad arma.” 
47Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 297. “ab ore aquae Thamis’, tam infra libertatem Quinque 
Portuum…”  “in partipus Walliae.” 
48Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 152, n. 260. 
Chapter 3: The Preparations for the Chevauchée 
 
70 
the commander of the expedition, but Warwick was one of the earls who accompanied 
him as part of the Prince’s command  staff.  This date, 10 March 1355, then, is the latest 
possible date at which the planning of the expedition could have begun, which indicates 
that any decision to send an expedition must have been made before 10 March, i.e.,  
before Lancaster returned to London from Avignon on 28 March.  Therefore, Edward III 
decided to send an expedition to Gascony—and the planning had advanced to the stage of 
arresting ships and naming commanders—prior to hearing Lancaster’s personal report 
and prior to meeting with the papal envoys. Indeed, given that the planning of the 
expedition had been underway for more than month by the time Edward III met with the 
papal envoys, it seems clear that the English king had no intention of accepting an 
extension of the current truce beyond 24 June 1355. 
Furthermore, Avesbury’s chronicle describes the French rejection in late 1354 of 
Edward III’s peace terms—essentially, sole sovereignty and authority over the entire 
duchy of Gascony, likely using its most extensive “borders,” “for himself and his heirs in 
perpetuity” without owing any homage to the French king.49  This rejection, given the 
controversy over Edward III’s homage for the duchy and past negotiations, cannot have 
been completely unexpected.  The formal rejection of the terms occurred around 
Christmas (circiter festum Nativitatis Domini) 1354 at the papal court in Avignon, 
                                                
49Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 420–21. “…quod rex Anglorum habuisset integrum 
ducatum Aquitannieae sibi et heredibus suis, imperpetuum [an Anglo-Norman word with 
a Latin ending, meaning in perpetuity], libere et quiete, sine homagio cuiquam regi 
Franciae faciendo…” 
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following which the English ambassadors returned to England in early 1355.50  Although 
Lancaster did not return to England until 28 March 1355, it is certain that Edward III 
knew of the failure to secure the peace terms he had put forward well before the duke’s 
return, at which point the King could have begun his preparations.   
Assuming a messenger left Avignon on 1 January 1355, he could be in London by 
the end of the month, if not sooner.51  The mounted nuncii regis and unmounted cursores 
regularly covered 30–35 miles in a day, including the regular stops to rest the horse every 
10 miles.52  However, given that Edward III could not have entertained much hope that 
the French king would deem his terms anything but unreasonable and unacceptable, 
                                                
50Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 421. “Tunc, dicto episcipo Norwycensi ibidem morete 
praevento, ceteri nuncii Anglici, infecto negocio, in Angliam sunt reversi.” 
51It is just over 700 miles overland and across the Channel from Avignon to London.  
Assuming a messenger changing horses could average 50 miles a day and figuring a day 
for the Channel crossing, it would take just over 14 days to make the trip.  In 1406, 
Thomas Della Croce managed the journey from London to Milan in six days, averaging 
100 miles each day. Mary Brayshay, “Post-haste by Post Horse?” History Today 42, no. 9 
(1992): 35–41, at 35.  This assumes an English messenger could travel through France.  
Although the English and French delegations did have safe conducts, there was no 
guarantee those would be honored.  A safer route would have been overland from 
Avignon to Bordeaux, which would have taken several days, followed by the 10–11 day 
voyage to Plymouth or Southampton, then a couple days overland to London.  
Alternatively, a messenger could have sailed from Bordeaux directly to London, which 
would have been a longer sea voyage but would have eliminated the overland journey to 
London.  Given the high volume of trade between Bordeaux and France, finding passage 
should have presented little difficulty.  A final option would have been to travel south to 
Montpellier or Marseilles, then take a ship to London from there.  The delegation did, in 
fact, dispatch a messenger to Charles of Luxembourg, and his safe arrival does suggest 
that an English messenger could travel through France.  For another example of the speed 
messengers could achieve, see Bernard S. Bachrach, Charlemagne’s Early Campaigns 
(768–777): A Diplomatic and Military Analysis (Leiden/Boston, 2013), 21, for the 
discussion of the Carolingian tractoria.  This system of relays allowed information to 
travel rapidly, as a message could travel 186–205 miles (300–330km) in 24 hours in ideal 
conditions. 
52Ann Hyland, The Horse in the Middle Ages (Redwood, 1999), 118. 
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Edward III was likely already preparing for a campaign in Gascony before getting word 
that negotiations had failed to achieve anything more than an extension of the truce until 
June 1355. 
Gascony and the War with France 
Edward III was certainly thinking about Gascony in the fall of 1354.  On 24 August 1354 
“four books newly written [missing or no longer extant], touching the state of the duchy 
of Gascony, were delivered to Master Michael de Northburgh, [bishop] of London,”53 the 
same Michael, bishop elect of London, who accompanied Lancaster and Arundel as part 
of the English delegation to Avignon.  The books were returned to Roger de Chesterfield, 
a chamberlain at the Chancery, for safekeeping in January 1356.54  The King’s yeoman, 
Richard English, was sent to Gascony “to further some business of [the king’s] there” in 
1354.55  The King was in regular communication with John de Stretele, the constable of 
Bordeaux.56  Furthermore, the King appointed Thomas Dautre, sergeant-at-arms, on 18 
February 1355 to arrest three ships in Southampton “to take victuals from England to 
Gascony for the munition of some of the king’s castles there.”57  This is but one example 
of Edward III’s efforts to supply the English castles and garrisons in Gascony; nor was he 
the first English king to concern himself with these matters.58  Perhaps these ships carried 
John Gubby and the 120 bacon pigs and other victuals purveyed from Wiltshire and 
                                                
53TNA, C 54/192, m. 15d.  CCR, 10, 83. 
54CPR, 10, 84.  According to an email from Paul Carlyle at The National Archives, it is 
possible these books are still extant, perhaps among the Exchequer records, but thus far 
they have not been discovered or catalogued 
55TNA, C 66/244, m. 13.  CPR, 10, 137. 
56TNA, C 66/242–250; TNA, C 54/192–194; TNA, C 61/66–68; TNA, C 76/32–34. 
57TNA, C 66/245, m. 24. CPR, 10, 178. 
58Prestwich, The Three Edwards, passim. 
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Southampton to “certain of [the king’s] castles” in Gascony.59   
Although this is only circumstantial evidence that the King was planning to send 
an expedition to Gascony as early as February 1355, it is more than suggestive as it 
indicates that the King was making certain that his castles in Gascony were properly 
supplied.  Which, granted, he may have done regardless as it was in his best interest in 
terms of keeping the Gascons happy and in terms of maintaining English royal authority 
in the duchy.  Clearly, though, Gascony and its military preparedness was not far from his 
mind at this time, which would have been the case given that he had sent legates to 
Avignon to negotiate the extension of the existing truce with France. 
The King’s concern for the duchy’s military defenses is hardly surprising given 
events of 1354 in Gascony.  French forces had enjoyed a series of successes that year.  
Under the leadership of Jean I, count of Armagnac, the French had taken Madaillan,60 
Prayssas, and Aiguillon at the confluence of the Lot and Garonne rivers.  Luisignan (in 
Poitou), “Lendin,” and other castles also were taken.61  The loss of these and other 
fortresses was a serious blow to English efforts to hold Gascony and to project royal 
authority.  Several Gascon lords abandoned their allegiance to the English king, and one 
of the stated aims of the campaign was, indeed, the recovery of these allegiances.62  
Others, such as the Albret (Lebret) family, remained loyal to Edward III; members had 
                                                
59TNA, C 54/193, m. 35.  CCR, 10, 112.  The order to purvey the pigs dates to 15 
February 1355. 
60This fortress belonged to the Albrets, a key Gascon family that had significant ties to 
England. 
61Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 293—94; A. Breuils, “Jean Ier, Comte d’Armagnac,” 
Revue des Questions Historiques LIX (1896): 48–52; Adolphe Magen Jurades de la ville 
d’Agen (Auch, 1894), 328–29. 
62BPR, IV, 143–45. 
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served in English armies, and members would serve on the Prince’s campaign.  It was in 
Edward III’s best interests to demonstrate his own loyalty, that he cared about his Gascon 
subjects and their concerns.  Therefore, Edward III knew before Lancaster’s journey to 
the papal court in late 1354 that a military response to Armagnac’s activities in Gascony 
was necessary.  Gascony cannot have been far from Edward III’s mind during the winter 
of 1354–1355. 
Edward III was also thinking about the more general conflict with France.  John 
de Bokenham and Robert Cursoun of Lenne, along with other merchants, were granted 
licenses to sell ale, flour, and malt outside of England “to any foreign parts not at enmity 
with the king; on condition that they find security in the port of shipment that they will 
not take the same to parts of enmity.”63  In some cases the license specifies that the 
merchants are to trade only with Flanders, Holland, or Zeeland, all places “in the king’s 
friendship.”64  Regardless of whether Edward III was already planning expeditions to 
France, he clearly did not want France to receive goods from England, particularly goods 
that could help France supply its troops.   
Preventing French troops from receiving English flour placed additional pressure 
on the ability of the French to supply their own troops, particularly in areas that had 
experienced chevauchées.  Interestingly enough, the King did grant the Countess of 
Pembroke, whose son (b. 1347) was raised with Edward III’s children and later married 
                                                
63TNA, C 66/244, m. 8.  CPR, 10, 148. 
64TNA, C 66/244, m.  6.  CPR, 10, 151. 
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his daughter Margaret in 1359,65 permission in early February to stay “beyond the seas” 
until Martinmas (11 November) “on condition that, if war break out between the king and 
his adversary France” she was to return to England with all possible speed.66  While this 
certainly is not direct evidence that the King was planning an expedition, it does indicate 
that he believed the truce with France would not last and that there would be a renewal of 
hostilities. 
It also seems clear that Edward III was planning on renewing those hostilities 
himself, and, indeed, commanded an army in France in 1355.  At the very least, he was 
not actively trying to prevent a renewal of the conflict.  In January of 1355, Edward III 
ordered crews to be deployed on vessels that were in royal service.  The orders do not 
specify the ships’ destinations but do suggest that the King was planning an expedition.  
The places that were to provide the mariners, from the mouth of the Thames to London, 
might suggest these men would be serving on the ships that would convey Lancaster’s 
troops to France, as his expedition was to sail from London.67 
Furthermore, the King also sent orders, dated 20 January 1355, to Bartholomew 
de Burghersh regarding horses.  Specifically, Burghersh, in his position as the constable 
of Dover castle and as a Warden of the Cinque Ports, was to ban the sale and transport of 
horses outside of England.  In the event that he discovered any horses thus sold illegally 
before the expedition(s) set sail, he was to seize the animals and record the numbers and 
                                                
65Her son John Hastings was the second earl of Pembroke and later served on campaigns 
with the Black Prince in Spain and as a lieutenant of Aquitaine. 
66TNA, C 66/245, m. 28.  CPR, 10, 170.  This issue came up again several times, and the 
King granted a number of extensions. 
67TNA, C 66/244, m. 4.  CPR, 10, 155.  For Lancaster’s expedition, see Chapter 1. 
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values of the horses thus seized, then send the information to chancery from time to 
time.68   
The King’s concern with the availability of horses in England is evident.  While 
merchants, per the orders discussed above, were allowed to export grain and other goods 
as long as the final destination was not France, Burghersh’s orders forbade the sale of 
horses anywhere outside of England.69  This suggests an expedition was being planned.  
As will be discussed below, a large number of horses would be needed for any 
expedition.  The list of witnesses for the order to prevent the sale of horses abroad is 
noteworthy as it includes the mayor and bailiffs of Kyngston upon Hull, Leyne, and 
Southampton and the bailiffs of Boston, Sandwich, Baudeseye in Suffolk (modern 
Bawdsey), Shorham, Great Yarmouth, Herewich (Harwich), Ipswich, Colchester, and 
Dorcester;70 all are ports and coastal towns.   
These officials clearly were aware of the King’s orders and likely would be the 
ones responsible for enforcement should similar orders be sent to their respective ports.  
While there is no direct contemporary evidence that these men were to make and enforce 
similar proclamations, it is highly unlikely that they would have witnessed this document 
and believed themselves to be unaffected by it.  Given that Edward III went to the trouble 
of explicitly banning the sale and subsequent transport of horses overseas from Dover, it 
                                                
68Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 293.  “…ne quis mercator, seu alius quicumque, aliquos equos 
venales, magnos vel parvos, nisi solummodo parvos equos pro equitatura sua, extra 
regnum nostrum Angliae…mittat vel traducat; et omnes equos venales, quos…inveneritis 
traducendos, capi et arestari, et custodiri…” 
69Rymer, Foedera, III, i, “nè quis mercator…extra regnum nostrum Angliae.”  It is 
unclear if the sale and transport of horses to Gascony was also banned. 
70Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 293. 
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is likely he intended the ban more generally—unless, of course, there was a significant 
problem with horse smuggling based in the port of Dover. 
In addition to the ban on the export of horses, an order of 6 February 1355 called 
on the town of Sandwich to prevent foreigners (peregrini) from leaving “for foreign 
parts”71 via the port.72  Any shipmasters and mariners who provided transport faced a 
“heavy forfeit” (gravi forisfactura) unless the foreigner had “our specific command.”73  
While the order fails to state explicitly the reasons for this action, it is likely due to 
concern about foreigners either purposefully or inadvertently providing King Jean II and 
his military staff with information about England’s military activities, particularly in port 
towns.  In short, Edward III obviously had some notion that the French government 
employed spies and cultivated informants.74 
The activity at ports, it should be remembered, would be a key indicator of an 
upcoming expedition because the arresting and mustering of ships, mariners, and victuals 
would begin long before an expedition sailed from England.  Like the order to Burghersh 
discussed above, this latter order to prevent foreigners from leaving England had several 
witnesses from key ports, including men from four of five of the Cinque Ports (Dover, 
New Romney, Hythe, and Hastings—Sandwich is not listed), Great Yarmouth, Boston, 
Dartmouth, Bristol, Plymouth, Weymouth, Ipswich, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and 
                                                
71Rymer, Foedera, III, i.  “ad partes exteras.” 
72Rymer, Rymer, III, i, 295.  “quivis magister, aut marinarius, sub gravi forisfactura 
nostra, hujusmodi peregrimos ad easdem partes traducat…” 
73Ibid.  “sine mandato nostro speciali.”  The text does not specify the precise penalty for 
the mariners and the captains who transported foreigners, although imprisonment was a 
possibility. 
74Sumption, Trial by Fire, 154. 
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Greenwich, among others.75  What is particularly significant about this list is that the 
ports represented in the list of witnesses were all involved in the arresting and mustering 
of ships for the upcoming expeditions to France, those led by Lancaster, the King, and the 
Prince.76 
Based on the above information, it seems clear that the King’s decision to send 
troops to Gascony was made well before the council at Westminster, which met after 5 
April 1355,77 but before Lancaster returned from the failed negotiations on 28 March, and 
even possibly before Edward III knew officially that France had rejected his peace terms.  
Arguably, given that Edward III was well aware of the French position on his demands 
from previous negotiations it is unlikely he had any serious expectations that the French 
would now agree to those demands, especially in light of the success of Armagnac’s 
encroachments on the Gascon frontier.  Edward III sent Lancaster and his fellow deputies 
to Avignon in 1354 to negotiate a peace with France, but as he did so, the King likely was 
already have been looking ahead to the 1355 campaigning season.78 
Choosing a Commander 
The decision to send an expedition to Gascony having thus been made, Edward III also 
had to appoint a commander, a choice that might have been made at the same time as the 
decision to send a force to Gascony or at some point after that.  As discussed above, the 
                                                
75Ibid. 
76Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 152–55, Rymer, III, i, 297–300. 
77Hewitt only commits to saying that “[c]ertain steps taken early in 1355 may perhaps 
foreshadow a policy not declared till April.” Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 4.  
Avesbury dates the key council meeting to “after Easter (post Pascha),” which was 5 
April 1355.  Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 423. 
78Given this, one does wonder if Edward III actually was interested in peace terms or 
merely in buying time in which to reorganize and mount an expedition. 
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King and Lancaster, who would have been a sound choice as he had previously led 
campaigns in Gascony (1345–1347),79 were already committed to lead separate invasions 
of France.80  Lancaster was given command of the arguably more significant operation in 
northern France.  When the shortage of ships meant both forces could not sail at the same 
time, priority was given to Lancaster’s expedition, gathered at London, and the Prince 
had to wait at Plymouth for sufficient shipping.81  He also had to wait on a “favorable 
wind…for more than forty days.”82 
Aside from the issue of transport, it could be argued that Lancaster’s campaign 
was more important as that expedition was entrusted to a man of considerable experience 
and ability, both as a military commander and a diplomat, while the Prince was relatively 
untried.  However, the earl of Warwick, like Lancaster, was an experienced commander 
and soldier.  As of 10 March 1355, Warwick was committed to Gascony,83 and he 
undoubtedly could have been given command of the expedition.  Perhaps Warwick was 
the King’s original choice to lead an expedition to Gascony.  It is not until April, more 
than a month after the ships were arrested for Warwick’s passage, that there is direct 
                                                
79Incidentally, this was also part of a multi-pronged campaign with the King attacking 
from Flanders and the Earl of Northampton from Brittany, and 1346, of course, was the 
Crécy campaign and the year Lancaster (then the earl of Lancaster, as he did not become 
the duke of Lancaster until 1351) besieged and captured Poitiers. 
80Rogers has argued for only two campaigns and that Edward III always intended to lead 
the second expedition.  He suggests that Lancaster was named as the commander in order 
to mislead French agents.  While his argument for only two fleets seems reasonable, I 
find this claim implausible given Prestwich’s work with the documentary evidence. 
81Baker suggests this possibility when discussing the Prince’s delay at Plymouth as 
caused by the wind, “the others having been supplied (cæteris paratis).”  Baker’s 
meaning, however, is not entirely clear. 
82Baker, Chronicon, 226.  “…ventum prosperum…per amplius quam quadraginta dies.”   
83Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 297. 
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evidence that the Prince was going to Gascony.  The first orders to purvey supplies for 
the Prince’s expedition date to 24 April, and the first orders to arrest ships for the 
Prince’s passage to Gascony date to 27 April 1355.84  Even if the Prince were chosen to 
lead the expedition at the council that met after 5 April 1355, Warwick had already been 
committed to going to Gascony for more than a month. 
It is, however, likely that Edward III, known for his military acumen, assigned his 
commanders based on more than just their personal experience: He picked the 
commander most likely to accomplish the goals of a particular campaign, and the goals of 
Lancaster’s expedition were different than those of the Prince’s campaign.  The ultimate 
goal of Edward III’s strategy was full sovereignty over (an expanded) Gascony.  But 
these two expeditions pursued specific objectives beyond simply pressuring the French 
by wreacking economic havoc.  Edward III’s strategic aims help explain why the Prince 
was given command of the expedition to southern France rather than more experienced 
commanders.  It was also a way to provide the future king with military experience. 
Edward III’s objective in Gascony was the re-establishment (and re-enforcement) 
of English royal authority in Gascony.  Successfully achieving this goal would support 
his claim to sole sovereignty in the duchy, as well as provide a foundation for future 
campaigns.  To achieve his aim of possessing Gascony in full sovereignty, then, Edward 
III had to demonstrate his ability to project and enforce English royal power across the 
Channel, not only to the self-interested Gascon nobility but also to Jean II.  Therefore, 
since the King could not lead the expedition himself, he sent his heir, the Prince of 
                                                
84Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 298–99. TNA, C 76/33, m. 12. 
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Wales, who was appointed—officially—at the council at Westminster, which met 
sometime after 5 April 1355.85 
This choice was not lightly made, and Edward III had clear reasons for it.  One 
was that the Gascons themselves had requested the Prince lead such an expedition.  Jean 
de Grailly, the Captal de Buch (d. 1376), Aguer de Montaut, lord of Mussidan, and 
Guillaume Sans, lord of Lesparre, led the Gascony embassy to England,86 and these men 
specifically asked for the Prince to lead the English forces.  According to Le Vie du Black 
Prince Noir, Jean de Grailly, the Captal de Buch, led a contingent of Gascon barons to 
London and requested a “chieftaine de vostre sang.”87  The Prince, then, was someone 
whom the Gascons were willing to acknowledge as a leader and to follow, and the Prince 
was not unknown to them.  Indeed, the Captal de Buch was a familiar figure at the 
English court.88  The Prince also was a renowned and respected soldier; he had already 
proven himself at Crécy (1346) when he was sixteen, both to Edward III and to many of 
the soldiers who accompanied the Prince to Gascony in 1355.89  He could command 
loyalty.  Furthermore, as the Prince of Wales, he was a legitimate choice to endow with 
                                                
85Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 424. “In dicto concilio apud Westmonasterium 
ordinatum fuit quod dominus Edwardus…transfretaret in Vasconiam…” 
86Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 15; Green, The Black Prince, 53; Rogers, 
War Cruel and Sharp, 293–4. 
87Chandos Herald, Le Vie du Black Prince Noir, ed. Diane B. Tyson (Tübingen, 1975), 
63, lines 542–43. 
88De Buch’s name appears throughout the documentary and narrative sources.  For more 
on de Buch, see next chapter.  For the most recent monograph on de Buch, see Denis 
Blanchard-Dignac, Le captal de Buch: Jean de Grailly, 1331–1376 (Bordeaux, 2011). 
89Kelly DeVries, “Teenagers at War During the Middle Ages,” in The Premodern 
Teenager: Youth in Society, 1150–1650, ed. Konrad Eisenbichler, 207–23 (Toronto, 
2002), at 208. 
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the power to represent the king and speak with the king’s voice in Gascony and France.90 
Nor was the Prince’s relative inexperience—as a commander not as a soldier—
ignored in the choice of secondary commanders.  It is no accident that the Prince’s 
(presumably) closest advisors were both experienced and familiar to the Prince.91  Nor is 
it a coincidence that his staff included four earls and no fewer than ten of the original 
Knights of the Garter, including Jean de Grailly and other leading Gascon nobles.  The 
careful selection of advisors suggests not only that Edward III wanted to make sure that 
his son was advised ably but also that the King wanted to do whatever he could to ensure 
the success of this expedition.92  This perhaps also helps explain the early orders for ships 
for the earl of Warwick.  It is possible that Warwick and his retinue sailed for Gascony 
prior to the Prince’s departure in order to prepare for the arrival of the Prince’s troops.  
Warwick did, in fact, serve as the constable of the army and led the vanguard when the 
army left Bordeaux.93  Warwick and Robert Ufford, first earl of Suffolk (1298–1369), did 
                                                
90The indenture between the Prince and Edward III explicitly states “as if the king were 
there in person” and grants the Prince broad authority to make truces, accept homages, 
pass judgment, and punish rebels, all of which is in keeping with Edward III’s goals.  For 
more about the sources of the Prince’s authority, see my article, “Symbols and Soldiers: 
English Royal Authority in Gascony, 1355–1356,” in Authorities in the Middle Ages: 
Influence, Legitimacy, and Power in Medieval Society, Fundamentals of Medieval and 
Early Modern Culture 12, ed. Sini Kangas, Mia Korpiola, and Tuija Ainonen, 267–83 
(Berlin, 2013).  For the Anglo-Norman text of the indenture, see Mollie M. Madden, 
“The Indenture between Edward III and the Black Prince for the Prince’s Expedition to 
Gascony, 10 July 1355.” Journal of Medieval Military History XII (2014): 165–71. 
91The earl of Warwick, for example, had been the Prince’s mentor on the Crécy 
campaign.  See Baker’s descriptions of the Crécy campaign for the list of men who 
served with and under the Prince in 1346.  Many of them are the same men who served in 
1355–56.  See also David Green’s work on the Prince’s retinue. 
92Like the small raids the Prince led during the Crécy campaign, this expedition also was 
a learning experience. 
93Baker, Chronicon, 230. 
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leave from Southampton, rather than Plymouth, and while it is unclear which part of the 
army departed first for Bordeaux, it is clear that the Prince’s expedition was meant to 
absorb Warwick’s force.94  
Money 
The chevauchée required a great deal of money to organize and finance, and once the 
decision to send an expedition to Gascony became official at the council there was a 
flurry of financial activity.  The Prince, like his soldiers, was “paid advance war wages 
and reward for himself and the men of his own retinue for half a year,” with more 
advances promised if the king “wishe[d] the prince to stay longer in those parts.”95  The 
Prince’s wages and “regard” (bonus) came to 8129l 18s.96  The four earls also received 
considerable sums.  The wages and regard for the Prince and the earls ran to nearly 
14,500l.  The Prince’s treasurer also distributed advances and wages and paid for supplies 
and victuals.  Before the expedition had even sailed for France, Peter de Lacy, the 
Prince’s receiver-general, had already paid more than 7242l ¼d “for the fees and wages 
of divers knights and men-at-arms retained for the prince’s expedition to Gascony, as 
well as for victuals and other items needed for the expedition.”97  This required a flow of 
ready cash, which meant the Prince had to find ways to raise it, in addition to that 
provided by the King. 
One source of money was the Prince’s own resources, which, however, were 
insufficient for his needs.  His wardrobe accounts should have been well-organized, 
                                                
94Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 22. 
95TNA, E 36/278, f. 88r.  BPR, IV, 144. 
96TNA, E 403/377, m. 29. 
97BPR, IV, 156. 
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considering that Gervase de Wilford, Hugh de Colewik, Nicholas Pynnok, and William 
de Sridlyngton were commissioned in late November 1354 to audit William de 
Northwell’s accounts as keeper of the Prince’s wardrobe and the “treasurer of the 
household” “for the whole duration of his keepership.”98  The accounts of Peter de Lacy, 
the Prince’s receiver-general in London, were also audited in late November and early 
December of 1354.99  Granted, these audits are not evidence of campaign planning as 
early as November 1354, but they do suggest that, when the decision was made to send 
the expedition to Gascony, the Prince—or at least his administrators—had a relatively 
good idea as to his available funds and the state of his financial affairs100—and his need 
for additional money.  It cannot have escaped their notice that he was in debt, that of the 
422l expected from North Wales in the spring 300l was assigned to pay France Bochel, 
merchant of London, Thomas Perle of London, and William Orleton, merchant of 
Lodelow, with the remainder to pay the wages of John de Wengefeld.101  These funds, 
then, were not available to finance the Prince’s military preparations.  
Given the known state of the Prince’s finances, it was patently obvious that he 
needed more money.  Master John de Brunham, chamberlain of Chester, was to bring 
with him to London “as much as he can get of the moneys assigned for the prince’s 
household and the works of Kenyngton, retaining the moneys assigned for the prince’s 
                                                
98BPR, IV, 120. 
99BPR, IV, 121. 
100Hewitt argues that the Prince’s finances were unstable. Hewitt, The Black Prince’s 
Expedition, 25.  He had many debts, had recently given lavish gifts, and enjoyed dice.  
Creditors were understandably concerned about the possibility of the Prince’s death in 
France. 
101BPR, IV, 130, 132. 
Chapter 3: The Preparations for the Chevauchée 
 
85 
chamber and wardrobe for making the payments of fees to the knights and esquires…and 
for buying cloth for the prince’s archers.”102  This tells us that the money for paying 
soldiers and providing livery to archers was to come from specific accounts and that the 
Prince, in London, needed money.  The wages of archers from Chester and Flint, as well 
as the wages of their captains, came “out of the common fine of Cheshire [the fine 
imposed on Chester as a result of the aborted 1353 rising] and the subsidy of the county 
of Flynt [a grant of 1000 marks (666.67L) made to the Prince by the county of Flint in 
1353].”103 
As of 4 September, the Prince’s auditors had informed him of the funds available 
from all of his lordships: 1338l 8s 2.5d from Chester; 1093l 13s 10.5d from South Wales; 
and 587l 16s 5d from North Wales.104  The total funds the Prince could hope to levy from 
his holdings, then, came to 3,019l 18s 6d.  While this is a not insignificant sum, assuming 
it was levied in full and in a timely fashion, it would be insufficient to meet the financial 
needs of the Prince’s expedition—especially considering the initial outlay for shipping 
and advance wages.  According to Henxteworth’s financial accounts of the campaign, the 
“sum of the issue” regularly came to more than 100l per week.  Over the course of the 
eight week campaign, Henxteworth paid out 1650l 16s 9d and an additional 2006l 6s 9.9d 
upon the conclusion of the expedition, for a final sum of 3657l 3s 6.9d.  The Prince’s 
personal resources alone could not cover these expenditures, let alone the total cost of the 
                                                
102BPR, III, 201.  The Cheshire archers wore green and white livery.  BPR, III, 204. 
103BPR, III, 204.  In 1353 there was the threat of a rising in Chester.  The Prince averted 
it through a show of force.  Heavy fines followed.  See BPR, III, 137, 140, and 162 for 
other entries related to the subsidy of Flint. 
104BPR, III, 214-5. 
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campaign.  During the expedition, the Prince received several large loans totaling 1638l 
1s 9d from John de Stretle, the Constable of Bordeaux.105 
Another source of money was the King and grants made expressly to the Prince of 
moneys that usually would have gone to the King.  For example, the King on 21 June 
“granted…to the prince…all the issues [fines], amercements [a penalty or fine assessed at 
the discretion of the court] and other profits of the last sessions in Cornewaille which 
pertain to the king,” and Robert de Eleford was ordered to levy the funds with all haste on 
8 July 1355.  It was the same for Devonshire.106  The Prince, as we know, had not yet 
arrived in Plymouth, and he was in need of funds, especially as it became clearer that the 
army would be in Plymouth for some time and would need to be supplied for the duration 
(see below). 
The Prince also received money “of the king’s gift” from the previous sessions of 
the justices of trailbaston [travelling tribunals appointed to suppress violence by brigands 
and local disorder] in Cornwall.  Some of this money was used to pay for purveyance 
[provisioning] at Plymouth.  By 7 September the cost of purveyance of victuals for the 
Prince’s household, which numbered more than 250 in 1369,107 not the entire force, had 
                                                
105Henxteworth, passim.  These seem to be personal loans, as Henxteworth differentiates 
loans from Stretle and loans from the treasurer, which came to 2058l 3s 8d.  The Prince 
also received a number of small personal loans from individual soldiers, such as Sir 
William Peykirke who leant the Prince 9l during the campaign. (DCO, Henxteworth 
accounts, entry for 14 January 1356, which records the repayment of the loan). 
106TNA, C 66/246, m. 20; BPR, II, 79; CPR, 10, 251. 
107David Green, Edward the Black Prince: Power in Medieval Europe (Harlow, 2007), 
129.  This figure is more than twenty years after the 1355 expedition and dates to the 
Prince’s tenure as Prince of Aquitaine, which began in 1362.  He and his spouse resided 
in Gascony and had an established household.  It is likely his household was smaller in 
Chapter 3: The Preparations for the Chevauchée 
 
87 
reached a sum greater than 1000l, and the Prince also contacted the chamberlain of South 
Wales for an additional 400l to help pay for it.108  As further recognition of the Prince’s 
unusual expenses, he received another 1000 marks (666.67l) yearly, which would be 
taken out of the customs of London.109  This grant recognized that the earl of Salisbury 
received a grant of 1000 marks (666.67l) yearly from Cornwall, money that would not 
then be available to the Prince.110 
The Prince also found money from other sources.  For example, Robert de 
Eleford, steward and sheriff of Cornwall, was ordered on 8 March 1355  “to join with the 
prince’s havener [harbor master] in selling the said wines [seized from a ship in Plymouth 
in February 1355], as the prince has learned that the wines in those parts are now dearer 
than they had been, to wit, 10 marks [6.67l] the tun.”  This order was made on the advice 
of John de Wengefeld, the Prince’s bachelor,111 who was “chief of the Prince’s council 
under the earl of Suffolk”112 in 1351 and later described as the “governor of [the Prince’s] 
affairs” in 1358.113  A later order to Thomas Filz Henry, the havener, of 28 March 
instructed him “to sell the said wines quickly at as high a price and in as profitable a 
manner as possible,” despite a decline in the market price.114  This could suggest that the 
                                                                                                                                            
1355.  It was not yet firmly established, and not every member of the household 
accompanied the Prince on the expedition. 
108BPR, II, 86. 
109TNA, C 66/246, m. 18; CPR, 10, 255. 
110TNA, C 54/193, m. 12; CCR, X, 154. 
111A bachelor was a man who had been knighted but did not have his own banner, thus he 
was not a banneret. 
112BPR, IV, 31. 
113BPR, IV, 263. For more about Wengefeld’s importance and role in the Prince’s affairs, 
see below. 
114BPR, II, 77. 
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Prince needed to raise cash, possibly to help fund the expedition to Gascony.  Other 
revenue options included pressing for the repayment of debts, such as the 500l owed by 
Sir Thomas Wogan and the approximately 250l owed by the countess of Hainault, which 
might provide a nice sum but would have been insufficient to meet his pressing and 
extraordinary needs.115 
The Prince also needed money to use abroad, and this is why the merchant 
Cenobe du Chastel was appointed on 27 June 1355 “to buy gold of all sorts for the 
prince’s use, both for convenience of carriage of the prince’s moneys during this 
expedition and also for the prince’s profit in making payments beyond seas.”116  This 
means the Prince would be carrying cash with him and would be accompanied by the 
necessary accountants and treasurers to keep track of it.  The Prince’s yeoman, John 
Henxteworth was assigned to this ‘department.’  Based on his careful accounts 
Henxteworth was more than capable.117  Wages had to be paid during the expedition; 
supplies had to be purchased.   
Furthermore, the final reason for Chastel’s appointment, “making payments 
beyond seas,” certainly could refer to wages and purchases but more likely refers to other 
types of payments, namely financial incentives to potential allies or to those Gascons 
                                                
115See, for example, BPR, IV, 139 and 143 regarding the repayment of a loan made to the 
Countess of Hainault, the Prince’s aunt. 
116BPR, IV, 134. 
117Henxteworth’s accounts and abilities will be discussed further in this and later 
chapters.  He was an able, efficient, and meticulous cashier for the duration of the 
campaign. 
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would needed to be ‘encouraged’ to return to their loyalty to England.118  Furthermore, 
the indenture [contract for military service] between Edward III and the Prince addressed 
this concern, stating that the Prince would be taking money with him “sufficient for the 
conciliation of the people of the country and such other purposes as he shall think proper 
for the king’s profit.”119  This suggests that Edward III’s purpose in sending this 
expedition to Gascony was more than the destruction of an enemy’s resources, although 
that was certainly part of it.  It indicates that the King and the Prince were committed to 
the aims of the campaign: restoring English royal authority in Gascony. 
The Prince, of course, was not the only one who needed money.  Those who 
accompanied him also had to find the funds to pay for their equipment and retainers.  For 
example, John de Sancto Philberto requested, and was granted, permission to “alienate in 
fee his manor…to the man or men who will provide for him a certain sum of money to fit 
him out to go to Gascony…”120 for up to two years after his death to raise the loan to pay 
for equipping himself for the expedition to Gascony.121  Essentially, then, John de St. 
Philbert could transfer the "ownership" of his manor in exchange for the money he 
needed to outfit himself for the campaign.122 
Supplies 
Transport Costs 
                                                
118Henxteworth did make cash payments to a few Gascon nobles who changed their 
allegiance to Edward III.  DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 24 and 30 June 1356. 
119TNA, E 278, f. 88.  BPR, IV, 144.  “…sufficeaunte p\ur/ conforter les gentz du pais et 
p\ur/ autres choses qil verra que soit affaire p\ur/ profit le Roi…” 
120CPR, 10, 224. 
121CPR, 10, 303. 
122For discussion on alienation of property, see Susan Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals: the 
medieval evidence reinterpreted (Oxford, 2001), 379–84 for England. 
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Supplies, of course, had to be transported to Plymouth from the English countryside, and 
the least expensive way to do so was water transport.123  The receiver [an official charged 
with receiving rents, tolls, and other monies; similar to a treasurer] and havener of 
Cornwall were both familiar with using the rivers and sea to transport supplies.  For 
example, an 11 September 1354 order commanded John de Kendale (receiver) and 
Thomas (havener) to hire “carriage by sea as far as Suthampton [sic.] for the venison 
[and] fish…which the prince has at Rostormel [sic.].”124  As Restormel Castle is on the 
River Fowey, the most logical course of action given the comparatively high cost of 
overland transport would have been to send the supplies to the coast via river transport, 
then transfer them to another ship for the journey to Southampton.  This transshipping, 
according to James Masschaele, was common.  Based on his study of the shrieval 
purveyance accounts, which record transport costs with varying degrees of specificity, 
Masschaele concludes that overland transport cost 1.5d per ton-mile, river transport cost 
0.7d per ton-mile, and sea transport cost between 0.2d per ton-mile (coastal transport) and 
0.3d per ton-mile (to the continent).  The ratio, then, of the costs of land transport : river 
transport : sea transport is approximately 8 : 4 : 1.125 
This was a common procedure, as shown in John Langdon’s article on the inland 
waterways, which demonstrates the frequency with which sheriffs and purveyors shipped 
                                                
123A. Burford, “Heavy Transport in Classical Antiquity,” Economic History Review, New 
Series 13, no. 1 (1960): 1–18; Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the 
Macedonian Army, 26–27. 
124BPR, II, 68–9. 
125James Masschaele, “Transport Costs in Medieval England,” Economic History Review, 
New Series 46, no. 2 (1993): 266–79, at 271–73.  The ‘standard rate’ of pay was 14d per 
day per cart, although some sheriffs did pay 18d per day per cart. 
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supplies to the coast via river transport, then along the coast to another port where the 
supplies were loaded onto a sea-going vessel.126  This order is further evidence that an 
organized supply and or trade route existed which the Prince’s purveyors could use in 
1355.127  In particular, the use of inland waterways in purveyance was “exceedingly 
complex,”128 and it was typical for the sheriffs charged with the purveyance of supplies 
and carriage of same to use a combination of land and water transport.  Typically, the 
supplies would be transported overland to a depot near water, where it was loaded onto 
suitable river transports and shipped to the coast.  Upon reaching the coast, the supplies 
either were loaded onto a sea-going vessel for transport to the ultimate destination or 
taken along the coast in a smaller ship to the final port.129  
The Prince’s retinue mustered at Plymouth, a port town, not simply because it 
needed a port from which to sail but precisely because of the ease with which supplies 
could be brought to the assembled army, an advantage that became quite clear as the 
army remained at Plymouth some weeks past its scheduled departure.  Without the option 
of resupply from the sea and the high cost of land transport, the army would have 
                                                
126John Langdon, “The Efficiency of Inland Water Transport in medieval England,” in 
Waterways and Canal Building in Medieval England, ed. John Blair, 110–30 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 112, 117–19.  River transport was capable of shipping 
loads of less than 25 quarters (7047.6 lbs) to more than 100 quarters (21,190.4 lbs). 
127The necessary coastal infrastructure had existed for some time, given that Restormel 
Castle dated to the Norman period and given that the castles in Wales depended on 
resupply by sea as recently as Edward I’s reign.  Peter Brears, “Food Supply and 
Preparation at the Edwardian Castles,” in The Impact of the Edwardian Castles in Wales, 
ed. Diane M. Williams and John R. Kenyon, 85–98 (Oxford, 2010), 85. 
128Langdon, “The Efficiency of Inland Water Transport in medieval England,” 129. 
129Masschaele, “Transport Costs in Medieval England,” 267. 
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stripped the surrounding area of available resources long before its eventual departure.130  
Furthermore, these resources must have been stored from the previous harvest, as the 
1355 harvest would not have been gathered in July. 
Supplies also came from diverse sources.  For example, the mayor of Dartmouth 
and the water-bailiffs [port officer responsible for enforcing shipping regulations, 
collecting customs, and searching ships] arrested the cog [a one-masted ship, see below], 
Le Escluse, supposedly laden with wheat.  Once it was clear it held “wares of divers 
merchants,” the ship was released on condition that it unload those wares nowhere 
“within the power of France or elsewhere for the succour of the enemies of the king and 
the prince.”131  This incident also shows the concern with keeping supplies away from 
France. 
In England, comestible supplies were generally purchased, and fairs and markets 
in the designated area were regularly cancelled in advance of purveyance to ensure an 
ample supply of goods for the king’s use.132  Without the fairs and markets, farmers and 
merchants had little choice but to sell to the royal purveyors.  Richard Gerounde and 
Walter de Wyght were to be paid 7l 22d and 19l 16s respectively “for wheat purchased 
for [the Prince’s] expedition to Gascony.”  The purchases were made before 6 September, 
                                                
130See Engels, 45–47, for examples of this on Alexander’s campaigns; Douglass Southall 
Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command, vol. 3 (New York, 1944), 20–189, for 
his explanation of how supplies affected General Lee’s decisions at Gettysburg in 1863. 
131BPR, II, 80.  It should be noted, too, that the system was plagued by corruption.  See, 
for example, CPR, X, 161 for an actual complaint.  See also the works by Ilana Krug, 
cited below. 
132Ilana Krug, “Royal Prerogative Gone Astray: The Social and Economic Impact of 
Purveyance of the English Peasantry at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War (PhD 
diss., University of Toronto, 2006), iii–iv. 
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when Peter de Lacy, the Prince’s clerk, was ordered to pay their bill.133  Payment, of 
course, could take time.  John son of John Rous of Northflete was still waiting in 
February 1356 for his 33s 4d for beans and peas purchased before the Prince’s fleet left 
Plymouth.134  That said, it seems that there was an effort to ensure timely payment.  On 7 
September, shortly before the fleet sailed, the Prince ordered that “speedy payment be 
made for the victuals which he has taken for the expenses of his household at Plympton 
[Plympton Priory was about 4–5 miles from Plymouth]…up to the sum of 1067l 8s 11 
¾d, which is the extent of the purveyance, as more fully appears by…an indenture 
containing respectively the names of persons, the particulars, and the amounts of the said 
purveyance…”135  The indenture was included with the order.  The Prince’s chamberlain 
of South Wales received his own orders, namely to provide 400l to help pay the bills.136 
Clearly, a large amount of supplies was needed.  More than one hundred pigs had 
already been shipped from Southampton to Gascony, although those pigs were officially 
for provisioning castles.137  In March, the sheriff of Southampton received orders to arrest 
threshers [workers to separate the grain and straw, usually by using a flail] “for threshing 
the wheat bought and purveyed…for provisioning the king’s towns and castles in 
Gascony,” and to pay them the King’s wages, and arrange transport.138  The transport of 
                                                
133BPR, IV, 153. 
134BPR, IV, 180.  Rous had his tally and had the support of Sir Ives de Clynton, who was 
willing to pay the sum in the event it was not reimbursed by the Prince’s staff.  The 
document states only that the food was purchased for the Prince’s expedition to Gascony 
and does not give a specific date. 
135BPR, II, 86. 
136BPR, II 86. 
137TNA, C 54/193, m. 35.  CCR, X, 112. 
138TNA, C 54/193, m. 32.  CCR, X, 118. 
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wheat from England to Gascony was a regular feature of Anglo-Gascon trade—the 
Gascons shipped wine, but this shows the machinery of purveyance in action.  Clearly, 
purveying the wheat, itself, was not enough.  It had to be threshed, then transported.  
While this wheat was not meant for the Prince’s army—at least not as of 1 March—it 
illustrates the method by which the Prince’s army would be supplied. As of 14 April no 
wheat was to be taken out of England except to Calais, i.e., not for Gascony or for selling 
abroad.139  
The purveyance procedure was already well established by Edward III’s reign.  
He made one significant adaptation, the shift to the use of royal clerks to oversee the 
process in 1336.  Each clerk or official was responsible for a county or number of 
counties in England.140  In many cases, though, the sheriff continued to be charged with 
purveyance.  Whether the sheriff worked alone or in collaboration with the official royal 
purveyor, he remained an integral part of the administration of purveyance as had been 
the case from the Norman and Angevin periods.141  The sheriffs and their bailiffs acquired 
the goods and arranged transport; upon reaching the depot or port, the official responsible 
for receiving the supplies (the receiver) recorded the supplies in his accounts.  All the 
officials—purveyors, sheriffs, and receivers—kept meticulous accounts, which were 
subject to auditing by the royal government.  Purveyance took an average of five to ten 
                                                
139TNA, C 54/193, m. 28v.  CCR, X, 190. 
140Krug, “Royal Prerogative,” 103–11. 
141Krug, “Royal Prerogative,” 103–11.  
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months and was widely dispersed throughout England.142  
The purveyance for the Prince’s expedition followed similar lines.  Orders were 
sent to officials in Cornwall, typically the sheriff and steward, John de Kendale, the 
receiver John de Skirbeek, and the havener Thomas.  The purveyance began in April and 
the army sailed from Plymouth in late September, which allowed the purveyors just over 
five months to complete their task.  That said, if the expedition had sailed as planned, the 
purveyors would have had only four months in which to gather adequate supplies.  This 
would be slightly below the average but still achievable. 
As an example of the purveyance in action, in April, officials in Cornwall 
received orders to purvey oats (300 quarters),143 wheat (100 quarters), and brushwood 
(presumably for fuel), as well as to stop selling the wine and instead preserve if for the 
expedition.144  The quarter equaled eight bushels or sixty-four gallons.145  This one order, 
then, amounted to 2400 bushels of oats and 800 bushels of wheat, or 84,571.2 lbs and 
28,190.4 lbs respectively.146  The oats would provide the daily allotment of grain for 
8457 horses or two days’ rations for 4228 horses.  In other terms, the oats thus purveyed 
                                                
142Krug, “Royal Prerogative,” 103–11.  See also, Prestwich, War, Politics, and Finance 
under Edward I; and John Robert Maddicott, The English Peasantry and the Demands of 
the Crown, 1294–1341 (Oxford, 1975). 
143A “quarter” was equivalent to eight bushels of wheat; one bushel of wheat was defined 
as eight gallons of wine and customarily weighed 64 tower lbs.  Zupko, English Weights 
and Measures, entry for “quarter”.   
144BPR, II 77. 
145TNA, 54/193, m. 12d; CCR, X, 226.  See Zupko, English Weights and Measures, 
entries for “quarter” and “bushel.”  By comparison, in the US, the legal standard for 
wheat is 60lbs per bushel.  My calculations are based on the English Winchester bushel 
standard of 35.238 lbs. 
146The US standard for oats is 32lbs per bushel.  I have used the Winchester bushel 
weight of 35.238 lbs in my calculations. 
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would provide the grain ration for between 750 and 800 horses for the voyage to 
Bordeaux at maximum rations, although the horses could survive on less as they were 
hardly working aboard the ships.  While these initially seem like large amounts of grain, 
when subjected to the ineluctable reality of the horses’ daily needs, this purveyance 
would barely dent the overall needs of the army.  Clearly, a great deal more would be 
needed.  All these supplies were to be amassed near Plymouth.147 
Wine was another key component of the purveyance, and Edward III, like English 
kings before him, interfered by setting prices.  Enterprising wine owners, “seeing the 
need of those about to set out” had raised prices after the expedition became public 
knowledge.  In response, in June, Edward III sent his butler, Henry Picard, and the mayor 
and sheriffs of London to inspect all cellars and enroll the wine in lists; then, they were to 
take the wine from the vintners and taverns and deliver it “to the magnates and other 
lieges about to set out.”  The vintners and tavern keepers were to receive the earlier, 
lower price.  Should the amount of wine thus purveyed prove insufficient, Picard, the 
mayor, and the sheriffs were to use their lists and take the wine “beyond [the individual 
owners’] own moderate and necessary consumption” from individual owners so that 
                                                
147BPR, II, 77.  This assumes an average daily requirement of 10lbs of grain per horse. 
Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, 
with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. 
General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355 indicates 9.5lbs of grain per 
animal (428).  The 2000 FM-31–27 (Pack Animals in Support of Army Special 
Operations Forces) indicates a range of requirements based on feeding weight but with an 
average requirement of 10lbs per day.  See FM-31-27, section 2-33 and table 2-3.  Yuval 
Harari gives a figure of 10kg (22lbs) of dry fodder (grain and hay) as the daily ration per 
horse.  Harari, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion 
Campaigns,” 305.  See also Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the 
Macedonian Army, 18. 
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departures would not be delayed.148  Edward III also ordained that a gallon of Gascon 
wine should sell at the same price in Bristol as in London regardless of the additional 
transport costs.149  The wine in this case was for consumption on board the ships, not for 
resale in Gascony. 
Incomestible supplies were also needed.  The Prince had “divers 
saddles…made…for his expedition to Gascony,” and Lambekyn, a saddler identified as 
“of Almain,” was paid 13l 6s 8d on 28 June as an advance for his work.150  Clearly, 
saddles were costly items, and the Prince needed more than one.  This perhaps indicates 
the reality of wear-and-tear on equipment, which would be a natural consequence of the 
rigors of campaigning; repairs could take time, and the Prince likely had different saddles 
for riding and for battle.151  Armor was another key item that was in high demand, and 
the armorers of London knew it—and raised their prices accordingly.  In much the same 
manner as with the wine, Edward III sent men to examine all the armor in the city and 
suburbs, to appraise it, “and to cause it to be sold to the magnates and other lieges…for a 
reasonable price.”152  As with the wine, anyone trying to hide armor would forfeit the said 
item.153 
Another key item was equipment for the archers.  A 6 September order to Peter de 
Lacy, keeper of the great wardrobe, commanded him “to purvey for the prince’s use 400 
                                                
148TNA, C 54/193, m. 25.  CCR, X, 134. 
149TNA, C 54/193, m. 25v.  CCR, X, 196. 
150BPR, IV, 152. 
151Piotr A. Nowakowski, “Remarks on the Construction, Evolution and Use of the War 
Saddle in Late Medieval Poland,” Fasciculi Archaeologiae Historicae 21 (2008): 61–73. 
152TNA, C 54/196, m. 24.  CCR, X, 134. 
153TNA, C 54/196, m. 24.  CCR, X, 134. 
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bows and 1000 sheaves of arrows [traditionally, there are 144 arrows to a sheaf], or as 
many as possible up to that number, and deliver them to the prince’s yeoman…by 
indenture.”154  This order acknowledges the necessity of additional equipment, and it 
indicates that the expedition would have a sizeable supply train (discussed in chapter 5).  
The use of the indenture suggests the importance of these items.  There are indentures for 
the purveyance and delivery of wheat, just as there are indentures for jewels and 
gold…and bows and arrows.  It appears that the requested bows and arrows were 
delivered as of 5 September 1355, when the Prince ordered the auditors of his accounts to 
reimburse de Lacy.155 
Aside from these supplies, the Prince needed a few specialized items.  Foremost 
among these was the new seal made for the Prince’s use in Gascony.  It was made by 
John Grenewich, goldsmith, and was equal in weight to 37s 1d.  The Prince paid 4l 17s 
1d for it.156  Unfortunately, it is unclear whether this is a new seal for the Prince to 
replace an existing one or if this is a copy of the King’s seal for the Prince’s use in 
Gascony.  Per the indenture between the King and the Prince, the latter was to “have full 
power under the king’s great seal.”157  It is tempting to speculate about the appearance of 
this new seal, but the Prince’s register fails to provide any particulars.  Silk cord was 
purchased “for letters patent made in the King’s Chancery on behalf of the Prince 
                                                
154BPR, IV, 153. 
155BPR, IV, 169. 
156BPR, IV, 166. 
157BPR, IV, 144. 
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touching his expedition to Gascony.”158 
The Prince took care to make sure his captains also were supplied.  Consider the 
25 May orders (discussed above) concerning the purveyance of wine and wheat for 
Bartholomew de Burghersh and assistance with the carriage of said supplies to 
Plymouth.159  Henry de Blakebourn, clerk and treasurer of the Prince’s household, was to 
make sure that the earl of Oxford, John Willoughby, and Bartholomew de Burghersh 
received their wine.160  The Prince’s generosity extended to other items, too.  The steward 
of the household, Edmund de Wauncy, received a bascinet [helmet] as a gift.161  His 
indenture with the king also specified compensation for lost horses.162  This was a key 
point, as the cost of horses was not inconsiderable.163 
The Prince’s archers from Chester received livery (white and green cloth for coats 
and hats), and the Cheshire archers also received advance pay (6d per day for twenty-one 
days) to cover the expenses of their journey to Plymouth.164  The Welsh archers, too, 
received an advance, but it was considerably smaller (3d per day for ten days) than that of 
                                                
158BPR, IV, 167.  These letters are likely the ones read out in Bordeaux at the cathedral of 
St. Andrew. 
159BPR, II, 78. 
160BPR, IV, 148-9. Oxford received 2 tuns, Burghersh two tuns and a pipe, and 
Willoughby one tun. 
161BPR, IV, 149. 
162BPR, IV, 144. 
163See Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, passim.  His data show that the appraised value of 
warhorses lost on campaigns in the 1330s and 1340 ranged from 100s (5L) at the low end 
for an “equus” to 100L at the high end for a destrier; the value of a courser ranged from 
30L–50L.  See Ayton, 237–40 for his tables. 
164BPR, III, 201, 204. The chamberlain of Chester was to pay the archers before the 
octave of Midsummer. 
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the Cheshiremen, and the Welsh troops had farther to travel.165  Nor were the archers the 
only members of the expedition that received help with outfitting themselves for the 
campaign.  The Prince spent more than 250l for “divers officers of the 
household…towards their outfit.”166  Two Friars Preachers, possibly serving as chaplains, 
also received money (7l 6s 8d) “towards their preparations for the voyage.”167 
All in all, the machinery of purveyance and recruitment seems to have functioned 
without undue difficulties, as there is no evidence of failure in the records.168  The 
purveyors’ efficiency, though, ran up against the long delay in Plymouth—more than 
forty days according to Baker169—and additional supplies were needed.  The Prince owed 
Ralph de Miduay and Thomas Waryn for twenty quarters and seventeen and a half 
quarters of wheat, respectively, purchases that were made for the Prince’s household 
while at Plymouth.  Incidentally, they were to be paid in part from the money raised from 
the last trailbaston session in Cornwall and Devonshire.170   
There is no suggestion in the sources that the army went hungry at Plymouth or 
ran out of comestibles during the sea voyage , suggesting that the purveyors were able to 
acquire the additional supplies needed not only for the  extended stay at Plymouth but 
also for the journey to Bordeaux.  Their successful handling of the problem is further 
testimony to their efficiency and England’s economic strength.  The ability of the military 
                                                
165BPR, III, 204 and 491. 
166BPR, IV, 166–67. 
167BPR, IV, 167. 
168See Krug, “Royal Prerogative Gone Astray,” and Krug, “Peasants and Purveyance at 
the Beginning of the Hundred Years War.” 
169Baker, Chronicon, 226. 
170BPR, II, 83. 
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purveyors to adapt to the delay also indicates the importance of the weather and the need 
for adequate shipping,171 as the need for additional supplies was a result not of 
shortcomings on the part of the purveyors but of a decided lack of shipping and adverse 
weather. 
The delay also exposed the expedition to another danger: attack.  In July, the King 
learned that French “galleys and ships in no small multitude” were sailing for England 
“to burn and destroy his [Edward III] shipping…”  Ports received orders to protect ships 
by bringing the  ships as near to land as possible and make certain that any vessels 
leaving port were “well and sufficiently furnished,” as well as to take steps to safeguard 
the town and shipping districts.  Southampton and Plymouth figured prominently in the 
list of ports thus addressed.  These included: Southampton, Portsmouth, Hastings, 
Shorham, Peiveseye, Chichester, Melcombe, Weymouth, la Pole, Lyme, Warham, 
Toppesham, Exeter, Plymouth, Dartmouth, Exmouth, Fowy, Barnestaple, and 
Sidemouth.172 
Ships 
Clearly, the Prince needed ships capable of transporting him and his army—and all of the 
equipment and victuals that were not in Aquitaine—to Bordeaux.  The English had 
significant experience at cross-Channel transport, and Edward III and his advisors clearly 
understood the complexities of raising and victualling a fleet.173  Those charged with the 
task were administrators well-versed in their duties and procedures, and the “complexities 
                                                
171Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition. 
172TNA, C 54/193, m. 17v.  CCR, X, 214–15. 
173Craig Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the 
Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011), 6. 
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of the bureaucratic procedures involved in raising a fleet…show that the Edwardian kings 
and their advisors had a firm grasp of the advantages to be gained through careful 
management of the kingdom’s maritime resources and by the deployment of fleets.”174  
And well they should, as it often required mobilizing more manpower—and funds—than 
raising land forces and was a key part of the supply systems on which land-based troops 
depended, and “the logistical capabilities of the English merchant fleet were paramount 
to any successful campaign…in enemy territory.”175  One reason for their success was the 
continuity in administrative personnel and the knowledge of experienced clerks, although 
in the 1350s through the 1370s there was less continuity as the bureaucratic tasks were 
carried out by sergeants-at-arms appointed on an ad hoc basis instead of professional 
clerks.176   
England’s Shipping Experience 
Naval forces were, obviously, fundamental for cross-Channel warfare, and England’s 
ability to transport and supply troops was a crucial part of the English successes during 
the Hundred Years War.  Ships were necessary for Edward III to maintain a trans-marine 
kingdom in peace time, and the naval conflict during his reign was part of an ongoing 
pattern dating at least to the reign of Edward I (1239–1307) and likely earlier.177  England 
had had to transport soldiers, horses, supplies, war machines and support personnel for 
                                                
174Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 6. 
175Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 2 and 9. 
176Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 25 and 31. 
177Timothy J. Runyan, “Ships and Fleets in Anglo-French Warfare, 1337–1360,” The 
American Neptune 40, no. 2 (Spring 1986): 91–99, at p. 91. 
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more than a century, and ships provided both convoy escorts and logistical support.178  
Ships were not used to fight naval battles (with a few exceptions, such as Sluys in 1340), 
but to carry soldiers and supplies for planned expeditions or to resupply campaigns or 
sieges already in progress.179  Edward III’s 1337 claim to the French throne did not 
change this pattern; rather, it increased the importance of control of the English 
Channel180 and English shipping.  Thanks to the victory at Sluys, Edward III had “firmer 
control of the North Sea and English Channel,”181 which was a central component of his 
continental strategy.182  If nothing else, it enabled the (relatively) unhindered 
transportation of English armies to the Continent.   
There were three main types of sea-going vessels during the early phases of the 
Hundred Years War: small sailing vessels, oared boats, and large ships of up to 250 tuns 
carrying capacity,183 approximately 33–40 cubic feet.184  For example, a late-fourteenth-
century cog of 78–80 tuns would not be considered a large vessel, but a 240-tun cog from 
                                                
178Timothy J. Runyan, “The Cog as Warship,” in Cogs, Caravels and Galleons: the 
sailing ship from 1000–1650 (London, 1994), 47-58, at 50, 53. 
179Bryce Lyon, “The Infrastructure and Purpose of an English Medieval Fleet in the First 
Phase of the Hundred Years’ War (1338–1340),” Handelingen der Maatschappij voor 
Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent, New Series 51 (1997): 61–76, at 64. 
180Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, “Naval Warfare after the Viking Age,” in Medieval 
Warfare: A History, ed. Maurice Keen (Oxford, 1999), 230–52, at 245.  
181Lyon, “The Infrastructure and Purpose of an English Medieval Fleet,” 62. 
182Timothy J. Runyan, “Naval Logistics in the Late Middle Age: The Example of the 
Hundred Years War,” in Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle 
Ages to the Present, ed. John A. Lynn, 79–100 (Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford, 1993), at 
93. 
183Timothy J. Runyan, “Naval Power and Maritime Technology during the Hundred 
Years War,” in War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, ed. John B. 
Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger, 53–69 (Woodbridge, 2003),, at 60.  The ton/tun is the 
wine tun of 252 gallons, which weighed approximately 2520 lbs; therefore, a ship of 80 
tons had a carrying capacity of 201,600 lbs (100.8 tons). 
184Runyan, “Cog as Warship,” 49. 
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1241 would be.185  In the 1350s, there were ships with tonnages greater than 150 tuns, but 
these were relatively rare.186  Customs evidence from 1327 shows that there were ships 
carrying greater than 200 tuns of cargo,187 and a ship of 200 tuns, the Seintmaricog, did 
sail in the Prince’s fleet.188   
During this phase, all ships were one-masted, as two- and three-masted ships did 
not appear until the early fifteenth-century.189  One-masted ships with a square sail were 
typical of northern Europe, and the earliest two-masted English ship dates to 1410 and 
was first used in Henry V’s (1387–1422) fleet in 1414/1417.190  Therefore, we can 
reasonably conclude that the Prince’s fleet likely included a number of one-masted ships 
of varying carrying-capacities, but somewhere between 78–80 and 150 tons or 2574–
2640 ft3 and 4950 ft3 carrying capacity, with a few ships outside of those parameters.  
Seintmaricog certainly exceeded 150 tons, and undoubtedly smaller vessels sailed in the 
fleet, as the order of 27 April 1355 for the arrest of all ships of more than twenty tuns 
indicates.191 
Oared vessels had an advantage over sailing ships, in that they could move 
                                                
185Runyan, “Naval Power and Maritime Technology,” 62.  Jan Bill lists the Bremen cog 
as an 84 tun vessel in “The Cargo Vessels,” in Cogs, Cargoes, and Commerce: Maritime 
Bulk Trade in Northern Europe, 1150–1400, ed. Lars Berggren, Nils Hybel, and Annette 
Landen, 92–112 (Toronto, 2002), at 99.  
186Ian Friel, “Oars, Sails and Guns: The English and War at Sea, c. 1200–c. 1500,” in 
War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, eds. John B. Hattendorf and Richard 
W. Unger (Woodbridge, 2003), 69–79, at 76. 
187Bill, “The Cargo Vessels,” 99.  His evidence comes from the Calendar of Memoranda 
Rolls for 1326–1327. 
188TNA, E101/26/37, m. 3. 
189Runyan, “Naval Power and Maritime Technology,” 60. 
190Friel, “Oars, Ships and Guns,” 71–72. 
191Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 298–99. 
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independently of the wind.  They could be quite large; according to Ian Friel’s research a 
ballinger [a light, oared vessel, sometimes referred to in Middle English as a barge] dated 
to 1401 had a hundred oars.  However, the large crew this necessitated limited the time 
the ship could spend at sea, and, by the fifteenth-century, sailing ships had replaced oared 
vessels as the primary naval force of the English fleet.  Oared vessels continued to be 
used as auxiliary crafts, particularly for reconnaissance and patrol.192  Replacing oared 
vessels with sailing ships was economical, in that it reduced the crew size and cost 
because oarsman no longer needed to be paid or fed.  It increased the amount of space 
available for carrying supplies, as the oarsman would not be taking up that space.193  The 
height of the sailing ships and the addition of fighting castles were causes of this shift; 
height, especially, was a critical advantage in naval warfare during the Middle Ages.194  
Height was particularly advantageous for the archers and crossbow men.195  These factors 
made the ships more difficult to attack.196 
The records of English ships show a variety of vessels active between 1337 and 
1360 and, therefore, available to Edward III and his administration for the purposes of 
transporting men, horses and supplies to the continent.  These included hulks [large, 
unwieldy transport vessel], caracals or carracks [large transport ships, often outfitted for 
war], galleys [low, oared vessels with a single deck], and cogs [one-masted ships with a 
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stern rudder], as well as others.197  England relied primarily upon the cog, while France 
generally employed galleys.198  In England, galleys were for the king, and they did not 
lend themselves to bulk transport.  However, galleys were best for raiding the shore.199  
Of these types, the cog is most prevalent.200  During this period, Timothy Runyan has 
shown that of the ships identified by type in the records 57 percent are cogs.  There are 
one hundred eighty-seven cogs, compared to forty-six “ships”, the only other type that 
has more than twenty vessels listed.201  While these percentages do not necessarily apply 
to the remaining 965 unidentified vessels, it is possible that a large number of them also 
were cogs.   
The cog was not fast, but it was durable.  It had a boxy shape, straight stem and 
stern, flush-laid bottom and a high freeboard.  It was also clinker-built and had a single, 
square sail, which was easier, and cheaper, to use than the lateen sail.  A Mediterranean 
vessel with lateen sails needed roughly double the crew.202  At the time of the Prince’s 
voyage, the most common vessel was the cog, followed by barges and ballingers.  The 
majority of his fleet was made up of cogs.203 
The Prince’s Fleet 
The Prince’s fleet, according to Craig Lambert, was “one of the most important of the 
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period.”204  He needed sufficient transport for his men, horses for those who would not be 
purchasing mounts in Bordeaux, and sufficient comestible supplies, including water, for 
the journey from Plymouth and Southampton to Bordeaux (420 and 421 nautical miles,205 
respectively), not to mention the incomestible supplies such as extra bow staves and 
arrows.206  Securing adequate shipping, then, was an immediate concern, particularly 
given that Lancaster’s campaign, departing from the Thames also required ships as did 
the king’s proposed personal expedition to Picardy.207   
Furthermore, one significant reason for the Prince’s delay in Plymouth was a lack 
of ships, underscoring in that failure the singular importance of this aspect of the Prince’s 
logistics.  The difficulty in providing transport also indicates that England lacked 
adequate shipping, in this instance, to meet the transport needs of multiple expeditions.  
Orders regarding this issue indicate that the naval clerks;208 the sheriffs of Devon and 
                                                
204Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Army, 153. 
205James Inman, Nautical Tables Designed for the Use of British Seamen, New Edition, 
Revised, Rearranged, Enlarged (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co., Ltd., 
1892), Table 51.  
206Edward III did send munitions to Gascony (see above).  The proportion of the supplies 
available to the Prince was probably limited, given that the castle garrisons would need 
supplies.  It is also possible that some of these munitions helped equip the Gascon forces 
assembling to join the English forces.  In December 1355, there was an urgent need for 
more bows, as indicated by the Prince’s orders to Chester. 
207See Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 293, n. 38.  He argues for only two fleets in 1355, 
suggesting that Lancaster’s and the King’s forces sailed together.  The total number of 
ships needed, though, would have been similar, as combining Lancaster’s and the King’s 
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208Walter Harewell, Robert Ledred, Richard de Bosevil, Richard de Cortenhale, Robert 
de Baildon, John de Ellerton, John de Haddon, and Robert de Appelby were all charged 
with arresting ships for the expedition.  Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 297–98. 
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Southampton; John de Beauchamp, admiral of the fleet,209 and his lieutenant Thomas de 
Hoggeshawe, who accompanied the expedition,210 Roger Mortimer, earl of March and 
Warden of the Cinque Ports;211 the King’s council, and Edward III himself were fully 
aware of the situation and were taking all steps to correct it.  The effectiveness with 
which these challenge were met indicates the “English had, by this period, developed a 
safe and secure system of cross Channel communication and transportation,”212 which 
directly benefitted the Prince’s expedition. 
There was a massive effort to secure shipping through a variety of means 
preceding the Prince’s eventual departure on 9 September.  Lambert has shown that 
England had a highly developed and effective administration for arresting ships and 
finding mariners.213  The search for ships for the expedition to Gascony began no later 
than 10 March.  Robert de Ledred, Walter de Harewell, and Richard de Bosevill were 
ordered by the king to arrest all ships with a carrying capacity of “thirty tuns and 
                                                
209Beauchamp was named admiral (admirallum) in March 1355 and was responsible for 
the territory east and south of the Thames, which included the Cinque Ports.  Rymer, 
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302.  
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greater”214 and “take mariners for the ships and put the mariners on the ships.”215  They 
were to search from the mouth of the Thames to the Cinque Ports.216 De Harewell was 
further ordered to do the same in Wales (the text is no more specific than “in partibus 
Walliae”).217  On 27 May, several captains were given permission to seize (arrestandum) 
mariners, at the Prince’s wages, for their ships going to Gascony.  While these orders do 
specify the number of mariners to be taken for each ship, they fail to indicate if these 
vessels are to muster at Plymouth, which is possible, as it does say  “to set out in that 
[expedition] with our dear and devoted [son], Edward prince of Wales,”218 although the 
ships in question could easily have been sent to Southampton for Warwick’s and 
Suffolk’s use. 
The expedition clearly had trouble securing shipping, as two months later Richard 
Cortenahle, Robert de Baildon, John de Haddon, Robert Appelby, John de Ellerton, 
Robert Ledrede, Richard Bosevil, and Walter de Harewell were commanded to arrest 
ships of “thirty tuns and greater” from the mouth of the Thames north to Lynn, from 
Lynn to Berwick-upon-Tweed, from London to Exeter, and in Exeter, Dynbegh, and 
Wales, man them with mariners, and array and outfit the ships for the expedition.219  
These orders to arrest smaller vessels clearly indicate that more ships were needed.  The 
                                                
214“triginta doliorum et ultra.” 
215Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 297.  “et ad marinarios pro navibus illis capiendum, et in 
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217TNA C 61/66, m. 14; Rymer, III, I, 297.  
218Rymer, III, I, 302. “ad proficiscendum in eâdem cum dilecto & fideli nostro, Edwardo 
principe Walliae.” 
219TNA C 76/33, m. 12; Rymer, III, I, 299.  
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ships were to be at Southampton by 11 June.  As the Prince and his retinue sailed from 
Plymouth, these ships would have been for the transport of Warwick and Suffolk, their 
retinues, and their horses (discussed below). 
Another method of acquiring ships was building or repurposing them.  In April 
1355 John Loveryk and William Cundy were ordered to “arrest all carpenters and other 
shipwrights” in Sandwich and the Cinque Ports and “put them in the works of the king’s 
ships.”220  It is not clear if they are to build new ships or repair or refit existing ships, but 
it does indicate the level of activity surrounding the organization of transport for the 
expeditions.  The orders were also issued “on the information of John de Bello Campo 
(Beauchamp)” (discussed in the next chapter).221  Similar orders on Beauchamp’s 
information were issued in May 1355 and specified that ships were being both built and 
repaired.222  In June, Robert de Selby, Henry de Selby, and Thomas de Stanton were to 
select twelve carpenters to repair three ships in Kingston-upon-Hull.223  There was a 
similar situation at York.224  The varied locations show that the fitting out of ships was 
not localized in any one port and that the King and his administration were attempting to 
find ships wherever and however they could.   
                                                
220TNA, C 66/242, m. 23; TNA, C 66/245, m. 12; CPR, X, 203.  This probably means 
they were modifying the ships for war, e.g., building ‘castles’ on the ships.  There were 
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fleet.  See Friel, “Oars, Sails, and Guns,” 69.There was still clearly a need for ships, as 
more ships’ carpenters were ordered to be arrested for that purpose in July 1356. TNA, C 
66/249, m. 18d; CPR, X, 446–47. 
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There were specific requisition methods for arresting vessels: arrest ships from 
every port; arrest ships in a specific administrative district—for example, John de 
Beauchamp was admiral (admirallum) for the territory south and east of the Thames; 
arrest ships from specific ports; arrest ships in a given geographic zone; or arrest ships 
from individual owners,225 as well as a variety of sources of ships, which included 
requisitioning merchant vessels (the largest source of ships), the King’s own ships, the 
Cinque Ports, agreements with owners and port burgesses, hiring ships from other 
kingdoms, city-states, or private persons, “asking” a port to provide a specific number of 
ships, seized vessels, ordering the construction of new ships, and offering owners and or 
masters a pardon in exchange for ships and or service without wages.226  That said, it 
should not be taken as an indication of a haphazard approach.  Rather, it is indicative of 
the scope and far-reaching capabilities of the naval administration and underscores the 
“underlying sophistication” that enabled administrative personnel to assemble two fleets 
in this manner.227 
That administration also was working to outfit these ships and was still 
scrambling to do so in late July.  Richard Cosyn, William Hichcock, Robert Budde, and 
Edward Goderych were ordered to find corders [rope-makers] “and other workers of 
cords and cables for ships” and “to purvey hempen thread [to make] the cords and 
cables.”228  There is a particular urgency in the Prince’s order of 29 July to John le Clerc, 
mayor of Hampton, to have the ship Seint Esprit out of Bayonne “suitably repaired by 
                                                
225Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 20. 
226Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 11–16. 
227Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 11. 
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Chapter 3: The Preparations for the Chevauchée 
 
112 
advice of the master,” John Loyas, and the costs would be paid by the Prince.  Seint 
Esprit had been “assigned for the Prince’s hall [for public meetings and assemblies],” 
although he actually sailed on a different ship.229 
The journeys from Plymouth and Southampton to Bordeaux were certainly 
familiar to mariners, as was the transport of men and horses.  For example, Richard 
English, his men and horses, sailed either from Plymouth or Weymouth for Gascony in 
late November 1354 on the king’s business,230 and Thomas Dautre’s January 1355 re-
supply mission sailed from Southampton.   
The Prince’s ship was the Christofre,231 and its captain was John le Clerc, mayor 
of Southampton,232 who received 10l  on 27 September as a gift from the Prince upon 
reaching Bordeaux.233  It was not the largest of the ships in the Prince’s fleet; that was the 
Seintmaricog, which had a carrying capacity of 200 tuns, making it a very large vessel, as 
discussed above.234  It appears that the outfitting of the Christofre was underway until the 
point of departure, as gear for the ship was purchased as late as 7 September, two days 
before the Prince sailed for Gascony.235 
Even after boarding, the ships did not sail immediately for Gascony, and there 
                                                
229BPR, IV, 143.  
230TNA, C 66/244, m.13; CPR, 10, 137.  Richard English was authorized to take a ship in 
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Battle of Poitiers, 28. 
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was still communication with the Prince’s administrators remaining in England.  One of 
the final orders is dated 6 September.  It was issued “by the prince himself, on board his 
ship in the port of Plymmuth [sic] on his departure for Gascony.”236  It does not address 
anything related to the expedition; rather it is a remission to Henry de Blakebourn, one 
time receiver of the chamber, of anything that “the prince might have against him by 
reason of his said office.”237  This suggests that, even though departure was imminent, the 
business of the Prince’s administration continued and would continue in his absence. 
Number of Ships  
Given that the Prince’s expedition was delayed due to a lack of shipping, unfavorable 
conditions notwithstanding, the obvious question becomes how many ships did the Prince 
require.  Here, then, we must again turn to the logistics and the hard and fast ‘rules’ about 
how much men (soldiers and mariners) and horses must eat and drink, how much cargo 
space comestible and incomestible supplies require, how much space horses require,238 
and the carrying capacity of the ships. 
The Prince commanded a force of roughly 2200 men from England and Wales,239 
including the retinues of the four earls.  Each man would need 3.5 lbs (1.6 kg)240 of food 
                                                
236BPR, IV, 149. 
237BPR, IV, 149. 
238It is certain that some men did bring their own horses, as Henxteworth’s accounts 
relating to the disembarkment at Bordeaux list payments for windage and re-imbursement 
for horses lost at sea. 
239See next chapter for discussion of military demography and the Prince’s numbers.  The 
size of the force would increase significantly with the addition of the Gascon troops. 
240Based on the army rations for 1901. Army Ration. Issue and Conversion Tables, War 
Department, 1789–1909 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901).  This 
assumes a moderate level of activity aboard the ships.  More food would be needed on 
the march. See the next chapter for more. 
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to meet his daily caloric needs, 3250 kcal/day for a man weighing 174 lbs (79 kg) and 5 ft 
9 in (1.75 m) tall.241  He would also need at least 2 qts (1.9 L) of water.  These figures are 
from the 2001 US Army Regulations about nutritional standards, and I have chosen these 
figures because they represent the needs of active soldiers and men generally ranging in 
age from their late teens to late thirties.242  Granted, members of the Prince’s company 
fall outside of this range—including three of the four earls—, but most of his active 
                                                
241For the height of the men, see Veronica Fiortato, “Townton, AD 1461: Excavation of a 
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Townton, AD 1461 (Oxford, 2000). For his discussion of the height and weight of Roman 
soldiers, see Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 9–10.  While average male 
height ranged from 5’4” (162 cm) and 5’7” (171 cm), Roth argues that the Roman 
soldiers were taller than average based on Vegetius’ minimum standards: 6 Roman feet 
(178 cm) for cavalry and 5’10”  (173 cm) for the first cohort, with an average of 5’7” for 
the army as a whole.  Roth uses the US Army height and weight tables to determine that 
the average weight was 145 lbs (65.7 kg).  For the food requirements, see Army 
Regulation 40–25, BUMEDINST 10110.6, AFI 44–141, Medical Services, “Nutritional 
Standards and Education,” Headquarters, Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
(Washington, DC, 2001). http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r40_25.pdf (accessed 27 
February 2013). There is no print version of this document, only electronic media.  AR 
40–25, i. 
242Fiortato, “Townton, AD 1461,” 101.  Based on the archaeology, all age bands “from 
the 16–25 band to the 36–50 band” were evenly represented, and the average age was 
thirty.  Roth’s Roman soldiers joined the army between 18 and 23 and served into their 
forties.  The average age during the Empire was around thirty.  Roth, The Logistics of the 
Roman Army at War, 11–12. Of course, the soldiers on board were probably not 
expending the same number of calories that they would during the campaign (or that the 
mariners were expending), but I am using these numbers as a baseline for consistency 
throughout the dissertation and on the assumption that the Prince had no wish to arrive in 
Bordeaux with a hungry army. 
Chapter 3: The Preparations for the Chevauchée 
 
115 
soldiers would likely have been between the ages of twenty and forty.243  These numbers 
also represent the minimum requirements for a man of the above height and weight; a 
larger or smaller man would need more or less food, respectively.  For example, a man, 
5’2” (1.6m) tall and weighing 134lbs (61kg) needed 2895 calories; a man  5’7” (1.7m) 
tall and weighing 145lbs (66kg) would need 3000 calories per day, and a man of 6’ and 
160 lbs would need 3057 calories per day.244  I have used an average of 3000 calories a 
day, slightly lower than the 3390 calories per day Roth suggests for Roman soldiers.  
Given these requirements and the 2200 men, not including the mariners who also had to 
eat and drink, the daily allotment of food and water per man totaled 3 lbs (1.3 kg) and 2 
qts (1.9 L), respectively.245   
For a sea journey of eleven days, with no access to resupply, the ships had to 
carry 33 lbs (15 kg) of grain and 5.5 gal (21L) of water for each man.  For an estimated 
force of 2200 men this would mean some 72,600 lbs (32,931 kg) of grain and 12,100 gal 
(46,200 L) of potable water for a total of almost 100 tons (193,000 lbs).  These numbers 
represent only the needs of the soldiers.  There would also be “support staff,” such as 
grooms for the horses.  The mariners would also need food and water, but we cannot 
estimate their numbers until we have a reasonable estimate as to the number of ships.  For 
                                                
243William de Montagu, earl of Salisbury, was 27; Robert d’Ufford, earl of Suffolk, was 
57; John de Vere, earl of Oxford, was 43; and Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, was 
42. 
244Calculations are based on the formula (for 25-year old men) given in US Army (1961), 
20: 0.95 (815 + 36.6W).  W is weight in kg.  This is the same formula used in Roth, The 
Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 12.  Roth calculates the average daily ration for 
Roman soldiers as 3390 calories (Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 43). 
245Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, 18; Army 
Ration. Issue and Conversion Tables, War Department, 1789–1909; Roth, The Logistics 
of the Roman Army at War, 43. 
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the soldiers’ food and water we know the Prince’s purveyors required a minimum of 100 
tuns of carrying capacity. 
Aside from food, the soldiers had other needs as well, namely space for 
themselves and their personal gear.  Additionally, they needed a certain amount of 
incomestible supplies, such as armor, livery, harness, and rope.  The army also carried 
with it a supply of extra bow staves and arrows, which were transported from the ships at 
Bordeaux to the advance supply depot at St. Macaire.246  Individual soldiers would have 
carried their own personal gear: clothing and weapons, possibly cooking equipment and 
small tools.247   Other needed items, though unmentioned in the sources, must have 
included hand mills for grain and tents.248  The fleet did not carry siege or mining 
equipment.249 
As this expedition was planned as a chevauchée, we know that most of the men, 
including the majority of the archers, were mounted.250  Some of the archers brought their 
horses with them, as shown by Henxteworth’s accounts for 1 October 1355.  He paid to 
“divers archers” under Hamon Mascy and Robert Brun (see next chapter for their roles as 
captains) a sum of 12l 18s 8d as a gift to replace horses lost at sea,251 which indicates not 
                                                
246DOC, Henxteworth accounts.  Henxteworth paid the clerk of the spicery 8s 9d on 3 
October for carriage of the bows and arrows to St. Macaire. 
247Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 72. 
248Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 77. 
249There is no evidence in any source that the Prince’s army carried siege or mining 
equipment; nor did Henxteworth pay any siege or mining ‘specialists’.  Caille, 
“Nouveaux Regards,” 89. 
250See Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, Ch. 1.  The Prince’s indenture specifies both 
mounted and foot archers, although it is unclear whether this indicate that the foot archers 
marched on foot.  See the next chapter for the rate of march and discussion of this issue. 
251DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 1 October 1355.  
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only that the archers had horses but also that the safe passage of the horses was not 
assured.  No doubt this is why some chose to purchase their horses upon arrival in 
Bordeaux.   
The Prince’s other great need, then, was transport for the horses and their food 
and water.  Those ships carrying horses were outfitted especially for the task with hurdles 
placed between the horses and the ships fitted with slings, not to mention special 
gangways for loading and unloading the horses.252  For example, the sheriff of Cornwall 
received orders dated 6 May 1355 to provide 2500 hurdles and fifteen gangplanks for the 
shipping of the horses, as did the sheriffs of Devon and Southampton.253  These hurdles 
would be used for constructing temporary stalls for the horses.254  
The cog was already well suited for transporting troops and bulk supplies,255 and 
                                                
252John Pryor, “The Transportation of Horses by Sea During the Era of the Crusades, 
Eighth Century to 1285 A.D.,” in Medieval Warfare 1000–1300, ed. John France, 524–68 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), passim; originally published in The Mariner’s Mirror 68 
(1982): 9–30 and 103–26.  See also, John Pryor, “The naval architecture of Crusader 
transport ships and horse transports revisited,” The Mariner’s Mirror 76, no., 3 (1990): 
255–73, at 255–56. 
253TNA, C 61/67, m. 13.  Rymer, III, I, 299–300.  “…duo milia & quingenta claias & 
quindecim pontes…pro eskippamento equorum…”  The orders specify that 8 of the 
bridges should be 20 feet long and 7 14 feet long.  The original ‘claias’ and 
‘eskippamento’ appear to be Anglo-Norman words to which Latin endings have been 
added. ‘Claias’ (and several alternate spellings) appears often in the following phrase: 
“cleyes e pountz,” giving it the meaning of gangplank. However, given that there are 
2500 “claias” needed and the specifications as to length pertain only to the “pontes” I 
have chosen to use “hurdles.” 
254Runyan, “Naval Power and Maritime Technology,” 53.  There is no good description 
of a “claias.”  T. Hunt, Teaching and Learning Latin in Thirteenth-Century England, 3 
vols. (Cambridge, 1991) includes the following description: “une cleie que soit coché sur 
le fosse e cele cleie seit coverte de foil…”  Langdon, “Efficiency of Inland water 
Transport,” 113, cites examples of sheriffs using river transport to ship the wooden 
hurdles to ports. 
255Runyan, “Cog as Warship,” 56. 
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the ships could be modified easily to carry horses.  There was a paliolus, a floor 
constructed on top of the structured floor of the hold, to protect the floor from the impact 
of soldiers and horses, as well as damage that could be caused by horseshoes.256  The 
stalls were located fore and aft, not abeam.257  Hurdles were used to build stalls.258  
Between 1338 and 1359, some 16,000 hurdles and 200 gangways for horses were built 
and transported to ports, such as Plymouth and Southampton.  More than 3000 horses had 
been shipped from Sandwich to Calais in 1354.259  Clearly, then, the English were 
experienced in transporting horses to the continent, especially given that the 16,000 
hurdles could have been used to transport a minimum of 8000 horses.260  The ships in 
Edward III’s 1338–1340 campaign transported more than 4,500 horses.261  The horses 
were put in slings,”262 and Pryor argues for stall dimensions of approximately 2 m long 
and 1 m wide.263  Using these dimensions, he suggests that the Crusader transport ships 
could transport roughly thirty horses.264 
Loading and unloading the horses from the main deck required a special dock, or 
special gangways, most of 15–20 feet (4.6–6m), that could be used from ports in the 
                                                
256Pryor, “The Naval Architecture of Crusader Transport Ships and Horse Transports 
Revisited,” 257. 
257Pryor, “Naval Architecture,” 259. 
258Runyan, “Naval Power and Maritime Technology,” 53. 
259Runyan, “Cog as Warship,” 56. 
260This allows two hurdles per horse, although three hurdles could be used for two horses 
if the central hurdle separated them.  In that case, 16,000 hurdles could be used for 
16,000 horses—not accounting for the re-use of hurdles. 
261Lyon, “Infrastructure and Purpose,” 66. 
262Pryor, “Naval Architecture,” 259. 
263Pryor, “Naval Architecture,” 259.  The architecture of Crusade ships indicates that 
there would have been 3.56 m in which to stable 3 horses abreast, sufficient for the 
horses’ needs and providing enough space to maneuver between horses. 
264Pryor, “Naval Architecture,” 259. 
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hull.265  The position of the ports was particularly important in this matter.  Pryor shows 
that these ports were located at the stern, allowing the ships to back onto beaches for 
amphibious assaults.266  There were two basic types of horse transports in the thirteenth-
century: those with one stern entry (Pryor calls it a port) and those with two stern 
entries.267  The paliolus268 was also stronger at the stern, where, following Pryor’s 
assertion about the stern ports, there would have been the most horse traffic.269   
In addition to special gangplanks, horses also were loaded and unloaded via 
windage in which the horse was fitted with a sling and raised or lowered by means of 
ropes and pulleys.270  The two methods likely reflect the variety of shipping employed 
and suggest that some vessels were not (or could not be) adapted to allow the use of 
gangplanks; therefore, windage would have been a necessary alternative.  In addition to 
the money spent on hurdles and gangplanks, Henxteworth paid 1l 4s 8d out of the 
Prince’s accounts for windage in Bordeaux, as well as 1l 2s 10d for the transport of 
harness from the ships to Bordeaux.271  The sheriffs of Cornwall, Devon, and 
Southampton were to be re-imbursed for the money they spent on the hurdles and 
gangplanks.272  Therefore, it is likely that the Prince’s fleet used both methods for loading 
                                                
265Runyan, “Cog as Warship,” p. 56. 
266Pryor, “Naval Architecture,” 255.  Pryor primarily uses evidence from William of Tyre 
and MSS illuminations. 
267Pryor, “Naval Architecture,” 256. 
268The paliolus was a “floor in a hold” that was built over the structured floor. 
269Pryor, “Naval Architecture,” 258. 
270DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 29 September 1355.  See also Matthew Horace Hayes, 
Horses on Board Ship: A guide to their management (London, 1902), 69. 
271DCO, Henxteworth accts, entry for 20 September 1355. 
272TNA, Rymer, III, I, 299–300. “Et de custubus, quos circa praemissa apposueris, tibi, in 
compoto tuo, ad scaccarium nostrum, debitam allocationem habere faciemus.”  The order 
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and unloading the horses. 
Given the relatively small carrying capacity of ships, even the large cogs, and the 
need to carry food and water, a ship could only carry a small number of horses, likely 
between eight and thirty animals.273  Each horse would need a daily ration of 15 lbs (6 
kg) of forage (such as hay), a half ration of grain (5 lbs, 2.3 kg) starting the second day of 
the voyage, and at least 10 gallons (45.5 L) of water daily,274 totaling 50 lbs (24.9 kg) of 
grain, 165 lbs (74.8 kg) of forage, and 110 gallons (416 L) of water for the eleven day 
journey to Bordeaux.  Therefore, a ship carrying eight horses would need to carry with it 
a minimum of 400 lbs (181.4 kg) of grain, 1320 lbs (598.7 kg) of forage, and 880 gallons 
(3331 L), or 8800 lbs (3992 kg) of water for a total of more than 5 tons of comestibles, 
while a ship transporting 30 horses would need at least 1500 lbs (680.4 kg) of grain, 4950 
lbs (2245.3 kg) of forage, and 3300 gal (12,492 L), or 33,000 lbs (14,969 kg) of water for 
a total of more than 19 tons of comestible supplies for the horses (see Table 3.1).   
                                                                                                                                            
for hurdles and bridges/gangplanks is quite common.  Cf. TNA, C 54/192, m. 29.  0CCR, 
X, 3.  
273Incidentally, a soldier might receive a higher bonus for service in Gascony.  Ayton 
suggests this is a recognition of the risk of horses dying on the voyage, as well as an 
encouragement to the soldiers to buy their horses in Bordeaux.  Given the expense and 
risk of transporting the horses, this seems reasonable. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 
125.  Pryor estimates that Crusader horse transports carried an average of 30 horses.  
Pryor, “Naval Architecture,” 259. 
274Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4, prepared under direction of Brigadier General A. 
MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1912), 428 and 451, particularly the paragraphs on shipping horses by sea. 
Increasing the grain ration after the second day is an option if necessary to ensure the 
animal’s good condition, but due to the idleness of the sea voyage, there is the danger of 
overfeeding and the consequent problems.  These numbers are an average of the amounts 
given for 3 separate feeding weights, 800 lbs, 1000 lbs, and 1200 lbs.  Engels uses a 
statistic 10 lbs of grain, 10 lbs of forage, 8 gallons of water. Engels, Alexander the Great 
and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, 18. 
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Table 3.1: Rations for the horses during the sea voyage to Bordeaux. 
  Day 1   Day 2           11-day voyage 
1 horse  Grain: 0 lbs  Grain: 5 lbs/2.3 kg          Grain: 50 lbs/ 24.9 kg 
  Forage: 15 lbs/6.9 kg Forage: 15 lbs/6.9 kg          Forage: 165 lbs/74.8 kg 
  Water: 10 gal/45.5 L Water: 10 gal/45.5 L          Water: 110 gal/416 L 
      (100 lbs275/45.5 kg)      (100 lbs/45.5 kg)                (1100 lbs/ 503 kg) 
 
8 horses Grain: 0 lbs    Grain: 40 lbs/18.1kg          Grain: 400 lbs /181.4 kg 
  Forage: 120 lbs/54kg  Forage: 120 lbs/54.4kg        Forage: 1320 lbs/599 kg 
  Water: 80 gal/364 L Water: 80 gal/364 L          Water: 880 gal/3331 L 
                                                
275Using the imperial gallon of 10 lbs. 
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       (800 lbs/363 kg)    (800 lbs/363 kg)                (8800 lbs/3992 kg) 
 
30 horses Grain: 0 lbs  Grain: 150 lbs/68 kg        Grain: 1500 lbs/680 kg 
 Forage: 450 lbs/204 kg Forage: 450 lbs/204 kg      Forage: 4950 lbs/2245 kg 
 Water: 300 gal/1364 L Water: 300 gal/1364 L       Water: 3300 gal/12,492L 
       (3000 lbs/1360 kg)       (3000 lbs/1360 kg) (33,000 lbs/14,969kg) 
   
This does not include the horses themselves or incomestible supplies related to their 
transport and use (e.g., saddles).   Nor does it account for the 5 lbs of straw needed for 
each animal, all of which would need to be mucked out and replaced daily.  Soiled 
bedding had to be removed for proper sanitation, to control moisture,276 and to protect the 
horses’ hooves from the corrosive effect of uric acid.  One horse would need 55 lbs of 
straw for the eleven day voyage; eight horses and thirty horses would need 440 lbs and 
1650 lbs of straw respectively.  Combined with the weight of the food and water, a single 
horse would require 125 lbs of supplies daily, 1375 lbs for the eleven days at sea.  A ship 
carrying eight horses would need 11,000 lbs, a ship with thirty horses 41,250 lbs. 
The horses and their related supplies, then, would take up a not inconsiderable 
amount of space.  A ship transporting eight horses would need a carrying capacity of at 
least 5 tuns just for the horses’ food and water.  When the straw is added to that, the ship 
would have to carry a minimum of 5.5 tons in supplies for the horses, particularly as 
transferring supplies while at sea was impossible.  On a 20 tun vessel, the minimum size 
                                                
276FM 31–27, 2–31. 
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Richard de Cortenhale and Robert de Baildon were to arrest for the Prince’s passage,277 
that would amount to just over 20 percent of the vessel’s carrying capacity for the horse’s 
rations. 
For heuristic purposes, let us suppose that less than half of the Prince’s forces 
brought their own horses.  The comestible supply needs of even 550 horses, which 
assumes one horse for every fourth man, would total more than 355 tonnes and require a 
fleet of ships with a carrying capacity of more than 320 tuns (the horses themselves must 
be included).  If even half the Prince’s force brought horses, assuming each of those men 
brought only a single mount which would not have been the case as a man-at-arms 
brought between two and five horses with him on campaign,278 that number would easily 
double.  The combined total, then, of the comestible supplies for the Prince’s 2200 men 
and 550 horses, a number probably on the low side, is approximately 430 tuns.  Lambert 
suggests that the fleet could have transported some 2000 horses.279  This is certainly 
possible even if only trained warhorses were transported;280 however, given that the 
archers’ horses were also transported it is clear not every horse shipped to Gascony was 
                                                
277TNA, C76/33, m. 12. Rymer, III, I, 298.  
278Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 58. 
279Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Army, 154. As he rightly points out, there is no way to 
know how many horses were purchased in Bordeaux.  He also estimates that the size of 
the force the fleet transported was 1500–2000 men, which is fewer than the 2200 men 
discussed above but not significantly so.   
280Carroll M. Gillmor, “The Brevium exempla as a source for Carolingian Warhorses,” 
Journal of Medieval Military History 6 (2008): 32–57; idem, “Practical Chivalry: The 
Training of Horses for Tournemants and Warfare,” Studies in Medieval and Renaissance 
History New Series 13, ed. J.A.S. Evans and R.W. Unger, 5–29 (New York,1992), 19–
20. 
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an expensive warhorse.281  If that is the case, the ships would have needed to carry more 
than 1300 tons of comestible supplies and water for the horses for the eleven day voyage, 
requiring a total tunnage of 1180 tuns. 
Given these real and inescapable needs, how many ships, then, did the Prince 
require?  We can approximate this using the following equation and entering the values 
that we know are concrete, such as the daily needs of men and horses.  The results will 
be, at best, approximations, as are all models, in part because of incomplete data and 
because we cannot know for certain the exact composition of the ships (their size and 
tunnage varied considerably; see Appendix A) transporting the Prince’s army nor can we 
determine precisely how they were laden.  A ship capable of carrying 30 horses may only 
have carried 25, for example.  Nevertheless, the following will allow us to determine the 
scale of the operation, which Lambert claims should be “regarded as one of the most 
important of the period.”282 
N = d(a+b+c) + d(e+f) + g 
                      x 
(For a detailed explanation of this equation, see Chapter Two: Historiography, Sources, 
and Methods, where it is described in detail).  
The Prince’s force numbered approximately 2200 men when the army sailed from 
England (more men would be added in Gascony), each requiring 3 lbs (1.3 kg) of food 
and 2 qts (1L) of water daily; each horse needed 18.5 lbs (8.5 kg) of food and 10 gal 
(30L) of water.  It took the Prince’s fleet eleven days to sail the 420 nautical miles to 
                                                
281DCO, Henxteworth accounts, passim. 
282Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 152. 
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Bordeaux.283  We also know that a ship could carry as many as 30 horses or as few as 8, 
and that the average carrying capacity was just over 70 tuns.284  Further, we must account 
for the mariners, and a ship of  200 tuns, like Seintmaricog, would require a minimum of 
fifty sailors to crew it; the average crew size, however, was sixteen.285  Each of these 
sailors, too, would require 3 lbs (1.3kg) of food and 2 qts (1L) of potable water.  Given 
these ineluctable constraints we can arrive at a reasonable estimate.  
Lambert’s research suggests a fleet of 187 ships provided by 37 different ports 
and sailed by nearly 3000 mariners, and that the average load of a ship was fourteen men 
and ten horses, as well as the sixteen man crew.286  That would mean that the average 
minimum carrying capacity of the ships was roughly eight (wine) tuns.  However, given 
that the orders for arresting ships specified that ships be at least twenty (wine) tuns, that 
the smallest carrying capacity known for the ships in the Prince’s fleet is 30 (wine) tuns 
(see Appendix A), and that the low-end carrying capacity for cogs was 78–80 tuns, that 
suggests four possibilities: one, that, even accounting for the men, mariners, and horses 
themselves, the ships were significantly under-laden, which is unlikely in the extreme; 
two, that ships carried an average of fifteen tuns of incomestible supplies, which is 
possible but improbable given the lack of siege equipment; three, that the expeditionary 
                                                
283James Inman, Nautical Tables Designed for British Seamen (London: J.D. Potter, 
1945), Table 51, 549. 
284Based on the average of the known carrying capacities of the ships in the Prince’s 
fleet; those capacities are known in forty cases. 
285Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 153, n. 266.  This is based on three 
Exchequer accounts (E 101/26/36, E 101/26/37, and E 101/26/38), which provide lists of 
wages, masters, and ships. 
286Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 153–54.  The exact number of mariners he 
provides is 2,937. 
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force was larger than the estimated 2200, and Lambert, in this case, seems to be accepting 
a force of 2600 men, although he claims that the size of the fleet suggests a force of 
1500–2000 men,287 in which case the average number of men per ship would be 8–10.   
Assuming a force of roughly 2200 gives us an average of 12 men per ship.  
Lambert’s numbers also amount to nearly 3000 mariners (His precise figure is 2937.).  
Accepting that, the fleet transported a total of more than 5000 men-at-arms, archers, 
mariners, and support staff and some 2000 horses, as well as their supplies.  The final 
possibility is that the fleet carried more comestible supplies than was needed for the 
eleven-day voyage.  This way, the army could be sure of adequate supplies if the voyage 
took longer than eleven days and have supplies readily available upon arrival in 
Bordeaux.  That the ships carried additional comestibles is indisputable.  Henxteworth 
certainly paid for the transport of such supplies to Bordeaux and to the advance supply 
depot at St. Macaire.288 
 
 
 
Table 3.2:289 The minimum needs of soldiers, mariners, and horses. 
  Numbers Food     Water 
Soldiers 2200  6600 lbs/2994 kg  1100 gal/4164 L/4.4 tuns 
                                                
287Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 154, n. 269. 
288DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 1 October 1355. 
289Tunnage calculated based on Langdon’s findings of an average of 6.5 quarters of grain 
per wine tun.  Langdon, “Efficiency of inland water transport,” 113, 118.  The tunnage 
for the water is calculated based on the 252 gallons/wine tun standard.  Zupko, English 
Weights and Measures, entry for tun. 
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         (11,000 lbs/4990 kg) 
 
Mariners 3000  9000 lbs/4082 kg  1500 gal/5678 L/6 tuns 
         (15,000 lbs/6804 kg) 
 
Horses  2000  389,000 lbs/174,447 kg 220,000 gal/832,791 L 
        (1000tonnes/997.903kg) 
 
Total    396,500 lbs/179,849 kg  222,600gal/842,633 L 
          (1010 metric tons) 
 
While the number of ships and mariners seems perhaps large, they are in keeping 
with earlier English fleets.  For example, the fleet for Edward III’s Low Countries 
campaign (1338–1340) comprised 370 ships,290 “370 masters, 282 constables, 11,325 
sailors, 585 pages, plus 5 clerks and 4 carpenters for the king’s ships”291 and transported 
2720 men-at-arms of varying social status, 5550 archers (mounted and unmounted), 4614 
horses, and an additional 500 personnel from the households of the king and queen.292  
These 370 ships, then, transported more than 20,000 men [soldiers (8270), sailors 
(12,571), and support staff (500)] and 4614 horses—and their supplies to the Low 
                                                
290Lyon’s figure, which disagrees slightly from the traditionally accepted 260), is based 
on the Incipiunt Vadia Nautarum in the wardrobe book kept by William de Norwell for 
the period 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340.  Lyon, “Infrastructure and Purpose of an 
English Medieval Fleet,” 65–66. 
291Lyon, 67. 
292Lyon, 66. 
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Countries, with an average of 31 sailors, 22 combatants, and 13 horses per ship.  In 
comparison, the Prince’s expedition was, taken by itself, a more modest expedition.  Of 
course, Lancaster’s and the King’s expeditions happened concurrently, but the success of 
this earlier fleet indicates that the English naval administration was certainly up to the 
task. 
Conclusion 
The Prince’s army mustered at two separate ports.  The Prince and those sailing with him 
mustered at Plymouth, where he stayed at Plympton until he boarded La Cristofre, and 
Warwick and Suffolk and their companies were mobilized at Southampton.  Their horses 
also were transported from Southampton.293 
These disparate elements—planning, finances, men, horses, ships, supplies both 
comestible and incomestible—came together at Plymouth and Southampton over the 
summer months.  The planning and preparations, of course, began several months in 
advance.  Everything seems to have gone reasonably well and relatively on schedule, 
although the wind was unfavorable.  Yet, when the wind turned favorable, the fleet was 
ready to take advantage of it.  This testifies not only to the efficiency of the individual 
bureaucracies but also to the degree to which they worked together.  It is clear that the 
expedition, at least as far as assembling a force and transporting it, was well-planned and 
took advantage of the existing, highly developed structures in use in England. 
Thus, with little difficulty, the Prince and his army of 2200 men-at-arms and 
archers and 2000 horses left Plymouth (or Southampton) on September 1355 in a fleet of 
                                                
293Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 36–40.  Rymer, Foedera, III, I, 300.  
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187 ships and sailed for Bordeaux.  This accomplishment testifies to the well-established 
ability of the English government to recruit and supply troops and transport them across 
the Channel.  The Prince and his expedition benefitted from England’s long tradition of 
transporting horses and soldiers to France.  As early as c. 1080, the English government 
was able to transport 3000 horses to France.294  Thus, supplying and shipping the Prince’s 
army to Bordeaux was well within the capabilities of the English government.  As we 
shall see in the following chapter, the English were equally capable of recruiting a 
competent military force.
                                                
294Bernard S. Bachrach, “On the Origins of William the Conqueror’s Horse Transports,” 
Technology and Culture 26, no. 3 (1985): 505–31; Bernard S. Bachrach, “William Rufus’ 
Plan for the Invasion of Aquitaine,” in The Normans and their Adversaries at War: 
Essays in Memory of C. Warren Hollister, ed. Richard P. Abels and Bernard S. Bachrach, 
31–63 (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2001). 
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Chapter Four: A Competent Military Force 
 
When the Prince sailed from Plymouth on 9 September, he was in command of a sizeable 
though not extraordinarily large force, a force that would grow considerably between his 
arrival in Bordeaux and the army’s departure from the city and its environs.  The addition 
of the Gascon lords and their followers, not to mention a number of mercenaries, swelled 
the ranks of the Prince’s army.  (For a discussion of the Prince’s army see below.)  The 
size of the army, though, was of itself not key to the Prince’s success.  The Prince was 
extraordinarily fortunate in his advisors and command staff,1 fortunate in the 
qualifications and experience of his subordinates and administrators, and happy in the 
skill and fortitude of his soldiers—those who had not deserted or committed a criminal 
offense (see below).  The Prince’s army was a well-organized force that was flexible 
enough to allow soldiers from England, Wales, Gascony, and other parts (the sources list 
describe several men as Spaniards and Allemains, or as coming from the Low Countries) 
to serve together and disciplined enough to keep these diverse men—who spoke different 
languages—working as an army under a single commander.  This clearly indicates a 
functional chain-of command, skilled administrators, a competent and cohesive command 
staff, and at least some translators. 
The Prince’s forces were highly organized.  Aside from the administration of 
recruitment and other “paperwork,” such as indentures, letters of protection, and 
                                                
1For discussion of military advisors as a general staff, see Bernard S. Bachrach, 
“Charlemagne and the Carolingian General Staff,” The Journal of Military History 60, 
no. 2 (April 2002): 317–57. 
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appointments of attorneys (all discussed below), a great deal of thought was put into who 
would accompany the Prince to Gascony and serve as his advisors and command staff.  
This included magnates and professional soldier-administrators.  That a capable staff was 
necessary is indisputable given his relative inexperience as a commander2 and the size of 
his force.  That the Gascons did serve in this campaign is indisputable.  They requested 
the Prince lead a campaign in Gascony, and it is unlikely that they would not participate.  
Furthermore, Henxteworth pays a number of Gascon lords (not just the Captal de Buch), 
and many Gascons receive mention or rewards in the Black Prince’s Register.3  Geoffrey 
le Baker also mentions several Gascons in leadership positions.4  The Gascons, then, must 
be included in any discussion of the Prince’s troops, as well as mercenaries such as 
Bernard van Zedeles who is described as an Almain.  Zedeles and his companions are 
provided with funds and gifts “for the expenses of himself and his companions on their 
going to the parts of Almain [Germany].”5 
Numbers 
The force that sailed from Plymouth was by no means a small army; nor was it unusually 
large for the fourteenth century even after the Black Death.  The estimates of its size vary 
from too low—usually because the Gascons are not included—to obviously exaggerated.  
                                                
2The Prince had received excellent training and served on the Crécy campaign, during 
which he led small raids and commanded the center at the Battle of Crécy (1346).  The 
1355 campaign, however, was his first solo command of a large force and entire 
campaign. 
3Henxteworth, passim. BPR, passim.  Gascons, not to mention “almains,” “Spaniards,” 
“Burgundians,” and “Hainaulters,” also appear in the Gascon Rolls, Patent Rolls, Close 
Rolls, and other sources. 
4Baker, Chronicon, 230–31. Barber, Life and Campaigns, 61–62. 
5BPR, IV, 253.   
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Discounting the several thousand Gascons, of course, skews the numbers downward.  
The assumption that the chroniclers always exaggerate their figures and revising those 
figures downward is also problematic, as in most instances there is no explanation for 
why and how those numbers are established.  Logistics and ineluctable realities, as well 
as the administrative documents, can be used to check the accuracy of the chroniclers and 
correct them as appropriate so that we can arrive at a figure more precise than John 
Trevisa’s “many men of armes and archeres.”6  First, though, a brief survey of previous 
estimates will illustrate the variety of figures and methods used to arrive at them. 
Herbert Hewitt, in his study of the expedition, only offers numbers for the English 
troops.  He gives the following figures: “1000 men-at-arms, 1000 horse archers, 300 to 
400 foot archers, about 170 Welshman.”7  His numbers are based on the earlier works of 
A.E. Prince and J.H. Ramsay, as well as the chronicles and the indenture between the 
Prince and Edward III, but he offers no further explanation as to how he arrives at these 
numbers.   
Ramsay concludes the Prince took 3400 men to Gascony: the 1100 men specified 
in the indenture for the Prince’s personal retinue and then double that number for the 
magnate’s contingents, thereby arriving at an estimate close to Robert of Avesbury’s 
3000, plus Welshman.  It is unclear as to why and how he arrives at that number for the 
                                                
6Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden Monachi Cestrensis together with the English 
Translations of John Trevisa and of an Unknown Writer of the Fifteenth Century, vol. 8, 
ed. Rev. Joseph Rawson Lumby (London, 1882), 348–49. 
7Hewitt, Black Prince’s Expedition, 20–21.  See also A.E. Prince, “The Strength of 
English Armies in the Reign of Edward III,” English Historical Review 47 (1931): 353–
71, at 355–66; and J.H. Ramsay, “The Strength of English Armies in the Middle Ages,” 
English Historical Review 14, no. 114 (1914): 221–27. 
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earls’ retinues.  Ramsay discounts Knighton’s 2200,8 a figure that fits the shipping data in 
the previous chapter.  He does not address the Gascons at all for the 1355 campaign.9  He 
also argues that Baker’s figures (a total of 7000 men) are too high, particularly the 4000 
men-at-arms.  In this he appears to be following Stow’s translation of Baker, who writes 
that the Prince had “quatuor mille togatorum, mille servientes, et duo milia 
saggittariorum.”  Stow translates this as “foure thousand men of arms, one thousand 
armed souldiours [sic], and two thousand archers.”10  Barber renders the same phrase as 
“four thousand men-at-arms, 1000 knights, and two thousand archers.”11  A more likely 
interpretation is “four thousand men-at-arms (including knights), one thousand sergeants, 
and 2000 archers,” which is more in keeping with English armies of the period.12   
A.E. Prince, in his work on the strength of English armies during Edward III’s 
reign, estimates the Prince had 2600 men in the force that sailed from England: one 
thousand men-at-arms, one thousand mounted archers, and three hundred to four hundred 
                                                
8Ramsay, “The Strength of English Armies,” 224.  Ramsay’s primary interest—aside 
from showing that the chroniclers invariably inflate numbers except when their numbers 
agree with his—is determining the size of the English force at Poitiers.   
9Furthermore, Ramsey summarily dismisses Gascon participation at Poitiers in 1356 “as 
most of these [the Gascon troops] had to be sent back for home defense.”  According to 
his figures 5000 combatants is the largest possible force the Prince could have fielded at 
Poitiers.  Thus the Gascons have no real role in either campaign. 
10John Stow, The annales of England, faithfully collected out of the most authenticall 
authors, records, and other monuments of antiquitie, from the first inhabitation until this 
present yeere 1592 (London, 1592), 408. 
11Barber, Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince, 72. 
12“Sergientium” is similar to “servientum” per Giles’ edition and “serviencium” per 
Thompson’s edition. Alternatively, the “servientes” could simply mean “men…provided 
under the terms of service,” rather than a reference to a specific type of soldier.  Anglo-
Norman Dictionary, “servise.”  There are no data on the number of “knights” in England 
in the mid fourteenth-century; Prestwich finds there were approximately 1000 active 
knights in England in 1324.  Prestwich, Plantagenet England, 390–92. 
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foot archers, plus about 170 Welshman.13  He bases his numbers on the Prince’s 
indenture with the king, then uses the regards (bonus payments) to estimate the size of the 
earls’ companies, Reynold Cobham, and John de Lisle.  Using the rate of 100 (66.67l) 
marks per 30 men-at-arms for a quarter year and the regards paid on 10 June 1355 for a 
half year’s service, he arrives at the following figures (See Table 4.1).14  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1: A.E. Prince’s estimates of men-at-arms in the Prince’s and magnates’ retinues. 
 Men-at-arms 
Prince of Wales 609*  
Reginald Cobham 30  
John de Lisle  60^ 
Salisbury  55 
Suffolk 60 
Warwick 120 
*The Prince’s indenture, however, specifies 433 men-at-arms.15 
^Interestingly, the account drawn up upon de Lisle’s death during the 1355 campaign 
                                                
13Prince, “Strength of English Armies,” 366. 
14Prince, “Strength of English Armies,” 367. 
15BPR, IV, 143. 
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shows that he had “20 knights (milites), 39 esquires, and 60 mounted archers.”16 
 
More recent work has revised the numbers upward and includes the Gascon 
contingents.  Jonathon Sumption suggests that the Prince brought 2,200 men from 
England, a number supported by Lambert’s work on the Prince’s fleet.  Sumption’s 
number includes the Prince’s personal retinue, as well as the companies led by the earls 
of Warwick, Suffolk, Salisbury, and Oxford, Reginald de Cobham, and John de Lisle (the 
six magnates named as accompanying the Prince to Gascony).  He estimates the total 
force at “between 6,000 and 8,000 men…an army roughly comparable with the one 
which had fought under Edward III at Crécy [a decade earlier, i.e., before the plague];” 
this is after the addition of the Gascon nobility, which he suggests provided at least 4,000 
men.  Sumption chooses this number as the Gascons “provided nearly 4,000 men for the 
chevauchée of the Earl of Stafford in 1352” and “cannot have done less for the Prince of 
Wales.”17 
Jacqueline Caille’s numbers are higher.  She writes “the raid called together 
several thousand men-at-arms…chevaliers, an exceptional number of archers (some 
mounted, some on foot), the light troops named bidauts to which is added auxiliaries of 
all sorts (valets, purveyors, conveyors but not any siege specialists).”18  Caille estimates 
                                                
16TNA, E 372/200, m. 43. 
17Sumption, Trial by Fire, 175–76. 
18Caille, “Nouveaux Regards,” 89. “Ce raid réunit pleusieurs milliers d’hommes d’armes, 
de 10,000 à 20,000 (si ce n’est pas 60,000!) selon les sources et l’interprétation qu’en 
donnent les commentateurs: des chevaliers, un nombre exceptionnel d’archers (les uns 
montés, les autres à pied), des combattants légers appelés bidauts auxquels il faut ajouter 
des auxiliares de toutes sortes (valets, pourvoyeurs, convoyeurs, mais aucun spécialiste 
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the force between 10,000 and 20,000.  These numbers clearly include the auxiliaries, the 
Gascons, and the mercenaries.  As the previous chapter indicates, the Prince’s fleet 
transported about 2200 soldiers and others from England to Bordeaux; therefore, Caille’s 
figures must include the Gascons and non-combatants.   
The suggested 20,000, however, is too large.  It would require the Gascons to 
field almost 17,000 soldiers, roughly four times the number Gascony provided for the 
earl of Stafford’s 1352 raid.19  Furthermore, the needs of an army of 20,000 would have 
significantly increased the logistical difficulties of supplying the force.  To begin, 250 
pack animals would have been required to carry a single days’ grain ration for the men, 
4000 animals to carry a ten day supply.  These figures also only account for the grain 
consumed by the pack animals (for each day, an animal would consume 10 lbs of its load 
of about 250 lbs), that is roughly ten pounds per day, and does not include the grain 
required by the cavalry horses.  Even if only 5000 cavalry horses, assuming a very small 
number of men-at-arms (each with two to five horses), accompanied the army that would 
result in an additional 50,000 lbs of grain for each day (See Table 4.2).  This would 
require nearly 8000 pack animals, more if additional fodder for the horses or water had to 
be carried.  20,000 thus seems to be too large a force.  (For discussion of the 10,000 see 
below).  Even if the army relied solely on carts to transport rations, that would have still 
required an additional 2700 cart horses (for the army’s use of carts see Chapter 5: The 
Campaign to Narbonne). 
                                                                                                                                            
des sièges urbains.”  She is correct about the lack of siege specialists.  There was also no 
siege equipment, which is in keeping with the nature of the chevauchée. 
19Sumption, Trial by Fire, 1745–76. 
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Table 4.2: Daily Grain needs for an army of 20,000 with 5000 cavalry horses. 
 Numbers Daily Grain Needs  10 Days’ Ration 
Men 20,000 3 lbs / 1.3 kg 600,000 lbs / 272,155 
kg 
Cavalry Horses 5000 10 lbs / 4.5 kg 500,000 lbs / 226,796 
kg 
Pack Animals 
 horses for 687 carts 
7900* 
2752 
10 lbs / 4.5 kg 
10lbs / 4.5 kg 
790,000 lbs / 358,337 
kg 
257,200 lbs / 116,664 
kg 
* The number of pack animals needed to carry the 10 days’ supply of grain. 
Peter Hoskins proposes a total force of 9000–10,000, including non-combatants.  
He suggests a force of 2600 from England, that, when adding the Gascons and 
mercenaries, totaled 6000–8000 combatants.  As for non-combatants, he writes that a 
complement equal to 50 percent of the army’s strength would have been unremarkable, 
bringing his total to 8000–10,000.20 
Moving from these estimates to the chronicles reveals that the contemporary 
writers provide remarkably similar numbers, with the exception of the normally reliable 
Geoffrey Baker.  His numbers are inflated.  He writes that the army was divided in three 
battalions: a vanguard of 3000 men-at-arms, a main force of “seven thousand men-at-
arms apart from clerks and foot soldiers,” and a rearguard of 4000.  With men-at-arms, 
                                                
20Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 20–21. 
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clerks, archers, and others, Baker claims that the army had 60,000 men.21  Using 
Sachskritik and the logistical models discussed in Chapter Two (historiography, sources, 
and methods), it is clear that this number is patently exaggerated.  For one thing, Edward 
III could not even begin to pay a force of that size, even if everyone received the same 
wages as a Welsh archer: 3d a day.22  That would amount to 750l per day and an 
enormous 5250l per week just for wages.  The largest “sum of the issue” Henxteworth 
recorded was 27 December 1355 and amounted to 373l 2s 9.5d.  The sum of 
Henxteworth’s “busiest” week came to 554l 4d, and the total for both November and 
December 1355, which saw the greatest number of payments of wages, ran to 2107l 7s 
11d, and that total included payments for food, supplies, and other items.  Looking solely 
at the pay records (the Prince and the magnates paid their companies from the advance 
wages they received) it is clear that Baker’s numbers are wrong. 
Using Engels’s basic logistical model, even without properly nuancing the data he 
uses for caloric needs (for more on that see Chapter 5: The Campaign to Narbonne), also 
proves that Baker’s numbers are faulty.  A force of 60,000 men would need 180,000 lbs 
(see Table 4.3) of grain daily just to feed the men, let alone the horses.  The number of 
horses required for a three days’ march would be staggering, particularly if the army had 
to carry fodder and water.  To start, some 1200 horses would be needed to carry a 
minimum of non-comestible supplies, assuming a low ratio of one horse to every fifty 
                                                
21Baker, Chronicon, 230–31.  “…septem mille viri armorum praeter clericos et servientes 
fuerunt…In toto exercitu taliter ordinato, fuerunt virorum armorum, clericorum, 
servientium, sagittariorum et brigancium et bidners, ultra sexgesies ille viri…”  Cf. 
Engels’ discussion of Alexander’s army of 40,000. 
22BPR, III, 491.  As far as I can tell, the Welsh archers received the lowest wages in the 
army, excluding support staff. 
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men and discounting cavalry horses, before including pack horses and their rations.23  
This expedition, however, was a raid.  Therefore, cavalry must also be included.  Baker 
claims there were 14,000 men-at-arms, so assuming a very conservative one horse per 
man-at-arms24 would give us 14,000 horses, excluding the horses necessary for mounted 
archers, in addition to the 1200 baggage animals.  Given that, the army would need 
roughly 1380 pack animals to carry a single day’s grain ration and more than 4500 horses 
for a three days’ march (see table 4.4).25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
23Engels, 19. N= 1(192,000+0+0)-(0) 
     250 – 1(250-10)  This assumes a ratio of one horse per fifty 
men and does not include cavalry horses.  It further assumes that fodder and fresh water 
are readily available and that personnel are not carrying supplies.  Therefore, 192,000 lbs 
is the total weight of the army’s grain supply for personnel and packhorses.  It is divided 
by the carrying capacity of a single horse less that horse’s daily ration of grain. 
24Ayton’s work clearly demonstrates that a man-at-arms would ideally have between 
three and five horses depending on rank. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 58. 
25Engels has shown that Alexander’s army, with a total size of more than 100,000, 
navigated terrains and climates more inhospitable than Gascony, for example, the 
Gedrosian Desert.  However, Alexander’s plan relied upon resupply by sea—an option 
unavailable to the Prince—and, when the fleet was delayed several months, Alexander 
lost 75 percent of his army on the march, particularly women, children, and the baggage 
train.  Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, 13, n. 8, 
94, n. 98, 110–18. 
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Table 4.3: Daily Grain Ration for Baker’s 60,000 soldiers and non-combatants. 
 Numbers Ration (lbs)/(kg)26 Weight (lbs)/ (kg) 
Personnel 60,000 3 lbs / 1.3 kg 180,000 lbs / 78,000 
kg 
Cavalry horses 14,00027 10 lbs / 4.5 kg 140,000 lbs / 63,000 
kg 
Baggage horses 1200 10 lbs / 4.5 kg 12,000 lbs / 5400 kg 
Pack animals 1384 10 lbs / 4.5 kg 13,840 lbs / 6228 kg 
Table 4.3: The army’s grain ration for 1 day using Baker’s numbers of 60,000, including 
14,000 mounted men-at-arms, and assuming a ratio of 1 baggage animal to every 50 
personnel.  This scenario also assumes that fodder and water are available. 
 
 
Table 4.4: Three days’ grain ration for Baker’s 60,000 soldiers and non-combatants. 
 Numbers Ration (lbs)/(kg) Weight (lbs)/(kg) 
Personnel 60,000 9 lbs / 3.9 kg 540,000 lbs / 234,000 
kg 
Cavalry horses 14,000 30 lbs / 13.5 kg 420,000 lbs / 189,000 
kg 
Baggage horses 1200 30 lbs/ 13.5 kg 36,000 lbs / 16, 200 kg 
Pack animals 4528 30 lbs / 13.5 kg 135,840 lbs / 61,128 kg 
                                                
26For the purpose of this basic exercise, I have maintained Engels’ numbers for the 
rations needed by each man and animal, e.g., 3 lbs of grain per man per day.  When this 
equation is applied to the Prince’s actual army, I use more nuanced numbers that account 
for factors such as the average age of the men, their level of physical activity, and 
conditions.  See Chapter 5. 
2714,000 is the bare minimum, as it assumes only 1 mount for each man-at-arms, which is 
unlikely. 
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Table 4.4: The army’s grain ration for 3 days using Baker’s numbers of 60,000, including 
14,000 mounted men-at-arms, and assuming a ratio of 1 baggage animal to every 50 
personnel.  This scenario also assumes that fodder and water are available.   
 
If forage and water were not readily available, which was the case along some 
points of the march, more than 13,000 horses would be needed to carry the weight of the 
army’s total grain (332,000 lbs), fodder (152,000 lbs), and water (1,516,00 lbs)—
impossible even for a force of 10,000 men—supplies for a single day (see Table 4.5).28  A 
two day march would require 80,000 horses not including the 14,000 horses of the men-
at-arms and the 1200 baggage horses, an astronomical number assuming that many could 
even be found (and given that typically a man-at-arms would serve with two to five 
horses depending on his status and that the archers would have been mounted).29  Even if 
forage were available, it still would have been impossible for the land to provide the 
necessary forage for that number of horses, especially if the army camped in the same 
place for more than one night, which it did.  A march of three days carrying grain, forage, 
and water would be impossible.  The logistical models show that, given these ineluctable 
realties, it is clear that Baker’s numbers are logistically nonsense.   
The army could, of course, march on half rations, which would bring the total 
weight of the army’s comestible supplies and water to 1,000,000 lbs.  If personnel also 
carried supplies at 30 lbs per person, then no pack animals would be needed for the first 
                                                
28N =  1 (332,000 + 152,000 + 1,51,600)   = 1 (2,000,000)  = 13,334 pack animals.  
     250 – 1(10 – 10 – 80)           150 
29Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 12–22 and 57–60.  Considering that, an army of the 
size Baker describes could have had more than 100,000 horses with it. 
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day as the carrying capacity of the personnel [1,800,000 lbs (60,000 x 30 lbs)] would 
exceed the weight of the supplies.  A second day’s march would require 1000 horses, and 
a third day’s march 8000 horses.  If the cavalry horses carried supplies, the army could 
carry enough supplies for four days, but even with cavalry horses being used as pack 
animals, the army could not march five days.30  This further underscores the 
improbability of Baker’s numbers.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
30It is highly unlikely that cavalry horses were used in this manner.  The larger point, 
though, is that a march of more than four days carrying food, forage, and water, even at 
half-rations, is impossible. 
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Table 4.5: One day’s ration of grain, forage, and water for Baker’s 60,000 soldiers and 
non-combatants. 
 Numbers Ration (lbs)/(kg); 
(gal)/(L) 
Weight (lbs)/(kg) 
Personnel 60,000 Grain: 3 lbs / 1.3 kg 
Water: .5 gal31 / 1.89 L 
180,000 lbs / 78,000 kg 
300,000 lbs / 113,400 
kg 
Cavalry horses 14,000 Grain: 10 lbs / 4.5 kg 
Forage: 10 lbs / 4.5 kg 
Water: 8 gal / 30 L 
140,000 lbs / 63,000 kg 
140,000 lbs / 63,000 kg 
1,120,000 lbs / 420,000 
kg 
Baggage horses 1200 Grain: 10 lbs / 4.5 kg 
Forage: 10 lbs / 4.5 kg 
Water: 8 gal / 30 L 
12,000 lbs / 5400 kg 
12,000 lbs / 5400 kg 
96,000 lbs / 36,000 kg 
Pack animals 13,334 Grain: 10 lbs / 4.5 kg 
Forage: 10 lbs / 4.5 kg 
Water: 8 gal / 30 L 
133,340 lbs / 60,003 kg 
133,340 lbs / 60,000 kg 
1,066,720 lbs / 400,020 
kg 
Table 4.5: The army’s grain, forage, and water ration for a single day using Baker’s 
figure of 60,000, including 14,000 mounted men-at-arms, and assuming a ratio of 1 
baggage animal per 50 personnel.  This table assumes that forage and water are not 
                                                
31Using the imperial gallon, which by definition weighs 10 pounds. 
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available and that personnel and cavalry are not carrying comestible supplies and that the 
army is on full rations. 
 
Thomas Gray, in Scalacronica, claims the Prince went to Gascony “with a 1000. 
men of armes and the erles of Warwike, Oxford, Saresby, and Southfolk…with the 
Gascoynes.”32  Gray hazards no guesses about the size of the Gascon contingent, nor does 
he mention the archers.  A thousand men-at-arms is a reasonable number, considering the 
433 from the Prince’s retinue and the addition of the earls’ companies.  At Poitiers, Gray 
writes that the Prince had “1900 men-at-arms and 1500 archers,”33 for a total of 3400.   
The indenture with the king states that the Prince had “433 men-at-arms and 700 
archers (400 mounted and 300 on foot) as his own retinue.”34  Henry Knighton claims the 
Prince had 800 men-at-arms and some 1400 archers.35  This is roughly double the 
Prince’s retinue, per the indenture, so unless Knighton was including the retinues of the 
four earls in his estimate, he clearly is exaggerating.  However, if Knighton is including 
the earls’ companies, than his total of 2200 men is in line with Sumption’s suggested 
figure and Lambert’s shipping data.  Avesbury claims the Prince had 1000 men-at-arms 
and 2000 archers, as well as a “large number of Welshmen,”36 for a total of more than 
three thousand men, a number that is unlikely even accounting for the retinues of the 
                                                
32Thomas Gray, Joseph Stevenson, and John Leland, eds., Scalacronica (Edinburgh, 
1836), 140. 
33Gray, Scalacronica, 147. 
34BPR, IV, 143. 
35Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle, 128–29. 
36Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 424.  “…cum mille hominibus armorum et M1M1 
sagittariis magnoque numero Wallensium.” 
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earls.  To meet such a total, the earls would each need to supply a retinue of at least 500 
soldiers—milites, squires, sergeants, and archers.  Using Knighton’s figures, the earls 
would each have to assemble a retinue of about 250 soldiers.  For example, the earl of 
Warwick provided a retinue of “2 bannerets, 26 knights, 71 men-at-arms, 40 armed men, 
and 100 archers” in 1341;37 Warwick’s 1359 retinue included eighty men-at-arms and 
one hundred archers.38  Suffolk provided a retinue of 55 men-at-arms for the 1342 
Brittany campaign.  Oxford’s retinue in 1334–1335 had 28 men-at-arms and 12 mounted 
archers.  Given these numbers, it is unlikely the magnates could have provided the 
remaining 527 men-at-arms to make Avesbury’s 1000—coming up with 327 to meet 
Knighton’s 800 would have been difficult enough.  It seems safe to say, then, that the 
Prince brought roughly 2000 soldiers with him, a number that accords well with 
Lambert’s data on the transport fleet and its capabilities (see previous chapter).  With the 
addition of the Gascons, probably 3000–4000 men, the Prince had a force of between 
5000 and 6000 combatants,39 as well as a large number of non-combatants.  
Aside from the combatants there would be those non-combatants essential to the 
functioning of the army, although one could argue that minstrels,40 presumably for the 
Prince’s personal entertainment, were hardly essential to the efficient progress of the 
                                                
37CPR 1340–1343, 264–67.  H.J. Hewitt, “The Organization of War,” in The Wars if 
Edward III, Sources and Interpretation, ed. Clifford J. Rogers, 285–302 (Woodbridge: 
The Boydell Press, 1999), at 289. 
38Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 161.  TNA, E 101/393/11, ff. 79, 87. 
39La Vie du Prince Noir, II, 643–44; Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 5, 344; Rogers, War Cruel 
and Sharp, 305, n. 103.  Sumption, Trial by Fire, 175–76; Hoskins, In the Steps of the 
Black Prince, 21. 
40Henxteworth pays a number of minstrels throughout the campaign.  See for example, 
DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 5 October 1355. 
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army.  This somewhat amorphous group would include cooks, grooms, chaplains, 
minstrels, the Prince’s tailor—yes, the Prince’s personal tailor accompanied the army and 
was kept quite busy41—, clerks, and hostlers.  Based on Henxteworth’s accounts, these 
non-combatants were organized into different ‘departments,’ such as the spicery, the 
kitchen, the marshalcy, and the butlery, among others.  That there were a number of these 
non-combatants accompanying the army is indisputable; the question is how many of 
them did so. 
This depends, in part, on the Prince’s supply system.  If the supplies are moved 
primarily by carts, the number could be larger if some of the non-combatants, such as 
grooms, did not double as drivers.  On the other hand, if most of the supply transport is 
done by army personnel and pack animals, fewer non-combatants would be needed.  
Engels estimates a ratio of one ‘follower’ to three combatants for Alexander the Great’s 
army.42  This would mean an additional two thousand men accompanying the Prince’s 
army, for a total of eight thousand.  Roth gives a lower ration of four to one,43 which 
would add 1500 men and bring the Prince’s force to 7500 men.  Yuval Harari’s work 
suggests a higher ratio,44 namely as high as 50 percent of the army’s strength (the number 
used by Hoskins in his calculations).  In the case of the Prince’s army, then, the 
noncombatants would come to 3000, for a total of 9000.  It seems safe to conclude that 
                                                
41Henxteworth pays him, and he is provided with cloth to make clothes for the Prince 
while on campaign.  DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 1 October 1355, 11–23 
December 1355, and 13 January 1356. 
42Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, 12–14. 
43Roth, Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 113–14.  His estimate matches 
Junkelmann’s numbers.  Junkelmann, Die Legionen des Augustus, 124. 
44Harari, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Campaigns,” 
301–02. 
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the size of the Prince’s army came to 8000–9000 men, including non-combatants, a 
number slightly higher than Sumption’s 6000–8000 men and just lower than Caille’s 
10,000 soldiers  (See Table 4.6 and Table 4.7).  All further calculations will be based on a 
force of 8000 men, erring on the side of the minimum of which the Prince’s logistics 
were capable. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6: Historians’ estimates of the strength of the Prince’s force. 
 Numbers 
J. H. Ramsay* 3400; 5000 
A.E. Prince 2600 
Herbert Hewitt^ 2570 
Jonathon Sumption 6000–8000 
Jacqueline Caille 10,000–20,000 
Peter Hoskins 9000–10,000 
*The first number is his estimate of the force that sailed from England.  The second 
figure is the highest number he accepts for the English forces at Poitiers. 
^Hewitt only gives numbers for the English troops and offers no numbers on the troops 
the Gascons supplied. 
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Table 4.7: The Prince’s numbers according to the Chronicler. 
 Numbers (1355; at Poitiers 1356) 
Geoffrey Baker* 60,000; 7000 
Robert of Avesbury 3000+ 
Henry Knighton 2200 
Indenture^ 1133 
Thomas Gray 1000; 3400 
*His numbers include the Gascons. 
+He also includes a “large number of Welshman.”  
^The indenture includes the Prince’s retinue, not the retinues of the earls and other 
magnates. 
Recruitment 
England already had in place a highly sophisticated system of recruitment and array by 
the mid-fourteenth century.  There were two distinct methods: commissions of array for 
archers and a variety of other means for men-at-arms, most notably the indenture.  The 
commissions of array first came into use under Edward I (1239–1307) during the Welsh 
wars and Scottish campaigns.  Initially, the responsibility lay with the sheriffs, but 
eventually this task passed to “magnates and knights with military experience.”45  By the 
end of the reign, the commissions also focused on more limited geographic areas, such as 
specific counties.  The commissions depended on local officials to select the soldiers and 
                                                
45Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 123.  “Knights” is Prestwich’s word. 
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archers.  The main result of these early commissions was large numbers of men of 
varying competence, given the common use of bribes to leave capable men who wanted 
to avoid service behind.  The quality of the archers improved with a change in 
recruitment practices under Edward III: the inclusion of specified numbers of archers, as 
well as men-at-arms, in indentures with commanders.  Commissions of array were still 
used, but by Agincourt (1415) almost every archer served in a retinue.  The exact 
mechanism for recruiting archers into a retinue is unclear.  They were not retained.  Most 
likely, the first place a commander looked was his own estate.46  This was certainly true 
of the Prince.  The archers for his retinue primarily came from Chester. 
The Prince required a large number of archers to be arrayed.  His initial orders of 
May 1355 to array 200 archers were augmented in June, when he commanded de 
Brunham to “send 300 archers of the county of [Chester]” and another “100 archers of 
the county of Flynt.”  They were to reach Plymouth by three weeks from Midsummer, so 
in mid-July.47  In addition to the recruitment of these archers, the Prince at times also 
specified who should be leading the archers, which suggests the Prince and his advisors 
had detailed knowledge of the men available to serve and lead these companies.  For 
example, the same order to John de Delves that commanded him to array archers for the 
Prince’s company specified that “Hamonet [sic] Mascy and Goldesburgh ‘le frere’” 
should lead the archers from the hundred of Broxton.  John de Hide, Robert de Legh the 
son, Robert Bruyn, and John Griffyn were also named “leaders of the archers,” and the 
Prince’s orders further specified to which group of archers each captain was to be 
                                                
46Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 122–25. 
47BPR, III, 199–200, 204. 
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assigned.48  Later John de Hide was given command of all the archers from Mackelesfeld 
despite an earlier order that assigned half to him and the half to Robert de Legh, fils.49  
The Prince, then, was not merely concerned with numbers; he was also involved in the 
selection of captains, which may have been made on the advice of the arrayers or other 
local officials.  This clearly demonstrates that the Prince’s army was hierarchically 
organized down to the smallest unit, namely a unit of twenty archers led by a captain, or 
vintenar (for more on the captains, see below).50 
Recruitment, of course, did not always go smoothly.  Men offered bribes—and 
recruiters accepted same—to avoid service.51  Occasionally “inferior men” were 
arrayed.52  Some archers in Chester chose to serve “in the companies of other persons” 
rather than in the Prince’s company, which indicates that the Prince’s retinue was not the 
only one that included archers.  This was a direct violation of the Prince’s decree that no 
archer could do so without special leave “until the prince should be assured of as many 
archers as he needed.”  The Prince clearly took this seriously, as he ordered John de 
Delves and Thomas de Dutton, the sheriff of Cheshire, to seize the lands and goods of 
any man who had done so, any man who was leading these archers, and whomever 
“procured their withdrawal from the prince.”53 
There was also the problem of ensuring that men, once recruited, actually showed 
                                                
48BPR, III, 200, 204. This is Hamon Mascy, who appears often in the BPR and in 
Henxteworth’s accounts. 
49BPR, III, 205. This countermanding order is dated 4 days after the original order. 
50Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 127. 
51Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 124. 
52Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 85–86.  This was not a new problem.  Edward III had 
such difficulties during the Scottish campaigns of the 1330s. 
53BPR, III, 205.
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up.  Take, for instance, the case of Thomas de Brescy.  He received his cloth for livery, 
and possibly his pay, along with the other archers from Chester but failed to show up at 
Plymouth.  Officials in Chester were instructed to find him and order him to “come to the 
prince with all speed.”  In the event he made excuses or tried to evade, they were to arrest 
him and confine him at Chester castle.54  At one point, action was to have been taken 
against Richard Bowere of Knotesford, as an order of 22 August commanded the 
chamberlain of Chester “to supersede any impeachment or levying of issues which may 
have been made against him because he came not to the prince when his companions 
came.”55 
There were also desertions once the archers arrived in Plymouth.  Richard de 
Wynstanston of Chester, for example, deserted and took with him more than 6l from the 
Prince’s wardrobe.  Unsurprisingly, the Prince commanded, on the advice of Sir Richard 
de Stafford, that Wynstanston be seized and imprisoned “until he has given satisfaction 
for the money and until further order.”56  Similar orders to imprison and seize the lands 
and goods of all the archers who had, after taking wages and livery, “withdrawn 
themselves from the prince, wither the prince knows not” were issued from Plymouth on 
5 September; a detailed list of thirty-nine names, organized by county, followed.57  De 
Brescy and Wynstanston, mentioned above, are both included in the schedule for Chester 
and are two of the four men listed as ‘missing’ from Chester.  The men from Flynt and 
                                                
54BPR, III, 212. 
55BPR, III, 214. 
56BPR, III, 214. 
57BPR, III, 215.  The counties are Flynt, Cheshire, and North Wales.  Copies of the letter 
and schedule were sent to John de Delves and John de Brunham, lieutenant justice of 
Chester and chamberlain of Chester respectively, and to the chamberlain of North Wales. 
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North Wales listed as deserters far outnumber the Cheshire archers.58  All in all, the 
schedule lists thirty-nine archers who had deserted, four from Chester, fourteen from 
North Wales, and the remaining twenty-one from Flynt [in north-eastern Wales but 
linked to Chester for administrative purposes]. 
These failures to appear and desertions demonstrate the high level of 
administration involved in recruiting soldiers for the English expeditions across the 
Channel.  The Prince’s forces were organized enough to know not only who had enlisted, 
as it were, and accepted wages and or livery but also who took the money and ran.  The 
seriousness with which these desertions were handled indicates an administration more 
than capable of recognizing the fraud and dealing with it effectively.  It clearly was 
considered a crime and, as far as the Prince’s orders are concerned, was to be handled as 
one.  This is borne out in a separate command that certain archers who returned to 
Chester were not to be impeached because the Prince was satisfied that they were, indeed, 
“too ill to travel with him.”59  This order of 2 September, as well as similar orders from 7 
September,60 suggests that these eight men, without the protection of the Prince’s 
blessing, could and likely would have been impeached, possibly imprisoned, and might 
have had their lands and or goods seized.  They were not the only men to fall ill during 
the delay at Plymouth.  Five men of North Wales and four men of Flynt were allowed to 
                                                
58Interestingly, the missing Welsh archers, based upon name evidence and the counties in 
which they were arrayed, far outnumber the English/Cheshire archers. 
59BPR, III, 214. 
60BPR, III, 215–16.  These orders list several men and are among the final orders issued 
from Plymouth before the expedition sailed for Gascony. 
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return home under similar circumstances.61  This does raise the question of disease 
among the soldiers waiting at Plymouth.  Unfortunately, there is no evidence as to what 
illness these men had or how many others had also fallen ill. 
While archers were arrayed, men-at-arms (bannerets, bachelors, squires, serjeants, 
and others.) were ‘hired’ in a variety of ways,62 and according to Walter de Milemete 
service could be divided into three categories: voluntary, paid, compulsory.63  Paid troops 
were a significant part of English armies.  Military obligation was insufficient for raising 
the numbers needed and attempts to institute difference forms of military obligation 
provoked significant hostility and resistance.  Paying and rewarding troops was much 
more effective.  This was done through indentures, i.e., contracts for military service.  
The use of short-term contracts dates to no later than the late thirteenth century, to 1270 
and Prince Edward’s (Edward I) crusade expedition.  These contracts became 
increasingly complex.  The English crown used them, and Edward I used contracts when 
sending armies to Gascony in 1290s.  Edward III did not use such contracts for 
campaigns he led personally, but did use indentures for expeditions led by others, such as 
the Black Prince (for more on indentures, see below).64 
The Prince had his own personal retinue of 433 men-at- arms, leaving the earls 
and those in their retinues to come up with the remaining 367 soldiers to arrive at 
                                                
61BPR, II, 216. 
62Servitium debitum was not among them.  Edward III’s reign saw one feudal levy in 
1327.  Edward III’s attempt to establish a new form of military obligation was abandoned 
in 1352. 
63M.R. James, ed., Treatise of Walter de Milemete (Oxford, 1913), xviii, ff. 27b–30.  
Milemete wrote his treatise in the last years of Edward II’s reign for the heir, the future 
Edward III. 
64Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 88. 
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Knighton’s total of 800 men-at-arms.  In some cases the earls used indentures, as well as 
other methods to provide the needed men-at-arms.  One source was men who had 
previously established relationships and agreements regarding military service.  Roger 
Loring, for example, held a manor in Somerset of the earl of Salisbury, for which he was 
to “render a lance of war yearly.”65  He served in Salisbury’s company on the campaign.66  
In addition to the earls’ retinues, other men-at-arms had their own, smaller retinues.  
Richard De Stafford (the Prince’s steward), for example, had his own company,67 albeit 
not an overly large one.68 
 Aside from the recruitment of soldiers, the Prince also had to recruit support 
staff.  It is not an accident that Humphrey le Ferrour, farrier of the Prince’s household, 
was pardoned a debt of 23l 8s 8d; the pardon is dated 1 June 1355 “by command of the 
prince himself.”69  Most of the support staff, though, likely would have been already in 
service, i.e. already members of the Prince’s household.  Hervey Hewe, for example, 
worked in the scullery before the campaign and continued to serve in that ‘department’ 
while in Gascony.70 
One other group that must be considered is mariners, who were not recruited in 
                                                
65TNA, C 54/192, m. 28v.  CCR, X, 58. 
66TNA, C 61/67, m. 7.  Rymer, Appendix E, 16. 
67BPR, III, 203, 212. 
68Exact numbers are unavailable, but there is a consensus that his company was small, 
possibly not more than 15–20 men.  Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 79–81; 
Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 119. 
69BPR, IV, 132. 
70DCO, Henxteworth, 23.  BPR, IV, 192. 
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the same way as archers and other soldiers.71  For example, Robert de Hull and Richard 
Theband were ordered to “take 120 mariners for the king’s service…in all ports and 
places from the mouth of the water of the Thames as far as the port of London, and put 
them on ships fitted out for his service to go at his wages as they shall be ordered.”72  In 
February 1355, Thomas Dautre, as part of his orders to arrest ships to carry supplies to 
Gascony, was “to take sufficient mariners for the governance (gubernaculum) of such 
ships and put them therein at the king’s wages.”73  This is clearly a different procedure 
than the commissioning and arraying of archers, let alone the system of formal 
indentures.  Shipmasters were also needed, and just as there was continuity in the 
personnel responsible for arresting ships there was some continuity among the 
shipmasters.  Of those who sailed to Gascony in 1355, at least seventeen of them served 
the king in the same capacity but unconnected with the Prince’s expedition the following 
year (See Appendix A).74 
“Paperwork” 
An expedition of this size generated an immense amount of paperwork, not all of it 
pertaining to the Prince’s military activities.  To be sure, the flurry of orders between 
March and early September in the Register clearly shows that the Prince was putting his 
affairs in order.  These orders included settling cases, assigning wardships, paying debts, 
appointing swan keepers (swanherds), and seeing to the administration of Cornwall, 
                                                
71For the most recent work on this subject see Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 
2011. 
72TNA, C 66/244, m. 4; CPR, 10, 155. 
73TNA, C 66/245, m. 24; CPR, 10, 178. 
74TNA, C 76/34, m. 17.  Rymer, Appendix E, 19–20. 
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Chester, Wales, and other lands in the Prince’s absence, among other things.  On 24 
August, John de Kendale was given the power “to remove and appoint bailiffs in 
accordance with the orders given to him on 19 August [emphasis mine].”75  He also 
reminded Robert de Legh, pere, a forester in Mackelesfeld to take proper care of the 
forest, “for the prince would hate his game to be destroyed or ruined in any way during 
his absence beyond seas.”76 
It also entailed setting up a council to oversee the Prince’s affairs while he was in 
Gascony.  First, Henry de Blakebourn replaced William de Northwell as the treasurer and 
keeper of the Prince’s wardrobe.  Blakebourn officially took over on 1 July 1355, the date 
on which Northwell was to deliver by indenture “everything of the prince’s that he ha[d] 
in his keeping, to wit, moneys, jewels, silver vessels, victuals, and all other things.”77  
Both men received letters to this effect.  The accounts show that Northwell had 
surrendered the jewels by 8 July 1355, and the value of these jewels was more than 500l, 
a substantial amount.78  One of Blakebourn’s tasks was making payments, especially for 
foreign expenses like alms, messages, gifts, and wages and fees of war (advances paid to 
soldiers), and these payments were to be “allowed” to him along with all “other costs 
incurred by him at the prince’s order.”79  Blakeburn, though, did have to justify his 
accounts with the auditors and the controller of the household, Alexander de Aungre.  He 
was given detailed instructions, particularly in regard to double-checking the treasurer’s 
                                                
75BPR, II, 82. 
76BPR, III, 207. 
77BPR, IV, 139. 
78BPR, IV, 141-2. The total value was 579l 10s, and the jewels included rings, silver gilt 
panniers, brooches, diamonds, rubies, and enameled pieces, among other items. 
79BPR, IV, 149. 
Chapter 4: A Competent Military Force 
 
157 
accounts before re-imbursing him.80 
The earls also made arrangements.  Ufford, the earl of Suffolk, appointed men to 
receive money due him from the sheriffs and royal ministers.81  William de Montacute 
arranged to have his debts postponed and or forgiven.82 he also appointed Richard de 
Chadesle to pursue the 10,000l owed the earl by the bishop of Salisbury and several 
canons of St. Mary’s church.83 
The Prince’s paperwork also included securing pardons for men in his company, 
men such as John Dymmok who had received known felons, specifically John de 
Lodelowe “indicted of the death of Simon le Keu.”84  Incidentally, Lodelowe served on 
the campaign and received his pardon for the felony on 5 June 1357.85  He and Walter 
Lodelowe received pardons on 6 September 1357 for robbery (for more on the criminal 
element of the army see below).86  Stephen Rollyng of Sandwich received a pardon on 28 
July 1355 for stealing a cow.  He was granted this pardon because he was “going on the 
king’s service” to Gascony.87  These men received pardons before going on campaign, 
which indicates that their business was sufficiently important to the king as to warrant 
pardons.  Furthermore, it allowed these men to serve on the campaign without standing 
trial, thus removing their crimes from the normal course of the king’s justice.   
                                                
80BPR, IV, 149. 
81TNA, C 66245, m. 1; CPR, 10, 223. 
82Rymer, III, I, 305. 
83TNA, C 54/193, m. 34v.  CCR, X, 180.  Chadesle did succeed in securing payment. 
84TNA, C 66/ 246, m. 14; CPR, 10, 262. 
85TNA, C 66/252, m. 28.  CPR, 10, 559.  His pardon gives the dead man’s name as 
Simon Cook 
86TNA, C 66/252, m. 6.  CPR, 10, 599.  Walter Lodelowe served in Salisbury’s company 
according to his pardon. 
87TNA, C 66/246, m. 8. 
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In some cases, the pardon was also a recruitment tool.88  In March 1296, pardons 
were given to prisoners and outlaws who provided the necessary sureties and pledged to 
serve in the army in Scotland.  They also received the king’s wages.89  In 1339–40 more 
than 800 pardons were granted.90  By 1343, as Edward III (1312–77) was preparing for 
the Brittany campaign, the system had altered somewhat.  Pardons were still offered, but 
the criminal only received one after serving in France at his own expense.91  Pardons 
were offered so regularly that it appears some soldiers joined the army for the express 
purpose of obtaining one.  Richard Holm of Yorkshire volunteered in 1359—after he had 
killed a man.92  Undoubtedly some men, like Holm, volunteered in order to receive a 
pardon.  Parliament protested on more than one occasion about the practice.93 
A group of six men who threw two pirates overboard received pardons in 1355 
                                                
88Helen Lacey, The Royal Pardon: Access to Mercy in Fourteenth-Century England 
(Rochester: Boydell & Brewer, 2009), 100.  For her discussion of the use of the military 
pardon and contemporary debates about it, as well as historiographic debates on the effect 
of the military pardon on public order, see 100–106.  John Bellamy, Crime and Public 
Order in England in the Later Middle Ages (London/Toronto: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul/University of Toronto Press, 1973), 192–93. 
89CPR, 1292–1301, 186.  Bellamy, Crime and Public Order, 192–93.  Any who were 
appealed, though, still had to stand trial upon their return to England. 
90Neil Jamieson, “‘Sons of Iniquity’: The Problem of Unlawfulness and Criminality 
amongst Professional Soldiers in the Middle Ages,” in Outlaws in Medieval and Early 
Modern England: Crime, Government and Society, c. 1066–c.1600, ed. John C. 
Apppleby and Paul Dalt, 91–110 (Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 103. 
91Owen Pike, A History of Crime in England, Illustrating the changes of the laws in the 
progress of civilization (London, 1873–1876), I, 295; Bellamy, Crime and Public Order, 
193. 
92Jamieson, “‘Sons of Iniquity’,” 102.  K. Fowler, Medieval Mercenaries (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 19.  Holm started his career as a professional soldier 
with a homicide in Coventry in 1359.  He went on to become a mercenary captain and 
ended as an esquire and captain of a castle in the Calais Pale in 1380. 
93Lacey, The Royal Pardon, 102–03. 
Chapter 4: A Competent Military Force 
 
159 
before the fleet sailed for Gascony.94  Given their actions, these six men were likely 
mariners, which raises the question of the use of pardons as an incentive for maritime 
service.  Of greater import, particularly for the shipping of the army, are a set of pardons 
granted to Thomas Clerk, John Ram, John Spryngcman (Sperman), Hamo Louetoft 
(Hamond Lovetoft), William Odam, Thomas Ram, Bartholomew Stygan (Stigeyn), and 
Robert Hull: all shipmasters of ships known to have been arrested to transport the 
Prince’s army to Gascony.  The pardons were for “the account which [they] should 
render of moneys and profits” from previous voyages,95 which may be indicative of 
smuggling.  Also significant is their collective experience.  Six of the seven had recently 
sailed to and from Gascony, specifically during “the last season of vintage [1354],”96 and 
the seventh man, Bartholomew Stygan (Stigeyn) had recently called at Vermeo (Bermeo) 
in Biscay (now Basque Country in northern Spain).  All seven, then, were familiar with 
the sea lanes between England and the ports on the Bay of Biscay.  While the use of 
pardons in recruitment of ship masters and mariners is not as clear as in the recruitment 
of land-based troops, the timing of these pardons is suggestive. 
Numerous letters of protection were “made out in favour of…those…who are to 
go in the prince’s company.”  Many of these letters were valid for a year from the 
quinzaine of Trinity, 15 June 1355.  Letters of protection also were made out in favor of 
men serving in other companies, such as Thomas Darden, who served in the company of 
                                                
94TNA, C 66/245, m. 12.   
95TNA, C 66/246, m. 5; CPR, 10, 280–81.  Rymer, Appendix E, 13–14.   
96TNA, C 66/246, m. 5; CPR, 10, 280–81. 
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Richard De Stafford,97 and John Tochet serving in the Earl of Warwick’s company.98  
The practice was a normal part of military preparations. The earliest examples date to the 
1220s and were a common feature of crusading.99 
There were also numerous “letters of attorney.”100  Roger de Clifford, who served 
in Warwick’s company, appointed his attorneys in early June.101  These were not sought 
solely by members of the aristocracy and land-holding classes.  Many were in favor of 
those from lower social levels, such as Alan Cheyne [a yeoman and later raised to knight 
bachelor sometime between 1357–1359] and Roland Daneys [raised to knight bachelor 
sometime after 1356 but before 1358].102  Executors were appointed.  Roger de Cotesford 
was granted his request that, if he died while in Gascony, his executors could hold his 
manor for a year following his death.103  The Prince’s executors were to hold his estate 
for three years “to discharge his debts thereout.”104 
Another form of “paperwork” involved the postponement of legal actions.   An 
assize of novel disseisin against William le Vernoun of Gostre was postponed until after 
Easter 1356 “as the said William is to go with the prince to the war in parts beyond seas,” 
                                                
97BPR, III, 203, 212. 
98BPR, III, 208. 
99Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 109. 
100As with the letters of protection, letters of attorney are not proof that a man actually 
served in Gascony. However, they do indicate the types and amount of paperwork that 
went into preparing for a campaign, both for the commanders and for individual 
participants who planned to go. 
101TNA, C 66/246, m. 26; CPR, 10, 241.  Clifford’s attorneys were appointed until 
Christmas. 
102BPR, III, 213. 
103BPR, IV, 133. 
104TNA, C 66/246, m. 13; CPR, 10, 264. 
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and the Prince did not wish William’s case to suffer “in any way while in his service.”105  
Roger Lestraunge, lord of Maillorseisenek, was offered a “respite…of all things in 
demand against him” until the Prince returned to England at the Earl of Arundel’s 
request.106  In this case, the postponement of legal action benefited not only the Prince 
but also a man not serving on the campaign.  The same was true for Thomas Gerveys, 
who was to be given respite in all matters against him until the Prince’s return.107 
Concerns about legal actions during an absence, like letters of attorney, were not 
solely the province of the titled and landholders.  Three of the Prince’s archers (John de 
Neuton, Geoffrey de Stanlegh, and William de Chorlegh) were “greatly afraid of being 
damaged in the absence because they…are bound to the prince in diverse sums as pledges 
for certain men of the county…”108  Both the lieutenant justice of Chester and the 
chamberlain of Chester were made aware of this concern and ordered “to shew them 
during their absence such favour in the matter of the said pledges as can fairly be 
shewn.”109  Simon de Grimesdich, John Starky, and John de Merbury, also archers of the 
Prince and pledges “pray[ed] the prince would grant them respite until their return to 
England.” 
The Prince’s orders of 7 September, issued from Plymouth to the chamberlains 
and lieutenant justices of Cheshire and North Wales, commanded his administrators “to 
put in respite the execution of any indictments for trespass or felony made in any part of 
                                                
105BPR, III, 207. 
106BPR, III, 212. 
107BPR, IV, 142. 
108BPR, III, 213. 
109BPR, III, 213. 
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the county” against any of the men “who are with the prince in this expedition, until their 
return to those parts.”110  This shows that the Prince, if nothing else, knew that members 
of his expedition were leaving legal matters behind unresolved and that legal matters 
could arise during their absences.  Clearly, he did not want his soldiers distracted or to 
suffer legal harm through their absence on his expedition, which would have affected 
morale.  If nothing else, it might have a detrimental effect on recruitment. 
Perhaps the most important form of paperwork was the indenture.  The indenture 
was, essentially, a written agreement or contract for military service made between the 
recruiter, e.g., Edward III, and the captain, e.g., the Black Prince.  It generally stipulated 
the rate of pay, regards (bonuses), the number of men the party was to provide, the period 
of service, sometimes the location of that service, and often that there would be 
compensation for lost horses.111 If this last was not stipulated it was generally understood.  
In 1357, the earl of Salisbury negotiated for restor of his personal mount and his “horse-
at-arms,” although usually a man only had one horse valued.112 
There existed also a system of subcontracts. The contracted party would then 
subcontract as it were with the men he would provide and he would pay their wages out 
of the money he had received from the king.113  Salisbury, for example contracted with 
Roger Maltravers in 1371.114  The system of indentures, particularly for overseas 
service—given Edward III’s foreign policy, overseas deployment was highly likely—had 
                                                
110BPR, III, 216. 
111Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, passim.  Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 92–97. 
112Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 96. 
113Hewitt, Black Prince’s Expedition, 19. 
114Maltravers was to provide a set number of men, his own horses and equipment.  The 
earl would pay shipping costs, wages, regard, and a fee of 20l.  TNA, E 101/68/5/107. 
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replaced military service based on landed obligations before the 1350s.115  Furthermore, 
these indentures were widely used outside of the military sphere, so this form of 
paperwork would have been a familiar, usual, and indispensable aspect of the Prince’s 
campaign.  Indeed, the Prince himself was bound to the king by indenture for his service 
in Gascony, and the sources are full of similar documents.116 
Of these, the most detailed, and certainly the most prominent, is the one dated 10 
July 1355 between Edward III and the Prince, and it needs careful examination not only 
because of how it exemplifies the format of the typical indenture but also because of how 
it endows the Prince with royal authority in Gascony.  It not only specified the number of 
men and archers the Prince was to provide as his personal retinue. discussed above, but it 
also detailed who would accompany the Prince and provide their own retinues: the earls 
of Warwick, Oxford, Salisbury, and Suffolk, of course, as well as John de Lisle and 
Reynold de Cobham.117  Each of these men would have made their own indentures, both 
with the Prince and also with the members of their own retinues, none of which are 
extant.   
Unlike many indentures, the one between Edward III and the Prince does not 
                                                
115Hewitt, Black Prince’s Expedition, 18.  Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 57–81.  
Edward III’s sole use of the feudal summons to muster an army was in 1327. 
116Edward III also used indentures to contract with foreign leaders for military service.  
For example, there is a 12 November 1355 indenture between Edward III and Henry, 
Count of Holstein.  The count was to provide “centum helmes et centum paunsers” and 
would “hospicijs” and “duo milia florenorum de scuto per annum.”  Rymer, Appendix C, 
2.  The original document is extant as Archives of Hamburg, 7 g (French) and 7 c (Latin).  
The Prince, it should be noted, also had ties to the Holy Roman Empire, particularly to 
the Burgrave of Nurenburg. 
117BPR, IV, 143–44. TNA E36/278, f. 88r.  For a published edition of the indenture, see , 
“The Indenture between Edward III and the Black Prince for the Prince’s Expedition to 
Gascony, 10 July 1355,” Journal of Medieval Military History 12 (2014): 165–71. 
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specify the Prince’s wages or regard (bonus); it says only that “the king has paid him in 
advance war wages and reward for himself and the men of his retinue for a half year” 
from when the Prince reached Plymouth.118  More important, though, than the money 
were the powers and authority assigned to the Prince.  He was granted “full power under 
the king’s great seal” to remove and appoint ministers, make ordinances, oversee the 
collection and use of rents, mints, and customs, grant lands gained war, make truces, take 
ransoms (except that of John II—that ransom would go to Edward III who would 
recompense the Prince), and pass judgment on “any who are rebellious and disobedient 
(des rebeux et desobeisantz) in those parts, and to pardon them and grant them life and 
limb.”119   
Edward III’s responsibilities included wages, sufficient shipping (see previous 
chapter), re-imbursing the Prince and others for the value of lost horses, and vicutalling 
the towns of Subise, Rocheford, Tanneye, and Talleburgh.  He would also ensure that the 
Prince’s interests in England did not suffer during his absence “on the king’s service 
overseas.”120  This showed the same understanding of the potential harm, albeit on a 
different scale, service outside of England could do to the Prince’s interests and the care 
taken to protect those interests that the Prince showed the men serving under him. 
The Prince’s powers as the king’s lieutenant were quite broad and far-reaching; he 
was the King’s representative, “as if the king were there in person,”121 and a 
representative of English royal authority—as well as the means to enforce it.  The 
                                                
118BPR, IV, 144. TNA E 36/278, f. 88r. 
119BPR, IV, 144-5. TNA E 36/278, f. 88. 
120BPR, IV, 144. TNA E 36/278, f. 88r. 
121BPR, IV, 144. TNA 3/36/278, f. 88r. 
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indenture makes it clear that the Prince’s expedition was not just a simple raid.  It was 
about restoring—and augmenting if possible—England’s control in Gascony and by 
extension furthering Edward III’s strategic goal of possessing Gascony in full 
sovereignty.  These stated goals reflected the King’s previously stated intentions in other 
documents, such as the 27 April orders to arrest ships and mariners for the Prince’s 
passage, which state the expedition is “pro salvatione and defensione regni nostri Angliae 
ad partes Vasconiae.”122  The text of the indenture also bears a striking resemblance to 
another text, a ‘letter’ to the Prince, also dated 10 July 1355 and recorded in the Gascon 
Rolls, which states explicitly that Edward III is sending the Prince to Gascony “for the 
reformation of the situation and control of our duchy of Aquitaine and other lands and 
places in our kingdom of France, and for the recovery of our lands and rights, which have 
been wrongly occupied by our rebellious subjects.”123  Thus, the indenture and this 
particular letter both describe Edward III’s political strategy in addition to delineating the 
military obligations of the King and the Prince. 
Even as the indenture anticipated the Prince’s success, for example, by detailing 
how the Prince was to deal with captured castles and towns, it also acknowledged the 
possibility of failure.  The King promised to rescue the Prince if he was “besieged or 
beset by so great a force that he cannot help himself.”  The Duke of Lancaster, as well as 
                                                
122Rymer, III, I, 299. TNA C76/33, m. 12. 
123Rymer, III, I, 307. TNA C76/33, m. 6.  “…pro reformatione statûs et regiminis ducatûs 
nostri Aquitainiae, et aliorum terrarum et locorum in regno nostro Franciae, ac 
recuperatione terrarum et jurium nostrorum, quae sunt per rebelles nostros perperam 
occupata…”  While the close parallels of this entry with the indenture might suggest that 
it is, in effect, a summary of the indenture, it fails to address the details of the campaign 
(e.g., the number of men-at-arms) and focuses instead on the Prince’s actual authority. It 
is also a ‘letter’ to the Prince rather than a formal contract like the indenture. 
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the earls of Arundell, March, Stafford, and Northampton, also promised to aid with such 
a rescue.  In the event that the Prince’s person was “in peril” without hope of timely 
rescue, the indenture allowed for him to make a truce for his army or take other action to 
help himself.124  The Prince’s indenture with Edward III, then, provided the Prince with 
the means to rescue himself. 
Pay 
The rates of pay were standardized in the early thirteenth century.  When the Hundred 
Years War began, Edward III doubled wages for overseas service in 1338.  Wages 
reverted to the lower level in 1339.125  Bannerets received 4s per day, knights 2s, a 
sergeant or man-at-arms 1s, infantryman 2d, mounted archers 6d.126  In addition to 
wages, the Crown also paid regards, or bonuses, also at a standard rate of 100 (66.67l) 
marks per thirty men-at-arms, although the regard rate might be increased.127   
The Prince and the earls unsurprisingly received the highest pay.  Oxford’s wages 
and regard (bonus) came to 1174l 13s 10d (see Table 4.8).128  John Beaupre received an 
advance of 50 marks “as his fee of war for a whole year.”129  Other men also received 
advances on their fees.  “Ralph de Mobberley [miles], John Danyers [miles], William de 
Carenton, Hamon Mascy [archer captain], John Danyers, Thomas de Stathum, Robert le 
Bruyn [archer captain], and Robert de Legh, ‘le filz’[archer captain]” were all to receive 
                                                
124BPR, IV, 144. TNA, E36/278, f. 88. 
125Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 84–85. 
126Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 84.  “Knights” is Prestwich’s term; he uses it for 
miles, which he writes could apply to a large group of men and could mean simply a 
mounted soldier. 
127Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 86. 
128TNA, E 402/377, m. 29. 
129BPR, II, 86. 
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“a moiety of their fees in hand” from the “moneys appointed for the prince’s chamber 
and wardrobe,”130 according to an order of 21 May.  Obviously, their fees for the war had 
already been negotiated, and those fees clearly show the differences in rank.  Mobberley 
and Danyers both received 11l 13s 4d as partial payment of their fees; the archer captain 
Hamon Mascy received 100s, while Robert le Bruyn was paid only 66s 8d.131  The 
Gascon men-at-arms were paid on a scale similar to the English men-at-arms, and a 
number of the Gascons had their own retinues.  The lord of Montferrand, for example, 
received wages for himself and his retinue.132 
Table 4.8: Army wages 
Captain Rank  Wages 
Edward of Woodstock Prince of Wales, Commander 8129l 18s 
Thomas Beauchamp Earl of Warwick, Constable of the army 2614l 4s 
Robert Ufford Earl of Suffolk 1428l 6s 8d 
John de Vere Earl of Oxford 1174l 13s 10d 
William Montacute Earl of Salisbury 1124l 2s 2d 
Sir Reginald de Cobham  652l 0s 8d 
Sir Ralph de Mobberley Esquire 11l 13s 4d 
Sir John Daniers 
(Danyers) 
Esquire 11l 13s 4d 
William de Karenton  10 marks 
Hamon Mascy Archer Captain, Broxen and Wirhale 
hundreds 
100s 
John Danyers  100s 
                                                
130BPR, III, 200. 
131BPR, III, 200. 
132TNA, E 213/233. 
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Thomas de Stathum  100s 
Robert le Bruyn Archer Captain, Edesbury hundred 66s 8d 
Robert de Legh, fils  66s 8d 
Richard de Mascy  5 marks 
Hamon de Asshelee  5 marks 
Sir John de Hide Archer Captain, Mackelsfeld hundred  
Hugh de Golbourn Archer Captain, Broxen and Wirhale 
hundreds 
 
Sir John Griffyn Archer Captain, Wych Malbank hundred  
John Breton  Gascon 9l 16s 
Bertrand (Aymery), lord 
of Montferrand 
Gascon 27l 12s (incl. 
retinue) 
 
 
Furthermore, the captains of archers who had the rank of miles received a higher 
daily wage “from the time of his leaving home until his arrival at Plymmuth” of 2s; 
esquires received 1s per day.133  Richard de Mascy and Hamon de Asshelee fees for the 
year were 10 marks each, half of which they received as an advance in late June or early 
July of 1355.134  Pay also depended on whether a soldier brought others with him.  John 
Griffyn, for example was to be paid 40 marks “if he is coming with two esquires” but 
only 23l 6s 8d “if he is coming with one.”135 
Archers from Chester were paid at a rate of 6d a day, while archers from Flint 
                                                
133BPR, III, 204. 
134BPR, III, 204. 
135BPR, III, 202. 
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(northeastern Wales next to Chester) received half that,136 just as Welsh archers had in 
the 1260s.137  This difference in pay suggests the Cheshire archers were mounted—based 
on the standard rates of pay.  Like the rest of the soldiers, the archers were paid an 
advance for the journey to Plymouth.  Obviously, the Cheshire archers’ higher salary 
would make their shorter journey easier than that of the archers from Flint. 
Wages were paid in advance for half a year’s service, which the indenture 
between Edward III and the Prince specified.138  John de Brunham, after bringing money 
to London, had “to return to Cestre before the octave of Midsummer to pay the archers’ 
wages prior to their coming to the prince.”139  However, it was not unusual for wages to 
be late or left unpaid.  Furthermore, as wages were calculated on a daily basis, payment 
was an administrative burden.  During Edward I’s major campaigns, the infantry was 
regularly mustered and counted; cavalry leaders accounted for the men under them.140  
The Prince had access to the Crown’s clerical resources and also took John Henxteworth 
on the campaign; he performed the task of a paymaster with his staff. 
The Prince’s Command Staff and Advisors 
The Prince’s 1355 chevauchée to Narbonne and back in the late fall was highly 
successful.141  He and forces left England behind schedule, but only two weeks after 
                                                
136BPR, III, 204.  
137Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 84; A. Lewis, “Roger Leyburn and the Pacification of 
England, 1265–67,” English Historical Review 54, no. 214 (Apr., 1939): 193–214, at 204. 
138TNA, E 36/278, f. 88r.  BPR, IV, 144. 
139BPR, III, 201. 
140Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 88. 
141For the campaign itself, see Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince and Hewitt, The 
Black Prince’s Expedition.  There are also a number of smaller studies focusing on 
specific aspects of the campaign, such as Peter Hoskins’ article on the question of 
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landing the Prince and his forces left Bordeaux.  The campaign, was planned and 
executed quickly.  The Prince could have considered the lateness of the season and 
waited until spring.  He chose not to delay—perhaps he felt he had waited long enough 
on the weather, considering the long delay (some six weeks) in England on account of 
lack of ships and unfavorable winds.142  Instead, the Prince and his advisors finalized 
their campaign plans.  The success of the campaign indicates that the Prince received 
excellent advice, suggesting that he had a strong, able staff of advisors.143  Furthermore, it 
appears that his staff of magnates and soldier administrators worked well together and 
with the Prince, and their efforts on his behalf served him well.144  This was a result of 
their collective expertise, the close ties that already connected them, and the prior 
experience all of them possessed, either as campaigners and or administrators. 
The Prince’s staff was extremely able and knowledgeable.  Numbered among his 
                                                                                                                                            
whether the Prince’s army passed to the north or south of Narbonne; Hoskins, “The 
Itineraries of the Black Prince’s Chevauchées of 1355 and 1356.”  His article is the latest 
contribution to this particular debate. There are also numerous French studies (discussed 
above), many of which deal with the French view of the raid. For a recent example, see 
Caille, “Nouveaux Regards.” For discussion of the campaign’s success, see the final 
chapter/conclusion. 
142BPR, III, 493. 
143For the Prince’s retinue, see David S. Green, “The Military Personnel of Edward the 
Black Prince,” Medieval Prosopography: History and Collective Biography 21 (2000): 
133-152; Green, Edward the Black Prince: Power in Medieval Europe, particularly 
chapters three (Nobility and Chivalry) and four (A Prince’s Household: Lordship and 
Status). See also Philip Morgan, War and Society in Medieval Cheshire (Manchester, 
1987), 97–148. 
144I say ‘appeared’ to work well together and with the Prince rather than that they ‘did’ 
work well together because the sources do not mention any strife; however, just because 
it did not make the chronicles, does not mean we can assume there was no discord.  In 
fact, it seems more likely that there were disagreements.  That said, it seems safe to 
conclude that there was no major discord of the type and magnitude that would result in a 
leader withdrawing from the Prince’s forces, an option more open to the Gascons than the 
English. 
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advisors were four magnates, all of whom had served at Crécy in 1346 (for discussion of 
the magnates see below), no fewer than eleven Knights of the Garter,145 and a number of 
the Prince’s personal—and professional—administrators from Wales and Chester, as well 
as some members of his household.  His staff also included a few Gascon lords, such as 
the Captal de Buch (d. 1376), one of the original Knights of the Garter who also 
happened to be a cousin of the Count of Foix, who had not declared for either France or 
England and through whose lands the army would need to pass.   
Aside from the locals who joined the Prince in Bordeaux, several of those who 
accompanied him had previously campaigned in Gascony.  For example, John de Vere 
(Earl of Oxford, c. 1312–1360) served under Henry of Grosmont (Earl of Derby, Earl and 
later Duke of Lancaster, c. 1310–1361) on a raid through Languedoc in 1349.146  
Additionally, many of these men were united by existing (and the hope of future) ties of 
kinship and marriage; they moved in the same circles, and some had served together 
previously in Scotland, Gascony, and Brittany, such as Sir John Chandos and Sir Nigel 
Lorying.147  And even when they did not, they were united by their mutual goals, service, 
and role as the Prince’s general staff in Gascony—and possibly continued service when 
the Prince’s retinue became the king’s retinue.148  We can presume, then, a certain 
                                                
145A total of twelve of the original Knights of the Garter took part in this campaign; the 
Prince is the twelfth. 
146The initial route of Lancaster’s campaign (Bordeaux to Langon) is mirrored by the 
Prince’s campaign in 1355; after Langon, the Prince’s forces continued south and then 
advanced toward Toulouse from the south while Lancaster’s forces generally followed 
the Garonne river to approach Toulouse from the west. 
147Green, “The Military Personnel,” 142. 
148The Prince’s personal retinue should be understood as still developing, and the 
campaigns of 1355 and 1356 were a key part of that development.  This is particularly 
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amount of cohesion among the Prince’s command staff, and many of the men who served 
as advisors to the Prince came from a “family tradition of service” and there were 
“numerous family allegiances.”149 
Magnates 
Four earls served with the Prince in Gascony: William Montacute (Salisbury), Robert 
d’Ufford (Suffolk), Thomas Beauchamp (Warwick), and John de Vere (Oxford).150  
These men also brought their own companies.  Warwick’s company, for example, 
included Roger de Clifford,151 who married Warwick’s daughter, Maude (d. 1403) and 
probably John Beauchamp, Baron Beauchamp of Somerset, who married Warwick’s 
daughter Alice.152  The earls were also responsible for recruiting and paying (out of their 
wages and regards from the Prince) their own companies.  The documentation concerning 
these retinues is not as complete as one would like. 
                                                                                                                                            
significant because members of the Prince’s retinue, guided by the command staff, not 
only “contributed to the victory at Crécy and formed the core of the armies that were 
victorious at Poitiers [1356] and Najera [1367]” (Green, 134); furthermore, these core 
members assisted with the Treaty of Brétigny (1359).  As Green argues, the treaty was 
“largely negotiated and implemented by members of the prince’s retinue,” and as his 
work shows, Crécy and the intervening years—the years between Crécy and the Prince’s 
investiture with the Principality of Aquitaine in 1362—provided the foundation for the 
later retinue and its successes (Green, 143).  The chevauchées of 1355–1356 were part of 
that foundation; therefore, examining the Prince’s core advisors for these two years will 
not only illuminate this administrative aspect of this particular campaign but also provide 
a basis from which to examine the later campaigns and the Prince’s administration of the 
Principality of Aquitaine. 
149Green, “The Military Personnel,” 142.  See the same article for discussion of the later 
retinue and how its members may have been recruited. 
150Baker, Chronicon, 229. 
151TNA, C 66/246, m. 26; CPR, X, 241.  Clifford had also been Warwick’s ward.  His 
prior experience included the naval battle, Les Espagnols sur Mer in 1350. 
152Bernard Burke, A genealogical history of the dormant, abeyant, forfeited, and extinct 
peerages of the British empire (Baltimore, 1978), 30.  
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Suffolk (1298–1369) had signed on before 25 June.153  He sailed with Warwick 
from Southampton.154  Ufford had been in the Prince’s service no later than 1337 and was 
head of the Prince’s council in 1351,155 so clearly he was well-known to members of the 
Prince’s staff and household, such as Wengefeld and Henxteworth.  When the army 
divided into three columns for the march, he was one of the leaders of the third 
column.156  He, too, had significant experience in the field, had fought in Gascony in 
1324, at Halidon Hill (1333) with Warwick and Oxford, and had served as a negotiator in 
Scotland.157  Early in the Hundred Years War, Ufford served as an admiral (like many of 
the admirals, he was not a professional sailor) commanded the second battle at Crécy in 
1346.158  He received his earldom in 1337, before which he had been an important 
banneret in the royal household159 and had been instrumental in Edward III’s 1330 coup 
d’état against Mortimer and Isabella.  Incidentally, the Prince was made Duke of 
Cornwall (England’s first duke) at the same ceremony in which Ufford received the 
earldom. 
Warwick was involved arguably before the Prince was given command.  Warwick 
was part of the expedition no later than 10 March 1355, when the King gave orders to 
arrest ships and mariners to transport the earl of Warwick and other magnates and men-
                                                
153TNA, C 66/245, m. 1; CPR, 10, 223. 
154TNA,C 76/33, m. 13; Rymer, III, I, 300.  Incidentally, Ufford’s son William later 
married Warwick’s daughter Isabel sometime before 1376. 
155BPR, IV, 31. 
156Baker, Chronicon, 230–31. 
157Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 106. 
158He shared that command with the earl of Northampton and the bishop of Durham.  
Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 160, 276.  Jean le Bel, ii, 105–06.  Rogers, War Cruel 
and Sharp, 104–05. 
159Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 168, 
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at-arms to Gascony160 and Edward III’s attorney.161  As Lancaster did not return until 28 
March and the council at which the Prince was officially appointed to lead the expedition 
was not until after 5 April (post Pascha),162 it is clear that the King already trusted in 
Warwick’s abilities.  He certainly had in the past.  Warwick had served in Scotland—
Halidon Hill (1333) and Brittany; he was a veteran of Sluys (1340).163  Warwick, 
described as “the magnificent and powerful man and most energetic warrior,”164 was 
known for his prowess and courage, such that the Anonimalle Chronicle claims the duke 
of Burgundy and his troops retreated in darkness rather than face “the devil Warwick” 
upon his landing at Calais in 1369.165   
During the Crécy campaign, Warwick helped secure the landing at La Hogue and 
was the Marshall of the army and responsible for the Prince of Wales during that 
campaign.166  He was also one of the commanders responsible for choosing the ground 
for the deployment of the English troops at Crécy.167  The Prince, then, would have been 
accustomed to working with Warwick and listening to his advice, particularly as 
Warwick had been the marshal of England since 1344.  During the expedition he was the 
                                                
160Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 297. 
161Oxford, Corpus Christi College, MS 78, ed. and trans. Clifford J. Rogers, Journal of 
Medieval Military History 7: The Age of the Hundred Years War (2009): 168–75, at 173. 
162Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 423. 
163Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 191. 
164London, BL, Beauchamp cartulary, f. 49. 
165Anonimalle Chronicle, 1333–1381, ed. V.H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927. 
, 61; Walsingham, Thomae Walsingham, quondam monachi S. Albani, Historia 
Anglicana (London, 1863–64), vo. I, 282. 
166Barber, Life and Campaigns, 29.  Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 87, 98, 105. 
167Clifford Rogers, “Edward III and the Dialectics of Strategy, 1327–1360,” in The Wars 
of Edward III, Sources and Interpretations, ed. Clifford J. Rogers, 247–83 (Woodbridge: 
The Boydell Press, 1999), 274–75, n.47.  Froissart, Oeuvres, V, 26. 
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constable of the army and led the first column.168  Warwick went on to serve in the 
Rheims campaign (1350–1360), witnessed the Treaty of Brétigny (1360), returned to 
Gascony in the Prince’s service in 1364, and served as a captain under John of Gaunt 
(1340–1399).169   
Oxford (1312–1360) was also an experienced soldier and was the Chamberlain of 
England.  He fought at Halidon Hill with Warwick and Suffolk, and later in Brittany.  He, 
too, served on the Crécy campaign with the Prince and participated in the siege of 
Calais.170  During the 1355 campaign, his next campaign after 1348, he served in the 
middle column under the Prince’s command.171  Following the Prince’s expedition de 
Vere fought in the Rheims 1359–1360 campaign, during which he was killed.172 
Salisbury was the other leader of the Prince’s third column in 1355.173  His father, 
William Montacute (d. 1344), was the first earl of Salisbury (one of the 1337 earls who 
received his earldom when the Prince was made Duke of Cornwall) and was a key part of 
Edward III’s 1330 coup d’état against Roger Mortimer (d. 1327), the coup d’état that 
placed Edward III definitively on the throne.  The younger William and the Prince grew 
up together.174  The former inherited the title in 1344 and later married Joan of Kent, 
                                                
168Baker, Chronicon, 230.  Barber, Life and Campaigns, 61.  Incidentally, his sons Guy 
(d. 1360) and Thomas (1337–1401), the next earl of Warwick, were both knighted in July 
1355 and served in the northern campaign that year.  DNB, vol. 4, 599.  
169DNB, V 4, 597–99. 
170Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 217. 
171Baker, Chronicon, 230. 
172DNB, vol. 56, 304–05.  His son Aubrey, the future earl of Oxford, was in the Prince’s 
service in 1366 and was retained for life by the Prince.  DNB, vol. 56, 280. 
173Baker, Chronicon, 230–31. 
174Yuval Noah Harari, Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100–1550, Warfare in 
History (Woodbridge, 2007), 1.  
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which marriage was annulled in 1349 after her husband Thomas Holland returned from 
overseas.175  Salisbury participated in the Crécy campaign and was knighted at Lo Hogue 
in July 1346 by either the King or the Prince, newly knighted himself.176  Hewitt lists a 
second William Montacute on the campaign, but this is not the earl’s son William as 
Hewitt claims given that his son was not born until after 1349.177  Montacute served again 
in 1357 and 1372. 
All of the magnates, then, were experienced soldiers, veterans of the King’s 
campaigns, and had fought beside the Prince before the 1355 expedition. 
Administrators and other Professionals 
A key member, if only a part-time member who did not accompany the expedition to 
Gascony, was John Beauchamp, a Knight of the Garter and the younger brother of the 
Earl of Warwick.  He had also served at Crécy and the naval battle of Sluys; his other 
posts included captain of Calais, Constable of the Tower of London, Warden of the 
Cinque Ports, and Admiral of the Fleet.  He was appointed admiral for the area east of the 
                                                
175After Holland’s death, Joan married the Prince of Wales.  Holland, incidentally, was at 
one time the seneschal of Salisbury’s household. 
176John L. Leland, “Montagu, William, Second Earl of Salisbury (1328–1397),” The 
Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); M. Warner, 
“The Montagu Earls of Salisbury, 1300–1428” (PhD diss., University of London, 1991); 
A. Grandsen, “The Alleged Rape by Edward III of the Countess of Salisbury,” English 
Historical Review 87 (1972): 333–44; M. Galway, “Joan of Kent and the Order of the 
Garter,” University of Birmingham Historical Journal 1, no. 1 (1947): 13–50.   
177Leland, “Montagu, William, Second Earl of Salisbury.”  Hewitt’s list of men serving 
on the campaign includes a William Montacute (son of the earl), based on Rymer, E, 17.  
However, the list in Rymer lists the earl twice, and the name Hewitt has taken for the son 
of the second earl is, in fact, the second earl.  Rymer reads: “…William  de Montacute, 
earl of Salisbury, William de Montacute, son and heir of William de Montacute, the late 
earl of Salisbury…” [emphasis mine]. 
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mouth of the Thames on 5 March 1355.178  Many of the orders related to the preparation 
of ships and transport of the Prince’s expedition, as well as Lancaster’s concurrent 
expedition to Normandy, were given on his advice or information.  Some of these were 
issued as early as January 1355, such as one to take mariners for the king’s ships.179  His 
knowledge of available ships and captains and his experience of naval operations and 
battles would have made him an invaluable staff member, particularly in the earliest 
stages of the campaign, namely the marshalling of ships for transport to Bordeaux and in 
any discussion of resupply by sea.  His lieutenant, Thomas de Hoggeshawe, was assigned 
to the Prince’s expedition, specifically to manage the maritime resources.180 
Reginald (Reynold) Cobham (c. 1295–1361) was another such professional.  He 
fought in the Scottish campaigns, was at Sluys (1340), fought at Morlaix (1342), and like 
Warwick, helped determine the English ground at Crécy in 1346, where he also was a 
member of the Prince’s guard.181  In addition to being a member of the command staff 
Cobham also served as the marshal of the Prince’s army in 1355 and led the first column 
alongside the constable of the army, the earl of Warwick.182 
The Prince’s staff also included soldier-administrators like John de Wengefeld.  
Wengefeld was clearly an able and trusted administrator.  Many, if not most, of the 
Prince’s orders and decisions are by the advice and or command of John de Wengefeld, 
                                                
178Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 296. The same day Robert Morley was appointed admiral “ab 
ore aquae Thamis versus partes borealis.” Ibid. 
179TNA, C 66/244, m. 4; CPR, 10, 155. 
180Rymer, Foedera, III, i, 299, 300, 302. 
181Rogers, “Edward III and the Dialectics of Strategy,” 274–75, n. 47.  Froissart, Oeuvres, 
V, 26.  Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 69–70, n.139, 193. 
182Baker, Chronicon, 230; Barber, Life and Campaigns, 61.  DNB, vol. 12, 291. 
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and these run the gamut from the payment of advance wages to giving gifts of wine to the 
administration of justice.183  Wengefeld was intimately involved in the administration of 
the Prince’s household and holdings.  Sir Henry de Blakebourn was another important 
soldier-administrator.  He served as the treasurer of the Prince’s household and the keeper 
of the Prince’s wardrobe.184  As treasurer, he was allowed “all foreign expenses, such as 
gifts, alms, necessary messages, wages and fees of war….,” with the expectation that he 
would have the accounts periodically reviewed.185   
Sir Edmund Wauncy was the steward of the Prince’s household and had been as 
of 1352; incidentally, he received  a bascinet (helmet) as a gift from the Prince just prior 
to the expedition’s departure from Plymouth.186  He was later commended in 1357 for his 
good service on the campaign and “the great position he held on the day of the battle of 
Poytiers [sic].”187  Indeed, he may have captured Philip of France (later Philip the Bold, 
Duke of Burgundy), as the Prince arranged for the Cheshire exchequer to pay Wauncy 
200l annually “until he [Wauncy] be satisfied of a sum of 4800 marks [3200l] due to him 
from the prince for the ransom of Sir Philip, son of the king of France.”188 
Another man who cannot be excluded is Richard de Stafford (c. 1305–1380).  
While he may not have been a ‘permanent’ member of the Prince’s staff, he was a trusted 
agent of the Prince.  He had fought in Gascony before under Lancaster (earl of Derby at 
                                                
183For single examples, see the following.  Wages: BPR, II–IV, throughout. Wine: BPR, 
II, 39; Justice: BPR, III, 12. 
184BPR, IV, 139. 
185BPR, IV, 149. 
186BPR, IV, 149. 
187BPR, IV, 215. 
188BPR, III, 452. 
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the time) in 1345–1346, and had served the Prince in various capacities in the intervening  
years.189  He had several brushes with the law and received a pardon of outlawry in 1326 
to serve in the retinue of Ralph, Lord Basset,190 another for being an accessory to murder 
in 1334 in exchange for service in Scotland, and in 1336 helped his older brother (the earl 
of Stafford) abduct Margaret Audley, one of the great heiresses of the day worth 2314l a 
year.191  Later, the younger Stafford served on commissions of “oyer and terminer”192 and 
was part of several diplomatic missions for the King.  He fought in France on multiple 
occasions and was in the van at Crécy, where he likely served the Prince for the first 
time.  They clearly developed an important relationship: in 1347 Stafford became the 
steward and surveyor of the Prince’s Welsh and English estate, a council member, a 
justice in Cheshire, and a recruiter of soldiers for service abroad.193  In March 1355 he 
and his fellow justices were charged with removing the sheriff of Oxford and Berkshire 
from office, an undoubtedly sensitive task.194  Upon the conclusion of the 1355 
chevauchée, the Prince sent de Stafford back to England with letters for the Bishop of 
Winchester, then head of the Prince’s council in England, and appointed him to recruit 
                                                
189Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 22–23, 80–81. 
190Basset helped secure his second pardon and a Ralph Basset also served on the 1355 
campaign. 
191DNB, vol. 52, 61. 
192See TNA, C 66/244, m. 7d; CPR, X, 164–65 for an example of an instance involving 
“fur collar crime” and William de Menyll, “chivaler,” and his attacks on the abbot of 
Burton on Trent.  He was also part of the commission charged with dealing with the riots 
at Oxford (TNA, C 66/245, m. 16d; CPR, X, 234). 
193DNB, vol. 52, 62. 
194TNA, C 66/245, m. 13; CPR, X, 200. 
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reinforcements.195  In 1360, Stafford helped negotiate the Treaty of Brétigny, then in 
1361 returned to Gascony with the Prince.196 
Among the professionals accompanying the Prince, although probably not one of 
the military advisors, was Master William Blackwater, the Prince’s personal 
physician.197  He served the Prince for many years before the expedition and until 1362, 
when he was granted “20 marks yearly in aid of his sustenance and 40s yearly towards 
his clothing” “for good service rendered.”198  He accompanied the Prince to Gascony, as 
he collected wages from Henxteworth and collected supplies through the office of the 
spicery (discussed below in Chapter 7).199  Other members of the Prince’s household 
include Geoffrey Hamelyn, yeoman and keeper of the Prince’s armor.200  
John Henxteworth was one of the Prince’s yeomen and served as the Prince’s 
paymaster on the 1355 campaign.  His meticulous and detailed accounts indicate he ably 
fulfilled his task as paymaster.  He was responsible for paying wages and paying for 
victuals and other supplies.201 
Gascons  
The Gascons were an important aspect of the Prince’s campaign, not merely because 
                                                
195BPR, III, 224. Barber, Life and Times, Chapter 4: “Campaign Letters: The Campaigns 
of 1355–56.”  Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 434–49. 
196His illegitimate son, Nicholas, and his legitimate sons, Richard and Edmond, 
accompanied him.  A Nicholas Stafford served on the 1355 campaign.  DCO, 
Henxteworth accounts, accounts for 2 October 1355.  This same Nicholas served under 
Richard Stafford and was charged with receiving Stafford’s wages and carrying same to 
him. 
197BPR, passim; Henxteworth, passim. 
198BPR, IV, 454. 
199DCO, Henxteworth accounts, throughout. 
200BPR, IV, 149 and elsewhere.  TNA E 403/389, m. 3. 
201DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 28 September 1355 through 30 June 1356.  
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many served under the Prince.  The Gascons invited the expedition, specifically requested 
the Prince to lead the campaign, and welcomed him with open arms and celebrations.  
According to Knighton, the Gascons, particularly the magnates and bishops, “came to 
meet them and rejoiced at their coming, and received them with honor.  And they offered 
themselves to the prince as their liege lord…to live and die with him in all his 
undertakings, if, at last, he would stay with them and protect them…”202   
This account corresponds with the account in the Livre de Coutumes, according to 
which, after the Prince read aloud his letters patent establishing his authority and 
promised to uphold the urban privileges of Bordeaux, those present responded “that they 
shall be to the said lord good, loyal, and faithful, and obeidens, and guard his body, life, 
and limbs in good faith…and assist in his rightful conquest…in life and death, shall 
guard his rights without ceasing…as the faithful subjects of our lord the king.”203  Those 
present included the Constable of Bordeaux, John de Stretle, the archbishop of Bordeaux, 
Amanieu de La Mothe (archbishop 1351–1360), and the Captal de Buch, among 
others.204 
Of these men, it is clear that some certainly served among the Prince’s key 
                                                
202Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle, 128–9. “Et magnates terre tam episcopi quam alii 
occurrerent eis obuiam leti de aduentu eorum, et receperunt eos cum honore. Et 
optulerunt se principi tanquam domino suo legio, cum bonis et catallis, in omnibus suis 
agendis uiuere et mori cum illo, si tamen moram trahere uellet cum eis ad eorum 
defesionem. Et erant parati cum eo.” 
203H. Barckaussen, ed., Livre des Coutumes (Bordeaux, 1890), no. XLVI, 443.  “Que edz 
seran audit monsenor bon, leyaus, et fideus, e hobediens; e l’guarderan cors, vie e 
menbres a bone fe et a lor leyal poder; e l’ajuderan a conquestar dreituras contra tots 
homes qui pusquan bivre e murir, e sas dreituras lo guarderan sens appetissar, saubant le 
fieutat de nostre senhor lo Rey.” 
204Livre de Coutumes, no. XLVI, 444. 
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advisors.  Jean (III) de Grailly (d. 1377), Captal de Buch, was undoubtedly numbered 
among the Prince’s closer advisors.  He came from a family tradition of service to the 
English crown; Jean (I) de Grailly had been lieutenant and seneschal of Aquitaine (1266–
1268, 1278–1287) under Edward I.  Upon his inheritance in 1343 he “became perhaps the 
foremost of those Gascon nobles whose loyalty to the English king-dukes of Aquitaine 
did much to maintain and further Edward III’s war efforts against France.”205  Such was 
his influence that, upon being taken prisoner  in 1364, he was released without being 
ransomed; Charles V, during Grailly’s second imprisonment (1372–1377), offered him 
several financial inducements to change sides in the conflict.206  The Prince certainly 
knew him well.207  He was an original Knight of the Garter, had fought during the Crécy 
campaign, and in 1355 served in the middle column, which was led by the Prince.208  Of 
great significance for this campaign, aside from his knowledge of the area and experience 
on the earl of Derby’s (later duke of Lancaster) Gascon campaign in the 1345, he was one 
of the three Gascon nobles who requested the Prince to lead the campaign and was also 
the cousin of Gaston Phoebus, count of Foix and Béarn.  The expedition had to pass 
through Foix’s lands and the Prince made every effort to protect those lands while the 
army traversed them.  De Buch also held the important castle at Castets-en-Dorthe, where 
the army halted and purchased supplies (6–7 October).  At Poitiers, de Buch led a 
                                                
205DNB, vol. 23, 257. 
206These were refused, and Grailly died in captivity. 
207Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 44. 
208Baker, Chronicon, 230. 
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decisive flanking movement.  In 1371, Edward III named him Constable of Aquitaine.209 
Bernard Ezii Lebret (lord of Albret) also likely was also an advisor.  Like de 
Buch, Lebret had close ties to the English court.210  In 1354 Edward III granted him “a 
yearly rent of 1000l.”211  Guillaume Pomiers must also be included.  He was the leader of 
the Béarnaise forces in the third column of the Prince’s 1355 army and had ties to 
England.212  Bertrand de Montferrand had similar connections and held the prévoté of 
Entre Deux Mers, a wine-producing region upstream from Bordeaux and north of the 
Garonne, in Gascony.213  His daughter Rose married de Buch.214 
A special group in Gascony deserves attention, too.  These are the English 
officials in Gascony.  While not all of them served on the campaign itself, their 
cooperation would have been essential to a smooth debarkation in Bordeaux, establishing 
advance supply depots, such as the one at St-Macaire, arranging accommodations and 
billeting in Bordeaux both before the fall campaign and after the return of the Prince’s 
army in December, and assisting with local suppliers, among other things.  The first is the 
Constable of Bordeaux, John de Stretle.  He provided the Prince’s army with several 
large loans;215 it is unclear if these loans were personal or if the funds came from his 
                                                
209Denis Blanchard-Dignac, Le Captal de Buch: Jean de Grailly, 1331–1376 (Éditions de 
Sudouest, 2011), 233–50, 275. 
210TNA, C 66/245, m. 8; CPR, X, 274. For example, his aunt and others appointed an 
attorney in England to handle the execution of Bernard de Lebret’s (père) will in England 
and to handle any outstanding business related to his estate. 
211TNA, C 54/192, m. 17.  CCR, X, 27–28. 
212TNA, C 66/245, m. 8; CPR, X, 274.  
213TNA, C 54/192, m. 13; C 54/193, m. 26.  CCR, X, 35, 130. 
214Blanchard-Dignac, Le Captal de Buch, genealogy tables. 
215DCO, Henxteworth accounts, throughout. 
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office.  He was in regular contact with Edward III.216  It was to him that at least some of 
the Gascon commanders presented their receipts for the payment of war wages, as others 
had done previously.217  John Breton, miles, and Bertrand, lord of Montferrand both did 
so for their war wages of 9l 16s and 27l 12s, respectively.218  In 1356, Raymond Everard, 
castellan of Limeuil’s, request for payment was forwarded to Stretle,219 and the lord of 
Ornon presented his receipt for war wages in 1358.220  John Tuscanan’s request for his 
wages, payment for which was in arrears, also dates to 1358.221 
Another important figure in Bordeaux was John de Cheverston, the seneschal of 
Gascony.  He was appointed seneschal on 20 March 1354, replacing James de Pipe.222  
De Pipe was to present Cheverston with “everything that pertains to the care and control 
of the seneschal of the duchy” by indentures.223  Based on the letters of protection and 
attorneys Cheverston had spent at least a year in office.224  Given that de Pipe had given 
all of his records to Cheverston and that he had held the office for a year and was re-
appointed on 15 March 1355, it is reasonable to suppose that Cheverston and his staff 
were capable.  Cheversston accompanied the Prince’s 1355 campaign.  In March 1356, a 
ship, la Katerine, was assigned to bring his (and the earl of Oxford’s) horses and victuals 
                                                
216A brief look at the Patent Rolls alone reveals the extent of that correspondence. 
217For examples, see TNA, E 213/250; TNA, E 213/12; TNA, E 213/230. 
218TNA E 213/240; TNA E 213/233.  Here, Montferrand’s given name is written as 
Bertrand; in other sources it is written as Aymery. 
219TNA, SC 8/46/2254. 
220TNA, E 213/246. 
221TNA, E 8/261/13026. 
222Rymer, Foedera, III, I, 297; TNA C61/67, m. 14.  “…omnia quis ad custodiam [et] 
regimen senescaltis Ducatus […] pertinent…” 
223TNA, C61/66, m. 14, 2nd item.   
224Ibid., items 3 and 4. 
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from England to Gascony.225  While that in and of itself is not conclusive of Cheverston’s 
military service in the Prince’s 1355 chevauchée, in 1359 Adam Bolehead, Simon Seint 
Geynes, and Richard de Cheverston received royal pardons for homicide at John de 
Cheverston’s behest.  Their pardons specifically cite their good service on the campaign 
in Cheverston’s comitina.226  Cheverston’s presence on the campaign would have been 
invaluable.  John de Roos, the mayor of Bordeaux, also would have been a valuable 
member of the Prince’s circle of advisors, and he, too, joined the Prince’s army in 1355. 
The fourth and final key official was Master Bernard Brocas (1330–1395), the 
controller of Gascony.  His father’s lineage was Gascon; as a younger son he pursued a 
military career and fought in Brittany, Scotland, Spain, and at Crécy.  In 1354, he 
traveled to Avignon in Lancaster’s retinue, which presented Edward III’s position to the 
French envoys at Avignon.227  He had been an absentee official, but Edward III ordered 
him to accompany the Prince “so that the office may not be ruled by improvidence 
through his absence.”228  This was a key financial post, necessary not only to the good 
governance of the duchy but also to the smooth operation of the Prince’s expedition.  Part 
of Edward III’s complaint in 1355 was that bills were not being written out, thereby 
inflicting damage on the duchy’s finances and the King.229  He fought at Poitiers and later 
served as the captain of Calais from 1377 to 1379.230 
Mercenaries 
                                                
225TNA, C 66/248, m. 19. 
226TNA, C 66/257, m. 28. 
227DN, vol .7, 740–41. 
228TNA, C 54/193, m. 21.  CCR, X, 140. 
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The Prince’s company was not made up solely of English, Welsh, and Gascon soldiers.  
There was also a corps of mercenaries.  These professional soldiers had diverse origins.  
For example, a Tideric, likely Tideric van Dale, is identified as a “knight of the king of 
Crakowe” and as an “usher of the Prince’s chamber.”231  Bernhard van Zedeles, one of 
eleven men clearly identified as Almains (Germans), brought with him three esquires.232  
At least five men appear in the documents as “Spaniards.”233 
One man does deserve special mention.  Eustace d’Aubrichecourt, identified by 
Henxteworth as a Hainaulter,234 was a well known mercenary who had served Edward III 
for many years.  He married Philippa of Hainault’s niece, the earl of Kent’s widow.  He 
came from a tradition of service to the English crown and served after the 1355 
campaign.  The Low Countries also had a long tradition of supplying mercenaries to the 
English crown.235  Nearly 450 mercenaries from the Low Countries served on Edward 
III’s 1359 campaign.236 
Non-Combatants 
Among the non-combatants that accompanied the army there were several individuals 
that appear in the documents.   
One key group dealt with the care of the horses: grooms and farriers.  Based on 
Henxteworth’s accounts the wages of grooms and the shoeing of horses was stipulated in 
                                                
231BPR, IV, 165, 167. 
232DCO, Henxteworth, 79. 
233DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 16 February 1356 ; BPR, IV, 252 and 269. 
234DCO, Henxteworth, 4. 
235Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 154–55; Fowler, The King’s Lieutenant, 204; 
Foedera, III, ii, 745; CPR 1361–64, 317–18; CPR, 1367–70, 12; J.A.F. de Larrea Rojas, 
Guerra y sociedad en Navarra durante la Edad Media (Bilbao, 1992), 144. 
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the indentures.237  There is no indication as to the number of grooms on the campaign.  
Two farriers, Roger de Cornelee and John Doyly, are named in the sources, but given the 
number of horses, more than two farriers must have accompanied the expedition.238  John 
Musshon, the herald of arms, served on the campaign.239 
The Prince’s minstrels Jakelyn the Piper and Hankyn accompanied the army.240  
That the Prince had entertainers is hardly surprising; he also lost considerable sums “at 
play,” an activity that continued during the campaign.241  Clergy also accompanied the 
expedition.  At least two Friars Preachers were retained,242 and several “parsons” 
accompanied the Prince: Thomas de Gerlethorpe, parson at Collesdone; Thomas de 
Rasene, parson at Scoter; Alexander de Aungre, parson at Wythingdon.  There were also 
a number of clerks:  William de Northwell, who was treasure of the Prince’s household in 
1354, Alan de Stokes, and the clerks Henxteworth identifies only as the clerk of the 
kitchen, spicery, marshalcy, and buttery, among others.243 
 Non-combatants included servants, although it appears that being a servant did 
not ipso facto preclude involvement in battle.  Indeed, William Lenche, described as the 
Prince’s servant and porter, received the rights to the profits of the ferry at Saltassh 
                                                
237DCO, Henxteworth, passim.  See especially the entries in December 1355. 
238TNA, C 61/67, m. 10.  Rymer, Appendix E, 16.  
239BPR, IV, 167; DCO, Henxteworth, 7. 
240Jakelyn the Piper and Hankyn, among others, receive payments from Henxteworth.  
DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September 1355 through 6 October 1355 and 
28 November 1355 through 30 December 1355. 
241BPR, IV, 74-75, 161. DCO, Henxteworth accounts. 
242BPR, IV, 167. 
243For de Northwell: BPR, II, 66; BPR, III, 83, 137, 147, and 186; BPR, IV, 66, 91, 102, 
passim; for de Stokes, BPR, II, 151, 184; BPR, III, 394 and 456; DCO, Henxteworth 
accounts, throughout every entry. 
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(Cornwall) on account of his service and “the great hurt which he received in the Prince’s 
service at the battle of Poyters, where he lost an eye.”244 
The Army’s Structure  
The Prince’s army was highly organized and structured, and there was a chain of 
command.  At the head of the army, of course, was the Prince of Wales.  His company is 
the best documented, allowing a rough delineation of its structure. 
The men who served under the Prince also had their own, smaller companies.  
Richard de Stafford, brother of the earl of Stafford and the Prince’s right-hand-man for 
special tasks (see above), had his own men, including one Thomas Darden.245  When 
Stafford returned to England following the conclusion of the 1355 chevauchée his men 
were reassigned to Chandos’ and Audley’s companies.246  While the exact numbers of 
their companies are unknown, Audley’s accounts for his service in Gascony in 1345 
show that he had then forty men-at-arms and forty archers in his service.247  John de 
Lisle’s company had fifty-nine men-at-arms and sixty archers.248  It seems like that 
Audley and Chandos had companies of similar size. 
There were at least six archer companies.  Each unit had twenty men led by a 
vintenar.  Five of these smaller units were united into a unit of one hundred men and was 
led by a mounted constable.  This structure continued during the Hundred Years War, 
particularly for the arrayed archers.  In this campaign, then, the Prince’s archers were 
                                                
244BPR, III, 194; BPR, II, 98. 
245BPR, II, 202–03, 212.   
246Letter from John Wengefeld to the bishop of Winchester, Avesbury, Gestis, 439–445. 
247Gribbit, “Accounting for Service at war,” 167. 
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Chapter 4: A Competent Military Force 
 
189 
organized in this manner.  The units of Welsh archers were likely accompanied by 
additional officers: chaplain, standard-bearer, doctor, and an interpreter.  This was the 
case in campaigns in 1339, 1342, and 1359.249 
The scant extant evidence for the earls’ retinues makes it more difficult to sketch 
out the structure of their companies, although the overall structure was probably similar.  
The earl of Warwick’s company included Roger de Clifford,250 John Beauchamp, Baron 
Beauchamp of Somerset,251 and John Tochet.252 
More broadly, the army on the march was divided into three columns.  According 
to Baker’s diary, this division occurred after the initial march through the Landes (see 
next chapter), so days seven and eight of the campaign.  At this point, “two miles from 
the village of Areule [Arouille]” the standards were unfurled and “exercitus in turmas 
divisas.”253  The Earl of Warwick, constable, and Reginald de Cobham, marshal, 
commanded the first column of, Baker claims, 3000 men-at-arms.  With them were John 
de Beauchamp (1329–1361), baron Beauchamp de Somerset, later Warden of the Cinque 
Ports and married to Warwick’s daughter Alice (in Warwick’s company), Roger de 
Clifford (also in Warwick’s company), Thomas de Hampton, miles and the standard 
bearer.  Seven un-named Gascon barons accompanied the first column.254  The middle 
                                                
249Prestwich, Armies and Infantry, 127–28. 
250His daughter Philippa married William Ferrers, Baron Groby, whose father, also 
William Ferrers, coincidentally served on the 1355–1356 campaign.  Eric Acheson, 
“Ferrers family (per c. 1240–1445), ODNB (2004). 
251Baker, Chronicon, 230. 
252BPR, III, 208. 
253Baker, Chronicon, 230. 
254Baker, Chronicon, 230.  The position of standard-bearer was not insignificant and was 
strenuous.  Richard de la Vache, who carried the King’s standard received 100 marks per 
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column—7000 men-at-arms according to Baker—was led by the Prince, and his sizable 
retinue would have formed a large part of this column.  Accompanying him were the 
“earl of Oxford, lord Bartholomew de Burghersh, lord John de l’Isle, lord [John] 
Willoughby, lord [Roger] de la Ware, lord Maurice Berkeley…lord John Bourchier, lord 
John de Roos, mayor of Bordeaux, [John de Grailly] the Captal de Buch, the lord of 
Caumont, [and Aymery de Biron] lord of Montferrand, the standard bearer.”255  The third 
column was led by Suffolk and Salisbury, as well as Guillaume de Pomiers, “who led the 
Béarnaise,” and had 4000 men-at-arms.256 
This, then, was the Prince’s army: 8000 strong (including non-combatants) and 
13,000–14,000 horses divided among three columns or battles.  It left Bordeaux and 
marched to Narbonne and back again.  It did not run out of supplies; there are no reports 
of soldiers going without food—although the horses supposedly had to drink wine.  On 
the campaign, the Prince and his army had to navigate the waterless Landes southeast of 
Bordeaux (see Chapter Five), cross the Garonne, and accommodate a baggage train 
increased by loot, among other logistical challenges  How the army accomplished this 
and how the logistics adapted to the needs of the expedition are the subjects of the next 
two chapters. 
                                                                                                                                            
annum for life “for good service in the strenuous bearing of the king’s standard in his 
wars.”  TNA, C 66/248, m.13; CPR, X, 360. 
255Baker, Chronicon, 230. 
256Bakers, Chronicon, 231. 
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Chapter Five: The Campaign to Narbonne 
 
The preparations in England complete and a favorable wind at long last obtained, the 
Prince and his company finally set sail from Plymouth to England on 9 September 1355 
and arrived in the Gironde on 20 September.1  The eleven day passage seems to have 
been moderately uneventful, although several horses were lost during the voyage.2  At 
least one ship was lost, and the owner, Nicholas de Rothum, was compensated for it 
through a pardon of 100 marks that he owed and “the goods in a ship of Scotland arrested 
by him in the Tyne and the ransoms of the Scots therein,” and an unnamed shipmaster 
received13s 9d as a reimbursement for repairs to his ship.3  Several Cheshire archers 
belonging to the companies of Hamon Mascy and Robert Brun lost their horses during 
the voyage and received 12l 18s 8d as a “gift in aid of expenditures for…horses lost at 
sea.”4 
 Upon landing in Bordeaux, final preparations for the fall chevauchée began and 
must have proceeded quickly, given that the campaign set out within two weeks of 
dropping anchor in Bordeaux.  The rapidity with which these last preparations were made 
suggests that the Gascons had already been preparing for the expedition.  On the whole, 
the expedition was well-organized, prepared for the logistical challenges of the march, 
and flexible enough to pursue what Yuval Harari terms a radical raiding strategy through 
                                                
1Sumption, Trial by Fire, 175. 
2DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 20 September. 
3TNA, C 66/249, m. 22.  CPR, X, 403.  DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 20 
September.  The recipient is unnamed, but Henxteworth specifies that the Prince’s 
physician Blackwater “carried” the money to the unnamed recipient. 
4DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 1 October. 
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southern France.  The first section of the march was probably pre-scouted, almost 
certainly to Arouille [81 miles (130 km)] where the banners were unfurled and the army 
divided into three columns, and possibly as far as Toulouse, about 153 miles (246 km) 
following a mostly direct route but about 186 miles (300 km) following the route taken 
by the army. 
This chapter, then, covers the first half of the Prince’s campaign: the march from 
Bordeaux to Narbonne.  The army left Bordeaux and its environs on 5 October and 
reached Narbonne on 8 November.  During these five weeks they marched approximately 
300 miles (480 km), or an average of 14.5 miles (23 km) per day on those days the army 
actually marched.  The purpose of the march, at least initially, was to invade Armagnac’s 
lands south and east of Gascony and lay waste to them in retaliation for Armagnac’s 
depredations in Gascony in 1354.  After accomplishing this aim, the Anglo-Gascon force, 
some six thousand combatants and two thousand non-combatants who may also have 
been armed, then turned to Edward III’s secondary strategic aim: demonstrating the 
power and authority of the English king and the inability of the French king to protect his 
kingdom and people from attack.  
Final Preparations at Bordeaux 
When the ships docked at Bordeaux the first order of business was disembarkation.  
Presumably, the men managed this without undue incident as there are no records of 
problems.  Disembarking the horses from the ships, however, would have been just as 
complex a task as loading them onto the ships had been in Plymouth and Southampton.  
Not all of the docks were able to accommodate special gangways, and some of the horses 
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were unloaded via windage.  John Henxteworth, the Prince’s cashier, re-imbursed the 
clerk of the Marshalcy more than 1l was spent on windage upon the Prince’s arrival in 
Bordeaux.5  Aside from offloading the horses, the animals needed special care and rest to 
help them recover from the voyage, and fresh supplies had to be purchased over and 
above what may, and likely was, already stored.  For example, 6l 14s were spent on 
herbage and hay.  Comestibles were also unloaded at Bordeaux,6 which does suggest that 
extra supplies were transported across the Channel.  Incomestibles also had been 
transported across the Channel and had to be removed from the ships.  Harnesses, for 
example, were carried from the ships by carts to Bordeaux, and thence to an advance 
supply depot established at St-Macaire, about thirty miles upstream from Bordeaux.7  
New saddle pads were purchased, too.8  In addition to these expenses, Henxteworth paid 
out 16l 4s 4d in the wages of grooms of the stables for the month of September.9  The 
grooms’ rate of pay is nowhere specified, so it is impossible to determine the precise 
number of grooms.  
 Aside from the supplies for the horses, there was considerable activity purchasing 
comestibles for the men.  The officers responsible for purveyance purchased an 
unspecified quantity of wine and two pipes (a cask holding approximately 120 gal) of 
cider.  A considerable amount of provisions was purchased.  Henxteworth records 48s 
10d for general provisions.  Specifically, the purveyors bought 53 quarters 4 bushels of 
                                                
5DCO, Henxteworth accounts, two entries for 20 September.  
6DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 20 September. 
7DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September and 30 September. 
8DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September and 6 October. 
9DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 30 September. Wages and advances, not to 
mention gifts, were paid out to the soldiers and men-at-arms, too. 
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wheat (by three tallies) for 12l 9s 8d; more wheat for 8s; fish for 7l 3s 6d, along with a 4l 
7s 11d purchase of fish and salt; flesh for 4l 18s 6d; 3.5 quarters of salt (for the horses, 
for preservation—Henxteworth does not specify) for 23s 4d; 4.5 lbs of fine herbs for 12s 
8d; and general food for 3l 19s 6d.10  At least 2l, and likely considerably more, was spent 
on the carriage of victuals to St-Macaire.11  Henxteworth does not specify the means of 
transport for these entries, although on the return to Bordeaux supplies were transported 
via the Garonne River to Bordeaux.12  Given the later use of river transport and the 
common use of same by wine producers, it reasonable to suppose that the army used the 
Garonne to transport supplies from Bordeaux to St-Macaire.13 
Additional incomestible supplies were purchased.  William Giles, attached to the 
office of the spicery, for example, bought candles, among other things.14  A further 450 
lbs of wax candles were bought in Bordeaux.15  Two buckles were purchased for the 
Prince’s helmet, and William de Stratton received a 9s advance for the two lances.16  He 
also spent 7l 10s for “120 ells of linen cloth bought from Vifyan de Vilers at 
Bordeaux.”17  Cloth for the livery of 100 Welshman cost 16l 13s 4d, likely sewn by 
                                                
10DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September through 4 October. 
11DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 2 October. 
12DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 29 November. 
13Turgeon, “Bacchus and Bellum,” 51, 60–65; Fowler, Age of Plantagenet and Valois, 
41–42. 
14DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 6 October.  The entry specifies that Giles made 
the purchases in Bordeaux. 
15DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 4 October. 
16DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 3 October. 
17DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 1 October.
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William de Statton, tailor, who collected the money and oversaw the purchases.18  A 
further 22s 8d was spent on canvas,19 possibly for tents although Henxteworth does not 
specify in his accounts.  These incomestible supplies were also transported to St-Macaire.  
Robert Pipot, for example, was reimbursed 8s 9d for carriage of bows and arrows to St-
Macaire.20  Related to the cost of carriage was the cost for containers for the carriage of 
specific items.  For example, the dozen pewter bottles bought by Master William 
Blackwater, the Prince’s physician, for the Prince’s medicines, wooden containers for the 
transport of salt, and a dozen coffers for the carriage of confections.21 
The establishment of the advanced supply depot was necessary.  First, it would 
have been impossible to amass the supplies, muster the army, and assemble the supply 
train within Bordeaux itself.  Bordeaux was approximately as populous as London with a 
population of 30,000 and was about 400 acres within the walls completed in 1327, 
although the city had expanded beyond the walls by 1355.22  St-Macaire was upstream, 
and transporting supplies there would have been a simple matter, given the long use of 
                                                
18DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 4 October.  Presumably this suggests a 
considerable amount of work for the tailor and his assistants.  William de Statton was not 
the only tailor on the expeditions; Henry de Aldrington, the Prince’s personal tailor, also 
accompanied the army. 
19DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 4 October. 
20DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 3 October.  This date does not mean the bows 
and arrows were taken to St-Macaire on 3 October, only two days before the army set out 
from Bordeaux, but is simply the date on which Henxteworth gave the clerk of the 
spicery the money to re-imburse Pipot. 
21DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September, 2–4 October. 
22Malcolm Vale, The Origins of the Hundred Years War: The Angevin Legacy, 1250–
1340 (Oxford, 1996), 144.  This corresponds with the figures at the Musée d’Aquitaine in 
Bordeaux.  Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 22.  George Unwin, ed., Finance 
and Trade under Edward III (New York, 1962), 43. 
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river transport along the Garonne.23  This advance supply depot would also ease the 
logistical challenges of the first couple days’ marches, as well as provide a possible 
mustering location for the Gascon troops that would be joining the English force.  It is 
unlikely that these troops, coming from diverse parts of Gascony, would all muster in 
Bordeaux, then march back out of the city.  It would be more practical for them to muster 
outside of the city and join up with the English force there.  
The Gascons ostensibly had only two weeks to outfit themselves and reach the 
mustering point.  However, as discussed in Chapter Four, the Gascon leadership knew 
there would be an expedition that fall.  Granted, they probably believed it would have 
begun earlier in the season and could not have controlled for the contrary winds that 
prevented the Prince’s force from sailing as planned, but they were expecting the Prince, 
an English force, and an expedition.  Given that, the logic of military logistics and 
preparedness suggests that the Gascons, just like the English, were making preparations 
in the spring and summer of 1355.  Chapter Three demonstrated how involved and 
complex the preparations for a campaign were—and how much time was involved—
therefore, the Gascon troops could not have been recruited and equipped and provisioned 
in the two weeks between the Prince’s arrival in Bordeaux and the departure of the army 
from the city.  English or Gascon—or French—the basic logistical realities of supply 
apply equally. 
 That the Gascon nobles were in Bordeaux when the Prince arrived is not in doubt.  
On the morning of 21 September, the Prince greeted the Gascons in the square of the 
                                                
23Turgeon, “Bacchus and Bellum.” 
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cathedral of St-André.  There, the Prince read aloud the letters patent from Edward III.24  
The text of the letters is recorded in Latin, while the Prince’s speech following the 
reading is recorded in French.  These letters established Prince Edward’s authority as the 
King’s lieutenant in the duchy.  His powers, as defined by the letters patent, mirror those 
powers delineated in the indenture made between Edward III and the Prince: making 
truces, accepting homages, dismissing ministers, punishing rebels.  The proclamation of 
the letters patent would have also made clear the purpose of the Prince’s presence in 
Bordeaux and the goals of the upcoming campaign—if those were not readily apparent.25  
Baker records that the Prince was “received with honor by the bishop and clergy 
and together with all those in holy orders, with the whole populace running to meet 
him.”26  Many prominent Gascons were witnesses to the reading of the letters patent.  
Among them were “Bernard Ezii, lord of Lebret (l’Albret);27 Pey (II) de Grailly 
(d.1357),28 viscount Benauges and Castillon; Jean (III) de Grailly, captal de Buch;29 
                                                
24Livre de Coutumes, 439.  “…Édouard, prince de Galles, a fait lire…”  The notary who 
recorded the event wrote the text of the letter in Latin but the response of the Gascons, 
and the Prince’s reply, are recorded in Anglo-Norman. 
25Livre des Coutumes publié avec des varientes et des notes, Item XLVI, 439–44.  For the 
practice of reading aloud, see Thomas Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, 1066–
1307 (Oxford, 1993). 
26Baker, Chronicon, 229.  “…applicans Burdegalim, receptus est cum honore, episcopo et 
clero atque religiosis universaliter sacra induit, cum toto populo ipsi occurrentibus.” 
27He married Jean (III) de Grailly’s aunt Brunissende in 1336.  He and his sons served on 
the campaign.  See Baker, Chronicon, 132, 140. 
28He was the grandfather of Jean (III) de Grailly, the Captal de Buch who served on the 
Prince’s campaign, and had significant ties to England.  He had served as the seneschal of 
Gascony, as had his father, Pey (I) de Grailly, and grandfather, Jean (I) de Grailly.  See 
Blanchard-Dignac, Le captal de Buch, 24–27. 
29He served on the campaign and was an original Knight of the Garter. 
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Sénebrun (V), lord of Lesparre;30 Bertrand, lord of Montferrand;31 Amaniu d’Albret, lord 
of Langoiran; Guillaume-Sancii, lord of Pommiers;32 Auger de Montaut, lord of 
Mussidan;33 Amaniu de Fossade, lord of Madaillan;34 Arnaut-Gassie de Foussat, lord of 
Thouars;” all are listed as milites and nobiles viri.35 Among the venerabiles viri, also 
described as milites, are lord Raymond de Landirania; Gerald de Podio [a lawyer]; 
Bertrand Ferrand,36 Pey de Calonges, canons of Bordeaux; lord Johan and Amaniu 
Colom, brothers; Arnald Monetarii.”37  Representing Bordeaux’s citizenry were “Johan 
Colom [possibly the same man as above]; Johan Tostanan; Johan de Born [a merchant 
and burgess of Bordeaux];38 Geraldus Cambon [possibly Guiraut de Cambon, a burgess]; 
Guilhem Guiraudon; Johan and Pey Guarcie, brothers; Johan de Porta; Pey Maurin.”39  
                                                
30The lord of Lesparre served on the campaign; however, there is some discrepancy as to 
his name. The Livre de Coutumes lists the lord of Lesparre in attendance at the cathedral 
for the reading of the letters patent as Sénebrunus (V), which is the name given in the 
Gascon rolls.  Hewitt’s list of Gascons serving on the campaign names the lord of 
Lesparre as Guillaume Sans.  His notes list the BPR and CCR, but these entries merely 
say ‘the lord of Lesparre,’ with no given name.  Perhaps Sénebrunus was the father of 
Guillaume Sans and lord of Lesparre in 1355 and the son, Guillaume Sans, served on the 
campaign, then between the beginning of the expedition and the bestowing of rewards 
Guillaume Sans had inherited the lordship.  That Sénebrunus was lord of Lesparre is 
indisputable.  He was married to Jean (III) de Grailly’s aunt, Jeanne, in 1331, the year 
Jean (III) de Grailly was born, so their son would have been of an age to serve on the 
campaign. 
31An Aymery de Biron is named lord of Montferrand in Henxteworth’s accounts. 
32He served on the campaign and was the leader of the Béarnaise contingent. 
33He served on the campaign. 
34He served on the campaign.  Henxteworth lists his name as Aymeric and does not 
mention his title.  DCO, Henxteworth accounts, 83. 
35Livres de Coutumes, 444. 
36He appears several times in the Gascon Rolls, often described as a king’s clerk. 
37Livre de Coutumes, 444. 
38TNA, C 61/87.  He was involved in the transport and trade of wheat and other goods 
(primarily foodstuffs like oats and beans) from Plymouth, Southampton, and Dartmouth 
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These men were all prominent figures, and those who served on the campaign 
would have been actively involved in the planning in Gascony.  It should be remembered 
that of those listed as witnesses Bernard Ezi, lord of Albret; Guillaume de Pommiers; 
Bertrand, lord of Montferrand; and Magister Gerard de Podio, “juris periti,” were part of 
the failed negotiations at Avignon in late 1354 and early 1355 and would have known 
what Lancaster would report to Edward III.40  De Buch, of course, was one of the 
Gascons who requested the Prince and his army in Gascony.  Thus, the Gascons who 
would be joining the Prince’s army had to have known and have already begun their 
preparations for the campaign before the Prince’s arrival in Bordeaux.   
Furthermore, given their firsthand knowledge of the territory the army would 
shortly traverse and the presence of de Buch, de Pommiers, Montferrand, and Albret on 
the Prince’s staff suggests that these men joined the Prince’s staff from England in the 
campaign planning at Bordeaux in the council held “concerning these matters,” following 
the reading of the letters patent.41  Their knowledge of their lands and people, the 
productive capacity of the land, the location of strongholds and unfortified towns, would 
have been invaluable.  Perhaps it was one of these men who suggested establishing the 
                                                                                                                                            
to Bordeaux.  The trade between England and Gascony was dominated by the eastward 
flow of wheat and the westward flow of wine. 
39Livre de Coutumes, 444.  The notaries who recorded the Prince’s words, the ceremony, 
and the witnesses were Bartholomew de Fayette and Martin de Fontanis. 
40TNA, C 76/32.  Foedera, III, I, 289.  This is dated 30 October 1354.  Albret, Pommiers, 
and Aymery, lord of Montferrand, all served during the Black Prince’s campaign.  Their 
presence among the delegation is indicative of their status and that they were known to 
Edward III, certainly through the mayor and constable of Bordeaux if not personally. 
41“Oxford, Corpus Christi College, MS 78,” ed. and trans. Clifford J. Rogers, Journal of 
Medieval Military History 7: The Age of the Hundred Years War (2009): 168–75, at 173. 
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advance supply depot at St-Macaire.42  At any rate, all of them would have been familiar 
with campaigning in Gascony and the logistics of the effort to be undertaken. 
Once the final preparations were made, the Anglo-Gascon force began the 
chevauchée. Contrary to earlier assumptions about chevauchées, this was an organized 
campaign, such that, while local sources of supply were used, the army did not solely 
“live off the land;” nor was the campaign “marked by an absence of strategy.”  Contrary 
to Hewitt’s statements, there was an able staff and real knowledge of available 
resources.43  Overall, the Prince’s chevauchée was well-organized and efficient, with a 
capable command staff, which made it possible for the Anglo-Gascon force to meet the 
logistical challenges it would face on the campaign. 
General Logistics 
Before examining specific logistical challenges, it is necessary to establish the general 
parameters of the army’s logistical needs.  This includes its consumption rate, the size of 
the baggage train, and the average speed of march.  After establishing these 
fundamentals, they should be applied to the information provided by Baker, as he is the 
only chronicler to provide a detailed, day-to-day account of the campaign (for more on 
Baker, who did not serve on the campaign but may have had access to a campaign diary, 
see Chapter Two). 
Consumption Rate 
                                                
42St-Macaire had been in French hands in 1296, and the expedition Edward I sent from 
England did not succeed in re-taking the town.  Prestwich, Edward I, 384. 
43Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 13. 
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The army’s consumption rate is fundamental to everything the army does; it determines 
to a very large extent what is and is not possible because it deals with the ineluctable 
reality that men and animals must eat and drink at least minimum quantities of food and 
water.  When they are campaigning, they must carry that food—and water when 
necessary—with them.  As discussed in Chapter Four, the army would need pack animals 
to carry supplies, in addition to the baggage animals carrying non-comestible supplies. 
 The Prince’s force, as established in Chapter Four, was roughly 8000 including 
non-combatants.  This would mean a total of 160 baggage animals using Engels’s ratio of 
one baggage animal per fifty men; Roth’s ratio of one animal to every 3.4 men gives a 
total of more than 2300 animals.44  The Prince’s army did not carry siege equipment with 
them, but they did carry tools.45  Even so, a significant number of carts would not be 
needed.  Furthermore, some of the territory through which the Prince’s army travelled 
would be incredibly difficult for horse-drawn carts.  That said, the army did have some 
carts with it, as Baker reports the loss of same while the army was at Narbonne.46  The 
single largest contributor, though, to the army’s consumption rate was the number of 
horses, those of the cavalry and the mounted archers.  This was a chevauchée, and the 
rate of march (discussed below) indicates that most members of the force were mounted. 
                                                
44This is based on the Roman data.  See Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of 
the Macedonian Army, 18; James McYntire and I.A. Richmond, “Tents of the Roman 
Army and Leather from Birdoswald,” Transactions of the Cumberland and 
Westmoreland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society 34 (1934): 62–90; Roth, The 
Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 82–84 
45Henxteworth makes no mention of any siege equipment, nor do any other documents.  
The chronicles and letters also make no mention of sieges or siege works. 
46Baker, 237. 
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 Per the Prince’s indenture, he had 433 men-at-arms and 700 archers in his 
retinue,47 and Knighton claims there were 800 men-at-arms and 1400 archers.  As the 
ratio of men-at-arms to archers is roughly the same (4.33:7 and 4:7 respectively, or 2:3.5 
more simply), that is the ratio applied to the entire army (combatants only) to determine 
the number of men-at-arms and archers.  This is in line with armies of the period.  By the 
end of the fourteenth century, the ratio of men-at-arms to archers was roughly 1:1, and 
many of the retinues of the 1359–1360 campaigns contained equal numbers of men-at-
arms and mounted archers.  Based on the above ratio, then, for an army of 6000, the 
Prince would have approximately 2200 men-at-arms and 3800 archers.  Granted, in the 
absence of data about the composition of the Gascon companies, this is, at best, informed 
guesswork.48 
Table 5.1: Ratio of men-at-arms to archers in the Prince’s force. 
 Indenture Knighton Total in the Army 
Men-at-arms 433 800 2200 
Archers 700 1400 3800 
Total 1133 2200 6000 
  
Once the ratio of men-at-arms to archers has been established, it is possible to 
infer the number of horses necessary for the combatants.  Depending on rank, the horse 
passage allowance could vary from one to five horses.  Andrew Ayton has shown that a 
                                                
47BPR, IV, 143-145. 
48See Andrew Ayton, “English Armies in the Fourteenth Century,” in The Wars of 
Edward III, Sources and Interpretations, ed. Clifford J. Rogers, 303–19 (Woodbridge: 
The Boydell Press, 1999), at 314. 
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banneret was allowed five horses, “four for knights and three for esquires;” each mounted 
archer would have had a single horse.49  This scale from the 1340 campaign was also in 
force in 1346, the 1360s, and more significantly for this study, in 1345 for Sir James 
Audley’s outbound voyage to Gascony.50  It seems safe to assume that a similar policy 
applied to the Prince’s outbound force.  For the purposes of simplification, and given that 
it is often impossible to ascertain the rank of every man-at-arms, let us assume four 
horses for each man-at-arms, thus accounting for those with as many as five and those 
with as few as three.  With approximately 2200 men-at-arms, this would come to 8800 
horses.  There would be an additional 3800 horses for the archers, for a total of 12,600 
horses for the combatants.  Add in the 160 baggage horses, and that indicates an 
approximate total of 12,760 horses not including pack animals.  All further calculations 
will be based on 13,000 horses. 
 With the size of the Prince’s force now estimated, it is possible to calculate the 
army’s consumption rate.  This can be done using Engels’ basic equation, discussed fully 
in Chapter Two, but with more nuanced values for the caloric needs of the men and 
animals and accounting for the varied needs of same under different circumstances, e.g., 
in desert conditions.  Engels’ model, while useful, does not sufficiently take into account 
these variations and nuances; that said, the equation itself is sound.  It is merely the 
values he supplies, e.g., 3 lbs of grain for the caloric needs of a soldier or 10 lbs of grain 
for a horse, that do not accurately reflect the needs of a man likely in his mid twenties to 
                                                
49Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 58. 
50Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 58, esp. n. 50 and n. 51. 
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late thirties and engaging in intense physical activity or those of a horse in desert 
conditions. 
According to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1912) a pack horse needs 9.25 
lbs grain and 14 lbs forage.  That ration would need to be increased depending on the 
work load.51  Alternatively, non-working horses fed by feeding weight would need 14–16 
lbs forage and 7–13 lbs grain, for an average ration of 15 lbs forage and 10 lbs grain, with 
the grain ration not to exceed 40 percent of the total ration at the risk of horses 
foundering.52  The risk is, essentially, over consumption of carbohydrates, which results 
in the sugars not being properly digested, leading to inflammation throughout the body 
but particularly in the lamina (the structure that suspends the bones of the foot) of the 
feet.53  This ration increases in the field to 12 lbs of grain and 14 lbs fodder—numbers 
higher than those supplied by Engels—and 8 gal (80 lbs) of water, which must be 
increased under arid conditions.  Under such conditions the provision of water must be 
carefully regulated.54  Foraging is highly encouraged in the field as it reduces the amount 
of supplies the army must carry.  Another option for reducing the train is establishing 
advance supply depots and caching supplies.55 
                                                
51Professional Papers, No. 29, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, Fourth (Revised) Edition, 
with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. 
General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 428–31; see also, Roth, The 
Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 9–13. 
52FM31–27, 2–12. 
53Doug Butler and Frank Gravlee, Laminitis & Founder: Prevention and Treatment for 
the Greatest Chance of Success (Cherokee, AL: Life Data Labs, Inc., 2007), 26. 
54FM31–27, 2–50, 2–71, 2–82.  It should be noted that the animals should be watered 
three times daily and not at the same time as feeding. 
55FM31–27, 2-67. 
Chapter 5: The Campaign to Narbonne 
 
205 
An alternative method for determining the army’s consumption rate is to look at 
the consumption rate of a unit.  For example, in 1938 a cavalry unit of 5 officers, 127 
enlisted men, and 153 horses required 1876 lbs of grain daily.56  Thus for every 132 men 
and 153 horses the army would need 1876 lbs of grain, for an army of 8000 (including 
non-combatants) and 13,000 horses, 114,436 lbs of grain for 61 units of the above 
configuration.  However, there would still be the matter of the addition 24 units of 153 
horses which would require another 1480 lbs of grain per unit, so an additions 35,520 lbs 
of grain per day.  The total grain needs, then, would be 149,956 lbs daily. 
Size of the Baggage Train 
The Prince’s campaign was indisputably a chevauchée.  The Prince chose to pursue a 
radical raiding strategy.  This entailed considerable movement, no sieges, and no stops of 
any significant duration.57  There was no intent to occupy territory, but rather to lay waste 
to Armagnac and the Languedoc and thus punish the duke of Armagnac for his 
encroachments on Gascony.  It has generally been assumed that a raiding army lived 
entirely off the land, although recently military historians have come to understand that 
local supply was not the only source of provisions.  That said, these same historians 
continue to over-emphasize the “living off the land” model of supply.58  And, as Yuval 
Harari has pointed out, the relationship between supply and strategy has been too often 
ignored.59  Of course, it is also easy to over-emphasize that relationship and focus on 
supply as the only determining factor, when, in fact, the Prince—or the King—decided 
                                                
56Cavalry Field Manual (1938), 183. 
57Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 300.  The longest stop was three days. 
58Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 299.  
59Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 299. 
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upon a chevauchée for strategic purposes unconnected to, although not uninfluenced by, 
the question of supply. 
The Prince’s raiding strategy determined what kind of supply system he needed, 
just as his supply system ensured he had to pursue a highly mobile strategy.  The Prince’s 
campaign matches Harari’s definition of a radical raiding strategy: rapid movement (9–
15.5 miles per day [15–25 km]), no sieges, no long stops, and lasting several weeks.60  
That he needed a supply system is not in doubt.  Relying on local supply was both 
untenable and would have put the army at considerable risk of starvation, not to mention 
that it would seriously limit the options for campaigns.  For one thing, an army pursuing 
this kind of raiding strategy did not have the time to stay in one place long enough to be 
thorough in foraging—assuming the local inhabitants had not already destroyed or hidden 
everything as word of the Prince’s advance spread.  Living off the land would have been 
problematic in the face of an active enemy harassing foragers or pursuing a scorched 
earth policy.  Troop behavior could also be an issue.  Troops sacking a town or village 
easily could destroy the food that could have been used to feed the army.61  Therefore, an 
army that intended to rely upon local supply had to pursue a raiding strategy, yet given 
the above difficulties, even a raiding army could not depend solely on local supply for 
adequate provisions.  Some type of supply system was necessary beyond the 
establishment of a supply depot at St-Macaire.62 
In order to remain mobile and pursue the kind of raiding strategy that the army 
                                                
60Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 301. 
61Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 306–10. 
62DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September–4 October.  Hoskins, In the 
Steps of the Black Prince, 23–26. 
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used, the Prince could not have used supply lines once the army left Gascony.  The army 
intended to raid too deeply into enemy territory to make that feasible.  The march to 
Arouille, where the army left friendly territory and the first hostilities occurred, alone was 
a march of 81 miles (130 km).  The carts shuttling back and forth between the army 
would not have been able to keep pace with that army, and the carts would have been 
without protection in enemy territory unless such protection had been pre-arranged.63  
There are no indications that such was the case.  Therefore, the Prince had to have a 
supply train that accompanied the army. 
The most recent work on fourteenth-century logistics and baggage trains is Yuval 
Harari’s article, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion 
Campaigns,” and his Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100–1550 (2007).  In 
his article, Harari posits an (imaginary) army of 15,000 (including 5,000 non-combatants) 
and 20,000 horses with about 100 carts and 850 pack horses to carry the grain supply for 
the entire army for 50 days and assumes a (very high) 50 percent spoilage rate (a rate he 
admits is arbitrary).64  This army, if subsisting solely on grain, would require 469–937 
tons of grain for a 50 day campaign.65  However, as he assumes a rate of spoilage of 50 
percent, the army would have less than 937 tons of grain upon which to subsist.  This 
means the army would be marching, if not at half rations (469 tons of grain would be half 
rations), on less than full rations, as the 937 tons would meet the normal needs of the 
                                                
63Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 324–25. 
64Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 314, 319. 
65Harari, “Supply and Strategy, 314. 
Chapter 5: The Campaign to Narbonne 
 
208 
soldiers.66  If half of that, per Harari, is lost to wastage, that means that the soldiers would 
receive 0.62 kg of grain per day, not enough to meet their real needs.  That said, this 
imagined army of 15,000 men would need 937–1874 carts, each carrying 500–1000 kg.67  
Based on these numbers, this army could be carrying with it anywhere from 468.5 tons at 
the low end, which would put the men at half rations, to 1874 tons at the high end, twice 
the grain needed by the army.  According to Harari, “[i]t seems, then, that theoretically 
even large fourteenth-century raiding armies could have carried their entire food supply 
with them.”68 
While that may theoretically be the case, there are several problems, including the 
“private” ownership of supplies and the financial cost.  That said, Harari shows that these 
are false problems, particularly the question of cost.  Providing supplies was actually very 
cost effective for the king,69 and, as discussed in Chapter Three, the English system of 
purveyance was highly developed and efficient.70  The third problem, however, is a real 
though not insurmountable one: Carts limit the army’s freedom of movement.  While this 
is the case, Harari warns that it should not be exaggerated and cites the Prince’s 1355 
campaign as an example.71 
                                                
66Harari claims that the men would need the daily caloric equivalent of 1.25 kg of grain. 
For 15,000 men this would be 18,750 kg of grain per day and 9,375,000 kg (937.5 metric 
tons). 
67Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 312.   
68Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 314. 
69Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 315. 
70Ilana Krug, “Royal Prerogative Gone Astray,” Ilana Krug, “Peasants and Purveyance at 
the Beginning of the Hundred Years War.” 
71Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 316.  “The achievement of the cart train which 
accompanied the Black Prince in 1355 should also warn us against exaggerating the 
mobility problems of supply trains.  This train—which for most the way was packed with 
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That the Prince’s supply train included carts is not in doubt, as some of them were 
attacked and plundered during the crossing of the Aude river at Carcassonne.72  Peter 
Hoskins, using Harari’s figures and methodology, determines that the Prince’s supply 
train included 70 carts (1200–3000 lbs in each) and 550 pack animals (he uses Spufford’s 
data for pack horses: 400 lbs per animal, 150 lbs higher than suggested by Engels and the 
US Army Corp of Engineers in 1912), plus about 300 horses for the carts (280 to be 
exact).73  Using Spufford’s figures as to the carrying capacity of medieval carts and pack 
horses, these 70 carts and 550 animals could have carried 304,000lbs (137,892kg) of 
grain.74  The pack animals and cart horses would consume 78,850 lbs (35766kg) of grain 
over ten days.  The baggage train thus constituted would easily have been able to carry 
ten days’ worth of supplies for itself, with some 225,150 lbs (102,126kg) of grain to 
spare.  However, as Table 5.2 makes clear, it would be impossible for the baggage train 
to carry ten days’ supplies for the entire army.  Even if every cart had a carrying capacity 
of 3000 lbs (1.5 tons), it would still be insufficient.75 
                                                                                                                                            
an enormous amount of spoils—travelled from Bordeaux to Narbonne and back in two 
months, fording several rivers on the way.” 
72Baker, Chronicon, 238.  “…in quo transitu duae quadrigae domini principis fuerunt per 
cives defractae, et ad magnum damnun depraedatae.”  The potential of breakdowns was 
one of the reasons commanders like Philip of Macedon, Alexander the Great, and 
Xenophon, among others, limited the use of baggage carts.  Engels, Alexander the Great 
and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, 15. 
73Harari’s calculations for an army of 15,000 men: 100 carts and 850 pack animals, as 
well as 520 head of cattle for ten days.  Harari, “Strategy and Supply,” 318–19 and 
passim.  For the carrying capacity of medieval carts, see Peter Spufford, Power and 
Profit: The Merchant in Medieval Europe (London: Thames and Hudson, 2002), 199.  As 
Harari suggests, Hoskins has assumed an average of four horses per cart. 
74I have used the minimum of 1200lbs for the carts. 
75Harari makes the point that it would be impossible to feed the horses with a horse-
powered train; therefore, local supply is necessary.  Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 320.  
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Table 5.2: Carrying capacity of the Prince’s baggage train based on Hoskins’ and 
Harari’s figures and using a carrying capacity of 1200 lbs per cart and 400 lbs per pack 
horse.  As it shows, the train would be insufficient to carry 10 days’ grain ration. 
Category Numbers 10 days’ ration Starting carrying capacity: 
304,000 lbs (137,892 kg) grain 
Cart horses 280 26,600 lbs (12,066 kg) 278,000 lbs (126,099 kg) grain 
left 
Pack horses 550 52,250 lbs (23,700 kg) 224,750 lbs (101,945 kg) grain 
left 
Soldiers 6000 210,000 lbs (95,254 kg) 14,750 lbs (6690.5 kg) grain left 
Non-
combatants 
2000 70,000 lbs (31,751 kg) –55,250 lbs (–25,061 kg) needed 
Cavalry horses 13,00076 1,202,500 lbs (545,455 
kg) 
–1,257,750 (–570,506 kg) 
needed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
He does not discuss other animals, such as oxen, as their use in fourteenth-century armies 
was limited.  Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 305, n. 18. 
76This is the number Hoskins gives.  Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 21.   
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Table 5.3: Carrying capacity of the Prince’s baggage train based on Hoskins’ and 
Harari’s figures and using a carrying capacity of 3000 lbs per cart and 400 lbs per pack 
horse.  As it shows, the train would be insufficient to carry 10 days’ grain ration. 
Category Numbers 10 days’ ration Starting carrying capacity: 
430,000 lbs (195,045 kg) grain 
Cart horses 280  26,600 lbs (12,066 kg) 403,400 lbs (182,979 kg) grain 
left 
Pack horses 550 52,250 lbs (23,700 kg) 351,150 lbs (159,279 kg) grain 
left 
Soldiers 6000 210,000 lbs (95,254 kg) 141,150 lbs (64,025) grain left 
Non-
combatants 
2000 70,000 lbs (31,751 kg) 71,150 lbs (32,273 kg) grain left 
Cavalry horses 13,000 1,202,500 lbs (545,455 
kg) 
–1,131,350 lbs (–513,172 kg) 
needed 
  
 
Given the above numbers, the army’s daily grain ration would be 159,385 lbs (72,296 
kg).  At most, the baggage train thus envisioned by Hoskins could carry 2.7 days’ grain 
ration for the entire army, assuming each cart carried 3000 lbs.  This, then, would be the 
maximum number of days the army could go without restocking the grain supply.  If the 
army also had to carry forage, the baggage train would need to carry 352,985 lbs of grain 
and forage, which means it could carry only one day’s ration.  Even at half rations, the 
train could still only carry two days’ rations.  If the army had to carry potable water, it 
would be impossible for the baggage train to carry even one day’s ration of grain, forage, 
and water.   
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Clearly, local supply was necessary for the horses.  This need for local forage also 
meant the army had to move frequently, as the horses would consume the available 
resources.  If the army relied solely upon local supply to feed the horses, the animals 
would have each required the forage from an area of 1614.6 ft2 (150 m2).77  The Prince’s 
roughly 14,000 horses (including pack animals and cart horses)78 would thus need the 
forage of more than 500,000 acres (roughly 800 square miles), or any forage within a 
9000 yd (700 m) radius.  In the unlikely event that the army could proceed along a broad 
front, relying upon local supply to feed the horses should have been possible—in theory.  
The Prince could not count on the availability of local supply.  The issue is not 
necessarily one of actual resources; given the season there likely would have been 
sufficient forage (grass, hay).  However, the Prince had to be concerned with a possible 
enemy presence—he could not have predicted that the French forces would remain 
behind the walls of Toulouse—, not to mention the possibility of the local inhabitants 
pursuing a scorched earth policy.79  Therefore, the Prince’s army had to carry with it at 
least some supplies for the horses and pursue a radical raiding strategy in order to avoid 
starvation.80 
The baggage train itself consisted of pack animals and some carts.  The carts, of 
course, had the advantage of being able to carry a significantly larger amount of supplies 
with many fewer horses—approximately three times as many pack animals as wagons or 
                                                
77Harari, “Supply and Strategy,” 310.   
78The number of horses for the soldiers is based on Ayton’s numbers: 1 horse for each 
mounted archer and 3–5 horses for men-at-arms. 
79Harari, “Strategy and Supply,” 310–11. 
80Harari, “Strategy and supply,” 311. 
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carts would be needed to transport the same amount of freight.81  Pack animals, however, 
increased the army’s mobility.82  According to the US Army’s Field Manual for Special 
Forces on the use of pack animals, pack horses can cover any terrain passable on foot and 
maintain the speed of 15–20 miles per day without reducing the amount carried, which 
should be roughly 20 percent of their body weight (150–300 lbs),83 or an average load of 
225 lbs—the figure provided in the US Army’s Corps of Engineers Field Manual in 
1912.84  In 1938 the US War Department’s Cavalry Field Manual suggests a load of 250 
lbs total, with 200 lbs being actual cargo.85  This figure is lower than Engels’ 250 lbs and 
certainly lower than Spufford’s 400 lbs; it is also less than Roth’s Roman data indicates.  
He finds that a single mule carried a load of 145 kg, i.e., 320 pounds.86 
Speed of March 
Pack animals could manage 15–20 miles per day even in mountainous terrain,87 although 
10–12 miles would be good going for the baggage train.88  On good roads and in ideal 
conditions the carts could possibly manage 2.5 miles an hour for 10 hours, or 25 miles 
                                                
81Professional Papers, No. 29, 477. 
82Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, 
with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. 
General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 427. 
83FM31–27, 1–4. 
84Professional Papers, No. 29, 429.  This source gives 225 lbs as the net load for mules 
and a gross load of 300 lbs. 
85Cavalry Field Manual (1938), 171. 
86Roth, The Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 77–79. 
87FM31–27, 1–4. 
88Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 25.  Hoskins’ figures are based on Hewitt, 
The Horse in Mediaeval England (London, 1983), 38, 59. 
Chapter 5: The Campaign to Narbonne 
 
214 
per day89—the campaign did have six marches of twenty or more miles; the average 
speed was fourteen-and-a-half miles per day.  This rate of 25 miles per day, of course, is 
predicated on the existence of good roads—not guaranteed in the fourteenth century.90  
Oxen were not a viable option, given that their fastest speed was 2 miles per hour; they 
can only work five hours per day, and their hooves are unsuited for long distance travel.91 
The men on horseback, moving independently of the pack train, could easily 
exceed 25 miles per day,92 35 miles per day under favorable conditions and could 
maintain an average speed of 6 miles per hour six days a week—the longest single march 
was twenty-eight miles early in the campaign—and the army’s average speed was 
fourteen-and-a-half miles per day.  A rest day after the sixth day was necessary.  These 
rates assume the pack train is moving at a slower pace behind the mounted soldiers, who 
would also need to be seasoned troops to maintain the pace.  That said, the pack train 
could keep up if the pace was kept to 5 miles per hour or slower.93  The mounted soldiers 
on a forced march could achieve and maintain a speed of less than or equal to 50 miles 
per day for 3 days and 100 miles in 24 hours if absolutely necessary.94  The Prince’s 
cavalry would not have moved at this speed in order to keep horses in combat-ready 
condition.  Clearly, under such forced-march conditions, the army would have to leave 
the pack train and baggage train behind, then wait for it to catch up.  Furthermore, given 
                                                
89Professional Papers, No. 29, 437. 
90Professional Papers, No. 29, 438. 
91Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army,” 15–16. 
92Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 25. 
93War Department Cavalry Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of 
Cavalry. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938, 145, 176. 
94Cavalry Field Manual (1938), 150. 
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the time it would take for the train to arrive—one to three days if the train moves at 2.5 
miles an hour—, which means the soldiers would have to carry rations with them (13–40 
lbs of grain).  Soldiers on foot could achieve 20 miles per day under normal conditions.95 
With these factors in mind, then, how quickly did the Prince’s army move?  Using 
Baker’s diary and the distances between the places he mentions, as well as Hoskins’ 
itinerary,96 the average speed of march was almost 14.5 miles per day over 42 march days 
and 17 rest days.97  Pack animals could certainly keep up with the army, and likely the 
baggage train could, too, if conditions were decent.  The length of the army’s marches 
varied from as short as 4 miles  to 28 miles, both of which occurred in the first two days 
of the campaign, for a two day average of 16 miles. 
The Prince’s Route 
On Monday 5 October (the first day of the march) the English forces left Bordeaux and 
marched the four miles to Urnoun/Villenave-d’Ornon (see Map 2),98 downstream from 
the supply depot at St-Macaire.  It may be that the pack and baggage train mustered at St-
Macaire, while the army marshaled at Urnoun/Villenave-d’Ornon.99  There appear, based 
on Henxteworth’s accounts, to have been a few more supply purchases (vinegar and salt), 
a couple horses were bought, and several men received advances on their wages.  These 
                                                
95Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 25. 
96Hoskins, for his book In the Steps of the Black Prince, walked the route taken by the 
Prince’s army in 1355 and 1356.  He found Baker to be fairly accurate even though he 
could not always find the exact places mentioned in Baker due to changes in the human 
topography. 
97Hoskins agrees with this rate of march and has shown that a man on foot could certainly 
achieve it. 
98I am providing the place names as given by Baker and the identifications made by 
Hoskins. 
99Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 22–26. 
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men included soldiers and servants, indicating that the non-combatants also received 
advance wages.  Of particular interest for the Prince’s supply train, Henxteworth recorded 
a deposit of 6l 13s 4d from the clerk of the kitchen.  The money came from the “issue of 
beasts,”100 which presumably were sold.  This is the only evidence that the Prince’s 
supply train contained live animals.  The presence of cattle, in the general sense of the 
word, would have slowed the supply train’s progress and complicated the issue of supply, 
as the cattle would need to graze, as would horses.  A herd would not have noticeably 
slowed the march, as a herd moved at approximately 15 miles a day.101  The Prince also 
had advance parties purchasing supplies, as in the case of oats purchased at Castets-en-
Dorte.  Henxteworth records the purchase on 6 October, but the main force did not reach 
Castets-en-Dorthe, just east of Langon and the advance supply depot at St-Macaire, until 
8 October.102 
The longest march was 28 miles along the Garonne on Tuesday 6 October from 
Urnoun/Villenave-d’Ornon to Audert/Castets-en-Dorthe (see Map 2), after which the 
army rested for a day—probably waiting for the baggage train to catch up as the train, 
even under ideal conditions, would have had difficulty making a march of 28 miles.  
Much, if not all, of this distance was along the Roman Via Aquitania,103 although Baker 
writes that the army took “a narrow, wooded road” and passed “through the walled town 
                                                
100DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 5 October.  The Latin is “exut. animalium,” which was 
used—if rarely—for the young of beasts. 
101This is the average speed achieved by nineteenth-century cattle drives.  Jimmy M. 
Skaggs, The Cattle-Trailing Industry: Between Supply and Demand, 1866–1890 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973).  
102DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 6 October. 
103Raymond Chevallier, Roman Roads (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1976) 36–37 and illustration 4. 
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of Langon.”104  Langon stood directly across the river from St.-Macaire, where the 
supplies had been shipped upriver from Bordeaux.105  In order to make the 28 mile march 
the army did not and could not stop to take on supplies.106  The long march, following so 
close on the sea voyage, was not without consequences, and “many horses were lost.”107  
It is possible these horses contracted fevers, as they would have been susceptible to it 
after the voyage.108  Given the loss of these horses—and the ones lost on the voyage—it 
is hardly surprising that Henxteworth advanced 27l to Reynold son of Reymund Sigyn to 
purchase horses for the Cheshire archers at Urnoun/Villenave-d’Ornon,109 although 
Henxteworth gives no indication as to when and where the actual horses were purchased.  
They may have been purchased in Urnoun/Villenave-d’Ornon, so that the Cheshire 
archers who had lost horses on the sea voyage would be mounted.  The Prince also 
acquired a new courser from Aymeric de Fossade, one of the Gascon lords.110  Hoskins 
speculates that one reason the army made such a grueling march in friendly territory was 
that the Gascons may have marshaled at Castets-en-Dorthe and that the Prince wished to 
meet them.  That may be, particularly as the castle had been taken by the English during 
the earl of Derby’s raid in 1345 and Jean de Grailly, the captal de Buch, held it in 
1355.111 
                                                
104Baker, Chronicon, 229. 
105Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 25–26. 
106Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 26. 
107Baker, Chronicon, 229.  “…longa dieta, in perditionem multorum equorum…” 
108Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 26. 
109DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 6 October. 
110DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 6 October.  The courser was brought to the 
Prince by Godfrey, one Fossade’s grooms, who received a gift of 20s for doing so. 
111Drouyn, La Guyenne militaire, 270–76. 
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During the one day halt at Audert/Castets-en-Dorthe112 on 7 October the army, 
while waiting for the train to arrive, took the opportunity to purchase supplies and likely 
inspected equipment after one day on the road.  The largest purchases were 31 quarters of 
wheat, 71 quarters, 10 bushels of oats, and an unspecified quantity of hay.  Many of these 
supplies were purchased from the constable of the town.113  The purchase of hay suggests 
that the army was carrying forage for the horses, at least for the next legs of the march 
which would take them across the Landes (see below).  Other purchases included meat, 
fuel, fish, and beans.114  The final, major purchase was a large quantity of wine that was 
distributed to the Welsh and Gascon soldiers.  This may have been intended to boost 
morale.  A good time appears to have been had by all, with the predictable amount of 
damage as a result.  The Prince “gave” 11l 5s as “a gift” “to divers men of the town of 
Tendorte” “in recompense for damage done by divers Welshman and other retainers.”115 
Fortunately for those still hungover, the march to Besashuntoun/Bazas (see Map 
2) on 8 October was an easy 11 miles.  At this point the army left the Garonne and 
headed south through land that became undulating.116  Although the advance continued 
along the route of the Via Aquitania, the Prince hired two men described as “varlets” and 
who must have been locals as guides.  They were handsomely rewarded for it.  They 
received 22s 6d,117 considerably more than the 6d per day wage received by the Cheshire 
                                                
112Henxteworth calls it Andorte and Epundorte. 
113DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 6 October. 
114DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 6 October.  The account for the fish and some of the 
meat was recorded on tallies. 
115DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 6 October. 
116Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 26. 
117DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 6 October. 
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archers or the 3d per day for the archers from Flynt.  This suggests that, even in friendly 
territory, English armies used local guides.  The Prince also took advantage of the halt 
and friendly territory to write letters.  William, a groom of Bartholomew de Burghersh, 
received 110s for carrying the letters back to England.118  The only thing Baker notes is 
the cathedral and a convent of Friars Minor in Besashuntoun/Bazas.119  That said, 
Besashuntoun/Bazas was an important town in Aquitaine and had changed hands several 
times between the French and the English.  Thanks to the earl of Derby’s efforts in 1347 
and reinforcements from Bordeaux in 1352, the town was in English hands in 1355.120  
Hoskins describes the town as “striking,” positioned “on a steep rocky promontory 
between two valleys,” and walled.121 
The army stayed at Besashuntoun/Basaz two nights.  The Prince gave orders that 
the soldiers “should wear the arms of Saint George.”122  More wheat and wine were 
purchased.123  Even though the army had just purchased supplies 1–2 days before they 
needed to take on additional supplies.  First, Besashuntoun/Basaz was the last large town 
                                                
118DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 10 December. 
119Baker, Chronicon, 229.  For a history of Bazas and how it originally became part of 
English Gascony, as well as the military service of the town in the thirteenth century, see 
Jean-Bernard Marquette, “Notes sur l’histoire de la ville Bazas au XIII siècle,” Les 
cahiers du Bazadais 24, no. 65 (1984): 3–47.  There was an Anglo-Gascon garrison of at 
least twenty men there during the reign of Henry III (1207–1272). 
120Sumption, Trial by Fire, 26; Fowler, The King’s Lieutenant, 64–65, 67. 
121Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 27.  The walls date no later than the early 
fourteenth century, so they would have been extant in 1355, as was the cathedral and 
episcopal palace. 
122Baker, Chronicon, 230.  This was not yet standard practice, but by Richard II’s reign 
(1377–1399) the practice was described and its purpose explained in the 1385 Ordinances 
of War.  See Matthew Strickland and Robert Hardy, The Great War Bow: From Hastings 
to the Mary Rose (Stroud, 2005), 201. 
123DCO, Henxteworth, entry for 6 October. 
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in friendly territory, which also made it a good place to rest.  Second, the next two days’ 
marches would take the army through the Landes, where the army would have difficulty 
finding forage and water.  The residents would certainly have been able to provide 
information in addition to what the Prince already knew from pilgrim itineraries and 
reports from previous campaigns, not to mention those of his advisors who had served in 
Gascony or were Gascons.  The Prince and his staff clearly knew what the coming march 
would be like and purposefully rested and took on supplies and possibly some water 
before heading south through the Landes to Arouille, where they would cross from 
friendly to enemy territory. 
Crossing the Landes 
Crossing the Landes presented the Prince’s army with a logistical challenge.  While it is 
now a maritime pine forest thanks to nineteenth-century forestation efforts,124 in the 
fourteenth century it was a sparsely populated moor or heath land.  It supported some 
trees but mostly heather and gorse; it was marshy in winter and in summer a sandy plain.  
Quicksand was a real hazard.125  Finding potable water would have been difficult.  Frost 
came early in the fall and lasted late into the spring.  It was certainly possible that the 
Prince and his army had to contend with an early frost on 10–11 October.126  The early 
frost would have been a concern had the army returned through the Landes.  They likely 
                                                
124J. Guinaudeau, La Foret Landaise (I.N.R.A.: Station de recherches forestières de 
Bordeaux, 1964), 2. 
125Jacques Sargos, Histoire de fôret Landaise (Bordeaux, 1997), 39–43. 
126Guinaudeau, La foret Landaise, 8 and temperature chart.  A decade-long study of the 
relative temperature in the Landes shows frost as early as 17 September in 1963, although 
the average seems to be mid-October. 
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had to contend with precipitation given that October is one of the rainiest months of the 
year in the Landes.127  All in all, the Landes were most inhospitable. 
This was certainly known to the Prince and his staff, as the conditions were 
described in a Pilgrim’s Guide in the twelfth century: 
This is a desolate country lacking in everything: neither bread nor wine nor fish 
nor water nor any springs.  There are few villages on this sandy plain, though it 
has honey, millet and pigs [which the army could have eaten] in plenty.  If you are 
going through the Landes in summer be sure to protect your face from wasps and 
horse flies which are particularly abundant in this region.  And if you do not 
watch your feet carefully you will sink up to your knees in the sea sand which is 
found everywhere here.128   
Furthermore, key members of the Prince’s staff, like de Grailly and Bernard d’Albret 
held lands in and around the Landes, and he and the others may have provided supplies, 
although there is no record of them having done so.  The Prince also employed local 
guides.  There is no doubt the Prince had sufficient and reliable information about the 
conditions in and paths through the Landes. 
 The first day’s march through the Landes took the army thirteen miles south to 
Nau/Castelnau (see Map 2).129  The exact location is unknown.  A castelnau was similar 
to a motte and bailey castle and, as such, is added to many village and town names in 
                                                
127Guinaudeau, La foret Landaise, precipitation chart.  Sargos, Histoire de fôret Landaise, 
39–43 for the historical climate of the Landes during the fourteenth century. 
128The Pilgrim’s Guide: A 12th Century Guide for the Pilgrim to St James de 
Compostella, trans. James Hogarth (London, 1992), 18. 
129Baker, Chronicon, 230; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 27–28, 207. 
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southern France;130 therefore, Castelnau could be a number of different places.  Hoskins 
identifies two possible locations: The first is now a very small village, near the north-
south route between Bazas and Arouille.  The second is only a mile south-east of the first 
location: St-Michel-de-Castelnau, which was larger than Castelnau.  There was a castle of 
some 40m by 60m near Castlenau but only some cellars remain.131  Baker writes that 
three castles were visible,132 but only that one castle, belonging to an ally of the Albret 
family, is known to have actually existed and may have been a source of supplies.133 
A large water supply would have been essential at the end of the day, and the 
Ciron River does run near the castle ruins, lending weight to Hoskins’ conclusion that the 
army camped at St-Michel-de-Castelnau.134  The horses would have had to have been 
well-watered at Bazas in the morning and some water must have been carried with the 
army, as “only a few very minor streams” were along the route to Castelnau,135 and the 
animals ideally should have been watered three times daily.136  The army would have 
needed 116,000 gallons of water, not counting the water needed by the pack and cart 
horses.  Carrying all the grain, forage, and water needed by the army for that day would 
have required almost 10,000 pack horses or more than 600 carts (with the addition of 
more than 2000 cart horses).  The Prince did not have this large of a supply train; 
therefore, the army did not carry all the supplies needed for the day.  They depended on 
                                                
130Henri Denifle, La désolation des monastères, eglises, et hôpitaux en France pendant la 
Guerre de Cent Ans (Paris, 1889), vol. 2–1, 87, n. 5. 
131Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 28–29. 
132Baker, Chronicon, 230. 
133Denifle, La désolation, vol. 2–1, 87. 
134Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 29. 
135Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 29.  See  
136FM31–27, 2–50, 2–71, 2–82. 
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the available water supplies.  The army did carry forage with them, and they would have 
needed to do so given that the most common vegetation in the Landes was heather and 
gorse.  However, carrying one day’s ration of grain and forage would have required 1300 
pack animals or just over 100 carts.  A supply train of this size, made up of a combination 
of pack animals and carts, would have been able to transport the needed supplies.  
Hoskins’ numbers of 70 carts and 550 pack animals would have easily been able to 
transport the supplies for the one day.137 
More meat and wine were purchased in castrum Nau/Castelnau.  While this was 
not the last place where supplies could be purchased, it was the last place in truly friendly 
territory until the conclusion of the campaign.  After the festivities at Endorthe/Castets-
en-Dorthe, the wine supply doubtlessly needed to be replenished.  The meat supply, too, 
probably needed adding to as it would spoil unless the army had a way of preserving it.  
3s worth of salt had been purchased on 5 October,138 but at least in friendly territory the 
army seems to have enjoyed fresh meat.  The many purchases of meat suggest that the 
Prince’s army did not have a large number of beasts with them, probably not more than a 
few hundred head.139 
The following day, 11 October,140 the army marched to Areule/Arouille (see Map 
2), a grueling march of 25 miles through the Landes.  Baker describes the march as long 
                                                
137Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 22.  That said, Hoskins claims that this 
number of horses and carts would be sufficient for ten days, which is not the case. 
138DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 5 October. 
139Hoskins, using the figures given by Harari, suggests 350 head of cattle for ten days’ 
worth of meat. 
140Baker claims it is 12 October, although the first Monday of October was the 5th, which 
would make Sunday 11 October.  Henxteworth also states that Sunday was 11 October, 
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and difficult, and many horses died.141  It is possible that the army ate the dead horses, 
but no source alludes to this practice.  He specifically states the army marched through 
the Landes, “which are part of the count of Foix’s lands.”142  Thus, even though the land 
itself was inhospitable, the army remained in relatively neutral territory given the count 
of Foix’s strained relations with Jean II and his family ties with de Grailly (Foix and de 
Grailly were cousins). 
This was a forced march through what Baker—and The Pilgrim’s Guide—
describes as a wasteland.  This was likely not a tactical decision, e.g., trying for surprise, 
but was a decision based on the army’s needs.  The lack of suitable forage and the dearth 
of potable water sources undoubtedly explains the length of the day’s march.  Crossing 
the Landes in two days, instead of the three days mentioned in The Pilgrim’s Guide, 
meant pushing the army but the complications of transporting three days worth of 
supplies outweighed that.  The army likely carried some forage with them from 
Besashuntoun/Bazas as they could not count on finding sufficient forage until they 
reached Arule/Arouille.  If water was in such short supply, the army must have 
transported some water and must have had the vessels to hold it.  The army did have 
experience transporting liquids, given the large amounts of wine, cider, and vinegar they 
were already carrying.  That said, most supplies would have had to have been transported 
from Besashuntoun/Bazas, as there were few options for resupply at castrum 
Nau/Castelnau. 
                                                
141Baker, Chronicon, 230. longa, vasta et mala, multos perdidit equos 
142Baker, Chronicon, 230. 
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For the two days’ march through the Landes the army would have needed 328,000 
lbs of grain, 280,000 lbs of forage, and 232,000 gallons or 2,320,000 lbs of water.  To 
transport the full ration of food, forage, and water for men and horses would have 
required more than 58,000 pack animals or more than 1300 carts, both of which are too 
large to be realistic.  The army, then, could not have carried with it all the grain, forage, 
and water it would need for the two day, 38 mile march.  The army could have marched 
on half rations, which would have necessitated almost 10,000 pack animals or 600 carts, 
both of which are still larger than the Prince’s supply train.  Thus, the army could not 
have transported even half-rations of grain, forage, and water.  Clearly, then, the army 
had no choice but to push through the Landes in two days. 
It is possible that the personnel carried water for the long march, as that would 
have increased the army’s carrying capacity by some 240,000 lbs if each man carried 30 
lbs.  This would mean each man could carry 3 gallons of water for a total of 24,000 
gallons of water.  If each man consumed half a gallon—the same 64 oz daily the Institute 
of Medicine currently recommends—(4,000 gallons total), there would be 20,000 gallons 
left for the horses, barely more than a gallon per horse.  A half ration of water per man—
32 oz or 4 8oz glasses—(2,000 gallons total) would leave 22,000 gallons for the horses, 
i.e., 1.6 gallons per horse during the day, which is not even half of the 8 gallons 
recommended for working horses to prevent dehydration in non-arid conditions.143   
                                                
143Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, 
with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. 
General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 431.  In arid conditions, the 
recommendation is to double or even triple the water ration. 
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Horses would have been watered in the morning and certainly upon reaching their 
destination, but some water would have been needed during the day.  It seems the only 
way to have accomplished this was to have personnel carry some supplies.  Regardless, 
though, of any measures the army took, they still lost many horses—on top of the horses 
lost on the 28 mile march of 6 October. 
In Enemy Territory 
Despite the hard march on 11 October the army stopped “two miles from the town of 
Areule/Arouille”  and unfurled the standards just inside Armagnac’s territory.144  
According to Baker, this is where the army divided into three battles.  The constable and 
the marshal of the army, Warwick and Reynold Cobham respectively, led the van; the 
Prince commanded the center—along with Oxford and de Buch, among others—, and 
Suffolk and Salisbury had the rear.145  In addition to the marching order, Baker provides 
valuable information on its composition.  It contained “men-at-arms, clerks, serjeants, 
archers, brigancium and bidners,” although not 60,000 of them as he claims.146  If the 
Prince’s force waited until this point to divide into three battles one does wonder how the 
army was organized for the first week of the campaign.  On the march, clearly, it was not 
a disorganized, amorphous mass of soldiers and non-combatants, especially considering 
the two forced marches of 6 October and 11 October.  It is possible the army was already 
divided into battles but did not unfurl the standards until Arule/Arouille and that Baker 
considered this the appropriate place to discuss the leadership of the army.  
                                                
144Baker, Chronicon, 230; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 29. 
145Baker, Chronicon, 230–31. 
146Baker, Chronicon, 231. 
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It is clear that 11 October demarcated the early march through friendly territory 
and the start of the campaign in unfriendly territory, Armagnac in this case.  The 
unfurling of the standards, the knighting of Jankinus de Berefort and others, 
Arule/Arouille and three other towns (see Map 3) surrendered to the Prince and became 
loyal to England again,147 which may have been pre-arranged.148  The captain, one 
William de Reymon, apparently welcomed the English and surrendered to the Prince’s 
army without much ado.  The army camped at Arule/Arouille.149  Arule/Arouille was a 
bastide town and almost certainly fortified by 1355.  It was built on a grid and had a 
central market and church.150  While Arule/Arouille was not a large bastide town, the 
Prince’s army would have been able to purchase supplies.   
Clearly, the soldiers engaged in pillaging supplies, but it would have been prudent 
also for the army to have purchased supplies, at least in Arule/Arouille, given the captain 
of the bastide had undoubtedly surrendered in order to prevent the plundering of the 
town, which likely would not have been able to withstand an assault.  At the very least, 
that had to factor into his decision, whether it was a prudent decision made when faced 
with the Prince’s army or one previously negotiated.151  It is entirely plausible that the 
surrender was negotiated ahead of time, as that was the simplest, least expensive way of 
                                                
147“et illo die fuerunt Janekinus de Berefort et alii milites ordinati…”  Baker, Chronicon, 
231. 
148Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 307.  He suggests that Reymon had already negotiated 
the surrender prior to the army’s arrival. 
149Baker, Chronicon, 231. 
150Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 31–33. 
151Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 33.  Clifford Rogers is a proponent of this 
view.  Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 307. 
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acquiring a town.152  It precluded the need for an expensive, possibly protracted siege—
the antithesis of a chevauchée—besides which, the Prince’s army did not carry any siege 
equipment or contain any siege specialists or engineers.  Negotiation, then, was the 
Prince’s only viable option if a town could not be taken quickly. 
Hoskins, following Rogers, identifies the other three towns as Juliac, Mauvezin-
d’Armagnac (5 miles east of Arule/Arouille), and Créon-d’Armagnac (5 miles southeast 
of Arule/Arouille), although Hoskins adds additional possibilities, including La Bastide 
d’Armagnac, held by the count of Armagnac and two and a half miles south of 
Arule/Arouille.  As he points out that would have been a tempting prize for the Prince, 
given the stated goal of punishing Armagnac.153  All of these towns were well within the 
raiding range of the Prince’s army and given their proximity to the base camp at 
Arule/Arouille, the small raiding detachments would not have needed to carry supplies.154  
These smaller operations, while conducted under the Prince’s aegis, seem to have 
been somewhat independent, small scale offensives.  Baker writes “those who wished to 
do so went out…,”155 and presumably those who did not rested at Arule/Arouille.  This 
clearly indicates that these activities were at most a loosely co-ordinated operation and 
that the disparate retinues within the army could and did operate somewhat independently 
                                                
152Harari, Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, passim.  Prior negotiation seems to 
have been quite common. 
153Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 33.  See also Maurice Romieu, Histoire de la 
vicomté de Juliac (Pau, 2005), 459–71. 
154It is possible that soldiers carried an “emergency ration.”  Standard practice in the 
United States cavalry was for men to carry a reserve ration.  War Department Cavalry 
Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of Cavalry. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1938.  It would not have been a bad idea to have done so, 
but there is no evidence that they did. 
155Baker, Chronicon, 231.  “exierunt qui volebant” 
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of the whole to forage.  Was the Prince personally involved in the co-ordinating of these 
offensives?  If not, his able and experienced staff certainly was and knew to whom in 
their retinues they could entrust the operations. 
The Road to Toulouse 
After the forced march through the Landes, the army rested on 12 October.  While the 
army rested, small detachments saw to replenishing the army’s supplies by “taking 
victuals and forage” and then burning the enemy’s lands—and some of the towns 
above—, thereby disrupting Armagnac’s ability to supply troops, adversely affecting the 
French king’s ability to collect taxes to support troops in other parts of France, and 
frightening the populace.  The Prince understood this part of his mission and its place in 
Edward III’s campaign strategy for 1355.  In his letter to the bishop of Winchester, the 
Prince describes Armagnac as the “leader of the wars of our adversary [Jean II] and his 
lieutenant in all the land of Languedoc.”  He “had more oppressed and destroyed the 
liegeman” of the King.  Therefore, “by advice and counsel of all the lords being with us 
and of the lords and barons of Gascony,” “we rode…through the land of Armagnac, 
harrying and wasting the country, whereby the lieges of our most honoured lord, whom 
the count had before oppressed, were much comforted.”156   
                                                
156Edward, Prince of Wales, “Letter to the Bishop of Winchester,” December 1355, in 
Avesbury, Gesta Edwardi Tertii, 434, 437.  “…par avys et conseil de toutz lez siegnurs 
esteauntz entour nous et de seignurs et barons de Gascoigne…le counte Dermynak estoit 
chevetein des guerres nostre adversairie et soen lieutenaunt en tout le pais de Lange de 
ok, et plus avoit greve et destruit les liege gentz nostre tres honure seignur et piere le roy 
et son pais qe nulle autre en ycelles parties…Si chivachasmes apres parmy la pays 
Dermynak, grevantz et destrauntz le pais, de qoi lez lieges nostre dit tres honure seignur, 
as qeux il avoit devaunt greve, estoient mult recomfortez.” 
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This last, the “comfort” of the beset lieges, at the very least relieving the pressure 
Armagnac’s activities placed on them, was one of the official reasons for sending the 
Prince and an army to Gascony.  One way to do so was through this show of force and 
devastation, demonstrating to both Armagnac and the said lieges that the English king 
protected—and avenged—his loyal subjects. 
This was the first instance—according to Baker—of the army turning to pillaging 
supplies from the local populace rather than purchasing said supplies.  That said, the 
army also continued to purchase supplies as needed on the campaign and continued to 
carry some rations—the grain certainly—with them, as they could not count on finding 
supplies everywhere.  As the march continued, word spread throughout the area, and the 
Prince and his staff might reasonably have been concerned about a scorched earth policy.  
The Prince’s advisors were certainly experienced enough not to trust the entirety of the 
army’s provisioning to “living off the land,” which Harari has shown was untenable as 
the sole source of supply for an army.157  Yet, for an army pursuing a radical raiding 
strategy like a chevauchée, a large supply train was equally problematic.  Thus, the 
Prince’s army had a small supply train while gathering a large portion, if not the majority, 
of provisions from local sources. 
The short time it would take, though, to strip an area of its resources prevented the 
army from staying too long in one place.  Harari writes that twenty thousand horses could 
consume the forage within a 1 km radius in a single day; thirteen thousand horses would 
do that same within a 650m radius.  For this reason—and possibly on account of the 
                                                
157Harari, “Strategy and Supply,” 197–311. 
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newly re-established loyalty of Arule/Arouille—the army rested only one day despite the 
grueling march the previous day. 
The march of Tuesday 13 October was an easy eight miles to Montclar (see Map 
3).  After the march through the desolate Landes the many streams and small rivers that 
wove through the open, undulating county of Armagnac must have been a welcome 
change.158  If nothing else, the abundance of fresh water sources certainly eased the 
earlier supply difficulties.  The eight mile march could have been easily accomplished, 
even by the supply train.  The cavalry could have covered the distance in less than two 
hours if trotting for 28 minutes per hour.  Even at a walk of only 4 miles per hour,159 the 
cavalry would have reached Montclar before noon, with fresh horses and plenty of time 
to raid the surrounding area. 
The combatants indisputably reached Montclar early in the day, as they had time 
to affect the surrender of the castle, take and burn three towns—Hoskins identifies Géou, 
Gabarret, and Panjas as the most likely.160  There was also time to knight (facti milites) 
the Prince’s tailor and others, and attack the fortress at Astang/Estang.161  Astang/Estang 
was on a steep escarpment and well-fortified in 1355.162  It was here, on 13 October, that 
Baker records the first casualty: John de Lisle, one of the magnates mentioned in the 
Prince’s indenture with the King and who supplied his own retinue, was wounded by a 
                                                
158See Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 31, for his description of the land.   
159Average trot speed is 9 miles per hour; average walk/lead speed is 4 miles per hour.  
War Department Cavalry Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of 
Cavalry. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938. 
160Hoskins, in the Steps of the Black Prince, 34.  
161Baker, Chronicon, 231. 
162Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 34. 
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crossbow bolt and died the next day which the army spent encamped at Montclar.163  
Wengefeld describes de Lisle’s death as taking place on 15 October after he “was slain 
right wonderfully by a quarrel on the third day [14 October] that we entered into the land 
of our enemies.”164 
De Lisle’s wound probably explains the two days of rest at Montclar, although the 
army possibly needed the additional day to recover after the march through the Landes, 
as they only halted one day at Arule/Arouille after the two-day and thirty-eight mile 
march from Bazas to Arouille (13 miles from Bazas to Castelnau; 25 miles from 
Castelnau to Arouille).  What seems to have happened is that de Lisle received his wound 
on 13 October and died on 14 October, while the army camped outside Montclar, then on 
15 October the staff and de Lisle’s retinue dealt with the necessary issues attendant upon 
his death; the sources do not speak to any arrangements regarding the body.  His accounts 
were tallied and reveal that his retinue contained “20 knights, 39 esquires, and 60 
mounted archers.”165  Presumably, the members of his retinue continued on the campaign 
and continued to serve in the Prince’s company and middle battle, where they had been 
before de Lisle’s death.166 
The Prince also learned an important lesson the first night at Montclar.  The 
Prince set up his sleeping quarters in the town that first night.  A fire broke out in the 
                                                
163Baker, Chronicon, 231. 
164John de Wengefeld, Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” December 1355, recorded in 
Avesbury, Gesta Edwardi Tertii, 440, 443.  “qu feust tuez mult merveilousement dun 
quarel le tierce jour qu nous entrasmes en les terres de noz enemys, et morust le XVme 
jour Doctobre.”  “Wonderfully” is the translation given in the Avesbury edition.  Perhaps 
a better choice would be marvelously. 
165TNA, E372/200, m. 43. 
166Baker, Chronicon, 230. 
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town, either accidentally or as an act of defiance, and the Prince had to flee the town.  
After this incident, the Prince removed to the camp outside the town and slept in tents—if 
a castle or monastery was not available—for the remainder of the campaign.167 
Like Astang/Estang, the towns Hoskins identifies were all within a ten mile radius 
of Montclar.  Panjas would have been an important target, given its commanding position 
in the Midour valley.  It was fortified.  The church certainly existed in 1355.  The nave 
was rebuilt at the end of the fifteenth or beginning of the sixteenth century after being 
destroyed at an unknown date during the Hundred Years War.168  One important reason 
for taking Panjas was the route the army took on 16 October to Logeron/Nogaro, which 
took the army along the Midour, across its floodplain, then up the river valley’s southern 
side to reach Logeron/Nogaro (see Map 3), another fortified town.169  This would have 
been a relatively easy march, only fourteen miles.  Even the baggage and supply train 
would have had little difficulty keeping pace. 
There is some dispute at to what happened at Logeron/Nogaro.  Baker’s account 
simply has the Prince’s army spending the night outside the town.170 while French 
historians J. Moissant and S. Dejean claim the Prince’s army spent three days trying to 
take the fortified town without success.171  Hoskins’s interpretation is that the army 
                                                
167Baker, Chronicon, 231. 
168Baker, Chronicon, 231; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 34. 
169Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 35. 
170Baker, Chronicon, 231. 
171Neither offers any evidence for the claim.  J. Moisant, Le Prince Noir en Aquitaine 
(Paris: Alphonse Picard et Fils, Étudiers, 1894), 34; S. Dejean, “L’incursion du Prince 
Noir en Agenais et en Toulousain (1355),” in La Guerre au Moyen-Age, fiftieth 
anniversary compilation by the Académie Toulousaine d’Histoire et d’Arts Militaries, 
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remained encamped at Montclar (while de Lisle succumbed to his wound) and that small 
contingents launched attacks on Logeron/Nogaro to probe the defenses and then reported 
to the Prince, either through a messenger or upon the main army’s arrival at 
Logeron/Nogaro.172  That seems plausible if those contingents camped near 
Logeron/Nogaro.  It was fourteen miles one way; twenty-eight miles and attacking a town 
would have been difficult for soldiers and horses to accomplish in a single day.  A 
mounted messenger using more than one horse, though, certainly could have covered the 
28 miles rapidly and thus facilitated communications between the army and the smaller, 
advance force.  
Logistically speaking, a small contingent could have managed the three days 
away from the main supply train.  Pack animals could certainly have transported the 
necessary supplies, as water and forage were available.  A contingent of fifty men and 
one hundred horses would require only 16 pack animals.  If there were a hundred men 
with 120 horse, they would have needed only 21 pack horses.  Alternatively, two to three 
large carts could have easily transported the minimum amount of supplies for a 
detachment of this size.  Carts could easily have reached Logeron/Nogaro by the end of 
the day, even with the reduced speed—2.5 miles per hour was possible only on flat, good 
roads—resulting from the climb out of the river valley; however, pack animals would 
have been more mobile, despite the larger numbers, and could have kept pace with the 
soldiers as long as the rate of march did not exceed five miles per hour.173  Even more 
                                                
172Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 35. 
173War Department Cavalry Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of 
Cavalry. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938, 176. 
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efficient would have been to have some of the horses carry supplies, as that would have 
eliminated the need for pack animals or carts entirely for a small force of fifty to one 
hundred men and 100 to 120 horses.   
In light of these facts, Hoskins’ interpretation could be correct.  If this was, 
indeed, what happened, the advance party reported the difficulties of taking 
Logeron/Nogaro and the Prince chose to leave the town untaken rather than spend 
valuable time and resources, not to mention the risk of allowing an army with a supply 
train designed for a chevauchée not a siege to become stationary for any length of time.  
The Prince also knew the army did not need to reduce every town in Armagnac to send 
the message that Jean II and his deputy, the count of Armagnac, could not prevent the 
depredations of the Anglo-Gascon army. 
The army left Logeron/Nogaro behind it on Saturday 17 October and marched 
thirteen miles southeast to Plasence/Plaisance (see Map 3), a town Baker describes as “a 
fine, strong town,”174 located on the Arros river’s west bank.175  Both the Prince and 
Wengefeld describe it as “the chief town of the land.”176  The likely route, which parallels 
the modern roads, continued to climb gently from Logeron/Nogaro for two miles, then 
crested the ridge.  The army was now far enough south they would have been able to see 
the Pyrenees.  They also would have seen the castle of Termes-d’Armagnac, although 
Baker does not comment on it, suggesting that the army bypassed it regardless of its 
                                                
174Baker, Chronicon, 232. “villam pulcram et fortem.”  See also Barber’s translation in 
Barber, Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince, 62. 
175Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 35. 
176Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 437; John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis 
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significant position on the ridge.177  As with Logeron/Nogaro, the Prince did not need to 
take Termes-d’Armagnac.  In a way, showing the local populace that the lord in the castle 
was unable to protect them was a more powerful message than reducing the castle. The 
residents clearly received and understood the intended message.  Reportedly, “all the 
inhabitants fled” Plasence/Plaisance.178 
The approach to Plasence/Plaisance left Termes-d’Armagnac behind and 
descended into the Arros river valley.  The army could have crossed to the west bank of 
the Arros immediately, then approached the town on that side of the river.  Alternatively, 
the army could have advanced along the east bank of the Arros and crossed the river at 
Plasence/Plaisance.179  Remaining on the east bank would have been logistically easier.  
The banks of the river were steep, making the land approach more difficult.  Waiting 
until reaching Plasence/Plaisance would have allowed the army to make use of the ford 
south of the town, as well as the wooden bridge.180  Furthermore, the army continued 
marching east from Plasence/Plaisance, so crossing the Arros twice would have made 
little sense.  It was more logical to advance along the eastern bank, set up camp there, 
then use that camp as a base to ford the river and attack the town and surrounding area, 
                                                
177For the route, see Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 35–36.  For the castle of 
Termes-d’Armagnac, see Jean Henri Ducos and Jacques Gardelles, Le guide des 
châteaux de France 32, Gers (Paris, 1900), 150.   
178Baker, Chronicon, 232.  “omnes incolae fugerunt.” 
179Ministère des Travaux Publics et des Transports, Institut Géographique National 
(Paris), map of Pau-Toulouse (originally created by the Service Géographique de 
l’Armée in 1934), hereafter, Pau-Toulouse Map; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black 
Prince, 36. 
180Alain Lagors, Les étapes de l’evolution de Plaisance au Moyen Age, Bulletin de la 
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such as the fortress at Galiaun/Galiax two miles to the west.181  It does seem clear that a 
relatively small detachment from the central battle, rather than the entire army, initially 
attacked Plasence/Plaisance.  The captal de Buch, the lord of Montferrand, and Adam de 
Louches, one of the Prince’s bachelors, led the attack on the town and the castle, which 
was guarded by a garrison led by the count of Montluzon.  The defenders were 
captured.182 
The army spent the next day, 18 October, encamped at Plasence/Plaisance.  It was 
on this day, according to Baker, that Galiaun/Galiax was attacked.  Aignan, a town seven 
miles northeast, may also have been attacked, as the Prince’s army “destroyed…all the 
country round about” Plasence/Plaisance.183  The following day, the army fired 
Plasence/Plaisance and destroyed it completely—although not before William Brun and 
another Cheshire archer purchased a white sumpter horse.184  The march to 
Basse/Bassoues (see Map 3) was twelve miles, and Baker writes, the army “left the town 
of Bealmarchie/Beaumarchés on the right.”185  Such a route means the army climbed 300 
feet out of the Arros river valley, descended into the Midour river valley before a steep 
250 foot climb to Mondebat, a small village, then proceeded along the narrow ridge 
                                                
181Map; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 36. 
182Baker, Chronicon, 232; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 36–37. 
183Jean-Justin Monlezun, Histoire de la Gascogne depuis les temps le plus reculés 
jusqu’á nos jours, vol. 3 (Auch, 1846–1850), 319.  This is a local tradition.  Prince of 
Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edward Tertii, 437; 
John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 443. 
184Alain Lagors, Les étapes de l’evolution de Plaisance au Moyen Age, as cited and 
discussed in Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 37; for the horse, see DCO, 
Henxteworth accounts, entry for 31 October. 
185Baker, Chronicon, 232. 
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between the Midour and Riberette rivers.186  This route was also the only option for the 
baggage and supply train, which meant it would have had to advance in a narrow column 
for several miles in the middle of the march.  The climbs would have been difficult for 
the carts, but they could have managed it with rest periods after each climb.187  The rest 
of the march was over undulating ground up to the bastide town.188 
The army camped at Basse/Bassoues and spent the next day, 20 October, there as 
well.  Richard de Stafford was promoted to knight banneret and “raised his banner for the 
first time.”189  Stafford, of course, was a key member of the Prince’s retinue and staff, 
and this may have been a recognition of his past service.  The day of rest would have 
been necessary to allow the supply train to recover.  The town surrendered without a 
fight, and the army took the day to resupply.  This was an orderly procedure as only the 
provisioning officers were allowed into the town while the majority of the army remained 
outside the walls; the officers may have paid for supplies although Henxteworth does not 
record any debits.  The official reason given by Baker was that the town belonged to the 
Archbishopric of Auch.190  While the Prince made a point about protecting the Church’s 
                                                
186Pau-Toulouse Map; see Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 37, for the precise 
climb data.  Portions of this route parallel the modern road system. 
187Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, 
with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. 
General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355. P. 438. 
188Baker, Chronicon, 232; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 37–38.  The castle 
there was not built until the 1360s, after the Prince’s raid. 
189Baker, Chronicon, 232.  “et illo die dominus Ricardus de Stafforde, germanus comitis 
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property, keeping the army out of the town also made good sense.  It was both possible 
and common for soldiers to destroy supplies accidentally.191   
The march of 21 October covered eleven miles to Miraude/Mirande (see Map 3), 
which belonged to the lordship of the count of Comminges, Pierre Raymond IV, and was 
the most populous town since Logeron/Nogaro.192  Escamont/Montesquiou was on the 
army’s left and seems to have been left alone.  The line of march clearly indicated the 
Prince’s intentions to punish the count of Armagnac by devastating the territory.  The 
army could have marched on Auch, which was a major town, but the Prince clearly had 
no intention of marching north and instead continued southeast to Miraude/Mirande.193  
The march, while not long, would have been difficult for the vehicles as it crossed four 
rivers: Guiroue, Baradée, Osse, and Lizet.194  The pack animals should have had no 
difficulty keeping pace, but the narrow ridge and the elongation of the vehicle train may 
have made it necessary for the carts to take a second day to make the eleven mile march.  
The pack animals (550 of them), if travelling two abreast, would stretch just over three-
fourths of a mile.195 
The army stayed two nights at the abandoned and “large Cistercian monastery of 
Bertones/Berdoues.”196  The inhabitants fled before the Prince’s army, and the Prince 
                                                
191Harari, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion 
Campaigns,” 308. 
192Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 39. 
193Baker, Chronicon, 232; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 38–39. 
194Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 38–39. 
195The standard march spacing is 5 yards.  F. Maurice, “The Size of the Army of Xerxes 
in the Invasion of Greece, 480 B.C.,” JHS 50 (1930): 210–35, at 223. 
196Baker, Chronicon, 232.  “et princeps hospitabatur in monasterio grandi de Bertones, 
ordinis Cistertiensis, in quo nullus vivens fuerat repertus.” 
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took advantage of the empty buildings.  No attempt was made to take Miraude/Mirande, 
which was defended by “many men-at-arms.”197  The Prince doubtless did not wish to 
risk the time or the casualties, especially if he already knew that the count of Armagnac 
and the constable of France were fewer than fifty miles away—close enough to relieve 
the town.  The two-day halt at Miraude/Mirande was likely needed for the cart and pack 
horses after the previous day’s climbing down and up river valleys; it was also the last 
rest day for the next four days and allowed the army to resupply and prepare for the next 
day’s (23 October) difficult march. 
Over the next four days the army covered 47 miles of difficult terrain with the 
Pyrenees visible to the south.  The march of 23 October took the army out of Armagnac 
and into the territory of Astarike/Astarac.198  This was a conscious decision made by the 
Prince and his staff.  They certainly knew they had left Armagnac.  They easily could 
have turned west and continued to devastate Armagnac in retaliation for the count’s raids 
on Gascony.  That would certainly have been an easier march than the approach to 
Toulouse.  Why the Prince chose to continue east is unclear, but his letter to the bishop of 
Winchester offers at least some hint.  He specifically mentions the presence of the count 
of Armagnac (1311–1373) and “other great men of our enemies” at Toulouse, which 
included “the constable of France the marshal Clermont (marshal 1352–1356)” according 
to John de Wengefeld (one of the Prince’s close advisors who served on the campaign, 
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see Chapter Four) and the information in his letter to the bishop of Winchester.199  The 
Prince often employed local guides, and in this instance these guides may have provided 
intelligence about the French forces at Toulouse.  Baker does indicate that French scouts 
were captured at various times during the campaign,200 and these scouts were possible 
sources of information. 
These two men, along with the Constable of France, Jacques de Bourbon (1321–
1362), were responsible for the defenses of Toulouse and southwestern France.  Each 
member of this “quarrelsome triumvirate” had his own troops.  Armagnac’s men were 
locals, summoned into service upon word of the Prince’s arrival in Bordeaux.  Marshal de 
Clermont’s men, from north of the Dordogne, accompanied him south to Toulouse, and 
Constable likely had his own northern retinues.  Substantial reinforcements were 
expected under the Dauphin’s command, but these were sent to Picardy—presumably to 
counter Edward III’s invasion there.  Armagnac’s strategy had been one of battle 
avoidance and defending larger towns, river crossings, and castles.  Although there was 
tension between Armagnac and Marshal de Clemront, they seemed to have been in 
agreement about what they thought the Prince would do next: lay siege to Toulouse.201 
Perhaps the Prince had local intelligence that the count of Armagnac was nearby, 
relatively speaking, and decided to pursue him.  The count had to have heard of the 
                                                
199Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
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200Baker, Chronicon, 131–32.  
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devastation of his territory but had yet to offer a response.  By marching on Toulouse, the 
Prince may have intended to force the count of Armagnac to battle—or to look even more 
impotent by remaining behind the walls of Toulouse.  It may also have been an effort to 
bring the war to part of France thus far unaffected by it, an area that furthermore was 
prosperous and provided Jean II with money and supplies “to maintain his war.”202  A 
combination of factors likely influenced the Prince’s decision, a decision that clearly was 
well-considered. 
The first stop on the way to Toulouse was the bastide town of Saxante/Seisan (see 
Map 4) eleven miles east Miraude/Mirande.  It was “a difficult march, narrow and 
mountainous” according to Baker.203  While there were no major rivers to cross, the army 
did have to cross a large number of smaller rivers.  The first was the Grande Baïse, which 
involved a steep 300 foot climb up the eastern escarpment.204  Then the army repeated the 
process with the Petite Baïse, the Sousson, the Cédon, then a final descent to the Gers 
river valley.205  While none of these were major rivers, indeed Hoskins described the 
Soussan and the Cédon as “little more than wide streams,” albeit in deep ravines, the 
army had to find fords or bridges, preferably more than one crossing point at each river to 
avoid choke points.206  The constant climbing would have been difficult for the vehicles, 
and the army—or at least the carts—would have needed to stop before each crossing to 
                                                
202John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 445. 
203Baker, Chronicon, 232.  Hoskins disputes this description but concedes that it would 
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204Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 40. 
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water the horses to prevent the animals from becoming distracted and again after each 
climb to rest the animals.207  The army camped only one night at Saxante/Seisan, which 
was burned “against the Prince’s orders.”208 
The next day, 24 October, took the army ten miles and across the Gers and three 
other rivers to Seint Morre/Simorre (see Map 4).  Like the day before, this march 
followed the pattern of climbing out of and descending into river valleys, and multiple 
fords would have eased the army’s passage.  The first climb out of the Gers valley was 
400 feet and steep,209 and the horses would have needed a rest upon reaching the ridge.  
This was followed by the steep-banked Arras and Lauze river valleys, then down into the 
Gimone river valley and to Seint Morre/Simorre.210  This was a sauveté, or fortified 
village built around a church or monastery.  The town had two gates and had earth 
ramparts and a moat (at least it should have had such fortifications according to the 
town’s charter); the church itself may have been fortified.211  The Dominican Abbey was 
abandoned when the Prince’s army arrived, and the rear battle camped there.  The middle 
camped two miles south at the bastide town of Villefraunke/Villefranche, and the van 
three miles southeast at Turmayn/Tournan.  All three, Baker describes as “wealthy and 
                                                
207 Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) 
Edition, with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of 
Brig. General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 432, 438. 
208Baker, Chronicon, 232–33.  “contra prohibitionem praeconis principalis incensam.” 
209Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 41. 
210Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 41. 
211Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 41.  Hoskins writes that only the abbey’s 
church remains after the rest of the abbey was destroyed during the Revolution.  Based on 
the charter, the villagers were required to build these fortifications. 
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full of victuals,” although all the inhabitants had fled.212  All three were likely burnt after 
being pillaged.213  Resupply would have been necessary as the officers in charge of 
purveyance had no way of knowing what they would find as they neared Toulouse. 
The next night (25 October) saw the Prince’s army at Socamon/Samatan (see Map 
4) after a twelve mile march through “the lands of the count of Comminges, which 
extended to Toulouse, but they were destroyed by fire and sword.”214  This perhaps 
suggests a scorched earth policy on the part of the local inhabitants, who according to 
local tradition fled to Lombez.215  The Prince does write that those “within [Samatan] 
deserted at the coming of our people.”216  There is no indication that this was more than a 
local decision, although it is possible it was part of a larger strategy co-ordinated out of 
Toulouse, if it was, indeed, an action taken by the locals.  If it were a local action, it 
demonstrates the wisdom of carrying at least some supplies with the army and 
replenishing those supplies when the opportunity presented itself, as it had the day before 
at Seint Morre/Simorre. 
Granted, the interpretation of Baker is open to some debate, particularly the 
following phrase: “sed fuerunt ignibus et gladio depastae [the lands were wasted by fires 
and sword].”  Barber translates the last clause “but they [the lands] had been laid waste,” 
suggesting that the Prince’s army found the lands already devastated.  M. L. de Santi, 
                                                
212Baker, Chronicon, 233.  “villas quidem opulentas et victualibus refertas, sed incolis 
fugitivs desolatas.” 
213Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 308. 
214Baker, Chronicon, 233. “in terras comitis de Comenge, quae extendebatur usque 
Tolosam, quae fuerunt ignibus et gladio depastae.”   
215Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 44, 218, no. 10. 
216Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 437.  “la quele ceaux [qe] dedeinz estoient voideront a la venue de noz gentz.” 
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however, interprets it as “they [the lands] were ravaged by sword and fire [Elles furent 
ravagées par la fer et par la flamme].”217  Hewitt does the same.218  Hoskins favors 
Santi’s interpretation as “more logical.”219  Why, precisely, Hoskins thinks it more 
logical than the possibility that the inhabitants burned the land is unclear.  “Ignibus et 
gladio” does not necessarily imply the army took the actions.  It is a cliché, reminiscent 
of the classical “ignis et ferre.”  Either interpretation is logical, given the army’s actions 
of the previous day.  The Prince and his staff—particularly the officers in charge of 
victualling—would have known about any destruction ahead of them, especially as it was 
only a few miles march from where they camped and resupplied.  Lending weight to the 
latter interpretation—that the destruction was caused by the Prince’s army—is John de 
Wengefeld’s letter to the bishop of Winchester.  He writes “[a]nd then into the county of 
Cominges, and [the Prince] took there many towns and burned and destroyed them and 
all the country.”220 
The army certainly would have been able to carry out such raids.  Once they 
climbed the 300 feet out of the Gimone river valley, they had a relatively easy march 
compared to the previous two days through rich and fertile country.221  They passed 
Sauneterre/Sauveterre on the left and then next to Wynbers/Lombez, a strongly fortified 
                                                
217Santi, “L’expedition du Prince Noir en 1355,” 19–20.   
218Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition,  55. 
219Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 215–16, no. 5.   
220John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 443.  “Et puis en la countee de Comenge, et prist illesqes plusours villes et lez fist 
ardre et destruire et tout le pays.” 
221Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 43, for the climb and his discussion of why 
the army did not cross the Save, contrary to de Santi’s and Hewitt’s interpretations. 
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city, which is probably why the army bypassed it.222  Samatan, itself, was a large and 
prosperous town, “the best town of the county” and was “as great a town as Norwich,”223 
the 2.5 miles of which enclosed an area of one square mile.224 The town was burned the 
next day (26 October), including the Minorite convent, and the army caused such damage 
it took the town twenty years to begin recovering.225  The destruction of the Minorite 
house was likely against the Prince’s command, given previous orders on multiple 
occasions to respect Church properties and the payment of 110s to friars of the order.226 
Despite the three days of marching, the army pressed onward toward Toulouse on 
26 October.   This was a fourteen mile march through land that was “spacious, flat, and 
beautiful,” which was accurate after the army passed Ste-Foy.227  Although Baker does 
not mention it, the army likely laid waste the countryside and destroyed Salvetat, which 
was a village only two and half miles from Ste-Foy.228  That was well within the army’s 
reach.  The army camped at Seint Litz/St-Lys (see Map 4) and halted there the next day 
                                                
222Baker, Chronicon, 233.  “dimiserunt a sinistris ville vocatam Saunetere en Asturake, et 
transierunt juxta fortem civitatem vocatem Wynbers.” 
223Baker, Chronicon, 233.  “magna et divite villa vocata Socamon.”  Prince of Wales, 
“Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 437.  “ questoit 
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Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 443.  “et est ausi graunt ville come 
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224Elizabeth Rutledge, “Immigration and population growth in early fourteenth-century 
Norwich: evidence from the tithing roll,” Urban History Yearbook (1988): 15–30, at 16. 
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227Baker, Chronicon, 233.  “patriam amplam, planam, et pulcram.”  Hoskins, In the Steps 
of the Black Prince, 44. 
228Jean Contrasty, Histoire de Sainte-Foy-de-Peyrolières, Ancien Prieuré du Moyen-Age 
et de la Renaissance uni en 1606 au Collège de Toulouse (Toulouse, 1917), 131. 
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(27 October), too.  At this point, the horses, particularly the cart horses, would have 
needed the rest.  They had worked hard over the previous few days, hauling carts and 
supplies up and down river valleys.229 
The Decision at Toulouse 
The other key reason for halting a day at Seint Litz/St-Lys was tactical.  The army was 
only fifteen miles from Toulouse, although the Prince writes that the army was only a 
league (three miles) from Toulouse.230  This discrepancy could have been reflective of the 
camps of the three battles.231  The army could easily reach the city in a single day’s 
march; conversely, the count of Armagnac and the marshal of France and their soldiers 
could reach the Anglo-Gascon army with equal ease—and would not have the added 
burden of a supply train.  Armagnac’s force was recruited locally and probably numbered 
at least 3000 men, the number he had raised in 1349 to counter a potential attack by the 
earl of Lancaster, then stationed in Gascony.232 
Toulouse was a large city of more than 30,000 inhabitants.233  Froissart described 
it as “very great and strong and fair and well fenced.”234  The Garonne ran through the 
                                                
229Professional papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, 
with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. 
General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 437–38. 
230Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 437. 
231Hoskins, in the Steps of the Black Prince, 47. 
232Sumption, Trial by Fire, 60. 
233Vale, The Origins of the Hundred Years War, 144.  Sumption gives a figure of 20,000 
residents.  Sumption, Trial by Fire, 58. 
234John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 443.  “car noz enemys avoyent debrusee toutz les pountz dune part Tholouse et 
daultre, forsqe pris lez puntz en Tholouse, qe la ryver va parmy la ville.  Et le conestable 
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city, both parts of the city were walled—there were three miles of walls in 1218 when 
Simon de Montfort (1165–1218) unsuccessfully besieged the city235 and by 1550 the 
walls enclosed some 140 hectares and were 6.5 ft (2 m) thick and 30 ft (9 m) high, but the 
perimeter remained just over 3 miles (5 km)236—and the repair and raising of the height 
of the ramparts begun in 1345 had been completed in 1347.  The seneschal invested in 
war machines and munitions.237  There must have been several, as four machines were 
taken from Toulouse for use by French forces at English-held Auberoche in 1345.238  The 
garrison was not made up of professional soldiers but was assembled on an ad hoc basis; 
nor did the city have a “designated military commander.”  The city also had an arms 
industry and stocked an arsenal that included both individual arms and “engines of 
war.”239 
At this point, the Prince and his staff had decent intelligence.  They knew “the 
constable of France, the marshal Clermont, the count of Armagnac, were, with a great 
power, in the said city at that same time.”  They knew “our enemies had broken down all 
the bridges in Toulouse on the one side of Toulouse and the other, save only the bridges 
in Toulouse, for the river goeth through the midst of the city.”   
                                                                                                                                            
de Fraunce, le marschal de Clermound, le counte Dermynak, estoient, od graunt poari, en 
la dite ville a mesme le heur.  Et la ville de Tholouse est mult graunt, fort, et beale, et 
bien enclose.” 
235Jim Bradbury, The Medieval Siege (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1992), 135–36.  
Montfort did not have enough men to cover the walls. 
236Solon, “Tholosanna Fides,” 282. 
237Gratien Leblanc, “Toulouse, les remparts du faubourg Saint-Cyprien,” Mémoires de la 
Société Archéologique du Midi de la France XLV (1983–1984): 19–137, at 31–35 
238Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, 257–58; Sir R. Payne-Gallwey, The Crossbow 
(London: 1903), 272. 
239Solon, “Tholosanna Fides,” 275. 
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The chronicler Jean le Bel wrote that the French had four times more men-at-arms 
than the Prince.240  Those inside the city clearly also had intelligence about the Prince’s 
movements—why else destroy the bridges?—and had taken appropriate actions to stop 
the army, either by forcing them to turn back or to besiege the city.   
With the bridges across the Garonne broken, those were the two main options 
open to the Anglo-Gascon army; assaulting the city or trying to draw the defenders out 
were also options.  At least, that was how it must have appeared.  The Prince and his staff 
chose a different option, an option that likely had not occurred to the defenders within 
Toulouse because it had never been done before: cross the river and continue east with 
Toulouse at its back.  Why did they choose this option?  Before discussing what the 
Anglo-Gascon army did do, though, the other options not taken need examining because 
those choices would have been considered.  The quality and collective experience of the 
Prince’s staff ensures that the options would have been considered. 
The first option was perhaps the most obvious: turn back and return to Bordeaux.  
Logistically speaking, this was probably also the easiest option.  While the army could 
not return by the same exact route it had taken—if nothing else, fresh forage would be 
needed—they could proceed toward Auch, which would take them across territory 
similar to that which they had just traversed or followed the Garonne valley and the Via 
Aquitania or taken some other path.  Any way they chose would see the Anglo-Gascon 
army back in friendly territory just over two weeks with some pushing.  There would be 
ample opportunity to pursue the stated aim of punishing the count of Armagnac by 
                                                
240Jean le Bel, 220.  Barber suggests a much smaller force supplemented by mercenaries 
and untrained militia.  Barber, Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine, 121. 
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spreading further destruction in the county’s countryside.  A major disadvantage was the 
French force at Toulouse, which would be well-positioned to attack the rear of the Anglo-
Gascon army.  If the French chose not to force a battle or launch a major assault on the 
retreating army, they could certainly harass the army with small-scale attacks and 
disrupt—or perhaps capture—the baggage and supply train.  The French would not have 
been slowed by a baggage train.  However, any force following in the wake of the Anglo-
Gascon army would have faced the potential problem of finding supplies and forage for 
themselves.  The retreating army likely would have destroyed whatever it did not take for 
itself, partly as part of its mission and partly to hinder the pursuit. 
Returning to Bordeaux would have been a practical decision.  It was almost 
November.  The Prince had accomplished the aim of punishing the count of Armagnac 
and had demonstrated the will and ability of the English king to defend his subjects and 
their lands.  The lack of response by the local French lords and, perhaps more 
significantly, by the representatives of Jean II’s authority and power in the region also 
helped underscore English power and the impotence of the French king in the face of that 
English military power.  By that measure, the Prince had already achieved a measurable 
level of success, had already done enough to convince Gascons whose loyalties were 
wavering just where their best interests lay.  Thus, returning to Bordeaux was certainly a 
sensible, logical option that military experience would have suggested had a reasonable 
chance of success.  In this sense, then, the first option was the most likely choice and 
possibly what Armagnac and Clermont expected. 
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The second, related option, was to try to draw the defenders out and force a battle.  
The Prince’s staff would likely have found the odds favorable.  Many of these men were, 
after all, veterans of several campaigns.  The army had been on campaign three weeks, 
had had time to form unit cohesion, and its inexperienced members had gained some 
seasoning.  Yes, the Anglo-Gascon commanders would have liked the odds in the right 
circumstances.  That the Prince himself may have welcomed such a battle is not unlikely, 
especially given his decisions on the eventual return to Bordeaux when Armagnac finally 
emerged to harry the Anglo-Gascon army.241 
The third option was to besiege Toulouse.  This would have entailed a shift from a 
radical raiding strategy to a persisting strategy and remaining stationary for an extended 
period of time.242  Toulouse was not going to fall without a protracted siege.  Even if the 
Anglo-Gascon army was able to persuade someone in Toulouse—preferably a member of 
the garrison—to betray the city, wooing a traitor would take some time and finesse.243  In 
the event a receptive ear could be found in Toulouse, the Prince did have a large amount 
of money on hand.  Officially, it was for “for the prince’s profit in making payments 
beyond seas.”244  While that most likely meant ‘purchasing’ allies and loyalty, it could 
also be used to buy the army’s way inside the walls of a besieged city.  Even with the 
cash on hand, though, it would still take time to find someone who could be bought.  
Then, of course, there was the problem of making sure he or she stayed bought.  The 
                                                
241For a similar interpretation, see Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 46. 
242Harari, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion 
Campaigns,” 301. 
243Harari, Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 10–16. 
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Prince himself was well aware of the possibility of a traitor turning into a double-
agent.245 
Time, of course, was an issue.  For every day spent on a siege the army would 
continue to consume supplies at the same rate.  If the 15,000 horses consumed the forage 
within a 750 m radius each day it would be only a matter of days before the horses had 
consumed all the forage within a mile of the camp, more considering the forage needs of 
any livestock with the army.  Within three weeks the forage within a 10 mile radius (the 
maximum distance away from camp the carts could hope to travel to get forage and 
return to camp in a single day) would have been consumed—assumed the enemy had not 
burned it.  Further than 10 miles out, and even within a smaller radius, the risk of attacks 
on the foragers would have been a real concern.  Forage aside, the army likely had only a 
few days’ worth of grain supplies.  With each additional day of the siege, the foragers 
would have had to range further and further afield to find supplies.  They would have 
been unable to rely on local source of supply for more than a week.246   
                                                
245Harari, Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, Chapter 5, passim.  In essence, the 
French led by Geoffrey de Charney purchased their way into Calais—except the 
negotiations were not as secret as they could have been, and Edward III found out.  He 
and a small force, which included the Prince, covertly entered Calais.  They allowed the 
original plan to proceed, dealt with the small party of French soldiers, then the main force 
sortied out of the gate to attack the French army waiting to be let into the city.  The 
Prince led a smaller force out of another gate and attacked the French flank.  Thus, the 
Prince was well aware of the fraught nature of this kind of negotiation. 
246Harari, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion 
Campaigns,” 310. 
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It would have been imperative to find another source of supply or risk 
starvation.247  The area to the south-west of Toulouse had already been stripped as the 
army passed through on its march of the previous few days, and south was not an option 
since the count of Foix was, if not an ally, a friend and a cousin of the captal de Buch.248  
The bridges across the Garonne were broken, which would have made gathering supplies 
from the other side of the Garonne virtually impossible.  That would have left the 
foragers with more limited options for acquiring supplies.  Of course, it was technically 
possible for the Prince’s army to have received supplies from Bordeaux via river 
transport,249 although the army would have to allow time for messengers to reach 
Bordeaux, supplies to be purveyed, and then transported.  Indeed, the army would have 
been dependent on water transport if the siege became protracted.250  If river transport 
could be arranged, it would be sensible to ship horses back to Bordeaux; however, that 
would make it extremely difficult for the army to lift the siege and continue the 
chevauchée.  Furthermore, the Garonne for at least 100 miles downstream was in enemy 
territory and guarded at key points by fortifications,251 which would have made using it to 
transport supplies most difficult and unreliable if not impossible.  Moreover, navigating 
the river between Castets-en-Dorthe and Toulouse could be problematic (river shipping 
                                                
247Harari, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion 
Campaigns,” 311. 
248Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 46. 
249Harari, “Strategy and Supply in Fourteenth-Century Western European Invasion 
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now uses the locks in the Garonne Lateral Canal), and the Prince and his advisors could 
not ignore the possibility that the enemy had river vessels that could blockade the river 
and thus prevent resupply by river transport.  
Aside from the issue of supply, which was a real and significant problem, the 
Prince also did not have any siege equipment or siege specialists with him.  Furthermore, 
surrounding the entire city would have also required at least some part of the army to 
cross the Garonne, not to mention blockading the Garonne upstream from Toulouse to 
prevent supplies from reaching the city via the river.  Yet, even if the army had the 
necessary equipment and specialist personnel, time was still the enemy, and the arrival of 
a relieving force was a real danger.  Given that the Prince’s army had no way to control 
access to Toulouse on the east, a messenger would have had absolutely no difficulty in 
leaving the city. 
Moreover, the Prince had only 6000 combatants, not nearly enough men to 
surround the city effectively.  Toulouse, as discussed above, was moated and surrounded 
by three miles of walls.  With a population of 30,000, there would have been at least 8000 
adult males.252  Additionally, there was the hastily assembled garrison and the troops of 
Armagnac (at least 3000 men), Clermont (Marshal of France), and Bourbon (Constable of 
France).  All told, the defending force at Toulouse probably numbered at least 11,000 
men, almost twice the number of Anglo-Gascon combatants.  Taking Toulouse would 
have required a prolonged siege.253 
                                                
252Solon, “Tholosanna Fides,” 281.  Malcolm Vale suggests a population of 34,000.  
Vale, Origins of the Hundred Years War, 144.  
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In light of these considerations and given the experience of the Prince’s staff, 
especially those veterans of the siege of Calais, the Prince and his staff knew laying siege 
to Toulouse was not a viable option for the Anglo-Gascon army.  Nor were the count of 
Armagnac or Clermont ignorant of the considerations the Prince and his staff had to 
consider.  It is likely the French commanders came to the same conclusion: that an 
Anglo-Gascon siege of Toulouse was not feasible, especially not a siege of the length 
needed to force the surrender of the city.  Of course, the Prince could have simply 
ordered an assault on the city, although given the strength of the city’s walls and the 
number of war machines and defenders that had little hope of success and promised 
heavy casualties.  Armagnac and Clermont knew this, too.  Therefore, the French leaders 
could reasonably have assumed that the Anglo-Gascon force would turn back to 
Bordeaux.  It must have been quite a surprise to the residents of Toulouse and the French 
military leaders when the Prince elected to pursue a different option.  They chose to 
continue their eastward march. 
From a supply standpoint this was certainly doable.  The land east of the Garonne 
“was very rich and plenteous.”254  Baker describes the people as in “a state of terror, not 
knowing what to do and unable to flee, because they had believed that they were safe 
because of the rivers [the Garonne and Ariège].  Nor did they know how to fight back, 
since they had never been involved in warfare before”255  Therefore, the Anglo-Gascon 
                                                
254Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 437.  “car la terre estoit mult riche et plentenouse.” 
255Baker, Chronicon, 233–34.  “unde territae gentes illius terrae, nescii quid facerent, nec 
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army could have reasonably expected to purvey, forage, and pillage supplies from local 
sources.  Leaving Toulouse behind unsubdued would mean leaving an armed force at the 
army’s rear—an armed force that thus far had made no move to engage the Anglo-
Gascon army.   
The real challenge was crossing the Garonne and the Ariège (see Map 4).  The 
bridges were broken.  The crossings downstream as far as Tonneins, roughly 100 miles 
away, were not in friendly territory.256  According to John de Wengefeld, a key member 
of the Prince’s staff, no one in the Prince’s army knew where the fords were, “yet by the 
grace of God, they found it,”257 and all the bridges outside the walls of Toulouse had been 
broken.   The Prince had in the past—and would later in the campaign—hired locals to 
guide the army, but there is no evidence in the accounts that such happened in this 
instance, although it is possible.  The crossing point certainly had to be chosen with great 
care.  The Prince describes the rivers as “very stiff and strong to pass.”258  Baker’s 
description is more elaborate: The Garonne was “rough, rocky, and most frightening,” 
and the Ariège was even “more dangerous.”  “The said rivers had never before been 
crossed by any horse.”259 
                                                                                                                                            
and Campaigns of the Black Prince, 63.  Incidentally, Baker identifies the river as the 
Gironde, but both the Prince and John de Wengefeld say that it is the Garonne. 
256Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 309. 
257John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 443. 
258Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 437.  “qe sount assez reddez et fortes a passer.” 
259Baker, Chronicon, 233.  “…exercitus transmeavit aquam de Geroude, rigidam, 
petrosam, et mirabiliter terribilem; et iterum eodem die Aquam de Arage, illa de Geroude 
plus periculosam, et descenderunt ad Tolosam.  Prœdictas aquas nunquam aliquis equus 
ante transivit…” 
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Both Wengefeld and the Prince claim the crossing took place about one league 
(three miles) upstream from Toulouse, although Hoskins has shown that these distances 
are incorrect.  If the army crossed the river that close to Toulouse they would have 
needed only to cross the Garonne not both the Garonne and the Ariège.  Therefore, 
Hoskins is correct when he writes that the crossing had to take place upstream of the 
confluence of the two rivers, about seven miles (just over two leagues) from Toulouse, 
near Pinsaugel.260  Most likely the army made its Garonne crossing roughly a mile 
upstream of the confluence.  Any further upstream the river banks rise to 50–60 feet, 
which would have added a considerable level of difficulty to an already difficult crossing 
and would have been both impractical and ill-advised.  Near Pinsaugel, the river is about 
140 yards wide, the banks are less steep, the water shallower, and Cassini’s eighteenth-
century map seems to indicate a ford in this location.261  As for the Ariège crossing, 
Hoskins rightly views this as part of the same operation, given that the most likely 
place—“between the confluence and Lacroix-Falgarde”—to cross the second river was 
only a mile’s march from the ford at Pinsaguel.  The van would have completed the 80 
yard crossing of the Ariège while troops in the rear were still on the far bank of the 
Garonne.262  Logistically speaking, the army, already experienced in crossing rivers 
thanks to their passage of the previous few days, could have managed the crossings with 
proper care and planning and kept the grain dry, which would have been a key 
                                                
260Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 49.  Both Hewitt and Rogers argue for 
almost the exact same location.  Hewitt, Black Prince’s Expedition, 56.  Rogers, War 
Cruel and Sharp, 310, n. 127. 
261Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 49–50; Cassini, CD-ROM, France Sud, sheet 
38. 
262Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 50–51. 
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consideration.  They did so “without losing scarce any of our people.”263  It does appear 
that they lost some horses, as Henxteworth paid out 13s to the clerk of the pantry for the 
purchase of “two mares for carrying bread” at Monte Giscard/Montgiscard, where the 
army camped on 29 October (the day after the river crossing).264 
The logistical and physical difficulties of crossing the Garonne and Ariège aside, 
the army also had to be concerned about harassment from French forces.  Froissart 
describes active skirmishing between the Anglo-Gascon army and the French defenders, 
the destruction of the suburbs, and the Anglo-Gascons arrayed in battle lines—after the 
crossing—while the French wanted to give battle but were forbidden to do so by the 
count of Armagnac.265  Given Froissart’s reputation for embellishment, this likely is 
exaggerated.  Armagnac probably did order the destruction of the suburbs, which was a 
common practice.  The forbidding of a sortie is in line with Armagnac’s approach.266  As 
for the skirmishing, drawing the troops up in battle lines after crossing the rivers makes 
no sense, so Froissart is wrong on that account.  He is also wrong in stating that the army 
crossed at Port-Ste-Marie, about eighty-five miles downstream.267  Furthermore, the 
Prince, Wengefeld, and Baker all fail to mention any engagement with enemy troops.  
That said, some skirmishing probably did occur.  If nothing else, if the army crossed at 
                                                
263Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 437.  “saunz gaires perde de noz gentz.” 
264DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 31 October. 
265Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 5, 339, 344–45. 
266Breuils, “Jean Ier, Comte d’Armagnac,” 57. 
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known fords, these place were likely guarded.268  If not, that begs the question of why 
not.  Perhaps Armagnac simply did not consider that the Anglo-Gascon army could cross 
the river and failed to have the possible crossings heavily guarded.  Regardless, 
Armagnac, Clermont, and the residents of Toulouse were undoubtedly surprised at the 
Prince’s decision and the success of the maneuver, which, while perhaps not quite 
“audacious to the point of foolhardy,”269 was an impressive feat and opened up a new—
and rich—field of operations for the Anglo-Gascon armies. 
The way forward to Narbonne was filled with prosperous and ill-defended towns 
and villages.  It was harvest; there were cattle and sheep.  The army would have an easy 
time of it under these conditions and have a deep impact, economic and psychological, on 
the Languedoc.270 
Toulouse to Narbonne 
Despite the fourteen-mile march and hazardous crossing, the army camped only one night 
at Falgarde/Lacroix-Falgarde.  They pressed on to Monte Giscard/Montgiscard (see Map 
4) the next day (29 October).  Even though this was the first English army to campaign in 
this part of France, the Prince and his staff would have known at least part of the 
directions to Monte Giscard/Montgiscard.  Castanet, which was pillaged and burned as 
                                                
268For Hoskins’ interpretation of the discrepancies, see Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black 
Prince, 47–52 
269Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 56.  Rogers disagrees with Hewitt’s assessment 
because the Prince had no communication and supply lines that could be cut.  Rogers, 
War Cruel and Sharp, 310. 
270Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 54.  While the Prince obviously was 
unfamiliar with Clausewitz, he would have recognized the truth of his words: “If the 
enemy country is rather loosely knit, if its people are soft and have forgotten what war is 
like, a triumphant invader will have no great difficulty in leaving a wide swath of country 
safely in his rear.”  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 621. 
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part of the army passed through the town, was on the pilgrim route to Santiago de 
Compostela and on the old Roman road, the Via Aquitania.271  The army likely followed 
the road—perhaps the carts took advantage of it—while it had the chance.  Monte 
Giscard/Montgiscard was “a large and fine town, part of the inheritance of lord Almeric 
de la Fossade, which was confiscated by the French king [in 1356] because he [Fossade] 
was loyal to king of England.”272   
The army burned twelve windmills.  One does wonder if that was against orders.  
The Prince had been careful during the early days of the campaign to protect—or at least 
order the protection of—the lands and buildings of allies and the church.  Furthermore, 
Aymeric de la Fossade was on the campaign and undoubtedly provided excellent local 
knowledge of the area.  It is possible that Fossade knew of the crossings for the Garonne 
and Ariège, although that does not fit with Wengefeld’s statement that no one in the army 
knew of any crossings.273  Fossade’s presence meant he was also in a position to object, if 
not strenuously, to the destruction.  While he may not have approved the action, Fossade 
must have understood the strategic import of doing so.  It would disrupt considerably the 
area’s ability to supply itself let alone provide victuals for French forces.  Given that 
                                                
271Dom Claude de Vic and Dom Joseph Vaissete, Histoire générale de Languedoc, vol. 7, 
191.  The Via Aquitania was built in 118 BCE to link Narbonne and the Via Domitia to 
Toulouse and Bordeaux.  Incidentally, the modern N113 and D33 follow the same route 
as the Roman roads.  See also, Chevallier, Roman Roads, 160–61. 
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hereditatis domini Almerici de la Fossade, quam sibi abstulit coronatus Francorum, quia 
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Fossade’s lands in the sénéchaussée of Toulouse were confiscated in 1356,274 probably 
because of his participation in the Anglo-Gascon campaign, the strategic value of the 
destruction is clear.   
Froissart claims that the residents of Monte Giscard/Montgiscard resisted with 
arrows and stones and wounded some soldiers.275  Consequently, the army destroyed the 
town and its environs, which probably supported about 2500 people.276  The 
fortifications, probably made from a mixture of earth, sand, and straw (essentially, 
adobe), would not have offered much of an obstacle for the Anglo-Gascon army.  The 
town was, indeed, destroyed to the point where tax exemptions, granted by Jean II, were 
confirmed in 1357 to help the town rebuild.277 
The other major event during the march of 29 October was the capture of two 
French spies, who revealed that Armagnac remained in Toulouse and “the constable of 
France was in Montmaban, four leagues from Toulouse, expecting the army’s arrival to 
besiege Toulouse.”278  Hoskins identifies Baker’s Montmaban as Mountauban, some 
thirty-five miles north of Toulouse and argues that this does not fit with the earlier 
information as to Baker’s earlier claims that the constable was at Toulouse.  He resolves 
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this discrepancy by suggesting that the constable had perhaps left some troops in 
Montauban.279  This depends on his identification of Montmaban as Montauban.   
Perhaps Baker’s Montmaban is Montrabé, only six miles slightly north-east of 
Toulouse.  It would not be unreasonable to move some of the defenders out of Toulouse 
and to another, nearby location, which could then allow that force to relieve the besieged 
town should the Anglo-Gascon army turn back to besiege Toulouse.  Perhaps the 
constable took troops and did march north toward Montauban, which could have been 
reached in an easy two day march.  There is, of course, another possibility: spies lied 
about the constable’s location, perhaps to make the Prince and his staff think Toulouse 
was not as well-defended as it had been.  If nothing else, the capture of the spies indicates 
that, although Armagnac remained in Toulouse, he was not idly sitting by.  He was taking 
steps to gather intelligence about the Anglo-Gascon army, an action in keeping with his 
steady and cautious approach. 
Thus, apprised of the French position, the Prince’s army continued its march 
through Languedoc, camping at Anionet/Avignonet (see Map 5), fourteen miles 
southeast, a large, well-fortified merchant town of 1500 houses (households),280 at least 
6000 people.  Following the road, broadly speaking, the army marched through 
Basige/Baziege and Villefranke/Villefranche and burned twenty windmills, which likely 
supported a population of roughly 4000.  The route the army followed took them through 
                                                
279Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 55. 
280The Prince describes it as “very great and strong.”  Prince of Wales, “Letter to the 
bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 437.  Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 
5, 346.  Froissart implies that the town was unfortified, but Hoskins’ research shows that 
Froissart was wrong and had stone fortifications dating to the twelfth-century.  Hoskins, 
In the Steps of the Black Prince, 58. 
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a rich and fertile country, and they took full advantage of that.  Several towns, including 
Montesquieu, within a couple miles of the Via Aquitania were destroyed.281  In 1378, 
Montesquieu had only forty taxable households, a reduction clearly worthy of mentioning 
in the records.282  The swath the army cut was somewhat restricted south of the route, as 
the count of Foix’s lands were only ten miles south and the Prince had thus far made a 
concerted effort not to harm the lands of allies or potential allies.  Foix, it should be 
remembered, was also a first cousin of Jean de Grailly, the captal de Buch, a member of 
the Prince’s staff.  
At Avionet/Avignonet the army maintained its battles in camp, although there was 
some division along regional lines within the camps: “The entire army stayed at the large 
town called Anionet/Avignonet…the middle and third battles quietly in the suburbs, and 
the first in another part of the suburbs, the Gascons and Béarnaise within the town, from 
which all the residents had fled.”283  One assumes the news of events at Montgiscard had 
spread and the inhabitants made an informed decision to flee to a nearby hill fort.  That 
did not save them.  “It was taken by storm” on Friday284 and thoroughly destroyed on 
Saturday (31 October) before the army left.  While the early fourteenth-century church 
seems to have escaped most of the destruction, which was significant, the town did not.  
This seems clear in the measures Jean II authorized on 28 August 1356 (before Poitiers) 
                                                
281For the distance of the towns from the Via Aquitania, see Hoskins, In the Steps of the 
Black Prince, 57–58. 
282Antoine-Lucien Cazals, L’Histoire de la Ville et de la Communauté de Montesquieu-
sur-Canal (Toulouse, 1883), 32. 
283Baker, Chronicon, 234. 
284Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 437.  “et fust pris par force; dedeinz quele estoient logges toutz noz batailles.” 
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to stimulate construction and rebuilding.  The measures included exemptions from taxes 
for three years and exemptions from war taxes for seven years—if the rebuilding 
happened within the year.285 
Taking the time to destroy Avionet/Avignonet in the morning probably explains 
the short march of only nine miles on 31 September.  They marched first to a small town 
“called Manus de Pucels/Mas-Stes-Puelles (see Map 5), with an Augustinian convent.”286  
Both town and convent—and presumably the town’s two windmills—were burned and 
the damage must have been extensive, given that the town received exemptions similar to 
Avionet/Avignonet to encourage rebuilding.287  Then the army moved on to a richer, 
larger prize: Chastelnavernareo/Castelnaudery (see Map 5).  This was a large town on the 
Via Aquitania, populous and rich, and defended with fortifications, even though they 
were of poor quality.288  The town was taken by storm, and Froissart gives a dramatic 
version of events: killing, pillaging, looting, holding residents to ransom.289 
The army camped the next day (1 November) at Chastelnavenareo/Castelnaudery 
and also celebrated All Saints Day there.  There was no choice but to take this day of rest 
as the army had marched the previous four days without interruption.  The horses had to 
                                                
285Ordonnances des roys de France de la troisième race, vol. 3, ed. Mr. Secousse, 73–74.  
The measures also allowed the consuls to compel labor and threatened residents with a 
two-mark fine—to help pay for rebuilding the walls—if they failed to build a new home 
within the year. 
286Baker, Chronicon, 235.  “et villa vocata les Manus de Pucels, cum conventu 
Augustiniensium.” 
287Baker, Chronicon, 235.  Dossat et al., Languedoc et le Rouergue dans le Trésor des 
Chartres, Items 1770 and 1775. 
288Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 5, 346–47; Henri Mullot and Joseph Poux, Nouvelles 
recherches sur l’itinéraire du Prince Noir à travers le pays de l’Aude, 2, n. 3. 
289Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 5, 346–47.  While Froissart tends toward the dramatic, his 
account of the army’s actions after taking the town is probably accurate.  
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be rested.  Henxteworth took advantage of the halt to catch up on his accounting.  Several 
men received advances on their wages, others were re-imbursed for purchases of horses, 
wine, and wax.290  Four Cheshire archers received 8s as a “gift” to cover the purchase of 
“shoes and breeches bought for them.”291  The accounts also suggest that the Prince had 
advance scouts and purveyors.  Thomas, the oven keeper, was given 3s 4d to carry to the 
clerk of the spicery for “wax purchased at Carcassonne,” which was twenty-four miles 
southeast.292  This indicates that some members of the Anglo-Gascon army had ranged at 
least twenty-four miles ahead of the main force and returned. 
Given that distance and the capabilities of men and horses, the round trip from 
Chastelnavenareo/Castelnaudary of fifty miles minimum (the advance purveyors could 
have left the army at Anionet/Avignonet, for example, then returned to meet the army at 
Chastelnavenareo/Castelnaudary) would have taken at least two days, most likely three.  
It would depend on whether carts were taken along or a pack train was used.  Given that 
the only purchase Henxteworth re-imbursed was wax, it is possible a couple pack 
horses—or even the purveyors and their personal mounts—could have carried the wax.  
This purchase of wax was not the only one.  The clerk of the spicery was reimbursed a 
further 7s 9d for wax purchased by Thomas of the chandlery and Thomas the baker 
(perhaps the same Thomas the oven keeper mentioned above).  While Henxteworth 
balanced his accounts, a small force took an unnamed nearby town, the residents of 
                                                
290DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 31 October. 
291DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 31 October. 
292DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 31 October. 
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which paid the army 10,000 gold florins (1420l)293 to spare the town and its wealth.  
Hoskins suggests this town may have been Pexiora, five miles southeast of where the 
army was encamped.294   
The next morning (2 November) the army departed 
Chastelnavenareo/Castelnaudary, but not before burning the town, the church of St 
Michael and its archives, the hospital of St Antoine, and the Minorite and Carmelite 
convents.295  The destruction of the church and convents does raise a question: had the 
Prince changed his previous orders not to harm church lands and property or were those 
orders forgotten—or ignored—in the heat of the moment.  The destruction was 
significant, as indicated by a royal charter of August 1356 and a 1357 confirmation of tax 
exemptions.  The new Carmelite convent was granted an exemption regarding the 
separation distance between their convent and that of the Minorites from the pope in 
1363, allowing it to be rebuilt inside the new walls.296  Leaving the burning town at its 
rear the army marched forward, through two towns two miles north of the Via Aquitania: 
St Marthae le Port/St-Martin-Lalande and Vilkapinche/Villepinte.297   
                                                
293Baker, Chronicon, 235.  “a quo quidam exeuntes conquisierunt unam villam, cui ut 
parcerent et catallis eorum, oppidani dederunt decem millia florentium aureorum.” 
294Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 60.  The order of St John of Jerusalem had 
its seat there. 
295Baker, Chronicon, 235; Froissart, Oeuvres, 5, 346–47; Mullot and Poux, Nouvelles 
recherches, 2, n. 3. 
296J.F. Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois: Incursion du Prince Noir en 
1355, 50–51, nn. 71–74; Dossat et al., Le Languedoc et le Rouergue dans le Trésor des 
Chartres, Item 1764.  The Carmelites needed the exemption from rules that governed the 
distance that had to separate their convent from that of the Minorites. 
297Baker, Chronicon, 235.  “Die Lunae transierunt per villas sanctae Marthae le Port, et 
oppidum grande vocatum Vilkapinche…”  Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 60. 
Chapter 5: The Campaign to Narbonne 
 
267 
Both Hewitt and Hoskins add a third town, Las Bordes/Lasbordes.298  Baker 
describes Vilkapinche/Villepinte as an “oppidum grande.”  The fifteen mile march ended 
at Alse (see Map 5).  There is some debate about the modern location of “Alse.”  Hewitt 
and de Santi, for example, as well as Barber in his translation of Baker, identify it as 
modern Alzonne.299  Mullot and Poux and Jeanjean prefer Alzau.300  Hoskins seems to 
favor Alzau, which would better fit Baker’s description of Alse as a “viculum,” than 
Alzonne.  Alzau was only two and a half miles from Alzone and given that the Prince 
chose not to camp within towns after his unfortunate experience at Montclar, Alzau 
seems a more credible location than Alzonne.301  Alzone, whether the army camped there 
or elsewhere, did not survive the proximity of the Anglo-Gascon force.  It was destroyed.  
The inhabitants, like those of the towns discussed above, later received privileges from 
the king, tax exemptions, and various immunities to compensate for their losses.302 
The next day (3 November) took the Anglo-Gascon army nine miles down the 
Via Aquitania to Carcassonne (see Map 5).  It was an easy march over flat ground.  
Carcassonne was a rich prize, “fine, richly supplied, and well built, larger than London 
                                                
298Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 58.  He cites Avesbury as his source, but the 
Prince’s letter does not actually mention the town.  Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black 
Prince, 60.  He cites De Santi, L’Expedition du Prince Noir en 1355, 22, as the source for 
the inclusion of Lasbordes. 
299Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 58; de Santi, L’expedition du Prince Noir en 
1355, 22; Barber, Life and Campaigns, 64. 
300Mullot and Poux, Nouvelles recherches sur l’itinéraire du Prince Noir, 3; Jeanjean, La 
Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois, 23. 
301I follow Hoskins here.  See his discussion In the Steps of the Black Prince, 61. 
302Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans en pay audois, 51; Dossat, et al., Languedoc et le 
Rouergue dans le Trésor des Chartres, Items 1737. 
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within its walls.”303  The Prince describes it as “a fair city and great” with an “old city, 
which was a very strong castle.”304  Wengefeld claims it was “greater, stronger, and fairer 
than York.”305  The comparison with York was probably more accurate.  The rest of 
Baker’s description of Carcassonne is precise.  There were two parts, the bourg and the 
cité.  A double curtain wall surrounded the cité, and the Aude river flowed between them.  
A single stone bridge of 270 meters, the Pont Vieux, had fourteen arches and connected 
the two parts of Carcassonne, although much of the bridge does not actually span the 
river Aude.  The cité end of the bridge is 250 meters from the walls, which meant troops 
who crossed the river would be within missile range of the castle.306  Within the bourg “at 
the foot of [the bridge] was a fine hospital” and “four convents of the four orders of 
friars.  The friars did not flee; the residents of the bourg and the minoresses [Poor 
Clares]…fled to the cité.”307  The Prince’s account is similar to Baker's.  He adds that 
“great captains [cheveteyns] were therein and men of arms and commons in great 
number; for all the greater part of the people of the land of Toulouse were fled thither, but 
                                                
303Baker, Chronicon, 235.  “villam pulcram, praedivitem, et bene aedificatam, ampliorem 
Londoniis infra muros.” 
304Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 438.  “qestoit bieal ville et graunt.”  “al auncien ville, qestoit mult fort chastiel.” 
305John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 443.  “qest plus grande, plus forte, et plus beale qest Everwyk.” 
306Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 62. 
307Baker, Chronicon, 235.  “ad cujus pedem pulcrum hospitale fuit situatum.  In burgo 
fuerunt quator conventus quator pauperum religiosorum, quorom ministri, scilicet fratres, 
non fugerunt, burgensibus et minorissis quae ilic etiam habitabant, in civitatem 
fugientibus.” 
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at the sight of us they forsook the city [the bourg] and fled to the old city [the cité], which 
was a very strong castle.”308   
Given that intelligence, it is hardly surprising that the Prince and his staff chose 
not to assault the cité.  They stayed in the bourg, which was large enough to 
accommodate the entire army in three-fourths of the bourg.  There the army found “an 
abundance of muscat wine and other victuals both delicacies and essentials.”309 
The army stayed three days in Carcassonne.  The first day (3 November), 
presumably after the residents fled, Lebret’s sons were knighted, as were several English 
soldiers: the lord Basset of Drayton was promoted to banneret, too, Roland Daneys, and 
others.310  The next two days (4–5 November) the army rested.  At some point during 
those two days, the residents offered the Prince a truce and 250,000 gold écus to spare the 
town.  Baker, in unusually dramatic fashion, records the Prince’s reaction: “He had not 
come for gold but for justice, not to buy but to take cities.”311  The Prince clearly rejected 
                                                
308Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 438.  “…et grauntz cheveteyns dedeinz et des geants darmes et comunes a graunt 
nombre; car tout le plus de geantz de pays de Thoulousane tanqe la estoient fuiz, meas a 
nostre venue ils guerperont la ville et sen fuerent al auncien ville, qestoit mult fort 
chastiel.” 
309Baker, Chronicon, 235.  “In burgo totus exercitus bene et laute hospitatus, vix 
occupavit tres ejus quartas, abundans vino muscato et caeteris victualibus tam delicatis 
quam necessariis.” 
310Baker, Chronicon, 236.  “et effecti milites filii domini de Libreto, et dominus de Basset 
Dreitone, qui incontinenti cum erecto proprio vexillo militavit.  Item Rolandus Daneys et 
plures ad ordinem militarem promovebantur.” 
311Baker, Chronicon, 236.  “Offerentibus aurum princeps respondit, quod huc non venit 
pro auro sed justitia prosequenda, nec ut venderet sed caperet civitates.”  See also, 
Barber, Life and Campaigns, 65.  Baker does not usually fall into such dramatic language 
in his account of the 1355 campaign, although he does indulge in dramatic speeches in 
his account of the 1356 campaign.  Jeanjean suggests a lower figure of 25,000 écus based 
Chapter 5: The Campaign to Narbonne 
 
270 
the terms, at least as far as sparing the town is concerned—the town was indisputably 
burned, although the religious houses were spared.312  Wengefeld adds that “all the other 
towns in the country were burned and destroyed” in addition to Carcassonne.313  The 
Prince provides more detail, namely that “the whole of the third day we remained for 
burning of the said city, so that it was clean destroyed and undone.”314 
Based on Froissart’s more colorful account this took some effort, as the town was 
defended: as many as ten to twelve chains across the street, for example.  The Anglo-
Gascon forces dismounted and drove the defenders out of the bourg, with Eustace 
Daubriggecourt, miles and mercenary (see Chapter Four), at the front.315  Local sources, 
though, suggest that the bourg was undefended.316  Nor do Baker, the Prince, or 
Wengefeld mention any fighting.  A letter from the city’s clergy to the Prince indicates 
that perhaps there were some minor incidents: “the bourg is not burnt or that another new 
damage be added to that which it has already suffered [emphasis mine].”317  The clergy’s 
letter begged the Prince to spare the bourg.   
                                                                                                                                            
on the town’s ability to pay, although provides no evidence for the figure.  Jeanjean, La 
Guerre to Cent Ans en pays audois, 31. 
312Baker, Chronicon, 236.  “princeps die crastina jussit burgum ita incendi, quod domibus 
religiosis parceretur.”  
313John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 443.  “Et tout cele ville et toutz lez aultrez villes el pays fusrent ara et destruitz.” 
314Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 438.  “et ;e tierce jour entier demurrasmes sur lardour de le dit ville, si qu lestoit 
nettement destruit et defait.” 
315Froissart, Oeuvres vol. 5, 347–49. 
316Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois, 26–31. 
317For the text of the clergy’s letter, see Thomas Augustin Bouges, Histoire ecclésistique 
et civilie de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne (Marseilles, 1978 [1741]), 241; Jeanjean, 
La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois, 31–32.  For his discussion of the letter, see 
Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 63–64, no. 28. 
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If your excellency refuses us this grace, by necessity the houses will be burnt, the 
churches abandoned and divine services cease.  We do not believe that a heart as 
noble and religious as yours should consent to this.  Poor wretches that we are, we 
dare to make this humble plea to your Excellency, because we are persuaded of 
your clemency, that you love Jesus Christ and his servants, that you and yours 
seek only to defend and support the Church and to search for justice.318   
It was signed by an impressive list of senior representatives of a variety of religious 
orders: Dominicans, Carmelites, Hermits of St Augustin, Franciscans, Commanders of St 
Eulalie and St Antoine, churches of St Michel and St Vincent, Penitent Sisters of Ste 
Marie Madeleine, and Sisters of Ste Clare and St Augustin.319  The letter failed to save 
the bourg but perhaps it helped save the churches and convents, although the Dominican 
and Franciscan convents and the Chapel of Notre Dame did sustain some fire damage.320 
After the plundering of Carcassonne’s bourg, the Anglo-Gascon army would have 
been amply resupplied, and the Prince would have been assured that the effects of his 
campaign would have significant repercussions for Jean II.  In addition to the spoils, the 
army also took records (remembraunces), which Wengefeld explicitly mentions in his 
report to the bishop of Winchester.  The Prince and his staff—and later Edward III and 
his advisors—would have gained valuable knowledge of the productive capacity of the 
                                                
318Bouges, Histoire ecclésistique et civilie de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne, 241; 
Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois, 31–32.  I have used Hoskins’ 
translation.  Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 64. 
319 Bouges, Histoire ecclésistique et civilie de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne, 241; 
Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois, 31–32. 
320Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 64.  He cites his correspondence with Jean-
Louis Bonnet, a local historian of Carcassonne. 
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Languedoc, of its contributions to Jean II’s war efforts, and been able to extrapolate the 
long-term consequences for that war effort.   
The destruction was such that Jean II personally wrote to Carcassonne’s residents 
on 22 November 1355.  He, the letter explains, remains in the north to counter the threat 
of the other English army and expresses his wish to avenge the town.  He even offers to 
send his son—for similar reasons that Edward III sent his heir—to lead the army, “God 
willing,” of course.  The letter further orders Armagnac to see to the bourg’s repair and 
defenses,321 and by 1359 the bourg was walled and efforts underway to prepare lists of 
households,322 presumably for the purpose of taxation.  Six royal sergeants were also to 
be appointed and charged with the collection of taxes.323  While it took longer for most 
towns to recover, the pace of the bourg’s reconstruction and the attention given to better 
defenses suggests that Wengefeld’s estimation324 of the city’s importance to the French 
economy and royal tax base was accurate and that the people of the Languedoc had 
learned from the Prince’s chevauchée that they were not immune from attack. 
With considerably more baggage in tow, which the supply train seemed to 
accommodate with little incident—an indication of the army’s logistical capabilities—the 
Anglo-Gascon army moved onward toward Narbonne, fewer than fifty miles away, on 6 
November.  The march took the army past the castle of Botenake/Bouilhonnac on the left.  
                                                
321Bouges, Histoire ecclésiastique et civile de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne, 242–43. 
322Alphonse Mahul, Cartulaire et archives des communes de l’ancien diocèse et de 
l’arrondissement administratif de Carcassonne, vol. 6, pt. 1 (London, 1956), 21; Bouges, 
Histoire ecclésiastique et civile de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne, 242–43. 
323Bouges, Histoire ecclésiastique et civile de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne, 242–43. 
324John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 442. 
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The ten mile march to Rustican/Rustiques (see Map 5) was “difficult, rocky, and crossed 
by rivers.”325  Such a road would have taken the army south along the left bank of Aude, 
and is directly contrary to Froissart’s account, which claims the army crossed the Aude at 
Carcassonne and continued onto the Via Aquitania on the other side of the cité.326   This, 
however, would have placed the army within range of the cité’s cannons and 
springbalds,327 not to mention bow range.  It would have been a great risk with no real 
tactical advantage, and the Prince was too intelligent a commander to make such a poor 
decision.328  And even if he was not, Warwick and the other magnates certainly were.  
Furthermore, such a route would not fit Baker’s description of the route.  Following the 
left bank of the Aude south, though, meant the army would have had to cross the Fresquel 
and Orbiel rivers, as well as several other of the Aude’s tributary streams, and the terrain 
also resembles Baker’s description.329  The first river crossing was the Fresquel, two 
miles southeast from Carcassonne; then the army turned east again.  The small castle of 
Botenake/Bouilhonnac was half a mile east of the Orbiel river.  There is no evidence that 
the castle was assaulted.  Rustican/Roustiques was only another two miles southeast of 
the castle.330 
                                                
325Baker, Chronicon, 236.  “transierunt iter laboriosum, petrosum, et aquosum, dimisso a 
sinistris castro de Botenake intacto, per campestria et villas vocata la Rustican…”  See 
also, Barber, Life and Campaigns, 65. 
326Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 5, 347–49. 
327Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 5, 349. 
328Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 65; Mullot and Poux, Nouvelles recherches 
sur l’itinéraire du Prince Noir, 5. 
329Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 60; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 
65. 
330Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 66. 
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Baker makes no mention of any towns, although he does tell us that “the whole 
area was burned,”331 nor do the Prince or Wengefeld mention any towns specifically.  The 
Prince writes only that they “rode through all the land of Carcassonne,” and Wengefeld 
writes that “all the other towns in the country were burnt and destroyed.”332  Froissart 
suggests that the town of Trèbes, two miles south of Botenake/Bouilhonnac and 
commanding the confluence of the Aude and Orbiel rivers, was ransomed,333 although the 
more likely scenario is that it was burned considering the fate of other towns.  Millan, a 
nearby hamlet, was burned, as indicated by Géraud de Barbairan who declared that he 
could not confirm the taxes on the land he held—because the passage of the Anglo-
Gascon army had destroyed the records.334  As discussed above, the Anglo-Gascon force 
did take and destroy records. 
Even with a difficult march and accounting for the time necessary to burn a pair 
of small towns, the army, including the supply and baggage train, would have reached 
Rustican/Roustiques in good time to set up camp.  The army camped one night there and 
the next day (7 November) marched twenty-one miles to Canet (see Map 5).  The march 
was “wearisome and the army was afflicted by wind and noxious dust.”  On the left was 
Esebon, a fresh-water lake of 20 leagues [60 miles] in circumference, four miles from 
                                                
331Baker, Chronicon, 236.  “et totam patriam combustam.” 
332Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 433.  “Et puis chivachasmes tut le pays de Carcasees…”  John de Wengefeld, 
“Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 443.  “…et 
toutz lez aultres villes el pays fusrent ars et destruitz.” 
333Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 5, 350.  
334Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 5, 350.  For the burning of Trèbes, see Hewitt, The Black 
Prince’s Expedition, 60 and Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois, 34.  For the 
burning of Millan, see Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois, 34 and Mullot 
and Pous, Nouvelles recherches sur l’intinéraire du Prince Noir, 6, n. 3. 
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Rustican/Roustiques.335  Fresh water would not have been a difficulty, which was 
fortunate given the increasing weight of the booty the army was collecting and the space 
it must have taken up in the carts.  They passed by Sylome, which was left intact because 
it belonged to the Prince’s friend Isodo de Bretagne, often identified as the large town of 
Lézignan or the hamlet and royal fief Sérame.336  The route through Sérame to the Orbieu 
river crossings was more direct and through easier terrain than going through Lézignan.  
Based on Hoskins’s itinerary, the most likely route took the army through Puchéric, 
which is on the Aude river, and Castelnau-d’Aude, two miles east of Puchéric, crossing 
the Aude, then camping at Canet, ten miles from Narbonne.337 
The Anglo-Gascon force would have needed to cross the Orbieu river (see Map 6) 
the following day (8 November) and did so in two groups.  One group used a ford at 
Chastel de Terre, and the rest of the army used a bridge.338  There are two probable sites 
for the bridge.  The first is La Rougeante, where the Via Aquitania is believed to have 
crossed the Orbieu and only five miles south of Canet.  Given the relative frequency with 
                                                
335Baker, Chronicon, 236–37.  “Sabbato per iter tœdiosum, vento et pulvere exercitui 
nocivis, dimiserunt a sinistris piscinam aquarum recentium, habentem in circuitu 20 
leucas…et vocatur Esebon..”  Barber, Life and Campaigns, 65.  Hoskins, In the Steps of 
the Black Prince, 67.  Modern maps show the lake, dried-up now, as Marseillette, which 
is much smaller than Baker’s described lake of 60 miles in circumference. 
336Baker, Chronicon, 237.  “…atque venerunt ad villam vocatam Sylome, redditam 
princeps sed intactam, ratione dominae Isidis de Breitannia amicœ principis…”  Mullot 
and Poux, Nouvelle recherches sur l’itinéraire du Prince Noir, 7, and Hewitt, The Black 
Prince’s Expedition, 61, for Sérame.  Jean le Bel, Chronique, 221, identifies Sylome as 
“Lesignen.”  Barber, Life and Campaigns, 65, in his translation of Baker chooses 
Lézignan as Sylome. 
337Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 67–68.  Hoskins, rather than choose either 
Sérame or Lézignan, suggests that the army, if spread along a broad front, could have 
passed through both. 
338Baker, Chronicon, 237.  “…transierunt aquam de Sande, partim apud vadum vocatum 
Chastel de terre, et partim trans pontem…” 
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which bridges were washed away, it is entirely possible that a bridge was being 
constructed, as Baker indicates.339  The second possible location is Villedaigne, only a 
mile distant from Canet.  Cassini’s eighteenth-century map shows the road from 
Narbonne to Carcassonne going through Villedaigne.340  It is unclear when the preferred 
route shifted.  Granted, if the route through Villedaigne was experiencing increased 
traffic, this could be the site of Baker’s bridge construction, placing the ford at Le Gué de 
l’Homme, three miles to the northeast.341  The rest of the march was “between steep 
mountains,”342 which corresponds with the route through Villedaigne, where the hills on 
both sides of the route rise 300 feet.343  Thus the army came out of the mountains and had 
their first sight of Narbonne (see Map 5). 
                                                
339Baker, Chronicon, 237.  “…et partim trans pontem novum sed imperfectum…”  
Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 69. 
340Cassini, CD-ROM, France Sud, sheet 58. 
341Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 69. 
342Baker, Chronicon, 237.  “…inter arduos montes…” 
343Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 60.  Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 
69.  This route also follows the modern N113. 
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The Prince’s army halted at Narbonne (see Map 6), about 114 miles (184 km) from 
Toulouse, most of which was along the Via Aquitania.  This was the furthest east the 
army marched, although a few raiding parties did venture a bit farther.  After the halt at 
Narbonne, the Anglo-Gascon army turned for Bordeaux.   The return march, which this 
chapter discusses, was more arduous than the outward march from Bordeaux to 
Narbonne.  The days grew shorter: only 9.7 hours of daylight in Narbonne on 10 
November and 8.9 daylight hours by the time the army reached La Réole on 2 
December.1  The speed was faster, the rests were fewer, and the French forces were in 
pursuit. 
The Anglo-Gascon army reached Narbonne on Sunday 8 November.  It had 
covered an impressive distance (300 miles) in the thirty-five days since leaving Bordeaux 
on 5 October.  Of those days, twelve of them were rest days, some of which were 
necessary for both men and horses.  For example, the army rested a day after the long 
marches from Villenave-d’Ornon to Castets-en-Dorthe (6 October, 28 miles) and 
Castelnau to Arouille (11 October, 25 miles).  The army, then, marched only twenty-three 
days during the campaign to Narbonne.  The army had moved at an average speed of 8.5 
miles per day, although if the rest days are not included in the average, then the army had 
                                                
1Hours of day light determined by using the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Daylight 
Hours Explorer, which is part of the Astronomy Education at the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln program. 
http://astro.unl.edu/classaction/animations/coordsmotion/daylighthoursexplorer.html 
Accessed 4 November 2013. 
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maintained an average rate of thirteen miles per march day during the first half of the 
campaign, with a ratio of about one rest day for every two march days.   
The return to Bordeaux proceeded at an accelerated pace.  The army marched 289 
miles in twenty-four days total, nineteen marching days and five halts.  Their rate of 
march accelerated to an average of fifteen miles per day, and the ratio of rest to march 
decreased to one rest day for almost every four days of marching.  This acceleration was 
despite of the increased baggage and had several causes, not least of which were the 
lateness of the season—it was already November and the army was 300 miles from 
Bordeaux and about 200 miles from friendly territory—and the pursuit by French forces.  
The Anglo-Gascon Army at Narbonne 
The Prince and his army halted at Narbonne on 8 November.  They remained encamped 
at Narbonne on the following day.  Narbonne was “a noble city and of fair size, greater 
than Carcassonne.”  Narbonne itself had some 30,000 residents and was 88 acres within 
the walls.2 According to Froissart there were 3000 plus “fine houses” in the walled 
bourg.3  Like Carcassonne, Narbonne also had a fortified cité, which housed the 
                                                
2 Jacqueline Caille, “Urban expansion in the region of Languedoc from the eleventh to 
the fourteenth century: the examples of Narbonne and Montpellier,” in Urban and Rural 
Communities in Medieval France, ed. Kathryn L. Reyerson and John Drendel, 51–72 
(Leiden: Brill, 1998), at 54, 56, 60–61.  Jacques Dupâquier and Jean-Pierre Bardet, eds., 
Histoire de la population française, vol. 1 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1988), 
304.  
3Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 5, 351–52; Paul Carbonel, Histoire de Narbonne, dès origines à 
l’époque contemporaine (Narbonne, 1956), 193.  Baker, Chronicon, 237.  “…habuit 
ecclesiam magnam cathedralem sancti Justini, item eximium castrum episcopi, et turrim 
fortissimam pro vicecomite illius villae.”  Baker describes the bourg as “revera majorem 
et melius aedificatum quam illud de Carkosona.” 
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viscount’s tower, the bishop’s castle, and the (unfinished) cathedral.4  Viscount Aimeri 
VI (1348–1388) of Narbonne had “five hundred men of arms,”5 presumably in the 
garrison, although the Prince does not specify.  Two stone bridges and one wooden 
bridge spanned what was then a branch of the River Aude (the Canal de la Robine now) 
and connected the bourg and the cité, and the central bridge—the Pont des Marchands—
went through the gates in both the bourg and cité walls.6  The cité’s walls were intact as a 
result of the city’s consuls refusal to demolish part of the wall in order to complete the 
cathedral of St. Just and St. Pasteur, which brought construction of the cathedral to a halt 
in 1344.7  Their refusal was a direct result of instructions issued by King Philip IV 
(1293–1350) of France in 1344.  Per these instructions, the consuls were to ensure the 
province’s defenses were in suitable condition.  Whatever motivations the consuls may 
have had, the residents of Narbonne were fortunate that the consuls had followed the 
king’s directive. 
Wengefeld provides a fuller description in his letter than the Prince and includes 
information on Narbonne’s location relative to French cities and towns, thus providing 
                                                
4Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 71.  Part of the cité encompassed the original 
Roman site. 
5 Edward of Woodstock, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis 
Edwardi Tertii, 438.  “qestoit noble ville et graunt assez, plus qe nestoit Carcasone…en 
chastiel, dedeinz quele estoit le viscounte de Nerbone od D. hommes darmes…” 
6Baker, Chronicon, 237.  “Inter civitatem et burgum sunt duo pontes petrini et tertius de 
merennio, altero petrino pro vecturis diversorum mercimoniorum bene aedificato.” 
7The cathedral remains unfinished.  According to a plaque on the cathedral, this is a result 
of the economic toll caused by the devastation wrought by the Prince’s campaign and the 
silting up of the river.  The dispute between the consuls and the clergy was upheld by the 
vigue]ier royal de Béziers, even after the archbishop of Narbonne made a personal plea.  
Paul Carbonel, Histoire de Narbonne (Marseille, 1988 [1956]), 194; Jacques Michaud 
and André Cabanis, Histoire de Narbonne (Toulouse, 1981), 194; Hoskins, In the Steps 
of the Black Prince, 71–72. 
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the letter’s recipients with helpful details about the city:  “And the said city is a little 
smaller than London [probably around 50,000 people before the plague8], and it is on the 
Greek sea, and from the said city to the high sea of Greece is but two short leagues [6 
miles].  And there is a haven and landing place, the water whereof cometh into Narbonne.  
And Narbonne is but fifteen leagues [45 miles] from Montpellier, and eighteen [54 miles] 
from Aigues-Mortes, and thirty from Avignon.”9  Wengefeld’s description is not entirely 
accurate—Montpellier is about 60 miles and Avignon is 118 rather than 45 miles and 90 
miles respectively.10  Nevertheless, the bishop of Winchester would have had a good idea 
of where the Anglo-Gascon army was and how far they had travelled.   
Just as at Carcassonne, at Narbonne, too, “the people…did forsake [the bourg] 
and betook them to the castle.”11  The cité was well defended with walls—thanks to the 
consuls’ actions—and artillery, which Baker specifies as “ballistas and other machines” 
(balistis et aliis machinis).12  The Prince’s army remained under fire “through the entire 
night and into the following day.”13  In light of that, the decision to camp within the 
                                                
8Sumption, Trial by Battle, 39–40.  
9John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 444.  “Et la dit ville est poy meindre de Loundres, et est sur la meer de Grece, et y 
naad de la dite ville a la haut eer de Grece qe ii petitz lieues.  Et il y aad port de meer et 
arivaille, dount la eawe vient a Nerboun.  Et Nerbon nest qe xv. Lieues de Mountpellers, 
xviii. De Egemort, et xxx. De Avinoun.” 
10I have used the measure of three miles per league, as in Zupko, A Dictionary of English 
Weights and Measures, “league.” 
11Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 433.  “la qeule lez geantz dycelle guerperont et mistrent en chastiel…” 
12Baker, Chronicon, 237.  “fortis et bene murata…” 
13Baker, Chronicon, 237–38.  The original construction is an ablative absolute: “sed per 
totam noctem et in crastino sequenti civibus cum exercitu balistis et aliis machinis 
dimicantibus…”  A literal translation would be “the army having been in peril from the 
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bourg—the Prince chose the Carmelite convent—and clearly within range of the cité was 
not well considered.  The army suffered many wounded, and Jean de Pommiers, one of 
the Gascon leaders, was among them.  None were killed according to Baker.14  This is the 
first mention Baker makes of the army taking artillery fire.  Neither the Prince nor 
Wengefeld mention artillery, although Wengefeld writes “the city of Narbonne held out 
and was taken by storm.”15  Likely he is referring to the bourg not the cité. 
The Anglo-Gascon army spent two nights at Narbonne.  The bourg was set on 
fire, either by the army or the defenders of the cité “with flaming crossbow bolts.”16  
Given the Anglo-Gascon army’s previous actions, and the vigorous defense of the 
residents, either or both are possible.  Hostages were taken.17  During the retreat from 
Narbonne, the army crossed the river in several places but not without incident.  Two of 
the Prince’s baggage carts were plundered by residents of Narbonne and greatly 
                                                                                                                                            
residents fighting with ballistas and other machines through the entire night and into the 
following day…” 
14Baker, Chronicon, 238.  “…multis ex utraque parte sauciatis, nonulli interierunt.”  
Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans en Pays Audois, 38, for the wounding of Pommiers.  
According to a conflicting report, Pommiers and nine other Anglo-Gascons were killed.  
See Thalamus parvus: Le petit thalamus de Montpellier, ed. Ferdinand Pegat and Eugéne 
Thomas, 351. 
15John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 444.  “Et la ville de Nerbon se tenoit et feust gaigne par force.” 
16Baker, Chronicon, 238.  “Die Martis burgo per ignem inflammato, per cararias 
ardentes, exercitus profectus ad torrentem…”  Sumption, Trial by Fire, 181.  Cararias is 
an alternative spelling of the Anglo-Norman word for the bolts: “harreaus.”  “Cararias” 
and other plural forms appear in a variety of sources.  Both Hewitt and Hoskins write that 
the Anglo-Gascon army set the bourg on fire, while Sumption suggests that the cité 
defenders were the ones who started the fire. 
17Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois, 38. 
Chapter 6: The Return to Bordeaux 
 
282 
damaged.18  The English and Gascons probably forded the river near Cuxac-d’Aude, 
which was fortified by the French.19  Here, the hostages taken at Narbonne either paid 
their ransoms or were executed,20 most likely to teach an object lesson to the local 
populace.  After fording the river Aude, the army marched nine miles northward to the 
town and castle at Ambian/Aubian (see Map 6).   
Hoskins posits three possible locations for the castle.  The first is Ambian/Aubian, 
itself.  While the town is located near a saltwater lagoon it is on the Via Domitia, which 
would make it a logical location for a castle to control the flow of traffic.  The second is 
the fortified abbey grange Fontcalvy, which supplied the Cistercian abbey Fontfroide, 
two miles west of Ambian/Aubian.  The third possibility is Ouveillan, which had two 
castles.  Ouveillan was destroyed by the Prince’s army, which prompted the construction 
of new fortifications in the fifteenth century.  The damage caused was significant, as the 
population was reduced from about 1000 to 400 people.  The plague was certainly a 
factor, but the Anglo-Gascon army’s actions undoubtedly contributed to the reduced 
population.21 
The Decision to Return to Bordeaux 
At this point in the campaign, the Anglo-Gascon army reached the furthest eastward point 
                                                
18Baker, Chronicon, 238.  “…in quo transitu duae quadrigae domini principis fuerunt per 
cives defractae, et ad magnum damnum depraedatae.” 
19Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 72.  See also, Cassini, CD-ROM, France Sud, 
sheet 58. 
20Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 72; Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 
60–61; Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans en Pays Audois, 38 
21Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 72–73.  His information about Oiveillan is 
drawn from conversations with local historian Julien Aussenac and the Archives 
Communales, Ouveillan, Series GG. 
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of the chevauchée.  There is some debate as to what that point was: Béziers, St-Thibéry,22 
or Capestang (see Map 6).23  Logistically, Capestang, only five miles northeast of 
Ouveillan, is the most reasonable.  If the army marched toward Homps, where they halted 
on 12 November, the route via Capestang was thirty-three miles.  The army could easily 
have covered that distance in three days at eleven miles each day.  Had the army marched 
via Béziers, which was walled, the army would have had to march sixteen miles each day 
to cover the forty-eight miles.  Hoskins suggests that perhaps a small, mounted unit went 
as far as Béziers but the main force went no further than the rich town of Capestang, 
which was on a saltwater lagoon and had 4000 residents.24  The town at first negotiated to 
pay a ransom but the consuls stopped negotiating upon receiving intelligence that a 
militia was marching from Avignon and that the count of Armagnac had (finally) left 
Toulouse.25 
The Prince and his staff were also aware of the count of Armagnac’s movements, 
as well as the approaching militia.  The Prince writes that “there we took our counsel 
whither we might best draw; and by reason that we had news from prisoners and others 
that our enemies were gathered together and were coming after us to fight us, we turned 
                                                
22Le Bel, 221. 
23Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 5, 350–52.  Froissart, though, has the Anglo-Gascon army 
reaching Capestang before marching on Narbonne. 
24Monique Bourin, Michel Adgé, Yves Rouquette, and Bernard Nayral, L’imagier et les 
poètes au château de Capestang (Portet-sur-Garonne, 1991),  
25Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 73–74.  Capestang’s wealth was based on salt 
production.  For Capestang, see Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois, 38–41; 
Mullot and Poux, Nouvelle recherches sur l’itinéraire du Prince Noir, 9; de Vic and 
Vaissete, L’histoire générale de Languedoc, vol. 7, 191. 
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again to meet them, and thought to have had the battle in the three days next following.”26  
The Prince and his staff had to consider their options.  It was possible the Anglo-Gascon 
army could have defeated the militia, then turned to meet Armagnac and his force.  Given 
Armagnac’s caution and previous actions, the Prince’s staff could reasonably have 
assumed they would have the time to fight the first army before Armagnac arrived.  The 
drawback to such a plan, of course, was the risk of being trapped between two hostile 
forces and being outnumbered. 
The army could have continued to march northeast toward Montpellier; however, 
the news of the Prince’s progress had reached Montpellier.  The residents had already 
taken their goods to Avignon for protection and destroyed the outer suburbs.27  The 
residents were no doubt attempting to make Montpellier a less attractive target.  Even 
more than the potential prizes that Montpellier might yield, the Prince and his staff had to 
consider the season.  It was almost mid-November, and the army was deep in French 
territory.  Marching further away from Gascony would delay the army’s return to safety 
and increased the risk of Armagnac’s forces cutting off the return to Gascony.  In light of 
that consideration, there was nothing to be gained by continuing the march.  Thus, the 
Anglo-Gascon army turned to face Armagnac, the marshal Jean de Clermont, and the 
                                                
26Edward of Woodstock, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis 
Edwardi Tertii, 438.  “Et illesques preismes nostre counsail vers ou nous purrons mieltz 
trere; et, par cause qe nous avons novels de prisoners et aultres qe noz enemys esttoient 
assemblez et venoient apres quidasmes daver eu la bataille deinz les trois jours ensuantz.” 
27Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 433.  “…inhabitantes villam de Mounpelers, hoc 
audientes et timentes ne consimilia paterentur, omnia aeidficia in suburbio ejusdem villae 
demoliri fecerunt et meremium hujusmodi aedificiorum infra muros deferri.” 
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constable Jacques de Bourbon, expecting contact and battle within three days.28 
On 11 November the army marched approximately 12 miles westward from 
Ambian/Aubian to the vicinity of Ulmes/Homps (see Map 6), which the army marched 
through the following day.  The army probably advanced along the path of the Chemin 
Romieu, an old Roman road that connected Béziers and Homps.29  Baker describes the 
march as “long and difficult, but especially injurious to the horses, because of the rocky 
terrain, and [they were] furthermore without water or other victuals, the horses drank 
wine for water, and the food was cooked in wine, [and] no liquid except wine or oil was 
found.”30  The water shortage was real.  The march west took the army through uneven, 
undulating land that was crossed with several streams.  At this point in the year, though, 
those streams most likely were dry and would present difficulties for the march while 
providing little to no water.  The only certain water source was the Cesse River, only 
three miles from Ouvellian, where part of the army camped on 10 November.  Assuming 
the river still had a reasonable amount of water flowing in it, the army still had the 
majority of the march ahead.   
Considering that the Anglo-Gascon army had managed to cross the Landes—even 
though they lost many horses—they were capable of transporting at least minimal 
amounts of water.  Logically, then, the army would have done what it could to carry 
                                                
28Edward of Woodstock, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis 
Edwardi Tertii, 438; John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in 
Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 444. 
29Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 75. 
30Baker, Chronicon, 238.  “…per longum iter et malum, sed equis praecipue nocivum, 
quia petrosum, et sine aquis potarunt vinum, et in vino cibis coctis, nihil liquidum nisi 
vinum aut oleum reperiebatur.” 
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water with them on this march, which was considerably shorter than the two-day crossing 
of the Landes.  If the horses were truly drinking wine and Baker is not exaggerating, then 
there was an inadequate water supply to meet the army’s needs.  This would have been a 
problem in the morning, when it was time to water the horses.  Given the lack of water, 
though, it is possible that the army marched first, then stopped to water the horses after 
the first hour of march.31 
The march of 12 November took the Anglo-Gascon army near Homps, where 
some of Armagnac’s officers had planned to camp on the night of 11 November.  They 
probably learned this information from locals, who were undoubtedly concerned about 
the proximity of two military forces.32  Given that the Prince and Wengefeld both write 
that they expected contact with French forces, Froissart is likely correct that some of 
Armagnac’s soldiers could have chosen Homps as a camp.  Baker confirms that some of 
Armagnac’s officers did stay there.33   
The French force was clearly nearby, and yet the Anglo-Gascon army had no 
contact with them.  Wengefeld writes “when we ought to have come upon them, they had 
news of us before day, and they drew away and disappeared towards the mountains and 
the strong places, and went by long marches toward Toulouse.”34  He adds that some of 
                                                
31Horses should be watered 2–3 times per day, but it can be done only once.  If not 
watering the horses before marching, it needs to be done after the first hour of march.  
See Professional Papers 29, 431–32. 
32Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 5, 350. 
33Baker, Chronicon, 238.  “…ubi praecedenti nocte fuerunt hospitati officiarii comitis 
Arminiacensis…” 
34John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 444.  “..qaunt nous deveroms avoir venir sur eaux, ils avoient novels de nous 
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the French army’s local guides, including the constable of France’s personal guide, were 
captured; Wengefeld seems to have overseen the examination of these guides with the aid 
of a papal sergeant-at-arms, who was with the army to arrange for conducts for two papal 
nuncios for the purpose of negotiating a truce.  The sergeant “was in my keeping” and “I 
made him examine the guides which were thus taken; for the guide that he examined was 
the guide of the constable of France, of that country, and he could well see and know the 
countenance of the Frenchmen by examination.”35  The Prince and his staff, then, would 
have had detailed intelligence—if accurate—about the movement of the French forces 
and the upcoming marches. 
The Papal Messengers 
It was during this time, 10–12 November, envoys from the pope at Avignon reached the 
Prince.  The pope clearly had his own sources of intelligence and was well-informed 
about the Prince’s movements.  Innocent VI’s letters and offer of the papal nuncios as 
negotiators indicate the level of his concern about the Anglo-Gascon campaign and its 
effects on the population.36  In addition to the messengers sent to the Prince, the pope sent 
a message to Jacques de Bourbon, count of Ponthieu and constable of France (1319–
1362); Robert de Duras (1326–1356); Jean de Clermont, marshal of France; Jean 
d’Armagnac; Pierre Raymond II (c. 1325–1375), count of Comminges; Jean, count of 
                                                                                                                                            
devaunt le jour, et lour retreerent et disparierent devers les montaynes et les forces, et 
alerent as graundes journess devers Tholouse.” 
35John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 444.  “Et purceo qe le serjaunt darmes le seint piere feust en ma garde, jeo luy fice 
examiner les guydes qe feurent ensi prisez; car le guyde qil examina feust le guyde le 
conestable de Fraunce, celle native, et il purroit bein veer et conustre le countenance de 
lez Fraunceis par lexaminement.” 
36Innocent VI, Letter 1804. 
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Lisle, and Jean de Levis, lord of the city of Mirepoix.  In the message, Innocent VI 
describes the effects of the Prince’s actions, namely the “many difficulties and 
tribulations” being suffered by the population and his concern that a battle between the 
Anglo-Gascon and French forces could result in a large loss of life (magna strages).37  He 
calls on the constable and the others to meet with the appointed papal nuncios—Jean, 
archbishop of Capua, and Peter, bishop of Turiaso—and the Prince to negotiate a truce.38 
The Prince also received a letter of introduction for the two nuncios from the 
pope, and his own letter to the bishop of Winchester indicates that he knew of the 
nuncios’ status.  While the Prince does not give the names, he does specify that the 
messengers were bishops.  The Prince was not the only person to receive a letter.  The 
pope had good information about the Prince’s officers, and several members of his 
command staff also received a letter: Warwick; Guy de Beauchamp (Warwick’s second 
son); Suffolk; Oxford; Salisbury; Nigel Loryng; Bartholomew de Burghersh; Stephen de 
Cussington; Robert de Stretton, canon of Lincoln; Bernard Ezii d’Albret; Pierre de 
Grailly, captal de Buch;39 Selebrun, lord of Lesparre; Guillaume-Sanci, lord of Pommiers; 
and Robert de Clifford.40  The letters of introduction addressed begin with a request for 
peace.41  This list includes key members of the Prince’s staff and suggests that Innocent 
VI had good intelligence about the Anglo-Gascon army and its command structure, as 
                                                
37Innocent VI, Letter 1800.  “…angustiis et tribulationibus multis…” 
38Innocent VI, Letters 1800–01.  The letter to Jacques de Bourbon is given in full; the 
letters to the other men are recorded with the following formula: “Item in e. m. dilecto 
filio nobile viri…” with the name of the man thus addressed. 
39This is an error, Jean (III) de Grailly was captal de Buch. 
40Innocent VI, Letters 1802–03. 
41Innocent VI, Letter 1802.  “Licet pro pace inter carissimos…” 
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well as about the French force. 
Baker makes no mention of the papal messengers, but both the Prince and 
Wengefeld specifically discuss the messengers, the message, and the Prince’s response.  
The Prince writes: 
the holy father sent to meet us two bishops, which sent unto us to have conduct, 
which we could not grant unto them.  For we would enter into no treaty, until we 
should know the will of our much honored lord and father the king, and specially 
by reason that we had news that our lord was passed the sea with his power.  But 
we sent back word to them by our letters that, if they should wish to treat, they 
should draw towards him, and that which we he would command us, we would do 
it, and in such manner they turned back.42 
Wengefeld’s letter concurs that messengers from the pope arrived for the purpose of 
“treat[ing] between my lord [the Prince] and his adversaries of France,” although he adds 
that the papal messengers “were but seven leagues” (21 miles) from the army and sent 
their letters with a sergeant-at-arms, who was placed under Wengefeld’s guard.  He 
continues, “the said messenger was two days in the host before my lord would see him or 
                                                
42Edward of Woodstock, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis 
Edwardi Tertii, 438.  “A quele heure le seint piere manda devers nous ij. Evesqes, lez 
qeuz manderent a nous pur conduyt avoir, le quele nous ne lour vodrons ottroier.  Car 
nous ne vorrons entrer en tretee nulle, tantqe nous seoussiens la volente nostre tres 
honure seignur et piere le roy, et nomement par cause qe nous avons novelles qe nostre 
seignur estoit passe la meer ovesque soen poair.  Einz lour remandasmes par noz lettres 
qe, sils vorront treter, ils se treassent devers luy, et ceo qil nous vorroit comander nous le 
ferrons; et en tiel manere ils se returnerent.” 
Chapter 6: The Return to Bordeaux 
 
290 
receive his letters.”43  The Prince “would in no wise suffer the said messengers to com[e] 
nearer to him; but, if they would treat at all, they should send to my lord the king, and 
that my lord [the Prince] would do nothing except by command of my lord the king, nor 
listen to any treaty without his order.”44   
The Prince clearly had no more interest in the pope’s offer to negotiate a truce 
than Edward III had in April 1355  Like his father, the Prince kept the papal 
representatives waiting.  His indenture with Edward III (discussed in Chapter Four) 
granted the Prince the power to negotiate truces.  He could have received the papal 
nuncios, could have accepted the pope’s offer of arbitration, and could have accepted a 
truce—which presumably would have included safe conduct for his army’s return to 
Bordeaux.  Yet, the Prince chose not to receive even the letters carried by the sergeant-at-
arms whose task was to arrange safe conducts for the nuncios to the Anglo-Gascon army.  
Ostensibly, his reason was Edward III’s presence in France, but the tone of the Prince’s 
letter—and Wengefeld’s description of the Prince’s response—suggests that the Prince 
was using this fact as a convenient excuse not to make a truce.  He purposefully chose to 
ignore the nuncios and pursue his own objectives, namely the continued devastation of 
the Languedoc and possibly bringing Armagnac and the French forces to battle. 
                                                
43John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 444.  “…qe feust pur treter entre mounseignur et ses adversaries de Fraunce.  Et le 
deit messager estoit ij. Jours en lost avaunt qe mounseignur lui voleit veer od rescevre ses 
lettres.” 
44John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 444.  “Car il ne voleit seoffrir en nul manere les dits messages venir plus pres de 
luy; meas, sils voudront reins treter, qils mandassent au roy mounseignur, et qe 
mounsiegnur ne voleit rien feare si ne soit par comaundement du roy mounseignur, ne 
oyer nul tretee sauntz son maundement.” 
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Given that the Prince was aware that a papal messenger had arrived and knew 
Edward III was in France, the delay in receiving the sergeant-at-arms is interesting.  The 
Prince was possibly stalling while he and his command staff met to consider their 
options.  About the time the papal messenger arrived, the Prince received intelligence that 
the French forces at Toulouse had left that city and were near Carcassonne, about 41 
miles west of Narbonne.  The Anglo-Gascon force had covered that distance in three 
days.  The French army could certainly match that speed and perhaps could exceed it.  If 
the supply train were left to catch up in its own time, the French combatants, particularly 
those on horseback, could have reached Narbonne in three days at a rate of 13.6 miles per 
day—roughly the same rate at which the Anglo-Gascon army had marched during the 
first half of the campaign.  The delay in receiving the intelligence must also be 
considered.  The Prince and his staff had to account for the fact that their intelligence was 
at least a day old, which meant the French forces could be a day’s march closer.  The 
army expected to meet the French forces in the next couple days but then received 
additional intelligence that the French had turned back toward Toulouse (see above). 
Aside from the content of the messages and the interplay between the Prince and 
the papal messengers, there are several important items to note about the intelligence 
available to the Prince, Armagnac, and Pope Innocent VI.  First, the pope was clearly 
aware of the Prince’s progress through the Languedoc and had accurate information.   
Both the Prince and Wengefeld indicate that the messengers from the pope 
reached the army at Narbonne or shortly after the army left the city, although it is 
possible that the envoys met the army as it marched north. The papal missives are dated 5 
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November,45 when the Anglo-Gascon army was three days’ march from Narbonne, which 
would have been enough time for a messenger to reach Narbonne from Avignon before 
the Anglo-Gascon army departed on 10 November and certainly before the army marched 
from the vicinity of Homps on 12 November.  This indicates that Innocent VI knew not 
only about the Prince’s progress through the Languedoc but also had enough information 
to extrapolate that the Anglo-Gascon army was marching toward Narbonne and then 
north. 
Innocent VI also had enough knowledge of both the Anglo-Gascon and French 
forces to know the major captains.  Consider the list of men who received individual 
letters from the pope.  The French command, then, includes: Jacques de Bourbon, the 
count of Ponthieu and constable of France; Robert de Duras; Jean de Clermont, marshal 
of France; Jean, count of Armagnac; Peter Raymond, count of Comminges; Jean, count 
of Lyle; and Jean de Levis, lord of the city of Mirepoix.   
The English command according to the Pope’s intelligence included: Edward, 
Prince of Wales; Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick; Guy de Beauchamp, Warwick’s 
second son; Robert d’Ufford, earl of Suffolk; Thomas de Vere, earl of Oxford; William 
de Montague, earl of Salisbury; Nigel de Lorying; Bartholomew de Burghersh; Stephan 
de Cusyngton; Robert de Stretton, canon of Lincoln; Bernard, lord of Albret; Pierre de 
Greilly, captal de Buch; Selebrun, lord of Lesparre; Guillaume, lord of Pommiers; and 
Robert de Clifford.  Clearly, the pope had good information about the Anglo-Gascons, 
even if it was not entirely accurate.  For example, the letter to the Captal de Buch is 
                                                
45Innocent VI (1352–1362): Lettres Secrètes et Curiales, ed. Pierre Gasnault, vol. III, 
209–11, Letters 1800–1808. 
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addressed to “Petro de Grelino,” when, in fact, it was Jean de Grailly who was the captal 
de Buch, a title inherited through the maternal line. 
The French command likely had the same intelligence about the Anglo-Gascon 
army that the pope did.  They certainly knew where the Prince and his forces were—the 
papal nuncios approached the French, too, and the French had their own local guides—
and what the Prince’s options would have been.  Armagnac, Clermont, and Bourbon 
probably were aware of Lancaster’s activities in Normandy and of Edward III’s arrival in 
Picardy, although their information would have been out-of date given a messenger 
would have needed at least a couple days to cover the distance.  Nevertheless, the French 
commanders likely knew the general position of Lancaster’s and Edward III’s actions if 
not the most current details about their movements.  Additionally, the French knew the 
Anglo-Gascon army had turned toward them and likely intended to force a battle.  
Armagnac, in keeping with his policy of avoiding battle, retreated toward Toulouse. 
The Prince and his staff knew the French had drawn “away and disappeared 
towards the mountains and the strong places, and went by long marches toward 
Toulouse.”46  They learned of the French movements from local guides returning from 
their service to the French forces.  The Prince cites the arrival of Edward III in France as 
his reason for not meeting with the papal nuncios, which indicates that the Prince was 
aware of Edward III’s movements.  This awareness, though, would have been general 
rather than specific because communication between the English forces would not have 
                                                
46John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 444.  “…et lour retreerent et disparierent devers les montaynes et les forces, et 
alerent as garundes journees devers Tholouse.” 
Chapter 6: The Return to Bordeaux 
 
294 
been reliable due to the distance, the time it would take the message to reach the Prince, 
which likely would have made the information on the King’s position outdated, and the 
chances of interception.   
While a messenger relay could cover 100km in a day, there was the very real risk 
of interception.  It could have taken sixty days or more for the Prince in Gascony to 
communicate—initial message and its response—with Edward III in Picardy.  Therefore, 
“any practical coordination between the fronts was well-nigh impossible” and Edward III 
could only “make an initial overall plan giving each local commander a certain role to 
play.”47   
In light of that, the Prince knew what his role was and agreeing to a negotiation 
might not have been part of it, particularly when he was enjoying considerable success.  
Given the distances and time involved, the Prince and his army could be safely back in 
Gascony before Edward III’s wishes were known.  It is likely the Prince knew that 
Edward III had landed in Calais in late October—the King and his force marched out of 
Calais on 2 November—, but any close cooperation between the three English forces 
would have been impossible.  The Prince, Edward III, and Lancaster had to trust that the 
commanders were following the broad outlines of the initial plan, but within that plan 
each commander had the freedom to pursue his objectives as he deemed best.  In this 
instance, the Prince chose not to negotiate. 
Seeking Battle? 
The Anglo-Gascon army camped at Aryle/Azille (see Map 6) on 12 November.  The ten-
                                                
47Yuval Harari, “Inter-frontal Cooperation in the Fourteenth Century and Edward III’s 
1346 Campaign,” War in History 6, no. 4 (1996): 379–95, at 380–83. 
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mile march took the army near Homps, which escaped destruction.  Whether this was a 
result of the town offering the Prince a ransom of 12,000 écus (1200l), as Froissart 
indicates,48 or a decision to bypass the town rather than take the time to destroy is 
unclear.  The central Anglo-Gascon column camped at Aryle/Azille, which Baker 
describes as a “pleasant town belonging to the count of l’Isle,”49 who was on the French 
side.  The other two columns possibly stayed at the town of Pépieux and the castle and 
village of La Redorte, two miles north and south respectively of Aryle/Azille.50 
Both Pépieux and La Redorte were destroyed.51  Pépieux’s thirteenth-century 
church was destroyed by the Anglo-Gascon force, and was rebuilt in 1379.52  
Aryle/Azille itself was fortified long before the arrival of the Prince’s army, but these 
fortifications were augmented after 1355.  The church of St. Julien and St. Balisses 
survived; the town also had two convents: the Cordeliers in a northern, unwalled suburb 
and the Poor Clares within the walls in the northwest part of the town.53  The Prince spent 
the night in one of the convents, in which there was “a great abundance of muscat wine 
                                                
48Froissart, Oeuvres, vol. 5, 350.  Froissart’s account may be suspect, given that he has 
the army marching from Carcassonne to Narbonne via Capestang, rather than 
Carcassonne to Narbonne and thence to Capestang and Homps.  See Hoskins, In the Steps 
of the Black Prince, 76, for his discussion of the problems with Froissart’s accounts. 
49Baker, Chronicon, 238.  “…bonam villam comities de Insula, vocatam Aryle 
hospitata.” 
50Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 76. 
51Baker, Chronicon, 238.  “Illo die fuerant destructa bona villa de Pypions, et ejus 
castrum vocatum Redote.” 
52Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 76.  Hoskins cites an account located in the 
church of St. Etienne in the text but not in the notes. 
53Mahul, Cartulaire et archives des communes, vol. 4, 8 and 257; Hoskins, In the Steps of 
the Black Prince, 76. 
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deposited in the cellar for the countess of l’Isle.”54  Baker adds that the wine “was wasted 
[destroyed]” (fuerat vastata)—presumably after the Prince and his men had sampled it. 
The French were nearby, likely just across the river Aude and south of La 
Redorte.  Baker claims the Prince’s men captured enemy scouts, who revealed “that the 
constable of France and the count of Armagnac intended to spend the night in the same 
towns where the [Anglo-Gascon] army spent the [previous] night.”55  Thus, the Prince 
and his staff had good intelligence about the position of the French forces and could 
reasonably have expected a battle, as both the Prince and John de Wengefeld indicated in 
their letters to the bishop of Winchester.  Perhaps this is why the “Almain,” Theoderic 
Dale, “an usher of the Prince’s chamber, was made a knight” at this time.56 
North or South? 
This intelligence about the French movements must have influenced the decision-making 
of the Prince and his staff.  The location of enemy forces—and the desire either to meet 
or to avoid them—would have been a factor in choosing the route by which the army 
continued marching west on 13 November.  Our knowledge of the route for the next few 
days—13 November through 15 November—is confused and has been interpreted in two 
distinct ways, which relates directly to the Prince’s motives and the larger objectives of 
                                                
54Baker, Chronicon, 238.  “…ubi magna abundantia vini muscati pro comitissa de Insula 
in cellariis reposita…” 
55Baker, Chronicon, 238.  “...et discooperatores inimicorum capti retulerunt quod 
Francorum constabularius et comes Arminiacensis in eadem villa, ubi exercitus 
pernoctavit, intendebant pernoctasse.” 
56Baker, Chronicon, 238.  “…Theodoricus Dale, ostiarius camerae domini principis, 
fiebat miles…”  Dale is described as an “Alamain” in the BPR, and he continued in the 
Prince’s service for several years and received annuities and other rewards for his service.  
For the annuities, see BPR, IV, 207 and 218. 
Chapter 6: The Return to Bordeaux 
 
297 
the chevauchée.  These two interpretations center on two key questions: Did the Anglo-
Gascon army march north or south of Carcassonne?  Was the Prince seeking battle with 
Armagnac or seeking to avoid battle? 
Those favoring the northern route argue for a battle-avoidance strategy.  Henry 
Mullot and Joseph Poux57 argue for the northern route.  It has been accepted by J.F. 
Jeanjean,58 Tourneur-Aumont,59 and H.J. Hewitt.60  In all cases, the northern route is 
linked to battle-avoidance, as the French forces were known to be south of the Anglo-
Gascon army.  The southern route, in contrast, is tied to a battle-seeking strategy.  This 
view is adopted by Clifford Rogers, who sees a battle-seeking strategy underlying the 
entire campaign, and Hoskins follows Rogers’ interpretation.61  The route proposed by 
Rogers and Hoskins has the advantage of following the line of march delineated by 
Baker.  Indeed, Rogers specifically addresses the importance of Baker’s account, which 
was “clearly based on a campaign diary written during the chevauchée” and “provides by 
far the most detailed and accurate narrative…of the expedition;” therefore, “any proposed 
route which directly contradicts its statements” should not be accepted.62 
Baker’s description of the route for these few days, then, needs careful 
examination, which Hoskins has ably accomplished in both his article in the Journal of 
Medieval Military History and his book, In the Steps of the Black Prince.  As Hoskins 
                                                
57Mullot and Poux, Nouvelles recherches sur l’itinéraire du Prince Noir à travers les 
pays de l’Aude, 14 
58Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans en pays audois, 42 
59Tourneur-Aumont, La Bataille de Poitiers, 85–87 
60Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 63. 
61Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 305; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 78–82; 
Hoskins, “The Itineraries of the Black Prince’s Chevauchées of 1355 and 1356.” 
62Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 317. 
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shows, “the topography, toponymy and an assessment of time and distance all point to the 
prince…in pursuit of Armagnac.”63  Adding the logistical constraints—the ineluctable 
needs of men and animals for provisions and water, the consumption rate, the speed of 
march, the physical and human topography—within which the Anglo-Gascon army had 
to operate confirms that the Prince and his staff chose the more difficult route—south—
and sought to meet the French forces. 
The route of 13 November was “long, rocky, and lacking water.”  The army 
camped “at Lamyane,” which was “poor with few houses and little water.”64  On 14 
November, the Anglo-Gascon army marched with “the lake of Esebon and Carcassonne 
and the whole of the previous march” on the right (to the north).65  The third column 
camped at Aliere, the center at Puchsiaucies, “where a fortified tower was taken, but the 
Prince lay beyond the bridge next to a beautiful river,” and the first column at Pezence, 
which had been burned along with the surrounding countryside.66  The 15 November 
march was through “pleasant countryside” and long because the army pressed onward, 
“because the Prince would lodge at the large abbey of Mary at Prolian,” which housed 
more than 200 men and women “in separate houses.”  The Prince was admitted into the 
“spiritual brotherhood.”  The army burned Lemoyns, where there was a large convent of 
                                                
63Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 82. 
64Baker, Chronicon, 238–39.  “Die Veneris exercitus profectus per longum iter petrosum 
et inaquosum, hospitabatur apud Lamyane, sed male pro penuria domuum et aquarum.” 
65Baker, Chronicon, 239.  “…reliquerunt a dextris piscinam de Esebon, et Carkasonam et 
totum iter pristinum…” 
66Baker, Chronicon, 239.  “…et retrocustodia hospitabuatur apud bonam villam vocatam 
Alieire, et media apud Puchsiacucies, ubi turris defensa fuit conquista, sed princeps jacuit 
ultra pontem, juxta pulcrum rivum aquarum, ex cujus utraque parte patria ignibus 
vastabatur, cum bon villa de Pezence, ubi prima custodia fuit hospitata.” 
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friars; Falanges, with its twenty-one windmills; the towns of Vularde and Serre; along 
with the whole countryside.67 
Baker’s place-names are obscure and the two interpretations depend on the 
identification of the various towns.  The proponents of the northern, battle-avoiding route 
identify Baker’s “Lamayne” as Lamignan.68  It matches Baker’s description of “poor with 
few houses and little water.”  However, it is but seven miles from Azille, which hardly 
seems like a “long” march.69  Both Rogers and Hoskins identify La Mayne as Villemagne 
(see Map 6).70  Villemagne was twenty miles distant, and the march would have involved 
an 800 foot climb across the Montagne d’Alaric.  The Anglo-Gascon army would have 
crossed the Aude river early in the day, after which there would have been few if any 
water sources.71  Furthermore, the summer had been dry.72 
                                                
67Baker, Chronicon, 239.  “…intraverunt per patriam pulcram, longam et latam, itinere 
magno, et exercitus acceleravit ad hoc, quod princeps foret hospitatus in abbatia magna 
beatae Mariae de Prolian, ubi in distictis claustris vivunt de possessionibus 100 
Praedicatores, et 140 dominae reclusae, vocatae Praedicatrices, ubi dominus princeps in 
spiritualem confraternitatem domus cum multis aliies devote fuerat receptus.  Illo die 
exercitus succendit inter caetera villam de Lemoyns, ubi fuerunt conventus quorumlibet 
fratrum, majorem Carkasona, et pulcrum oppidum vocatum Falanges, cui pertinebant 21 
molendinae ventosae, et villas de Vuladre et Serre, cum tota patria.” 
68Mullot and Poux, Nouvelles recherches, 10–11.  The argument is that “Lemayne” is a 
corruption of La Méjane, which was how Lamignan was often written. 
69Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 78. 
70Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 318, n. 165; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 
78.  This town was often written as Villa Magna, Villare, De Villamanha, and 
Villamagnha, so Lemyane is a realistic corruption.  Hoskins eliminates Comigne, another 
suggestion for Lemayne on the southern route because it is only ten miles from Azille 
and within a couple miles of the river Aude, which hardly meets Baker’s description of 
lacking water. 
71Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 78–79; Hoskins, “Itineraries,” 18; 
Topographical Map, Pau-Toulouse.  For discussion of the geology, see La Montagne 
d’Alaric-Aude-et ses entours. Étude géologique, Bulletin des services de la carte 
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A twenty-mile march with an 800-foot climb, without water, would have been 
difficult and would have required several stops to rest the horses.  Baker makes no 
mention of any horses lost that day, but it is certainly possible that some were, as was the 
case in other marches Baker describes as long and rocky.  What Hoskins fails to elaborate 
on is the grade of the climb.  If the army climbed 800 feet over the course of the entire 
twenty-mile march, that is a long, continuous climb, the grade would have been a gentle, 
easy 0.75 degrees.  If the climb began after Comigne, two miles from the river Aude and 
ten miles from Azille, the grade would have increased to 1.5 percent, still not steep 
enough to require any adjustments for the supply and baggage train.  However, if the 
climb was in the last five miles, the grade would have been 3 percent and would have 
required the load to be reduced to maintain distance, i.e., the weight in the carts would 
need to be lightened if the army wished to cover the same distance as it could on a less 
than 3 percent grade.   If the majority of the climb was in the last few miles, the grade 
would have been approximately 7 percent.  The army could have done it, could have 
maintained the load over the shorter distance, but it would have been difficult.73   
The march, though, was twenty miles, not two, and the climb came at the end of 
the day, on the fourth consecutive day of marching.  It was also the second day that Baker 
                                                                                                                                            
géologique de la France et des topographies souterraines 47, no. 224 (1949).  The maps, 
in particular, are helpful. 
72L. Fédié, Histoire de Carcassonne (1886), 448–49; Étienne Baluze, Vitae paparum 
avenionsium, ed. G. Mollat (Paris, 1914–1927), 314; Richard Barber, Edward, Prince of 
Wales and Aquitaine (London: Allen Lane, 1978), 123; Bouges, Histoire ecclesiastique et 
civile de la ville et diocèse de Carcassonne, 242. 
73Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, 
with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. 
General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 438. 
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describes as difficult, rocky, and waterless.  The horses, and soldiers, were in danger of 
being overworked and needed rest.  They would not get it for another five days on 19 
November, and the march of 14 November was twenty-three miles.  Based on Baker’s 
description, with the lake Esebon, which Hoskins identifies as the now dry lake of 
Marseillette,74 on the right (north) means the army was heading south.75  Mullot and 
Poux, the principal advocates of the northern route, argue the Anglo-Gascon army saw 
the lake as a river with the north shore as the river’s right bank.76  This seems rather 
convoluted and unlikely given Baker’s description of the lake on the eastward march: a 
freshwater mountain tarn with no water flowing into or out of the lake.  The Anglo-
Gascony army passed Esebon on the march toward Narbonne and the lake was then on 
the left (north).77  If Baker’s description is accurate on the march east, it seems unlikely 
that he would be inaccurate on the return.  The lake, even now, “is clearly visible from 
higher ground, and is less than a mile from the Aude.”78  It is unlikely that the Prince and 
his able staff did not know where they were in relation to such important topographical 
features. 
Further evidence for a southern route are the letters of John de Wengefeld and the 
Prince himself.  Wengefeld specifically states that the French “drew away and 
                                                
74Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 79; Hoskins, “Itineraries.” 
75Baker, Chronicon, 239.  Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 79; Hoskins, 
“Itineraries,” 18. 
76Mullot and Poux, Nouvelles recherches sur l’itinéraire du Prince Noir, 13. 
77Baker, Chronicon, 336.  “…dimiserunt a sinistris piscinam aquarum recentium…quae 
nec recipit nec emittit aquas aliunde, nisi pluviales aut scaturientes, et vocatur Esebon.”  
See also Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 79; Hoskins, “Itineraries.” 
78Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 79. 
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disappeared towards the mountains and the strong places,”79 i.e., the Montagne 
d’Alaric.80  The destruction of towns, of course, is also evidence of the Anglo-Gascon 
army’s passage, and the advocates of both the northern and southern routes point to 
destroyed towns in support of their arguments.  Hoskins has shown that the evidence for 
the towns Mullot and Poux cite—Peyriac-Minervois, Buadelle, Villepeyroux, and 
Conques81—either is erroneous or has been mis-interpreted.82  Rogers suggests Siran and 
La Livinière were sacked by the Anglo-Gascon army, and Hoskins’ experience of 
walking the route indicates the feasibility of Rogers’ argument as both towns are within 
easy distance—three miles—of Pépieux, near where the army camped at Azille.83  
Therefore, outriders, particularly from the rearguard, easily could have attacked the towns 
on the morning during the march. 
On the night of 14 November the army rearguard camped at Aliere/St-Hilaire, the 
center at Puchsiaucies/Pennautier,84 and the vanguard at Pezence/Pezens (see Map 6).85  
Puchsiaucies/Pennautier and Pezence/Pezens are both within a day’s march of 
                                                
79John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 444. “…et lour rereerent et disparierent devers les montaynes et les forces…” 
80See Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 79–80; Hoskins, “Itineraries,” for his 
discussion of the identification of the mountains as the Montagne d’Alaric as opposed to 
the Minervois. 
81Mullot and Poux, Nouvelle Recherches, 14.  See also Jeanjean, La Guerre de Cent Ans, 
43–44; Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 63; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 318, 
nn. 163–66. 
82Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 79–80; Hoskins, “Itineraries.”  For example, 
the evidence for Conques is local tradition that the English sacked the town, which could 
have happened at several points during the Hundred Years War.  See Denis Péberrnard, 
Histoire de Conques-sur-Orvieil et de la Manufacture des Saptes (S.I., 1899), 250. 
83Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 318, n. 164; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 
80; Hoskins, “Itineraries.” 
84Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 80. 
85Baker, Chronicon, 239. 
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Villemagne and Lamignan, At Pezens, for example, Julien Courtieu’s excavations 
uncovered a hill that commanded the Fresquell valley and uncovered pottery, coins, and 
“un boulet de bombarde, envoyé par les Anglais.”86  The location proposed by the 
northern-route advocates for the army’s halt on 13 November.  From Villemagne, the 
center column would have had a twenty-three mile march, while the vanguard had a 
slightly longer march of twenty-six miles, which was within the capabilities of the army 
based on previous distances.  The supply and baggage train, though, would have been 
unable to keep up with the vanguard and would have had difficulty matching the rate of 
march of the center column.   
As for the rearguard, Aliere has been identified as Villalier—northern route—and 
St-Hilaire—southern route.  Hoskins’ analysis of the distances shows that Villalier is not 
a feasible location.  If the rearguard stayed at Villalier they would have had a thirty-four 
mile march minimum to Prouille the next day (15 November).87  Such a march would 
have been nearly ten miles longer than any other march of the campaign; the supply and 
baggage train could not possibly have completed such a march—the maximum distance 
the supply train could have achieved was twenty-five miles on good roads.88  The cavalry 
could have marched thirty-five miles under favorable conditions and without a supply or 
pack train if they pushed,89 but this would have left the supply and baggage carts—and 
loot—vulnerable.  If the rearguard camped at St-Hilaire they would have had a twenty 
                                                
86Mazieres, “Faits et gestes,” 126. 
87Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 80–81; Hoskins, “Itineraries.” 
88Professional Papers, 437. 
89War Department Cavalry Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of 
Cavalry. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938, 145. 
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mile march on 15 November, a much more manageable distance which the supply train 
could have also completed.  St-Hilaire is thirteen miles distant from Pezence/Pezens and 
Puchiaucies/Pennautier.  Hoskins suggests that this should not exclude St-Hilaire even 
though the other dates for which Baker provides locations for all three columns indicate 
the columns encamped within three miles of each other; however, at one point during the 
1356 campaign the rearguard camped thirty miles from the other columns.90  
Furthermore, coins found at St-Hilaire are suggestive.  These coins were French in origin 
but no longer in use in Languedoc in 1355.91  Given Henxteworth’s use of multiple specie 
it is possible that members of the Prince’s company could have carried these.  The coin 
finds add weight to the identification of St-Hilaire as Baker’s Aliere, though, is the 
distance and rearguard’s marching capabilities. 
One further factor in considering the Prince’s choice between the northern and 
southern routes is an option that has not been discussed.  No examination of the 1355 
chevauchée argues that the Prince took the simplest path to Bordeaux: the central route 
along the Aude river valley.  This would have left Carcassonne and the lake north of the 
army’s route and the Montagne d’Alaric to the south.  The Prince and his army could 
have avoided a “long, rocky, waterless march,”92 could have spared themselves and their 
                                                
90Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 81; Hoskins, “Itineraries.”  
91Jean Sarrand, “La chevauchée du Prince Noir dans la region de Carcassonne, novembre 
1355,” Mémoires de la Société des arts et des sciences de Carcassonne, series 4, vol. 5 
(1963–1967): 155–58, at 158.  The dating of the coinage was determined by Maurice 
Nogué. 
92Baker, Chronicon, 238–39.  “…longum iter petrosum et inaquosum…” 
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horses the climbs and narrow passes of the route through the Montagne d’Alaric.93  If the 
Prince sought to avoid battle this would have been the easiest, most logical path, not the 
northern route.  Yet, the army clearly did not choose the path of least resistance to return 
to Bordeaux as quickly as possible, which would have been practical considering the 
lateness of the season.  Given the collective military experience and acumen of the 
Prince’s staff this was a considered decision made for clear reasons to achieve specific 
objectives.  Instead, the Anglo-Gascon army moved south in pursuit of the French. 
The Push to the Garonne 
Thus, the night of 14 November, the Anglo-Gascon army camped in three locations: the 
rearguard at Aliere/St-Hilaire, the center at Puchsiaucies/Penaultier, and the vanguard at 
Pezence/Pezens.  On 15 November the army camped at Prolian/Prouille (see Map 6), a 
march of sixteen miles for the center column.  This march was a significantly easier 
march through “fair, open country,”94 most likely along the Via Aquitania for some 
distance, then southwest to Montréal and west to Prolian/Prouille.  Baker calls it a long 
march, although compared to other marches the army had completed, it does not seem 
long.  However, this was the sixth day of march without rest and followed a couple very 
long, arduous, and waterless marches.  No doubt the march felt long, and the Prince 
welcomed the opportunity to take advantage of the brothers’ hospitality.  The vanguard 
marched about twenty miles, and the rearguard, marching from St-Hilaire, would have 
                                                
93For his discussion, see Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 81–82; Hoskins, 
“Itineraries.” 
94Baker, Chronicon, 239.  “…intraverunt per patriam pulcram, longam et latam…” 
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had a longer march of roughly twenty-five miles.95   
During their march toward Prolian/Prouille the rearguard destroyed Limoux,96 
Routier, and Villar-St-Anselm.  Limoux was a large town of about 15,000, making it 
larger than Carcassonne, and it was wealthy thanks to viticulture, agriculture—both 
cultivation and milling—cloth manufacture, tanning, and dressing furs.  The Aude river 
flowed through the town, with the larger and fortified part of the town on the west bank 
of the river.  Two bridges connected this part of Limoux to the unfortified, eastern 
suburbs.  Limoux boasted three religious houses: Dominican inside the walls and 
Franciscan and Augustinian outside the walls, at least one of which was on the east bank 
of the Aude.97  Limoux would thus have been a rich prize for the Anglo-Gascon army, 
and Hoskins suggests that the allure of Limoux might be one of the reasons the rearguard 
was stationed thirteen miles from the center and vanguard on the night of 14 November.98  
The army certainly understood Limoux’s importance; Wingefeld told the bishop of 
Winchester that Limoux, along with Carcassonne and two other nearby towns, “found 
each year for the king of France the wages of a thousand men of arms and, besides, one 
hundred thousand old crowns, to maintain his war.”99 
Given Limoux’s importance as a center of cultivation and milling and viticulture, 
                                                
95Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 81–83; Hoskins, “Itineraries.” 
96Baker, Chronicon, 239. 
97Denifle, La désolation des monastères, vol. 2, pt. 1, 91–92; Fonds-Lamothe, Notices 
historiques sur la ville de Limoux (Limoux, 1838), 93. 
98Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 83. 
99John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 445.  “Car Carcasoun et Lemoignes, qest ausi graunt come Carcasoun, et ij. 
Aultres villes de coste de Carcasoun, troveront chescun an au roy de Fraunce lez gages de 
mil hommees darmes et, oultre ceo, c. mil escutz veux, pur maintenire de guerre.” 
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it also is reasonable to suppose that the rearguard hoped to find ample supplies—and had 
to hope the town had not destroyed them.  The rate of march over the previous days 
would have made gathering supplies somewhat difficult, and the army would have taken 
the opportunity to replenish its supplies.  The monasteries did not escape destruction, and 
Limoux’s walls were destroyed,100 a not inconsiderable task.  Given the time this 
operation likely would have taken, it is possible that the majority of the rearguard 
continued the advance while a small party remained behind to effect the destruction. 
The destruction was clearly extensive given the reconstruction measures 
authorized: tax and service exemptions; permission to use wood from royal forests for 
rebuilding; power to compel skilled labor—masons and carpenters, for example—from 
nearby towns; no export taxes on grain and cloth under a certain amount; a grace period 
for debtors; taxes on goods purchased at the fair were reduced; tolls were increased.  Of 
particular importance was the reconstruction of the fortifications and written records.101  
The rearguard, unlike the Prince and the center, did not march through “fair, open 
country.”  Instead, the march from St-Hilaire to Prouille was through land that rose and 
fell steeply, so it would have been another difficult day for the soldiers under the 
command of the earls of Salisbury and Suffolk and the lord of Pommiers.  There were 
                                                
100A 1356 letter of Jean d’Armagnac discusses the destruction of the walls; see Fonds-
Lamothe, Notices historiques, 141, for Armagnac’s letter.  Innocent VI addresses the 
reconstruction of a monastery outside Limoux’s wall.  For the text of the papal letter, see 
Denifle, La désolation des monastères, vol. 2, pt. 1, 92, n. 1. 
101Fonds-Lamothe, Notices historiques sur la ville de Limoux, 141–47.  See also Hoskins, 
In the Steps of the Black Prince, 85. 
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many mills and hilltop villages, of which Routier was one.102  The presence of the mill 
ruins indicates that the route was through cultivated land, and the lateness of the season 
meant that the crops—if it had not been destroyed to deny supplies to the Anglo-Gascon 
army—would have been harvested, making it easy for the force to purvey supplies. 
The relatively autonomous activity of the rearguard over these two days indicates 
not only that the Prince trusted his commanders to pursue independent action, but also 
that there must have been a plan to regroup in the vicinity of Prolian/Prouille.  Thus, there 
was a designated route of march, which must have been pre-planned at least a few days in 
advance, i.e., before the Anglo-Gascon army marched from Lamayne/Villemagne on 14 
November. 
The vanguard, under the command of Warwick and de Cobham, marched from 
Pezence/Pezens to the vicinity of Prolian/Prouille and Fanjeaux, about twenty miles.  
Their route went slightly north and took them through Montréal, Villasavary, and 
Lasserre-de-Prouille.  By the time the vanguard reached Montréal it would have been 
roughly five miles from the rearguard, as the forces converged.  The vanguard pillaged 
Montréal and burned the Carmelite convent.103  Like the rearguard to the south, the 
vanguard was not sparing ecclesiastical property.  Lasserre-de-Prouille was a circulade 
town and so would have had a defensive perimeter, but it did not save the town.104 
                                                
102Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 86.  The town likely had only primitive 
fortifications in 1355.  See Dominique Baudreu and Frédéric Loppe, “Types de forts 
villageois dans le bassin moyen de l’Aude durant la Guerre de Cent Ans,” Archéologie du 
Midi Médiéval 22 (2004): 103–40, at 116. 
103Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 86. 
104See Mahul, Cartulaire et archives des communes, vol. 3, 257, 311, 340 for Montréal; 
and Circulades, sur la route d’un urbansime de 1000 Ans for Lasserre-de-Prouille. 
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The center marched along a relatively straight and easy route close to the 
vanguard’s route.  Both center and vanguard had camped near each other on the night of 
14 November with the rearguard thirteen miles south.  The march on 15 November 
proceeded along a broad front of thirteen miles, wreaking considerable destruction, that 
narrowed to five miles near Montréal, and converged in the vicinity of Prolian/Prouille 
(see Map 7) and Fanjeaux.  The Prince stayed at the Dominican abbey, where the 
brothers admitted him to "the spiritual brotherhood of the house."105  Whether this was a 
carefully considered move on the part of the brothers to preserve the abbey from 
destruction or not, the abbey survived the Anglo-Gascons’ visit to receive 32l in alms 
from the Prince and delivered by Richard of Leominster, a Dominican with the Prince’s 
army.106   
Fanjeaux was a mile further down the road from the Dominican abbey, on a hill 
450 feet above Prolian/Prouille.  It was fortified with ramparts and a castle, but these 
were insufficient.107  The town and its twenty-one windmills were burned.108  The fires 
would have been clearly visible at the abbey.  Perhaps that view was a factor in the 
Prince’s admission to the brotherhood.  One could wonder what the brothers thought 
about the Prince staying with them while the Anglo-Gascon army burned the nearby 
town, even if, as Hewitt states, such a situation “was not incongruous to the mind of 
                                                
105 Barber, Life and Campaigns, 66. 
106Baker, Chronicon, 239; DCO, Henxteworth accounts, 28 November 1355. 
107Hoskins states there are two castles in Fanjeaux but second one likely did not exist in 
1355.  Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 86. 
108Baker, Chronicon, 239. 
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1355.”109  Based on Baker’s description of events, it seems the brothers expected the 
Prince.  The army, he writes, pressed, “because the Prince was to stay in the abbey…,”110 
suggesting that scouts and or messengers had already preceded the Prince and either 
made arrangements or reported back to the Prince that the abbey would make a 
comfortable place to spend the night. 
The following day, Monday 16 November, the army marched seventeen miles to 
Ayollpuhbone/Belpech (see Map 7),111 which was a pleasant town with a castle outside 
the town.  The residents mounted a stout defense, but the town fell during an assault with 
no noteworthy casualties, i.e., no one any of the sources felt compelled to mention [John 
de Lisle was the only squire, knight (chivaler) killed on the campaign according to 
Wengefeld].  As for Belpech, itself, the town was walled and the castle was a square 
tower.  There were three bridges across the river, as well as two fords.  Thus, the river 
would have presented no obstacle to the Anglo-Gascon army, just as the fortifications did 
not withstand the army’s assault.112  However, the castle and town were spared from 
being burned because they belonged to the count of Foix’s lordship.113  Gaston Phoebus, 
                                                
109Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 72. 
110Baker, Chronicon, 239.  “…et exercitus acceleravit ad hoc, quo princeps foret 
hospitatus in abbatia…” 
111Baker’s Ayollpuhbone has been identified as either Belpech or Pech-Luna.  I have 
followed Hoskins here, who writes Belpech “is more likely” because of the terrain, the 
path of the forward march on Tuesday 17 November, and the consistency with Baker, 
who specifically mentions a castle outside the town.  Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black 
Prince, 87. 
112Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 87–88. 
113Baker, Chronicon, 239–40.  “Die Lunae media custodia hospitabatur apud bonam 
villam vocatam Ayollpuhbone, diu defensam, sed conquisitam per insultum; cujus 
castrum adextremum se redditdit, quibus princeps jussit nihil noceri per ignam, ratione 
comitis Fluxensis, cujus dominio pertinebant.” 
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the count of Foix, it should be remembered was a first cousin of Jean de Grailley, the 
captal de Buch, who was a key member of the Prince’s staff.  However, Belpech’s lord 
did not owe his allegiance to the count of Foix but rather to the archbishop of 
Toulouse.114  Perhaps Baker meant the town and castle were under Foix’s protection, as 
the count “was always ready to defend neighbors in return for a financial 
consideration…”115 Yet, why attack a town that belonged to Foix or was under his 
protection?  Was the Prince demonstrating his army’s abilities prior to his meeting with 
Foix?116 
The Prince and the count of Foix met the next day, 17 November, at the large 
Cistercian Abbey of Burgbone/Boulbonne, five miles northwest of 
Ayollpuhbone/Belpech.117  To reach the Cistercian Abbey, the army had to cross the river 
Hers, probably “at the Gué de Mourgail, 150 yards upstream from the” confluence of the 
Hers and Vixiège, as the bridge was not built until the fifteenth century.118  One of Foix’s 
ancestors founded the monastery in 1129, and the Abbey of Boubonne was the counts of 
Foix’s spiritual home.119   
Baker describes Foix as the “greatest magnate in all of Aquitaine,” young 
(twenty-one), a prisoner of the French king for two years, and well pleased to meet the 
                                                
114J. de Lahondès, Belpech de Garnagois (Toulouse, 1886), 1–7. 
115Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 88. 
116This is one of Hoskins’ suggestions.  Idem. 
117Baker, Chronicon, 240. 
118Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 88. 
119Baker, Chronicon, 240.  “…fundato per album comitis Fluxensis…”; Pierre Duffaut, 
Histoire de Mazères, ville maîtress et capitale des Comtes de Foix (Mazères, 1988), 120.  
In 1567 the abbey was burned during the Wars of Religion. 
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Prince.  From this meeting onward he remained loyal to the Prince.120  This, then, was a 
successful meeting for the Prince—let us remember one of his key stated aims was to 
secure allies—and demonstrated how the Prince could take advantage of the mis-steps of 
the French king in handling the count of Foix.  It also should have demonstrated to the 
Prince—and undoubtedly did demonstrate to his staff—the importance of not alienating a 
magnate of Foix’s importance.  At the very least, the Prince and his staff would have 
recognized the role of Jean II’s imprisonment of Foix, the struggle between Jean II and 
Gaston Phoebus over Béarn,121 and Jean II’s choice of Armagnac as his lieutenant in 
Languedoc in the count of Foix’s decision to meet with and ally himself with the Anglo-
Gascons—“the enemy of my enemy” as it were.   
In addition to his enjoyment of the meeting with the Prince and (presumably) his 
cousin, the captal de Buch—and whatever pleasure Gaston Phoebus may have derived 
from demonstrating his independence and displeasure to Jean II—, Foix presumably 
benefitted in more material ways.  For example, his squire Richard received a gift of 9s 
and Bernard Dassatz, described as a swineherd (porcarius) of Foix’s, received a gift of 
54s from the Prince.122  A more long-term benefit for Foix was that the Anglo-Gascon 
army refrained from burning, pillaging, and destroying his land.123 
Gaston Phoebus rode with the Anglo-Gascon forces for about fifteen miles of the 
                                                
120Baker, Chronicon, 240.  “comes praefatus, major scilicet totius linguae Doxitanae, 
obviatvit cum magna laetitia domino principi, evasus de carcere coronati Francorum, in 
quo Parisiis jacuit duobus annis, et mansit ex tunc cum principe fidelis.” 
121This was a dispute over homage similar to the dispute between Edward III and Jean II 
about Aquitaine. 
122DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 28–29 November. 
123Baker, Chronicon, 240.   
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remaining twenty miles of the day’s march to Miremont (see Map 7).  They rode through 
“Maselle/Mazères [a bastide town that was the count of Foix’s main residence]124 and 
Calmon/Calmont [four miles from Maselle/Mazères],125 which were divided by a river.  
A ruined castle was on the far bank.  The army left the large town of Seint 
Canele/Cintagabelle on the right…”126 The army likely did not enter Calmon/Calmont, as 
the terrain was easier if they remained on the left bank of the Grand Hers river, the same 
bank upon which Maselle/Mazères stood.  The count of Foix parted from the Prince’s 
company just downstream from where the Grand Hers met the Ariège at Tramesaygues.  
The army marched a further two miles from the hamlet to Seint Canele/Cintegabelle (see 
Map 7), where the Prince’s men camped that night.127  
Seint Canele/Cintegabelle did not belong to Foix128 and was burned, as was 
Hautripe/Auterive.  Baker describes Seint Canele/Cintegabelle as a “large town” 
(magnam villam) and Hautripe/Auterive as a “powerful castle” (adruum castrum), both 
“of which are French.”129  Baker’s statement indicates that the army knew these two 
places were not Foix’s.  It is reasonable to suppose that the towns and lands belonging to 
Foix were discussed during his meeting with the Prince and provided information about 
                                                
124Roger Armengaud, Boulbonne, le Saint Deni des Comtes de Foix (Mazères, 1993), 
165–71.  
125Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 89. 
126Baker, Chronicon, 240.  “Illo die equitarunt in dominio illius comitis per vills de 
Maselle et Calmon, quam dividit aqua, ex cujus parte ulteriori fuit antiquitus castrum 
destructum, et dimiserunt a dextris magnam villam de Seint Canele…” 
127Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 89. 
128It had been part of Foix’s lordship in the twelfth century but had become a royal 
domain in 1271; ergo, Foix would have had no interest in protecting the town and 
actually attacked it himself in 1359.  See Roger Ycart, Cintegabelle, Un village dans 
l’histoire (Cintegabelle, 1998), 19–20, 69. 
129Baker, Chronicon, 240.  “…quae sunt Gallicorum…” 
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the nearby places.  Seint Canele/Cintegabelle would have been tempting, with a 
population of almost 1200 households130 and wealth from its fairs and markets, which 
provided sufficient funds to pay for the maintenance of the bridge and fortifications.131  
Baker writes that the army left Seint Canele/Cintegabelle and Hautripe/Auterive to their 
right, then “crossed the dangerous Ariège river, just as they had done previously” on 28 
October.132   
Hoskins, though, has shown that Baker’s description does not match the 
geographic reality.  Seint Canele/Cintegabelle and Hautrive/Auterive are on the right 
bank of the Ariège, a mile downstream from the convergence of the Grand Hers and 
Ariège.  Thus, in order to march with the town and castle on the right, the army marching 
on the left bank of the river had to cross the Ariège before reaching Seint 
Canele/Cintegabelle, probably at the ford La Muraillette “one mile south of the 
confluence.”  To attack the town, the army would have had to recross the Ariège and 
approach across a narrow bridge under the shadow of the castle Fort Montmerle; the 
town’s gate on the river was guarded by a drawbridge.  Marching on the right bank, the 
same bank upon which Seint Canele/Cintegabelle stands, from Caumon/Caumont and 
approaching the town this way via the Porte Calmontaise would have been less 
difficult.133  The castle put up significant resistance, but the town was sacked and the 
crops destroyed, presumably after the army resupplied itself.  The destruction was 
                                                
130An enquiry in 1425 put the population at 1200 households. 
131Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 89–90. 
132Baker, Chronicon, 240.  “…dimiserunt a dextris…transierunt iterum aquam 
periculosam de Arage, sicut prius in die sanctorum Simonis et Judae.” 
133Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 90.  This route follows the modern D35 from 
Caumont. 
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considerable, as many witnesses confirmed as part of an inquiry in 1423, including one 
witness who was over one hundred who claimed to have personally witnessed the Anglo-
Gascon army’s attack.134 
Seint Canele/Cintegabelle is five miles upstream from Hautrive/Auterive.  The 
best march from Seint Canele/Cintegabelle was to leave the river to the right, given the 
steeply rising escarpment in places between the two towns.  Some hills rose 300 feet 
above the river valley.135  Baker mentions only the castle, but there was also a town.  The 
larger, fortified part with an undefended suburb was on the right bank, and another, 
unfortified suburb on the left bank.  The town was supposed to destroy the fortifications 
according to the 1229 Treaty of Paris; whether the town did or not in the thirteenth 
century, the town was fortified in 1355.  There were also two monasteries outside the 
walls, which were 150 yards from the river, leaving the suburbs and religious houses 
exposed to attack with no need to assault the town or castle.  Thus, the town and castle 
survived, but the monasteries and suburbs did not.136  After destroying 
Hautrive/Auterive’s suburbs, the army continued west, marching toward the Garonne and 
leaving Toulouse untouched twelve miles to the north.  The army clearly had a good 
grasp of where they were.  “The middle column spent the night at the large town of 
                                                
134C. Barrière-Flavy, Cintagabelle au XV siècle, 4–5, 7–9; Roger Armengaud, “Le 
Passage du Prince Noir,” La Croix du Midi, 9 February 1967. 
135Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 91. 
136Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 92; Louis Latour, “Le grand pont romain 
d’Auterive,” Mémoires 51 (1991); Louis Latour, “Le castrum d’Auterive: Ses origines, 
son histoire, ses fortifications,” Memoires 54 (1994).  
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Miremont.”137 
The next day, 18 November, the Anglo-Gascon army marched fourteen miles to 
Carbone/Carbonne (see Map 7) and, most significantly, re-crossed the Garonne, which 
was important both militarily and psychologically.  Before leaving Miremont, the town 
and its castle were both burned.138  The town covered seven acres within the 1.6-meter 
thick walls, had two suburbs and a windmill outside the walls.  There was also a ditch 
that in places was filled with water.  The motte and bailey castle had underground 
passages that led from the castle to the valley.  The town also had three large 
underground grain silos, each able to hold eleven tons of wheat, as well as smaller 
individual silos in houses.139  The Prince’s army would have searched for such hidden 
supplies and the loss of same would have been serious for the town.  The Prince and his 
staff understood the implications well. 
The march from Miremont began with a 400-foot climb out of the Ariège river 
valley, then a descent into and 300 foot climb out of the Lèze river valley.  This climb 
culminated at Mounthaut/Montaut, a small village, which belonged to the count of 
Foix,140 on the bluff above the Garonne.141  Baker describes the crossing of the Garonne 
as follows:  
                                                
137Baker, Chronicon, 240.  “…et media custodia fuit hospitata in magna villa de 
Miremont…” 
138Baker, Chronicon, 240. 
139Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 92–93, based on interviews with Jean-Yves 
Canal and Francis Bop; on the silos, see also Catherine Poulain-Martel and Jean-Yves 
Cana, “Des silos médiévaux à Miremont,” Gardarem Miremont, Bulletin No. 4 (2002). 
140Baker, Chronicon, 241; Baker calls Mounthaut/Montaut a “castrum.”  “Die Mercurii 
transierunt per castrum comitis Fluxensis, vocatum Mounthaut…” 
141Baker, Chronicon, 241; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 93. 
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At the foot of which [the bluff] the cavalry crossed the wide river Garonne in 
single file to the surprise of the country people.  Throughout the year boats are 
kept here for people to cross, but these had been removed by men from Noé in 
order to hold up the army.  When, by God’s grace, they had crossed the Garonne, 
according to men captured afterwards in enemy castles, no-one was able to cross 
the river because of floods caused by days of rain [November rain is typical], so 
that their crossing was justly ascribed to the hand of God.142 
After crossing the river 
Noé was taken by assault, and the castle surrendered; the rearguard spent the night 
in the latter.  They left the Garonne to the left, and came to the town of 
Marquefave, which was marvelously [mirabiliter] captured.  Then the centre 
crossed the said river yet again, to the amazement of the countrymen, to the strong 
town of Carbonne, defended on one side and the river on the other.  It was taken 
by assault before the prince arrived, so that the victors were able to lodge there; 
the prince, as was his invariable custom, encamped outside.143 
                                                
142Baker, Chronicon, 241.  “…ad cujus pedem equites singuli successive, cum stupore 
illorum de patria, transierunt aquam magnam de Geroude, ubi continue per totum annum 
sunt navicellae paratae pro transitu indigenarum, quae tunc ad exercitus impedimentum 
per villanos vicinos de North fuerant subtractae.  Aquam de Geroude cum gratia Dei 
pertansitam, relatione castellanorum nullus potuisset pertransivisse post inundationem 
louviae diurnae, unde ejus transitus Dei virtuti juste fuerat ascriptus.”  Barber, Life and 
Campaigns, 67. 
143Baker, Chronicon, 241.  “Prefata villa de North fuerat per insultum conquisita, in cujus 
castro reddito retrocustodia pernoctavit.  Ex tunc dimiserunt rivum de Geroude a sinistris, 
contra cujus cursum adiverunt villam de Markonaw, quae mirabiliter fuit conquisita: 
transivit enim iterum ibidem aquam praedicta cum admiratione villanorum media 
custodia, et tunc ad fortem villam de Carbone, muro ex una parte, et aqua ex alia bene 
munitam, tamen ante adventum principis per insultum conquisitam, ita quod hospitium 
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Even though the Garonne is not as wide here as at the initial crossing in October, this 
would still have been an impressive feat, especially given that at least some part of the 
Anglo-Gascony army recrossed it in order to take Carbonne.   
While Baker states the cavalry forded the Garonne at Mounthaut/Montaut, the 
Prince tells the bishop of Winchester that the army “took our road to pass the Garonne at 
a town called Carbonne, at three leagues from Toulouse.”144  What perhaps happened is 
this.  The cavalry of the rearguard and center used the ford at North/Noé, took the town 
and effected the castle’s surrender, then left the rearguard at Noé while the center’s 
cavalry rode three miles upstream, recrossed the Garonne, and took the village of 
Markonaw/Marqufaw.  After that, they continued upstream, recrossed the river at 
Carbonne, and took the town before the Prince, the infantry, the vanguard, and the 
baggage train arrived.145 
Baker’s emphasis on the grace of God and the amazement of the local populace 
suggests that the river was judged impassable.146  Given the astonishment that the passage 
of mounted men caused, it is likely that the river would have been uncrossable for men on 
                                                                                                                                            
praebuit victoribus, principe ad extra, ut ubique fere solebat, hospitato.”  Barber, Life and 
Campaigns, 67. 
144Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 438.  “…od nous preismes nostre chemyn a passer Gerounde a une vill appelle 
Carboun, a iij. Lieues de Tholouse…” 
145Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 94–97. 
146Baker’s use of the subjunctive (potuissent pertransivisse post inundationem pluviae 
diurnae) and the possible translations of diurnae (daily, of the day) does make the text 
somewhat ambiguous.  Does he mean that the army had to cross before it would have 
been impossible due to the daily rain or that the army crossed after floods caused by daily 
rains should have made it impossible? For discussion of this issue, see Hoskins, In the 
Steps of the Black Prince, 224–25, n. 32.  See also De Santi, “L’expédition du Prince 
Noir en 1355, d’après le journal d’un de ses compagnons,” Mémoires de l’Academie des 
Sciences, Inscriptions, et Belles-Lettres de Toulouse, series 10 4 (1904): 181–223.  
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foot and carts.  The army needed a bridge.  The Prince and his staff would certainly have 
been aware of the conditions through their scouts and likely knew that the nearest bridge 
was at Carbonne, a bridge neither Baker nor the Prince mention.147 
The bridge at Carbonne appears in an account in which the town’s residents 
abandoned the town, crossed the bridge with their families, and planned to defend the 
bridgehead against the Anglo-Gascon army.148  If that was the case, the locals had not 
been paying attention to the events in Languedoc.  As for the bridge itself, it was possibly 
Roman in origin or built in the mid thirteenth century and south of the town, where it 
allowed passage between Carbonne and the abbey of Bonnefont.149  After the cavalry 
secured the bridge, the rest of the army, including the Prince, could cross the Garonne in 
safety. 
Regardless of river conditions, the movement of the French forces would have 
added urgency to the army’s need to cross the Garonne.  The French had left Toulouse 
and by 19 November (the next day) were within six miles of the rearguard.  Undoubtedly, 
the Prince and his staff were aware of these movements before 19 November.  The tactics 
used—the cavalry crossing at Noé to provide a covering force and securing the bridge at 
Carbonne—would have ensured a safe crossing.  The Garonne was the last significant 
obstacle facing the Anglo-Gascon force on the return march to Gascony—the army 
would be back in friendly territory within ten days—, and thus this crossing would have 
had a significant psychological impact, both for the Anglo-Gascon force and its pursuers.  
                                                
147Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 96.  
148Blaise Binet, Mémoire de Blaise Binet (1768), quoted in Henri Ménard, Carbonne: 
Huit siècles d’histoire (Saint-Girons, 1985), 36. 
149Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 96; see also Ménard, Carbonne, 142. 
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The army had already crossed the Garonne once during the campaign, which had amazed 
the local populace, and they had done so again.  For a populace that had believed itself 
safe from attack east of the Garonne, an army that appeared able to cross the Garonne at 
will must have been a shock and must have seriously shaken their sense of security.  The 
crossing of the Garonne, as well as the depredation that followed, sent a clear message to 
France that the English could strike into the heart of Languedoc and to the people of 
Languedoc that the power of France could not protect them from English attack.  
Back in Friendly Territory  
The next day, 19 November, the army and the very tired horses rested for the first time in 
nine days and 146 miles.  Men and horses would have been in serious need of rest.  The 
horses, for example, had been pushed three days past the recommended maximum of six 
days for the cavalry horses.  The pack and carthorses had also been worked hard over the 
previous marches but it was unlikely that the horses had been seriously overworked, as a 
day’s rest would have been insufficient rest.  The horses would have needed a week’s rest 
to recover from two to three days’ overwork.150  Thus, the rest would have been welcome 
“after the continuous exertions of the previous days.”  The weather was “calm and 
enjoyable” (quieto et delectabili).151  It is possible that the farriers took advantage of the 
rest and the weather to re-shoe horses as horseshoes needed replacing every six to eight 
                                                
150Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, 
with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. 
General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 438; War Department Cavalry 
Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of Cavalry. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1938, 145. 
151Baker, Chronicon, 241.  “Die Jovis, tempore quieto et delectabili, quievit exercitus ad 
magnam recreationem post labores diebus pristinis continuatos.” 
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weeks, especially considering the distance travelled and the resulting wear on the 
horseshoes. 
It appears that the army truly rested after the crossing and did not engage in any 
major military operations.  Defensive measures had to be taken, and the army was 
undoubtedly prepared for an engagement with the French, which were roughly six miles 
away.152  The Prince and his staff knew the French position.  “Before midnight there 
came unto us [the Prince] news that the enemy with all their power, to wit, the count of 
Armagnac, the constable of France, the marshal Clermont, and the prince of Orange, 
together with many other great men of those parts, were come from Toulouse and were 
camped at two leagues distance from our rear guard; and there they [the French] lost 
some of their men and waggons at their camping.  And upon this news we drew towards 
them…”153 The Prince thus had detailed information upon which to base decisions.   
To confirm the scouts’ reports, the Prince sent Bartholomew de Burghersh, John 
Chandos, James Audley, Baldwin Botour, Thomas Felton, and others “to the number of 
thirty lances, to certify to us of the certainty of the said enemy”154 the next morning (20 
November).  They found a force of about  
two hundred men of arms of their [the French] side, with whom they fought and 
                                                
152Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 98. 
153Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 438–39.  “Devant la mynuyt nous vindrent novels qe les enemys od tut lor poair, 
cest assaver, le counte Derminak, le conestable de Fraunce, le marschal Clermound et le 
prince Dorenge, ensemblement od plusors aultres grauntz de ycelles parties, estoient 
venuz de Tholouse es se loggerent a ij. Lieues pres de nostre arrer gard, od ils perdrent de 
lour geantz et cariages sur lour loggier.  Sur queles novels nous treismes devers eaux…” 
154 Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 439.  “…a la mountance de xxx. Gleyves, de noz certefier de certainete des dits 
enemis.” 
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took of them five and thirty men of arms.  Upon which doings the enemy hasted 
sore afraid to their quarters, and held their road right to the cities of Lombez and 
Sauveterre, which towns were distant the one from the other only half an English 
league [1.5 miles]; and before them we encamped that same night so near to the 
enemy that we could see their fires in their quarters.  But there was between them 
and us a great deep river, and on the night before our coming they broke down the 
bridges, so that we might not pass over until on the morrow we sent out people on 
before to remake the said bridges.155 
Baker provides a somewhat different account.  Upon  
learning that the French were nearby, grouped in five large battles, our men left 
their encampment and drew themselves up in battle order about a mile away.  
When the army was drawn up someone hallooed at a hare; the enemy heard this 
and sent forty lances, who retreated in haste as soon as they saw the army drawn 
up in order, and the whole enemy army fled in confusion, so prisoners taken 
during the pursuit reported.  That day Bartholomew Burghersh, John Chandos and 
James Audley, at the head of eighty lances, set out on a scouting mission and, 
reaching the tail of the French army, they captured thirty-two knights and squires, 
                                                
155Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 439.  “Les queux chivachoient devers eaux, tantqe ils vindrent a une ville ou ils 
troverent cc. homes darmes de lour, ou les queux ils avoient affaire et pristerount de eaux 
xxxv. hommes darmes.  Sur quele busoigne les enemys se hastoient mult affraement a 
lour logge, et tindrent lour chemyn tut droit a les villes de Lombeys et Sauvetre, les 
queles villes nestoient lun del autre qe demy lieu Engleys; devaunt quels nous nous 
loggasmes mesme la nuyt si pres de eaux qe nous purrons veer lor feues en lor logges.  
Mes il y avoit entre eaux et nous une graunde profounde river, et de nuyt devaunt nostre 
venue ils ount debruse les pountz, si qe nous ne purrons passer tauntqe lendemayn qe 
nous mandasmes noz gentz devaunt pur refraire les dits pountz.” 
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among them the lord of Romery; they also killed many carters and destroyed the 
enemy’s provisions.  In the evening the prince lodged at Mauvesin, and four 
French men at arms, taking refuge in the church there from the English, only lost 
their horses and armour.156 
The two armies most likely faced each other northwest of Carbonne, which would have 
been downstream from the town in the direction of Toulouse.  The ground here is flat, 
and the French retreated northwest to Lombez, twenty miles away.157 
Despite the discrepancies of the Prince’s and Baker’s accounts, one thing is clear.  
The Anglo-Gascon army once again expected battle, and the French withdrew.  Based on 
the Prince’s account, Hoskins has identified the town where the advance party found 200 
French men-at-arms as either Bérat or Longages, either of which would have been a 
strong position for the French.158  It is unclear why the French would have abandoned 
such a position especially given their superior numbers—possibly three times as large as 
the Anglo-Gascon army—,159 although it is in keeping with Armagnac’s strategy of battle 
                                                
156Baker, Chronicon, 240.  “Die Veneris certificato quod Gallici in acies quinque magnas 
fuerant divisi, progressi, de prope existentes, nostri ad spatium unius milliaris de hospitio 
seipso in campo apto ordinarunt ad proeliandum.  Itaque exercitu ordinato, quidam 
suscitatum leporem exclamarunt, quod audientes inimici emiserunt 40 lanceatos, per quos 
viso exercitu ordinato reversosque celeriter haec nuntiantes, omnes fugerunt cum magno 
pavore, sicut retulerunt capti ex eis in persequutione.  Illo die Bartholomaeus de 
Burghasche, Johannes Chandos, et Jacobus D’Andeleye, ad summam quater viginti 
lanceatorum ordinati discooperatores, accedentes ad caudam exercitus Galicorum, 
captivarunt triginta duos milites et domicelllos, et inter eos dominum comitem de 
Romenie: item multos bigarios occiderunt, destruentes eorum victualia.  Sero principe 
hospitato in villa de Muwos, quatuor Gallici armorum Anglicos fugitivi in ecclesiam 
illius villae, equos et arma duntaxat perdiderunt.” 
157Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 98–99. 
158Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 99. 
159Le Bel, Chronique, vol. 2, 222; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 320, n. 174. 
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avoidance.  Granted, Armagnac may have presented a different account to Jean II.  The 
French king, understandably displeased, seems to have been under the impression that the 
Anglo-Gascon force had managed to avoid battle rather than that the French forces had 
retreated.160 
Another point of agreement between the two accounts is the number of prisoners 
taken: 32 (Baker) and 35 (Prince).  The size of the scouting party, though, is different: 80 
lances (Baker) and 30 (Prince).  A party of thirty lances seems a bit small to take more 
than thirty prisoners, although there is no evidence other than Baker’s account that the 
group numbered eighty lances.  Thirty lances, of course, could be a group of more than 
one hundred men; likely, the number was between fifty and eighty men.  Both accounts 
agree that the Anglo-Gascon army pursued the French. 
Their pursuit took the army from Carbonne, but only after setting fire to the town, 
the archives, and the bridge.161  From Carbonne, the army left the Garonne river valley 
and marched nineteen miles to Muwos/Mauvezin (see Map 8), a town with a substantial 
church.  The French were at Lombez and Sauvetere, six miles to the north.  In order for 
                                                
160For Jean II’s letter, see Delachenal, Histoire de Charles V, vol. 1, 130, n. 1.  “…quod 
numerus gencium nostrarum in armis numerum hostium nostrorum ibidem multiper 
excedbat, nec poterant evadere sine bello.” 
161Jean II extended the town’s privileges in August 1356 to assist with the rebuilding 
houses and the bridge.  The town was so completely destroyed that the residents rebuilt 
on a new site, which was easier to fortify; the new walls were nearly twenty-three feet 
high and complete by 1362.  Jean-Pierre Dehoey, “Carbonne sous l’Ancien Régime,” in 
Histoire et traditions carbonnaises, vol. 4, 59–61; Ménard, Carbonne: Huit siècles 
d’histoire, 37–39, 142; Joseph Dedieu, Histoire de Carbonne: Les institutions 
communales d’une bastide sous l’Ancien Régime (Nimes, 2004 [1953]), 33, 53; 
Ordonnances des Roys de France de la Troisième Race, vol. 382.  See also Hoskins, In 
Steps of the Black Prince, 98–100, for his summary of the events at Carbonne and its 
rebuilding. 
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the Anglo-Gascon army to be able to see the French campfires, they had to be camped on 
the ridge two miles north of the town.  This position would have provided them an 
unobstructed view of the Save river valley and the French camps.162 
Just as the Prince and his staff knew the French position, Armagnac and his staff 
also knew that the Anglo-Gascon army was in close pursuit.  One option for delaying that 
chase was to destroy the bridges across the Save, which the Prince reports the French 
did.163  The Prince sent men ahead to repair the bridges while the army continued the 
pursuit on 21 November.  The fifteen-mile march along the Save’s east bank to 
Oradrie/Auradé must have been difficult and muddy.  The road was narrow and in poor 
condition, and it rained.164 
The next morning, 22 November, the army burned the castle (castrum) in which 
the Prince had slept the previous night, then moved west.  First, they had to cross the 
Save.  The most likely place to do so near Oradrie/Auradé is the ford northeast of 
Marestaing, although some part of the Anglo-Gascon army may have used the repaired 
bridges.165  Thus far, the events of 22 November are clear.  As for the rest of the day’s 
march, part of the army engaged in combat with the enemy.  The Prince writes only “the 
enemy drew to the town of Gimont, whither we came the day that they came; and, before 
that they could enter the said town, our people took and slew full plenty of them.  And on 
                                                
162Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 101. 
163Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 439. 
164Baker, Chronicon, 242.  “Sabbato pluvioso carpserunt malum iter et strictum ad 
castrum de Oradrie, in quo princeps pernoctavit…” 
165Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 101, for the suggestion of the ford.  For the 
ford and its use since ancient times, see Jean Castan, Marestaing: Ancienne commanderie 
des Templiers (Marestaing, 2005), 17–19. 
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that same night we camped before the said town…”166 Baker provides more description.  
He writes that the army made a long march, after which it was discovered “that the 
enemy were on the far side of a large hill, near and below the town of Gimont, so that the 
English, delayed until midnight, sent in the meanwhile sixty lances with some archers to 
the right, to the town of Aurimont, where they found four hundred men-at-arms of the 
constable of France’s company, and forced them to abandon the town, killing, and 
capturing some of them as they pursued them toward Gimont.”167  The center camped 
uncomfortably at Auremont/Aurimont (see Map 8), the vanguard at Celymont/Selont 
about a mile from the enemy, and Baker does not specify where the rearguard camped.168 
The long march and delay Baker mentions make little sense given that the march 
from Muwoz/Mauvezin was only twenty miles, only twelve miles by the most direct 
route.169  Even given the hilly terrain, the cavalry could have covered the distance in a 
                                                
166Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 439.  “…lez enemys se treerent a la ville de Gymount, od nous venismes le jour 
qils y vindrount; et, devaunt qils purroient entrer la dite ville, noz geantz pristrent et 
tuerent tut plain de lour.  Et mesme cele nuyt nous loggeasmes devaunt la dite ville…” 
167Baker, Chronicon, 242–43.  “…circa vesperum perceperunt quod hostes fuerunt ex 
altera parte grossi montis, juxta et infra villam de Gemount, ita quod Anglici tardati 
usque ad mediam noctem, emiserunt interim sexaginta lanceas cum sagittariis ad 
dexteram villae de Auremont, ubi inventos 440 viros armorum constabularii Francorum, 
compulerunt villam evacuare, quibusdam occisis et captis nonnullis in persequendo usque 
Gemont.”  See also, Barber, Life and Campaigns, 68. 
168Baker, Chronicon, 243.  “…ita quod media custodia apud Auremont hospitata non 
bene; prima custodia apud Celymont, parvam villam ab hostibus uno milliari distantem, 
pernoctavit.”  Hoskins identifies Celymont as Selont, a small town about two miles from 
Aurimont.  It is on high ground, which would fit Baker’s description of the Anglo-
Gascon army’s position.  Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 102. 
169Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 101–02. 
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matter of hours with no ill effects on the horses.  Even at a walk (4 mph),170 the distance 
of twelve miles could have been covered in 3–4 hours, even accounting for rests and the 
hills.  The pack train could have easily managed twelve miles, and twenty would have 
certainly been within its capabilities.171  Even the carts travelling at 2.5 mph could have 
covered twelve miles in six hours without difficulty, twenty miles in nine hours 
accounting for rest periods.172  Why, then, was the army delayed until midnight?  The 
direct route is also inconsistent with the locations of Gemont/Gimont and 
Auremont/Aurimont.  Had the army approached Gemont/Gimont along the direct route, 
troops dispatched to Auremont/Aurimont would have been sent left, not right as Baker 
writes.173 
The discrepancies have been interpreted in different ways.  Hewitt explains it 
thusly: The French “offered sufficient resistance to hold the English force at bay until 
midnight.”  Meanwhile, some troops were sent upstream and took 
Auremont/Aurimont.174  Rogers explains the delay as follows.  The Anglo-Gascon army 
crossed the Save river, then marched southwest in the direction of Lombez and 
Sauveterre, where the most recent information placed the French army, only to learn that 
the French had withdrawn toward Gemont/Gimont.  The Prince then sent out a scouting 
                                                
170War Department Cavalry Field Manual. Vol. III. Prepared under direction of Chief of 
Cavalry. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1938, 145. 
171FM31–27, 1.4. 
172Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, 
with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. 
General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 437. 
173Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 102. 
174Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 67, 
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party and waited for confirmation before changing the line of march, upon receipt of 
which the army turned north.175  Hoskins finds Rogers’ interpretation more convincing, 
as the only way to reconcile Baker’s account with Hewitt’s explanation is if the army had 
already marched past Auremont/Aurimont, then turned back toward Gemont/Gimont.  He 
also sees no reason for a French detachment at Auremont/Aurimont during a 
confrontation, or why the Prince would send soldiers there.176 
A third possible cause of the delay could have been the crossing of the Save.  The 
Prince sent men ahead to repair the bridges on 21 November, so presumably the bridges 
had been fixed.  Depending on how long it took the advance repair party to reach the 
bridges and how extensive the repairs were, there may still have been work to do the 
morning of 22 November, thus delaying the Prince.  Also, it had been raining, which may 
have made the ford more difficult to use. 
Once the Anglo-Gascon army crossed the river, the force initially advanced to the 
southwest, in the direction of Lombez and Sauveterre.  Based on the information the 
Prince had about the position of the French forces, especially if the Prince was, indeed, 
seeking to bring Armagnac and the French army to battle, this direction is likely.   
Battle was clearly expected on 23 November.  “[T]he carters and officials were 
ordered to stay at Aurimont; the fighting men were drawn up in order and awaited the 
enemy in the open field but in vain.”177  The Prince and his army “abode there [Aurimont] 
                                                
175Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 321, n. 179. 
176Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 102. 
177Baker, Chronicon, 243.  “…jussis bigariis et officiariis remanere in villa de Aruemont, 
caeteri pugnantes in cohortes divisi hostes in campo expectarunt, sed incassum, 
nempe…” 
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on the morrow the whole day, thinking to have had battle.  And the same day we stood in 
arms, with all our battles, in the fields before sunrise; where there came unto us the news 
that before daylight the greater part of their host had gone away…”178  Once again, the 
French, despite their superior numbers, had retreated rather than face the Anglo-Gascon 
army in battle.  This action is consistent with Armagnac’s actions throughout the 
campaign.  Although it has been suggested that Armagnac’s army suffered from a series 
of defections,179 Armagnac, not to mention the marshal Clermont and the Constable 
Bourbon, undoubtedly weighed the risks and rewards of an engagement at this point, i.e., 
the Anglo-Gascon army was clearly heading back to Bordeaux.  Perhaps, as Hoskins 
suggests, Armagnac lacked confidence in his ability to defeat the Prince’s army in a 
battle.180  However historians have interpreted Armagnac’s actions, Baker leaves little 
doubt as to his opinion: “…they fled from their adversary (the English) out of sheer 
terror, when the latter had sought them for a long while, after long and bad marches, and 
had several times found them nearby.”181 
Based on the Prince’s account, though, the entire army had not fled.  “The leaders 
remained in quiet in the said town [Gemont/Gimont], which was great and strong to hold 
                                                
178Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 439.  “…et demurrasmes illeesqes lendemeyne tut le jour, entendantz daver eu la 
bataille.  Et le dit jour, estoions armes, od toutz nous batailles, es champs devaunt le 
solail leaunt; ou nous vindrent novels qe devaunt jour la plus graunt partie de lor host 
estoient departiez…”  
179Breuils, “Jean 1er, Comte d’Armagnac,” 58. 
180Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 103. 
181Baker, Chronicon, 243.  “…ita quod respectione armorum fuerant disconfecti, 
praesertim quum sui adversarii, scilicet Anglici, ipsos per itinera longa et mala diu 
quaesitos et pluries e vicino pertos solo terrore profectus fugaverint.”  See also, Barber, 
Life and Campaigns, 68. 
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against much people.”182  The Prince had a choice: attack Gemont/Gimont or leave the 
French commanders at his rear and return to Gascony.  This would have been a central 
issue when the Anglo-Gascon army returned to camp “and took counsel what were best 
for us to do.  And, forasmuch as we perceived that they would not have fighting, it was 
agreed that we ought to draw toward our marches…”183 The command staff would have 
weighed the likelihood of taking Gemont/Gimont. 
Gemont/Gimont was a bastide town.  The Cistercians founded it in 1265, and it 
had ditches and walls, as well a perimeter road outside of the walls.184  Clearly, it was 
strong and well-fortified and could have withstood an assault.  Given the lateness of the 
season and the proximity of the French forces, a siege would have been unadvisable even 
if the army had siege equipment.  The Prince’s staff would have also considered 
Armagnac’s past actions and the probability of French pursuit.  Concluding that the 
French might pursue and harry the army but not force them to a pitched battle was 
reasonable.  Leaving the French at Gemont/Gimont was a calculated risk, but all things 
considered heading back to Gascony was probably the safest decision. 
The final push toward Gascony began with a fourteen-mile march from 
Auremont/Aurimont to Montaut-les-Crénaux, (see Map 8) a small castelnau village.  The 
march was long, in terms of time more so than distance, through hilly country; roads 
                                                
182Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 439.  “…meas lez cheventeynes demurrerent en pees en la dite ville, qestoit 
graund et forte pur tenir encontre multz des geantz.” 
183Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 439.  “Et apres celles novels nous retournasmes a noz logges, et preismes consail 
qe mieltz nous serroit affeare.  Sur qoi nous nentendismes pas qils vorront aver le 
bataille, accordeux estoit qe nous nous deveroms trere devers noz marches…” 
184Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 103. 
Chapter 6: The Return to Bordeaux 
 
331 
were narrow and winding; there was very little water despite the previous rainfall.185  The 
route crossed two rivers; the river Gimone at the beginning of the march and the river 
Arrats, also early in the day.  After the Arrats there were no rivers or other bodies of 
water along the line of march.186   Supposedly the waterless conditions prompted the 
army to give the horses wine to drink, on account of which “the following day they were 
drunk, and could not keep a steady footing, with the result that many horses were lost.”187    
While it is doubtful that the horses were drunk, it is possible—if  the horses were, 
indeed, given wine—that the wine did have a deleterious affect.  The precise impact of 
the wine on the horses is unknown.  Given the sensitivity of horses’ gastro-intestinal 
tracts, it is certainly possible that the wine affected the horses adversely.  A horse 
accidently given 2L of isopropyl alcohol showed signs of disorientation, depression, and 
a reluctance to move.  The horse then collapsed and fell into a semi-comatose state.  After 
an initial recovery, the horse’s condition worsened and it showed signs of colic.188  Given 
that description, it is possible that Baker’s account is not impossible.  There are may also 
be other causes of equine death related to but not caused by the wine itself.  If the march 
were waterless, dehydration would have been a factor, particularly as it may not have 
been possible to get the horses to drink enough wine to relieve dehydration.  It could have 
caused losses.  Dehydration can cause impactions, the pain of which may lead to the 
                                                
185Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 103. 
186Topographical map, Pau-Toulouse. 
187Baker, Chronicon, 243.  “…quod defectu aquarum potarunt equos vinum, unde in 
crastino debriati non poterant recto passu incedere, et multi ex eis perierunt.”  See also 
Barber, Life and Campaigns, 68–69. 
188Bruce A. Somerville and Konnie H. Plumlee, “Acute isopropy alcohol intoxication in a 
horse,” Brief Communications/Communications Brèves, Canadian Veterinary Journal 37 
(June, 1996): 359–60. 
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horses lying down, rolling, kicking at their bellies, all of which would fit Baker’s 
description of the horses’ actions.  Intestinal spasms resulting from dehydration could 
also lead to displaced and twisted intestines, which can cause death.  Dehydration could 
potentially lead to renal failure, which would cause the wine’s effects to be more 
severe.189 
This was not the first time the horses had been given wine to drink due to a 
shortage of water—it had occurred on 11 November, also with the loss of horses—, 
which indicates that the army was not transporting water, or not enough of it to meet the 
horses’ needs.  Additionally, any problems caused by the first waterless march, e.g., 
impactions, would have been exacerbated by this second march.  While the route of 11 
November truly was waterless, on 23 November the Anglo-Gascon army camped on an 
open plain only four miles from the river Gers.  Scouts certainly would have found the 
river, yet the army did not push on toward it.  Given the shorter days and the hilly terrain, 
it may very well have been too dark to press forward without significant risks to the 
horses and the baggage train, which would also have been exposed to French harrying.190 
The first order of business on 25 November would have been reaching water.  It 
would have been essential to water the horses after the first hour of march,191 since it is 
unlikely that the army gave the horses more wine in the morning when the Gers was so 
                                                
189Correspondence with Dr. Erin Malone, University of Minnesota Veterinary College, 9 
January 2014. 
190Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 103.  For the risks of harrying, see Harari, 
“Supply and Strategy,” passim.  
191Professional Papers, No. 29. Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. Fourth (Revised) Edition, 
with Addenda. Engineer Field Manual, Pts. 1–4. Prepared under direction of Brig. 
General A. MacKenzie, Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1912. War Department Document 355, 431–32. 
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close.  The four-mile march to the Gers could have been accomplished in an hour’s time.  
After crossing the river, the Anglo-Gascon force marched along a broad front, “where 
they expected to meet the enemy.”192  The French army did not offer battle.  The Anglo-
Gascons marched onward, “leaving the walled town of Florenciae/Fleurance, which had 
once been English, to the right.”193  Their route took them through Silarde, described as a 
“large town” (grandem villam) and ended, at least for the Prince’s division, at 
Realmont/Réjaumont, “ten miles southwest of Fleurance.”194  Hoskins identifies Silarde 
as St-Lary near Ste-Radegund, about three miles west of Fleurance.195   
Realmont/Réjaumont (see Map 8), where the Prince and his division spent the 
night of 25 November, resisted and was taken by assault and burned.196  It was a sizeable 
fortified town with a castle.  While the town had been both French and English at various 
points, in 1355 it was under French jurisdiction.197  The army halted there on 26 
November.  During the day of rest “a wandering [French] man-at-arms was captured.”  
His intelligence must have been welcome to the Prince and his staff.  He reported “that a 
great quarrel had sprung up between the constable of France and the count of Armagnac 
because the count had promised to fight a battle for them, but had done nothing.  They 
[the French forces] had dishonorably fled many times.”  The man-at-arms added “that the 
                                                
192Baker, Chronicon, 243.  “…cum districtione magna praeterierunt aquam, ubi sperabant 
inimicis obviare…” 
193Baker, Chronicon, 243.  “…et dimittentes a dextris villam Florenciae muratam, 
aliquando Anglicam…” 
194Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 103. 
195Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 103–05. 
196Baker, Chronicon, 243. 
197Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 105.  There is also debate about whether the 
French or English founded the town, and Bentley, Fort Towns of France, 196, argues that 
the Cistercians founded it. 
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count was blamed for this.”198  This dissension between the two French commanders is 
plausible, especially in light of Jean II’s later dissatisfaction.199  The Prince had already 
decided to return to Gascony, but this information would have confirmed the choice.  The 
French clearly had no intention of offering battle.  The disagreement among the 
commanders also lessened the likelihood of co-ordinated pursuit and harrying. 
The order of march on 27 November suggests that the Prince was not overly 
concerned about a French attack.  The terrain was similar to the previous few days—
gentle hills and rivers, most running north to south—and the twenty-mile march would 
have been easily accomplished.  Even crossing the Baïse river, which Baker describes as 
“a great river,” would have caused little delay.  The army “crossed in scattered groups,” 
then “marched for the rest of the day between walled towns and strong castles,”200 such 
as Valence-sur-Baïse.  Despite tempting targets, such as the abbey of Floran, there is no 
evidence that the army attacked or pillaged further, or at least nothing Baker deemed 
noteworthy.   
The Prince’s division camped at le Serde (see Map 9).201  This has been identified 
as Lagardère (Hoskins, Hewitt, Thompson), Lasserre (Rogers), and La Ressingle (De 
                                                
198Baker, Chronicon, 243–44.  “..et captus errantius armorum, retulit quod inter 
constabularium Francorum et comitem Aminiacensem lis non modica fuit exorta, pro eo 
quod comite promittente bellum ad illorum utilitatem ineundum, nihilo facto cum 
dedecore pluries fugerunt, quod eidem comiti fuit imputatum.” 
199Delachanel, vol. 1, 130,  n.1. 
200Baker, Chronicon, 244.  “…transierunt, sed districte, magnam aquam, et residuo diei 
inter villas muratas et castra fortia…”  See also, Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black 
Prince, 105, for his description of the terrain. 
201Baker, Chronicon, 244. 
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Santi).202  Baker describes le Serde as being one league (3 miles) from Condone/Condom 
and as having been destroyed by Lancaster (during his 1349 chevauchée).  Neither 
Lagardère nor Lasserre are within a league of Condone/Condom.  La Ressingle fits the 
geographic description, is twenty miles from Realmont/Réjaumont and ten miles from 
Meysin/Mézin, and has the army crossing the Baïse near Valance-sur-Baïse; however, its 
walls are still intact and the town supposedly escaped destruction during the Hundred 
Years War, which does not fit Baker’s description.  Lasserre makes little sense: The army 
would have a twenty-five mile march on 27 November, then a ten mile march the next 
day.  The route also would not require the army to cross the Baïse river, which would not 
fit with Baker’s account.  Lagardère would be a fourteen-mile march on 27 November, 
followed by eighteen miles the next day.  That would be a more reasonable division of 
the march, especially considering the decreasing hours of daylight.203  
La Ressingle, however, seems the most likely choice, despite its supposed escape 
from destruction.204  A twenty-mile march was within the capabilities of the army.  Part 
of the march would have been conducted in darkness for the baggage train, although it is 
possible that the baggage caught up to the main army the following day at Meysin/Mézin.  
Aside from Laressingle’s position on the route, the army could have marched north along 
the Auloue river valley, would have had an easier crossing at Valence-sur-Baïse (see 
Cassini map), and would have only needed to make one river crossing.  The route to 
                                                
202Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 106; Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 
51; Thompson, ed., Chronicon Galfridi le Baker, 296; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 
322, n. 184; De Santi, “L’éxpédition de Prince Noir,” 31.  Barber opts for Lasserre in Life 
and Campaigns, 69, and Lagadère in Edward, Prince of Wales and Aquitaine, 118. 
203Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 106, for the distances. 
204The source for this is a tourist guide, Laressingle en Condomois. 
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Lagardère would have entailed two river crossings, the Baïse and the Auloue. 
The army reached Meysin/Mézin (see Map 9) on 28 November after an easy 
march of ten miles.  They crossed the Osse in groups—one likely crossing point was the 
Pont d’Artigues, which was only a mile southwest from Leressingle and on the route to 
Santiago de Compostela—, then they “entered a narrow forest road.”  At this juncture 
many of the Gascons and all of the Béarnaise troops departed, having been given leave to 
return to their homes.  The banners were furled.205  The army had entered the lands of 
Albret, who served with the Prince’s army and whose family had a long history of loyalty 
to England.  Meysin/Mézin “was always English” and very involved in the Anglo-
Gascon wine trade.206 
The army rested the next day (29 November) at Meysin/Mézin, perhaps to give 
the baggage train time to catch up to the army.  The Prince “received the homage and 
oaths of the town’s residents.”207  Henxteworth finally had the opportunity to bring his 
accounts up to date, and supplies were purchased.  Oats, hay, and vetch were purchased 
on 28 November; wheat, firewood, fish, and salt on 29 November.  Advance wages were 
again paid, as were reparations: 18s to Gerard de Rynaly in recompense for the burning 
of his house.208  The army had entered friendly territory, and the resumption of account 
keeping confirms that.  The absence of accounts from the time the army left Narbonne 
until it reached Meysin/Mézin further indicates the pace at which the army was moving.  
On the outward advance Henxteworth kept regular accounts, but on the return he did not, 
                                                
205Baker, Chronicon, 244. 
206Baker, Chronicon, 244.  “…quae semper fuit Anglicorum…” 
207Baker, Chronicon, 244.  “…recepturus homagium et sacramenta illorum de villa.” 
208DCO, Henxteworth accounts, accounts for 28 and 29 November 1355. 
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which suggests he may not have had the opportunity to do so.  The longer marches during 
the day likely would have left him little time to balance the accounts in the evening. 
The army left Meysin/Mézin on 30 November and marched twenty-two miles 
through the Landes to Gelons/Casteljaloux (see Map 9), which had three castles.209  It 
was a large town with paper and glass industries.210  On 1 December the Prince’s division 
marched fifteen miles to Melan/Meilhan-sur-Garonne (see Map 9), while other parts of 
the army marched an additional six miles “through desolate forest next to the Cistercian 
monastery of Montguilliam, and crossed the English royal forest of Boismajour” to La 
Réole (see Map 9), “which the earl of Derby [duke of Lancaster] had captured in the 
past.”211  The march took the army up onto a ridge between the Landes and the Garonne 
river valley and past several small villages in French hands on the Garonne’s western 
bank, which the army did not attempt to take at this time—that would wait until early 
1356.212  From the ridge, the route descends to the Garonne’s flood plain.  The town, 
itself, is 150 feet above the river, had been English, fallen into French hands, and re-taken 
by Lancaster in 1349.213 
La Réole had also been re-taken by Lancaster with the help of its residents, who 
                                                
209Baker, Chronicon, 244. 
210J. Queyrou, Casteljaloux et sa région (Casteljaloux, 1982), 4 and 8. 
211Baker, Chronicon, 244–45.  “…transierunt patriam silvestrem et vastam juxta 
monasterium Cisterciense vocatum Montguilliam, et trans forestam regis Angliae 
nuncupatam Bois majour, ad villam de Regula grandem et bene munitam, quam comes 
Derbie dudum conquisivit…” 
212Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 326–27. 
213Oeuvres, vol. 4, 278–79; Henri Ribadieu, Les campagnes du Comte Derby en Guyenne 
(Pau, 2006), 41. 
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understood that the association with the English benefited them.214  After the final march 
of six miles, the Prince and his troops reached the town and entered through its gates.  
They remained there until 5 December, passed that night at St-Macaire—the advance 
supply depot—, and were back in Bordeaux by 9 December, which is when 
Henxteworth’s accounts resume in Bordeaux.  Clearly, the Prince and his army covered 
the approximately thirty miles at a leisurely pace.215   
At St-Macaire the army began the process of standing down and preparing for the 
winter.  Supplies were purchased and transported, along with the Prince’s harness, back 
to Bordeaux, much of it via river transport.216  In Bordeaux, the army took stock of its 
accomplishments, settled in for the winter, and prepared for the 1356 campaign season.  
In a council at La Réole it had been determined “that the magnates and barons should 
spend the winter at different places on the border, to protect the Gascon lands from the 
inroads of the French.”217  The Prince and his command staff understood what they had 
accomplished during their two-month campaign and clearly meant to hold on to their 
gains and to maintain English authority along the marches. 
The return to Bordeaux continued the pattern of the initial advance to Narbonne: 
destroying infrastructure, burning, pillaging.  The Anglo-Gascon army effectively 
demonstrated that even the presence of a numerically superior French force—led by 
Armagnac and the Marshal de Clermont—could neither prevent the depredations nor 
                                                
214Sumption, Trial by Battle, 474–45; Fowler, The King’s Lieutenant, 62. 
215DCO, Henxteworth accounts, account for 9 December. 
216DCO, Henxteworth accounts, account for 5 December 1355. 
217Baker, Chronicon, 245.  “In Regula concilio principis consulto, ordinati fuerunt 
principes et barones ad hiemandum in distinctis locis super Marchiam, partiam 
intrinsceam Gasconiae contra versutias Gallicorum protecturi…” 
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protect the populace.  The Prince’s army wrought considerable destruction, and despite 
the sometimes arduous conditions and the loss of many horses, the army returned safely 
to Bordeaux.  The Prince may have failed to bring Armagnac to battle.  Even so, he 
judged his first solo command a success and looked to the future.  The subject of the next 
chapter, then, is the contemporary assessment of the campaign and the Prince’s future 
plans for his tenure as the King’s lieutenant in Gascony.
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Between the conclusion of the 1355 raid (2 December 1355) and the beginning of the 
Poitiers campaign (4 August 1356), the Prince’s army went to winter quarters and the 
business of repairs and resupply began.  The first task was to establish winter quarters, 
which would be used to protect the marches from the French and to serve as bases for 
small-scale winter operations.  The second task was taking care of “paperwork” and 
administrative tasks.  This involved payment of advance wages, re-imbursements for a 
number of items, shoeing horses, making repairs, and determining what supplies were 
needed from England.  Thirdly, then, resupply was a critical activity during the months 
between the conclusion of the 1355 campaign and the start of the 1356 campaign.  
Finally, the Prince reported the success of the former in a letter to the bishop of 
Winchester, the head of his council in England.  John de Wengefeld also wrote to the 
bishop.  The Prince waited to write his letter until 25 December, after the army was 
established in their winter encampments and the supply needs had been determined.  
Richard de Stafford, a key member of the Prince’s household and often charged with 
specific missions, carried the letters to England—he left after 25 December and arrived 
sometime after 6 January 13561—and oversaw the resupply mission. 
 Wengefeld and, one assumes, the Prince’s staff thought the war in Gascony could 
be continued.  He wrote in his letter to the bishop of Winchester, “[a]nd, by the help of 
God, if my lord had wherewithal to maintain this war and to do the king’s profit and his 
                                                
1Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 432, 437. 
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own honour, he would easily enlarge the marches and would win many places; for our 
enemies are sore astonished.”2  At the time Wengefeld wrote to the bishop it was clear 
that the Prince and the earls had already taken steps to guard the marches and further the 
war: “And at the writing hereof my lord hath ordained to send all the earls and all the 
bannerets to abide in certain places on the marches, in order to make raids and harass his 
enemies.”3  Thus, in Wengefeld’s assessment, the Prince’s forces could—and should?—
take advantage of the momentum of the fall chevauchée and pressure the count of 
Armagnac and expand the frontiers of the duchy.  Moreover, he makes it clear that the 
Prince and his staff had already taken steps to do so. 
Winter Quarters and Interim Operations 
The weather in late December and into January was cold and damp.4  The Prince and his 
commanders set up winter quarters in various locations.  The Prince himself established 
his headquarters at Libourne.  There he “watcheth for news which he ought to have there, 
and, according to the news that he shall have, he will dispose himself as seemeth best for 
                                                
2John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 445.  “Et, par laide de Dieu, si mounseignur eust de qoi maintenir ceste guerre et 
de faire le profit le roy et son honur, il enlargisseroit bein lez marches etgaigneroit 
plusors lieus; car noz enemys sount mult estonez.” 
3John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 445.  “Et a fesaunce du cestes monseignur avoit ordeyne de maunder toutes lez 
countes et totes les banertz a demeorer a diverses lieus sur les marches, pur feare 
chicaches et grever ses enemys.” 
4Current winters are chilly, damp, and rainy.  Due to the Little Ice Age, the winter was 
colder than at present.  Bordeaux was probably inland far enough to escape the worst of 
any Atlantic storms during the winter.  For discussion of the climate, see Brian M. Fagan, 
The Little Ice Age: how climate made history (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 49, 66. 
Chapter 7: After the Campaign 
 
342 
his honour.”5  Given that the earls, certain Gascon lords, and others were raiding in the 
early weeks of 1356, the news the Prince awaited likely involved the results of those 
raids.  He may also have been awaiting information from England as to the upcoming 
campaign.  Edward III planned (again) a tri-partite campaign: The Prince should attack 
from Gascony, Lancaster in Normandy, and the King in Brittany.  Wengefeld remained in 
Libourne with the Prince, as did Bernard Ezii, lord of Albret—a key Gascon member of 
the Prince’s staff with long-standing ties to England.  The lord of Pommiers was a league 
(three miles) away at Fronsac.  Those of the Prince’s retinue who were not participating 
on raids were stationed at Libourne and Saint-Emilion.6 
Given the plans for the 1356 campaigns, loose as those plans must have been in 
January, the Prince needed to secure the duchy and firmly establish an English presence 
along the Gascon Marches.  While the Prince remained at Libourne, he delegated the 
tasks to his subordinates.  The earls, Chandos, Audley, the Captal de Buch, and others 
launched several small raids that solidified England’s hold on the marches and 
strengthened the security of Gascony.  The Gascons, particularly those who had long-
standing ties to England, also participated in the raids.  The Prince and John de 
Wengefeld received reports of their activities, and the latter wrote to Richard de Stafford 
in England on 22 January 1356 and provided him with the details, as well as instructions 
to pass along the intelligence to the relevant partes, e.g., the Prince’s council in England 
                                                
5John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
449.  “Et mounseignur gaite novells le quels y deyt aver, et, solonc lez novels qil avera, il 
se tretera od il semble qe mieltz soit pur son honur.” 
6John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
449. 
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and the King.7  
As of 22 January 1356, the Anglo-Gascon forces had enjoyed a good deal of 
success.  Five walled towns—“Port-Sainte-Marie, Clairac, Tonneins, Bourg-Saint-Pierre, 
Castelsagrat, and Brassac”—and seventeen castles had surrendered.8  John Chandos, 
James Audley, Baldwin Botetort, and Reginald de Cobham raided 100 miles upstream 
along the Garonne9 and “took the said town…Castelsagrat by assault, and the bastard of 
l’Isle, who was captain of the said town, was slain, as they were assaulting and was 
stricken with an arrow through the head.”10  Cobham returned to “Landedac” and 
Botetort returned to Brassac, while Chandos and Audley remained in Castelsgarat, 
presumably to secure it.11 
Wengefeld’s letter to de Stafford is quite friendly and familiar.  He assures de 
Stafford that his men, who were with Chandos and Audley, were well and in Castelsgarat 
with “more than three hundred men-at-arms and three hundred foot soldiers and one 
hundred and fifty archers.”12  Wengefeld continues: “[They] have enough of victuals 
between this [22 January] and St. John’s day [24 June], save fresh fish and greens, as 
                                                
7John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
449. 
8John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
448. 
9Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 118. 
10John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
448.  “…pristrent la dite ville qad a noun Chastel Satrat par assaunt, et le bastard de Lyle, 
qe feust capitan de la dite ville, feust tue, auxi come ils assaillerent, qe feust ferru od une 
saete parmy la teste.” 
11John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
448. 
12John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
448.  “Et sount en celle ville plus qe ccc. Gleyves et de ccc. servauntz et cl. archiers.” 
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they have sent us word by their letters.  Wherefore you need not concern yourself about 
your good folk.”13  From their new base at Castelsgarat, Chandos, Audley, and their men 
raided the area around Agen, burning mills and bridges.  According to Wengefeld’s 
intelligence, the count of Armagnac and the seneschal of Agenais were both in Agen, but 
“would not once put out their heads, nor any of their men.”14  If Agen was as well 
supplied as Castelsgarat, the count and the seneschal had no reason to fight or venture 
without the walls.  They were secure for the winter and clearly had no intention of risking 
a loss in battle or losing the town.  Presumably, they would have mounted a defense in 
the event of an assault on the town walls.  The presence of lord Boucicaut, lord Ernald of 
Spain [Despaigne is what Wengefeld writes in the letter], and Grismouton of Chambly, 
and their three hundred men-at-arms and three hundred Lombard mercenaries at Moissac, 
three miles from Castelsagrat, likely also influenced Armagnac’s decision to remain 
safely behind the walls of Agen.  Despite the presence of the Anglo-Gascons, Armagnac 
did manage to leave Agen.  As of 22 January, the date of the letter, Wengefeld reported 
that Armagnac was in Avignon, as was the king of Aragon.15 
Suffolk, Oxford, and Salisbury also contributed to the security of the duchy, 
raiding as far as Rocamadour more than 100 miles along the lower course of the 
                                                
13John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
448.  “…et ount assetz de toutes maners vivres entre cy et le Seint Johan, si ne soit de 
pessoun fres et chowes, com nous ount mande par lour lettres.  Sur quey y ne coent pas 
qe vous pensez de voz bones geantz.” 
14John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
448.  “Et mounsire Johan Dermynak et le seneschal Dagenoys, qestoient en la ville 
Dagente, ne voillent une foitz butere hors lour teste ne nules de lor geantz…” 
15John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
449. 
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Dordogne.  As of 22 January they had been raiding twelve days and had not yet returned.  
Like Chandos and Audley, they, too, had Gascons in their company, including the lords 
of Mussidan and Pommiers.  Their company was of similar size, too: “more than five 
hundred men-at-arms, and two hundred soldiers and three hundred archers.”16  Warwick 
had been present at Clairac and Tonneins on the Lot and Garonne, and was presently 
raiding around Marmand with the express purpose of “destroy[ing] their victuals and all 
other things of theirs that he can destroy.”17  Later that spring, some time after April, 
Warwick took the walled town of Mirabeau in Quercy, as well as its strong castle.18   
As for the other members of the command staff entrusted with winter operations, 
they were disposed as follows: Bartholomew de Burghersh and 120 men-at-arms and 120 
archers were at Cognac; de Buch, the lord of Montferrand, and the lord of Curton, along 
with three hundred lances and 120 archers and some troops drawn from the garrisons at 
Taillebourg, Rochefort, and Tonnay.19  It is likely they took supplies from these towns, 
too.  Per the Prince’s indenture with the King, Edward III was responsible for victualling 
these towns and their garrisons.20  De Buch and his men raided north toward Saintonge.  
Reginald de Cobham, members of the Prince’s household, and “the Gascons which are in 
their company” had ridden out to join Suffolk, Salisbury, and Oxford along the 
                                                
16John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
449.  “…qe sount bien plus qe D. gleyves, et cc. servauntz et ccc. archiers…” 
17John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
449.  “…et est a fesaunce du cestes devers Mermande, pur destruire lours vives et tout 
aultre chose qil purra destruire de eaux.” 
18Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 450. 
19These three towns may have provided victuals.  Per the Prince’s indenture with Edward 
III, the King was responsible for supplying these towns with victuals.  For the garrisons, 
see DCO, Henxtewort, throughout. 
20TNA, E 36/278, f. 88; BPR, IV, 144. 
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Dordogne.21  De Buch, as part of his winter activities, garrisoned several towns in 
Saintonge.  During his raid, his troops took Périgueux’s cité by escalade, then turned it 
over to Auger de Montaut, lord of Mussidan.22  Later in the spring, an Anglo-Gascon 
force, possibly under the Prince’s direct command, took Le Mas, which was situated on 
the Gironde.23 
During these operations the Prince was in contact with his captains.  In addition to 
his letters to Richard De Stafford and the bishop of Winchester, the Prince sent letters (no 
longer extant) to the earl of Warwick on 7 January 1356, while the latter was 
campaigning along the Garonne, and to the earls of Oxford and Suffolk at Bergerac on 10 
January 1356.24   These letters possibly contained instructions for the earls as contrasted 
to the letter-report the Prince sent to the bishop of Winchester in England.  The Prince 
also received communiqués from his captains.  Both the captal de Buch and the lord of 
Montferrand sent messengers and New Year’s gifts.25 
The Prince’s captains were clearly busy on his behalf, and it is apparent that he 
trusted his subordinates to carry out their pre-assigned missions.  Given their success in 
securing the borders and the gains the Anglo-Gascon army had made and extending the 
frontiers of Gascony, he was right to do so.  Edward III had chosen well when he selected 
the men who would accompany the Prince to Gascony.  In addition to making militarily 
                                                
21John de Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
448–49. 
22Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 456–57; Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 
118; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 192; DCO, Henxteworth accounts; Villepelet, 233. 
23Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 450.  “Item, villa quadam, vocata la Masse, situata 
juxta flumen de Gerounde, reddita fuit dominoi principi Walliae.” 
24DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 7 and 10 January 1356. 
25DCO, Henxteworth accounts, account for 30 December 1355. 
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secure the lands gained in war, these operations not only established the foundation for 
the campaigns of 1356 but also had important political ramifications. 
Homages 
On 24 April, the Prince received the oaths of several Gascon lords who returned to their 
allegiance to Edward III.  These included Guiscart lord of Camound (Caumont), Jean le 
Galard lord of Leymulle (Limeuil)—his lands were confiscated by the French king in 
1357 and given to Jean la Maingre26—, Gaillard Durfort lord of Greynoles (Grignols), 
and lord Bertrand Dureford, among others. In addition to their submissions, the Prince 
also accepted the surrender of “30 castles, walled towns, and small fortresses.”27  In some 
cases, it appears that financial motives also were involved, as Henxteworth records a 
number of instances in which a Gascon submitted to the Prince for a monetary 
inducement.28  Stretle’s accounts reveal additional payments for losses resulting from 
continued service to Edward III and expenses tied to leading others “to the king’s 
obedience.”29 
Winter Supplies 
Given that the Prince and the troops under his personal command remained relatively 
stationary throughout the winter, supplies had to be transported from the countryside to 
the winter quarters.  One key item was fuel, which was transported from Langon and St. 
                                                
26Dossat, Le Languedoc dans le Trésor des Chartes, item 1776. 
27Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 449–50.  “…in Vasconia venerunt ad ligeanciam regis 
Angliae dominus de Camound, dominus Johannes Callard, dominus de Leymulle, 
dominus Gaillardus Durfort, dominus de Greynoles, et dominus Bertrandus Dureford, 
cum xxx castris, villis clausis, et fortaleciis.”  See also Moissant, 47–48. 
28DCO, Henxteworth accounts, 101, 109.  “causa adventus sui ad obedientiam domini 
Regis Anglie.” 
29TNA, Pipe Roll, Edward III 36, m. xv. 
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Macaire via the Garonne.30  Food, obviously, was another, and the soldiers enjoyed an 
increased variety in their diet as compared to field rations.  After the return to Bordeaux, 
Henxteworth recorded a significantly larger number of purchases of meat, fish, poultry, 
grains, e.g., rice, and vegetables, such as onions and garlic, than he did during the 
campaign,31 although it is likely soldiers found a variety of foods while raiding to 
supplement their diets.   
 Aside from these more mundane necessities, the Prince also indulged himself with 
a few luxuries: almonds; oysters; fruit; honey; and eels.32  Many of these purchases 
appear to be connected to the Prince’s Christmas celebrations.  The Prince and his army 
did, indeed, celebrate.  The Annonimale Chronicle states the Prince “command[ed] his 
lords…to have ease and refreshment for themselves,” and Chandos Herald writes the 
Prince “and his noble knights were there in great joy and solace.  There was gaiety, 
noblesse, courtesy, goodness, and largesse.”33 
Financial Matters 
Henxteworth’s accounts show a flurry of activity upon the conclusion of the campaign 
and the Prince’s return to Bordeaux.  In addition to the expenses attendant upon the 
conclusion of the campaign, his ledger shows the recurring costs of maintaining troops in 
Gascony.  The records begin the day the army arrived in Bordeaux in September 1355 
and conclude the last day of June 1356, thirty-five days before the Anglo-Gascon army 
                                                
30DCO, Henxteworth Accounts, 30 December 1355 and other dates. 
31DCO, Henxteworth Accounts, 9 December 1355 and after. 
32DCO, Henxteworth Accounts, 21–30 December 1355. 
33The Anonimalle Chronicle, 35; Chandos Herald, lines 657–64; Hewitt, The Black 
Prince’s Expedition, 84. 
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left on the 1356 campaign that would culminate at Poitiers.  Thus, Henxteworth’s 
accounts provide an overall financial picture of the campaign, as the expenditures can be 
tracked over time and by large general categories, such as horses, provisions, and 
transport, which nicely underscores the logistical priorities of medieval warfare. 
Before proceeding, however, there are some pertinent facts about the larger 
financial picture that require some airing.  Between 20 September 1355 and 29 December 
1355, Henxteworth paid out a total of 3706l 17s 4.92d, which is impressive considering 
the opening balance of the accounts was only 2595l 7s 6.25d and there remained 2377l 7d 
on 30 December.  This campaign clearly depended on the 3886l 5s 0.96d in loans from 
the treasurer, John de Stretle, Constable of Bordeaux, and a few other individuals.  The 
Constable of Bordeaux, John de Stretle, loaned the prince 1,538l in the first few days of 
October as the army was preparing for the campaign by transporting supplies to an 
advance depot at St. Macaire, further up the Garonne River.   
Within Henxteworth’s accounts there are several offices, or ‘departments,’ and 
administrators through which provisioning and purveying tasks were funneled.  First, 
there was the marshalcy.  The clerk of the marshalcy handled payments for the shoeing of 
horses and the wages of grooms.  The office of the poultry oversaw the purveyance of 
poultry and eggs, while the office of the buttery managed the purchase and transport of 
wine, as well as related incomestibles, such as bowls.  The clerk of the kitchen and the 
office of the kitchen, as well as the office of the pantry, were responsible for other 
comestible provisions, e.g., fish, meat, wheat, and cheese; the office of the saucery dealt 
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with spices and vegetables, such as onions and garlic;34 and the office of the scullery 
handled the purchase and transport of fuel (Henxteworth specifies both firewood and 
coal), herbage (grass, pasture), locks, and other incomestibles, such as wooden vessels.  
The office of the hall oversaw various tasks, including the repair of the Prince’s 
standards, the carriage of the Prince’s personal items, such as his harness, and the 
building of the cabin for Richard de Stafford.  The purchase of medicines was overseen 
by the office of the spicery.  Henxteworth, in his capacity as the cashier, personally 
handled the payment of wages, the Prince’s personal expenses, gifts and reparations, and 
the payment of money owed to individuals. 
Henxteworth records almost 900 entries for the period of 20 September 1355 
through 30 December 1355.  Nearly half of the entries went through the above offices, 
and payments to individuals account for the remainder.  Of the various offices, the office 
of the Marshalcy was by far the most active, followed distantly by the office of the 
kitchen.  The offices through which the most cash flowed were direct payments to 
individuals (70.2%), the marshalcy (10.0%), and the kitchen (4.9%). (See Appendix E ).  
The combined total of the offices that handled provisioning (151 of the known entries) is 
roughly equal to the total entries for the office of the Marshalcy.  
Looking at the amount spent by category, e.g., wages or transport, and office 
reveals that payments to individuals (wages and money owed in the book of memoranda, 
53.7%) were the largest budget item, followed by victuals (15.3%) and horses (both the 
animals themselves and related expenses, 10.4 %) (See Appendix E).  Dividing the 
                                                
34DCO, Henxteworth accounts, account for 21 December 1355. 
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budget items up via office demonstrates how the various expenditures of the campaign 
were spread among the offices and which offices were responsible for specific functions 
(see Appendix E).  Thus, it is clear that the Marshalcy’s primary responsibility was the 
horses and related expenses, and the pantry, kitchen, buttery, poultry, and saucery 
handled the provisioning.  Yet it is also apparent that the various offices handled 
expenses not normally within their purview.  For example, Henxteworth clearly grouped 
the wages of grooms with the shoeing of horses, and the clerk of the Marshalcy was 
responsible for the disbursement of said wages.  All in all, the accounts reveal a highly 
organized system for the distribution of funds and the organization of provisioning. 
In addition to the organization of the finances, the accounts show that the 
financial activity of the campaign was concentrated prior to the army’s departure on the 
raid and upon the army’s return to Bordeaux for the winter.  Mapping the expenses over 
time shows that certain expenses were tied to specific events in the campaign. Prior to the 
army’s departure from Bordeaux, the largest single category of expenditures was 
payments to individuals, either in advances on wages or in payment of money owed to 
individuals.35  Upon the army’s return, the largest expenses were, once again, wages—
advances for the next half-year, as specified in the Prince’s indenture with Edward III—
and the expenses related to horses, in particular shoeing and the wages of grooms.  A 
number of purchases were made during the campaign, primarily victuals and 
incomestible supplies.  The other key expenditures during the campaign were gifts and 
                                                
35It is unclear in the Henxteworth accounts what, exactly, the “money owing as written in 
the book of memoranda” is.  Given that Henxteworth specifies when he paid advance 
wages, I have separated the two as discrete items but considered both as payments made 
to individuals. 
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reparations for destroyed houses—in towns in friendly territory.  
The majority of expenses are clustered in late September and early October, and 
there is another cluster at the end of November, then a steady stream of debits through 
December as the army returned to Bordeaux and moved to winter quarters.  The first 
group of debits reflects the activities associated with disembarking, for example the 24s 
8d paid to the clerk of the Marshalcy for “windage of the lord’s horses in two ships” and 
another 3s on the carriage of harness from ships to Bordeaux, and preparing for the 
upcoming expedition.  Thus, the Clerk of the Marshalcy also received 37s 2d as an 
advance to pay for the removal and transport of oats. The clerk of the pantry received 33s 
4d for carriage of victuals from Bordeaux to St. Macaire, indicating the establishment of 
that advance depot.36  In December, the accounts demonstrate the flurry of shoeing and 
repairs, such as the repairs to the Prince’s standards, associated with the end of a 
campaign.37 
The other matter associated with the end of the campaign, of course, was 
resupply. 
Resupply from England 
Richard de Stafford, a key member of the Prince’s staff and household, was charged with 
delivering the Prince’s and Wengefeld’s letters to the bishop of Winchester, orally 
reporting to the bishop, and overseeing the resupply mission.  William Burton 
                                                
36DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 20 September and 1 October. 
37DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entries for 28 November–30 December. 
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accompanied him.38  The two men left Bordeaux after 25 December—and after a ship 
cabin was built for de Stafford’s use—39 and would have reached England within 
approximately two weeks.  By the time the Prince and Wengefeld wrote their letters, the 
army had already settled into their winter quarters and the winter needs of the army had 
been established. 
A significant part of that resupply was done by sea and included victuals, horses, 
and men.  The mechanics of resupply were similar to the original purveyance of 1355, 
i.e., orders were issued to purveyance officers and carried out by the sheriffs and their 
bailiffs.  The primary difference was the scale of the resupply operation.  Rather than 
recruiting men and purveying supplies for an entirely new operation, the Prince’s officers 
were seeking to fill precise needs, such as archers.40 
A critical aspect of Richard de Stafford’s mission to England was recruiting 
reinforcements.  Of the 300 new archers the King promised, the Prince ordered that “200 
of the best mounted archers they can find” come from Chester.  The chamberlain was to 
appoint their leaders, provide the archers with livery and advance wages (12d per day for 
the leaders and 6d per day for the archers) for their journey to Plymouth, and make sure 
they are at the port, ready to sail by 17 April 1356 with de Stafford.41  The number of 
archers to be arrayed in Chester was increased to 500, per a subsequent order of 26 
March, only eleven days after the chamberlain received the first order, which raised the 
                                                
38Prince of Wales, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” and John de Wengefeld, “Letter 
to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 439 and 444. 
39DCO, Henxteworth Accounts, 29 December 1335. 
40BPR, III, 224. 
41BPR, III, 224. 
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number of archers to be arrayed to 600.  These additional Cheshire archers, too, were to 
receive livery and advance wages. Significantly, the chamberlain was instructed to pay 
them only for eight days, as the Prince’s officers at Plymouth would “pay them their 
wages there.”42  This differs from both the immediately preceding order and the practice 
of 1355, in which the archers received twenty-one days’ pay in advance.  This may 
indicate that the chamberlain did not have enough cash on hand to pay such a large 
advance or that he lacked sufficient time to amass the sum given that the archers’ skills 
needed to be tested43 and the men themselves had to be arrayed and ready to sail at 
Plymouth by 17 April.  If nothing else, it is clear that the Prince’s officers at Plymouth 
did have cash on hand. 
Stafford was not the only one recruiting additional archers.  Thomas de Berkeley, 
sheriff of Gloucester, and his sergeants-at-arms Simon Basset, William atte Mershe, and 
John de Cornwaille arrayed one hundred mounted archers and provided them with one 
suit of clothes, as well as the bows, and John de Cornwaille accompanied them to 
Plymouth.44  These archers were the final 100 to make the full complement of 600 
archers.45 
One crucial aspect of resupply was a shipment of new baggage horses.  Per the 
orders of letters received as of 27 March 1356, John Kendale, receiver of Cornwall, was 
                                                
42BPR, III, 224. 
43Robert Hardy, Longbow: A Social and Military History (New York, 1977). 
44TNA, C61/68, mm. 4–6. 
45Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 92.  Interestingly, archers for the Prince’s 
company were not arrayed in Flint or North Wales, as they had been in 1355.  Instead, the 
Prince was required to provide 160 men and 50 Welshmen from Flint and North Wales 
respecitive, half archers and half lancers.  TNA, C 76/34, m. 11 
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to “purvey…thirty of the best and strongest baggage-horses that he can find, with saddles 
and other baggage harness,” as well as suitable grooms.  He was to be reimbursed for the 
horses, wages of grooms, and the cost of victuals and other necessities.  Roger Ragas 
bought sumpter (pack) horses, and those horses and the baggage horses purveyed by 
Kendal were to join “the other horses and grooms which are waiting for shipment.”46  
The sheriff of Devon purveyed 400 hurdles for shipping horses to the Prince.  These were 
for the same ships that Stafford and the additional archers would be sailing in to 
Gascony.47  Baker’s Chronicle mentions several marches on which horses were lost, and 
these orders indicate that more horses were clearly needed.48 
Comestibles were also purveyed and sent to Gascony.  John de Kendale, the 
Prince’s received in Cornwall, was to purvey and send to the Bordeaux “500 cod fish 
(whereof 300 are to be dried and 200 powdered, if the latter can be carried without being 
spoilt, and if not, all of them dried), and 400 salt congers…200 salted salmon.”  These 
orders date to 11 August, and Kendale was to send the supplies when “the ships sail at the 
present vintage season.”49  Thomas de Drayton, Hugh Fastolf, and Adam Kentisshe 
received a similar commission to purvey salted fish and herrings and to transport it to 
Gascony.50 
Arrows and bows were sorely needed.  Robert Pipot was sent to England, likely 
on the same ship as de Stafford, with orders to “purvey for [the Prince’s] use 1000 bows, 
                                                
46BPR, II, 94. 
47TNA, C 54/194, m. 19.  CCR, X, 256. 
48Baker, Chronicon, 230–44; DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 1 October 1355. 
49BPR, II, 98. 
50TNA, C 66/250, m. 18. CPR, X, 468. 
Chapter 7: After the Campaign 
 
356 
2000 sheaves of arrows and 400 gross of bowstrings.”  Citing both an “urgent need of 
bows, arrows and bowstrings” and a dearth of arrows in England, the Prince sent Pipot to 
Chester, there to “take all the arrows he can find…and to arrest the fletchers themselves 
to continue working at their craft…until [the Prince’s] need is satisfied.”51  According to 
the 29 February 1356 order to John de Brunham, chamberlain of Chester, the shortage 
was due to the King’s own demand for arrows.  Further underscoring the Prince’s need, 
Brunham is to help Pipot and pay the fletchers “such sums as he thinks will serve to 
encourage them in their work.”52  This last was altered to “to pay the said fletchers what 
is due to them for their labour.”53   
The Prince’s council was still contracting for the production of arrows as late as 
July, which indicates that more arrows were clearly needed.  Kendale was ordered “to 
pay the said fletchers from time to time” in July 1356.54  These orders reveal both the 
pressing need for a fresh, large supply of arrows and the strain such high demand placed 
on the productive capacities of England’s fletchers.  Brunham paid for the equipment, 
then paid by indenture Little John of Berkhampsted for the carriage of the supplies by 
land—the order specifies carriage by land—at the rate of 6d per day, the same rate of pay 
archers received.55  Pipot himself was in charge of the carriage of the bows, arrows, and 
strings purveyed in Lincolnshire and had permission to “tak[e] up on the way any bows 
                                                
51BPR, III, 223–24. 
52BPR, III, 224. 
53BPR, III, 224. 
54BPR, II, 98. 
55BPR, III, 224–25.  An indenture between Brunham and Pipot, which is not extant, 
specified the number of bows, arrows, and strings purchased and at what prices. 
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or arrows he can find in the hands of craftsmen between Cestre and Lincoln.”56  As this 
shows, the Prince’s purveyors were casting a wide net and were still actively looking for 
equipment. 
The earls’ companies were also in need of resupply, both of horses and victuals.  
As their indentures likely specified, the King provided the shipping, just as he had done 
in 1355.  The council assigned la Katerine atte Melle, based in Ipswich, to transport the 
required horses and victuals for John de Vere, earl of Oxford, and John de Cheverston, 
seneschal of Gascony.57  La Godale of Gosford carried the horses and victuals for Robert 
de Ufford and William de Montacute, earls of Suffolk and Salisbury.58  These are the only 
two named ships, but more would have been required. 
Philip de Whitone was responsible for arresting the necessary ships.  They were to 
be at Plymouth by 1 May for Stafford, his retinue, and the other troops and supplies going 
with him to Gascony.59  This is two weeks later than the 17 April date by which the 
archers were to be at Plymouth ready to sail.  Indeed, the relevant letters patent are dated 
16 April.  While Whitone was likely already at work procuring the necessary shipping, it 
is clear that the reinforcements and additional supplies were not sailing from Plymouth 
on 17 April.60 
In addition to the letters detailing the raid’s success, the Prince’s administration 
handled other paperwork.  For example, the earl of Salisbury’s letters of protection were 
                                                
56BPR, III, 225. 
57TNA, C 66/248, m. 19.  CPR, X, 348. 
58Ibid. 
59TNA, C 61/68, m. 4. Rymer, Appendix E, 20. 
60Ibid. 
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renewed until February 1357.61  Salisbury was clearly in contact with England, as he 
complained to the King that, despite the earlier letters of protection, men had broken into 
some of his houses, stolen his property, abducted two bondsmen, and “assaulted his men 
and servants.”62  The King appointed a commission to look into the matter.  The other 
administrative matter taken up was the issuing of pardons.  Only a few were issued upon 
the conclusion of the 1355 chevauchée,63 especially compared to the rush of pardons 
issued in the twelve months following Poitiers and the end of the 1356 campaign.64  The 
same pattern applies to the granting of rewards.65 
The French Response 
The French, of course, responded and made their own adjustments following the Prince’s 
return to English Gascony.  French forces had hardly covered themselves in glory, and 
the English troops had wreaked economic havoc throughout the French countryside, 
particularly in parts of France that had had little experience of the war and the inhabitants 
of which had believed themselves to be beyond the reach of English depredations.  Aside 
from the economic implications and the necessary repairs and rebuilding, there were also 
political repercussions. 
Just as the Prince had officially set out to punish rebels and to convince them to 
become loyal to the English king again, as well as woo new allies, the King of France 
still had to respond to all of those newly loyal to Edward III.  He had to reverse the new 
                                                
61BPR, III, 226. 
62TNA, C 66/249, m. 7v.  CPR, X, 452. 
63TNA, C 66/248, passim. 
64TNA, C 66/243–261; BPR, II, III, and IV, throughout years 1356–1360. 
65Ibid. 
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trend, the changing opinion of the Gascons that loyalty to the English king would best 
serve their interests.  For example, Amanieu de Fossat (Aymeric de Fossade according to 
Henxteworth’s spelling), served in the Prince’s company.66  In June 1356, John II 
declared him a rebel.67 
Armagnac did not sit idly through the winter.  He began rebuilding destroyed 
towns and strengthened western garrisons and outposts.68  The pope wrote him, 
beseeching him not to invade English-held territory.  Granted, he was actually in Béziers, 
then Avignon to meet with the pope.  The man left in charge of the French forces was 
Jean de Boucicaut, who was based at Moissac.  While he was certainly an able man, he 
had but 600 men at his disposal.69  Thus, Boucicaut was unable to mount a successful 
defense against the winter raiding of the English. 
These defensive actions, though, were all after the fact.  The question is why was 
there so little response.  Jean II deemed the Prince’s activities in Gascony less of a threat 
than Lancaster’s raid in the north, and much less of a threat than Edward III’s presence in 
Picardy—closer to Paris.  Another problem that undoubtedly had a larger claim on the 
French king’s attention was his son-in-law, Charles the Bad of Navarre, who frequently 
changed his loyalties.  Furthermore, Jean II lacked the high level of administration and 
military organization that Edward III had in England; nor did he have the money with 
                                                
66DCO, Henxteworth accounts, entry for 18 April 1356. 
67AN, JJ,  84, no. 569, fol. 294v.  Charles Samaran, ed., La Gascoigne dans les Registres 
du Trésor des Chartres (Paris: Bibliotheque National, 1966), 96. 
68Breuils, 58–59.  See also, Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 87. 
69Wengefeld, “Letter to Richard Destafford,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 446–
47; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 193. 
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which to develop and maintain one.70  In this respect, then, the French king did not have 
the resources to respond effectively to the multi-pronged invasion of France. 
The Prince’s Report 
By any measure the Prince’s 1355 campaign was a success for the Anglo-Gascon force 
and Edward III.  Armagnac had been punished for his encroachments on the Gascon 
marches; war had been carried to parts of France that had not seen war; loot and ransoms 
had been taken.  Reportedly so much booty had been taken it would have filled 1000 
carts,71 which seems to be hyperbole and makes no sense in practical terms.  Given that 
the carts likely held 1000–3000lbs, this would amount to 1–3 million pounds of booty.  
One does wonder how the Prince’s 70–100 carts multiplied to 1000 and how he fed the 
additional 2000–3000 horses necessary to haul those thousand carts of booty.  
Furthermore, such an enormous baggage train could not have kept pace with the army 
and would have slowed the rearguard considerably.  Thus, the 1000 carts are a gross 
exaggeration.   
That said, the army did loot extensively.  Wengefeld estimated—based on the 
“good records which were found in divers towns in the houses of receivers”72—that the 
lands and towns destroyed by the English provided the French king yearly with more to 
maintain his war than half of France. 
…Carcassonne and Limoux, which is as large as Carcassonne, and two other 
                                                
70Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition, 94–98. 
71Matteo and Filippo Villani, Historia universalis, ed. L.A. Muratori (1729), 353; Le Bel, 
Chronicon, ii, 222. 
72John de Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi 
Tertii, 445.  “…par bon remembraunce qe fusrent trovez en diverse villes en les hostez de 
resceivours.” 
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towns near to Carcassonne, found each year for the king of France the wages of a 
thousand men of arms and, besides, one hundred thousand old crowns, to 
maintain his war.  And know that, by the records which we found the towns in the 
county of Toulouse which are destroyed and the towns in Carcassonne and the 
city and country of Narbonne found, each year, over and above the aforesaid sum, 
in aid of his war, four hundred thousand gold crowns, as the citizens of the large 
towns and other folk of the country, that ought to have good knowledge, told us.73 
Given that the army had taken the records, the Prince and his staff had the material 
needed to make a reasonable estimate as to the damage they had caused the French king’s 
war efforts.  By this measure, indeed by any measure, the Prince’s campaign was a 
success. 
 It is likely that these letters from the Prince and Wengefeld were not the first news 
England had of the Prince’s campaign.  Early autumn would have seen many ships in the 
wine trade sailing between Bordeaux and England, and the two sub-admirals (Hoggeshaw 
and Deyncourt), both of whom had sailed to Gascony with the Prince, returned to 
England in October and November respectively.74  They could have provided accurate 
                                                
73Wengefeld, “Letter to the bishop of Winchester,” in Avesbury, Gestis Edwardi Tertii, 
445.  “Car Carcassonne et Lemoignes, qest ausi graunt come Carcasoun, et ij. aultres 
villes de coste Carcasoun, troveront chescun an au roy de Fraunce lez gages de mil 
hommes dames et, oultre ceo, c. mil escutz veux, pur maintenir sa guerre.  Et entenke, par 
lez remembraunces qe nous trovasmes, qe les villes en Tholousane qe sount destruitz et 
lez villes en Carcasoun et la ville de Nerbon et de Nerbendoys troverent chescun an, ou la 
summe susdite, en eaide de sa guerre, cccc. Mil escutz veux, come bourgeos de les 
graundes villes et aultres geantz du pays, qe deveroient avoir bone conissaunce, nous 
ount dit. 
74TNA, E 101/26/32, E 101/26/34; Pipe roll, Edward III 29, m. 4; Issue Roll, Edward III 
29, m. 8. 
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information about the start of the campaign, and the Prince’s and Wengefeld’s letters and 
de Stafford’s oral report would have covered events through the end of the campaign.  
There is no doubt that the Prince was pleased with the outcome of the raid, no doubt he 
considered it a success.  Moreover, he capitalized on that success to request 
reinforcements and argue for the continuation of the war. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
When the Prince and his forces set out on 4 August 1356 on the Poitiers campaign, he 
and the army had the success of 1355 to build upon.  And the 1355 chevauchée was, in 
the estimation of the English anyway, a success.  The Anglo-Gascon army marched 606 
miles from Bordeaux to Narbonne and back again in fifty-nine days with minimal 
logistical difficulties.  They crossed the Garonne river and carried the war to parts of 
France that had not seen war for some time, destroyed towns, infrastructure, and 
economic resources, and returned to Bordeaux laden with booty and records.  The 
logistics of the Anglo-Gascon army were up to the task, even when faced with long and 
arduous marches, some of which had little available water along the way.  A number of 
horses undoubtedly perished.  Despite that difficulty—the loss of some horses was no 
doubt anticipated—, however, the army’s progress was not slowed, which is further 
evidence of the organization and excellent advanced planning of the campaign.  The 
planning, the organized system of supply during the campaign, enabled the Prince to 
succeed in his first solo command and to achieve the stated goals of the expedition. 
 According to the documentary evidence, the purpose of this campaign was 
nothing short of the (re)establishment of the full sovereignty and authority of the English 
crown in Gascony.  Over and over, Edward III stated that his aim was the restoration of 
his status and control, reclaiming his lands and rights, in Gascony.  Following the 
conclusion of the campaign, the Prince’s letters, and the letters of Wingefeld, claim 
success based on this criterion: they had reclaimed lands, punished rebels, disrupted 
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France’s ability to fight against the English, and persuaded some Gascons lords to return 
to their allegiance to Edward III.  The campaign itself backs their words; the stated goals 
were more than rhetorical cover for plundering.  They were specific, achievable goals, 
and based on those aims, which should be accepted as real, the campaign was nothing 
short of a success for the Prince personally, for the army, and for Edward III and the 
future of English royal authority in Gascony. 
Towns, such as Arouille, that had once been English but had fallen to the French 
were brought back under English control,1 and the lands belonging to Armagnac were 
devastated.  The success of the 1355 raid, moreover, strengthened the loyalty of the 
Gascons, which stood the Prince in good stead the following year.2  As discussed in 
Chapter Seven, a number of Gascon lords formally changed their allegiance in April 
1356.  The fact that these men switched sides following the 1355 chevauchée suggests a 
connection between the Prince’s expedition and their decisions.  In other words, the 
application of force and coercive power convinced these men that their best interests 
would be served by denying the authority of the French king and submitting to the 
authority of Edward III, suggesting in this case that military success had re-established, if 
not created, English royal authority in Gascony.  More cynically, it suggests that these 
Gascon nobles may have considered continued loyalty to the French crown a losing 
proposition and therefore chose to submit to English authority, hoping to further their 
                                                
1Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince (see note 37), 33. 
2Hewitt, The Black Prince’s Expedition (see note 36), 71. 
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own interests.3  Regardless, the Prince’s 1355 campaign achieved the aim of returning 
rebels to obedience. 
 The Prince also remembered another goal of this expedition: wooing new allies—
or at least not offending neutral powers like the powerful count of Foix.  Three times 
during the campaign, the Prince’s army entered the territory of the count of Foix, and on 
17 November 1355 the Prince and Foix had a conference.  Whatever understanding the 
Prince may have had with Foix, the army refrained from plunder and destruction.4  By 
ensuring the safety of Foix’s lands, the Prince furthered the larger goal of the expedition: 
restoring and enlarging Edward III’s authority in Gascony and in France by establishing 
friendly relations with potential allies.  
 The underlying purpose of the Prince’s expedition was the assertion of English 
royal authority in Gascony, not only to bring disloyal subjects back to their obedience but 
also to impress upon the French king and his officers, such as the count of Armagnac, 
that Edward III was committed to maintaining his sovereignty and authority in Gascony.  
This was an important strategic goal for the English king because sovereignty was at the 
heart of the conflict between France and England.  
In order to accomplish that goal Edward III bestowed royal authority on the 
Prince.  This was done through the use of symbols (seals, indentures, soldiers, etc.) and 
the provision of soldiers, themselves a symbol of that obliging authority as well as the 
coercive power available to enforce it. The Prince’s expedition, his use of coercive power 
                                                
3Such actions were not without precedent throughout the period of English rule in 
Gascony. 
4Baker, 128, 135, 138. 
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and manipulation of symbols, compelled obedience, buttressed the legitimacy of Edward 
III’s position in Gascony, and furthered the English king’s efforts to claim full 
sovereignty in Gascony.  The 1355 expedition did not succeed in forcing Jean II to 
relinquish his ultimate sovereignty over France, nor did he cede sovereignty over any 
other part of France through which the Anglo-Gascon army campaigned.  It did, however, 
succeed in calling the authority and power of the French king into question, enough so 
that Gascon nobles turned back to Edward III and places in France that had thus far been 
spared from the ravages of war learned that the French king and his lieutenants could not 
protect them from English incursions.  In that respect, the expedition was a definite 
success and the Prince effectively re-established royal authority over the Gascons—at 
least for the moment. 
In what was ultimately a contest for the loyalty of elites, the assertion of English 
royal authority and power, obliging those elites to respect both, was a necessary facet of 
Edward III’s strategy to extend his authority and establish his uncontested sovereignty 
over Gascony.  The Prince’s expedition effectively demonstrated not only the reach of 
England’s power but also the limits of France’s power, and power, in this instance, was 
the foundation of authority.  Where power led, authority—it was hoped—would follow. 
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Appendix A: Ships of the Prince’s Fleet 
 
 Home Port Master Ship Tunnag
e 
Mariner
s  
Muster 
Port 
1  William 
Baret 
La Juliane  36  
2  John Gobet La Margarete  26  
3  William 
Henry 
La Nicholas  24  
4  William May La James  26  
5  John Burges La Gregory  20  
6  Stephen 
Stonyng 
La Seinte 
Mariebote 
 15  
7  Simon 
Steven 
La Mighel  26  
8  John Lewe La Cogg 
Johan de 
Jernemuth 
 26  
9 Winchelsea John 
Wilydon 
La Seinte 
Maricog 
200 50  
1
0 
 John 
Clerke^,2 
La Cristofre*  100 Plymout
h 
1
1 
  La James    
1
2 
  La Gilane    
1
3 
  La Margaret 
of the Tower 
   
1
4 
Bayonne John Loyas La Seint 
Espirit 
   
1
5 
Fowey John Tegyn La Cog Johan    
1
6 
 William 
Pierres2 
La Seint 
Marie 
   
1
7 
Fowey  La Seint 
Sauveourscog 
   
1
8 
Dartmouth  La 
Seintmarycog 
   
1
9 
Sidemouth  La George    
2 Polruan  La    
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0 Seintemarieco
g 
2
1 
Seaton  La Margaret 30 14  
2
2 
Lynn  La Saint Mary 
Cog 
80 22  
2
3 
Lynn  La Michael 50 14  
2
4 
Weymouth/Melco
mbe 
 La Margaret 80 22  
2
5 
Weymouth/Melco
mbe 
 La Peter 90 24  
2
6 
Weymouth/Melco
mbe 
 La Clement 70 20  
2
7 
Weymouth/Melco
mbe 
 La Saint Mary 
Cog 
90 24  
2
8 
Warham  La Saint Mary 
Cog 
80 26  
2
9 
Lymington  La Saint Mary 
Cog 
70 24  
3
0 
Lymington  La Nicholas 60 22  
3
1 
Hamelhoke  La Gracedieu 160 42  
3
2 
Hamelhoke  La Katerine 120 32  
3
3 
Hamelhoke  La Welifare 70 22  
3
4 
Hamelhoke  La Saint 
Esprit 
100 30  
3
5 
Southampton  La Trinity 100   
3
6 
Southampton  ? 70 22  
3
7 
Southampton  La Margaret 30 14  
3
8 
Shoreham  La Welifare  22  
3
9 
Shoreham  La Welifare  18  
4
0 
Shoreham  La Welifare 50 16  
4 Shoreham  La Katherine 50 16  
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1 
4
2 
Hamelhoke  La Nicholas 70 24  
4
3 
Shoreham  La Benedict 60 18  
4
4 
Shoreham  La Godier 40 18  
4
5 
Rye  La Nicholas 120 22  
4
6 
Rye  La Jonette 40 18  
4
7  
Rye  La 
Dieulavance 
66 18  
4
8 
Hythe  La Margaret 50 14  
4
9 
Hythe  La Saint Mary 
Boat 
 14  
5
0 
Hythe  La Alice 30 14  
5
1  
Hythe  La Saint Mary 
Boat of 
Rudynge 
30 14  
5
2 
Hythe  La Godier 38 14  
5
3 
Hythe  La Godbiete 38 14  
5
4 
Hythe  La Christiane 
of Poole 
30 14  
5
5 
Winchelsea  La Jonette 120 30  
5
6 
Dover  La Glythe 50 20  
5
7 
Dover  La Croniper 50 20  
5
8 
Dover  La Lancaster  20  
5
9 
Dover  La Navdieu 50 20  
6
0 
Dover  La Faucon  40 20  
6
1 
Sandwich  La Blison 110 30  
6 Sandwich  La Cog John 140 36  
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2 
6
3 
Sandwich  La Margaret 120 30  
6
4 
 William 
Ashenden 
La Cristofre  80  
6
5 
 Robert 
Gofair 
La New Saint 
Marie 
 80  
6
6 
 William 
Passelewe2 
La Jerusalem  70  
6
7 
 Thomas 
Clerk1,2 
La Edward  60  
6
8 
 John Blosse2 La Claws  60  
6
9 
 John Horset La Holk  60  
7
0 
 John Ram1,2 La Alice  45  
7
1 
 John Wille2 La Thomas  40  
7
2 
 Robert 
Andrew2 
La John  40  
7
3 
 Walter de 
Manthrop 
La Trinity  130  
7
4 
 John 
Sperman1,2 
La Rodecog  35  
7
5 
 Paul 
Portsmouth2 
La Edmond  35  
7
6 
 John Rok2 La Anne  30  
7
7 
 Hamond 
Lovetoft1,2 
La Faucon  30  
7
8 
 Robert 
Hull1,2 
La Isabelle  30  
7
9 
 Robert 
Fikeys2 
La Saint 
Marybote 
 25  
8
0 
 Thomas 
Ram1  
La Mariote  25  
8
1 
 Bartholomew 
Stigeyn1,2 
La Welifare  42  
8
2 
 John 
Maikyn2 
La Plenty  35  
8
3 
 William 
Odam1,2 
La Gabriel  50  
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8
4 
 Sir Reymund 
de Grusynak 
Le Bastide    
^Mayor of Southampton. 
* The Prince’s ship. 
1These shipmasters all received royal pardons (14 June 1355) for “the account which he 
should render of moneys and profits taken by him of the freight of his said ship.” CPR, X, 
280. 
2These shipmasters were commissioned 15 March 1356 impress mariners and report to 
Sandwich on 24 April “for the service of the king.” 
 
Data from BPR, passim; TNA E 101/26/37; TNA C 61/67, m. 11; Rymer, Appendix E, 
13–14.  TNA E 101/26/36 is too badly damaged to make out names of individual ships; 
however, Lambert’s work on the document has shown that the eastern ports mentioned 
provided 49 ships and more than 250 mariners.
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Appendix B: Edward of Woodstock’s Army 
The data below is drawn from Baker’s Chronicon, The Black Prince’s Register, Rymer’s 
Foedera  the patent and calendar rolls, and The Soldier in later medieval England project, 
particularly the searchable database (http://www.medievalsoldier.org).  This is an 
example of what can be done; the list is by no means exhaustive. 
 
First Column 
Commanders: 
Tomas Beauchamp, KG*, Earl of Warwick, Constable of the army 
  John Beauchamp, miles1 
Roger de Clifford, miles2 
John Tochet, miles 
Guy de Beauchamp, Warwick’s second son  
 
Reginald de Cobham, KG, Marshall of the army 
Soldiers/miles 
 Thomas de Hampton, miles, standard bearer 
Gascons 
 7 unnamed barons 
 
Middle Column 
Commander: 
Edward of Woodstock, KG*, Prince of Wales 
 Prince’s Retinue 
Thomas de Barnardstone, miles 
Richard de Baskerville, miles 
 Lauton, squire 
  Ralph Basset, Baron Draytone 
  John Beaupre, miles 
   John Maynard, squire/esquire 
  Baldwin de Bereford, miles 
  Maurice Berkeley, miles 
Thomas Blount, miles 
John Bourchier, Baron Bourchier 
Maurice le Brun, miles 
                                                
*Original Knight of the Garter, 1348. 
1He married Warwick’s daughter Alice.  It is likely that he served under Warwick’s 
command, although there is no direct evidence of that.  Given the family ties and 
Clifford’s presence in Warwick’s company, I have placed Beauchamp in the same 
company. 
2He married Warwick’s daughter, and the evidence conclusively states that he served 
under Warwick’s command. 
Appendix B 
 
412 
Bartholomew de Burghersh, KG* 
 Richard, chamberlain 
 William, valettus 
 groom 
John Chandos, KG* 
 Philip, chaplain 
 John, chaplain 
Stephen Cusyngton, miles 
 Thomas de Hardres, squire/esquire 
John Dargentein, miles 
John Dasseles, miles 
William Daubeneye, miles 
Thomas Fychet, miles 
 Squire/esquire 
James de Hanville, miles 
John de Haveryngge, miles 
Nicholas de Hotoft, miles 
 Squire/esquire 
Nigel Loring, KG* 
 Peter Riche, squire/esquire 
Thomas Madefrey, miles  
William Moigne, miles 
 Squire/esquire 
Walter Paveley, KG,* miles 
Richard de Stafford, miles and trusted with special, specific tasks 
   Thomas Dardern, miles 
Thomas de Styuecle, miles 
John Sully, miles 
 Richard le Baker, esquire 
William Trussel, miles3 
 Roger Meyuw, squire/esquire 
Peter de Veel, pere, miles 
Peter de Veel, fils, miles 
Roger de la Ware, miles 
 Robert Mounteny, squire/esquire 
Edward Wauncy, miles 
John de Willoughby, miles 
Walter de Wodeland, miles 
 
 
William Bisshop, sergeant at arms 
 
                                                
3 He was already in Gascony.  BPR, III, 217. 
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Archer Captains 
John de Hyde, miles, Captain of Macklesfeld hundred’s archers 
  John Griffyn, miles, Captain of Wych Malbank hundred’s archers 
Hamon de Mascy, Captain of Wirhale and Broxen hundreds’ 
archers 
  Hugh de Golbourn, Captain of Wirhale and Broxen hundreds’ 
archers 
Robert Bruyn, Captain of Edesbury hundred’s archers 
Robert de Legh, fils 
Thomas of Stathow  
 
Archers 
 John de Neuton 
 Geoffrey de Stanlegh 
 William de Chorlegh 
 Simon de Grimesdich 
 John Starky 
 John de Merbury 
 Robert of Hale 
 
Grooms 
 Richard Bekeinsfeld 
 
Guides 
 
Office of the Buttery 
 
Office of the Chamber and Hall 
 
Office of the Kitchen 
 Edward of the Kitchen 
 Thomas the ovenkeeper 
 
Office of the Marshalcy 
 Vincent de Gloucester 
 
Office of the Pantry 
 Thomas, groom of the Pantry 
 
Office of the Poultry 
 Walter the Poulter 
 
Office of the Saucery 
 John of the Saucery 
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 Thomas, page of the Saucery 
 
Office of the Scullery 
 John, boy of the Scullery 
   
 Other 
  Robert de Acton 
John de Alnewyk 
  William Bakepins 
  John le Baltere of Wottone 
  John de Benstede 
  Richard de Bentone of London 
  John Bereford, son of Edward Bereford 
  Richard de Berewyk 
  Nicholas de Berkeley 
  Thomas de Bernardstone 
  John Bishop 
  Richard Blake of London 
  Hugh Bon-hominis 
  William Boulge 
  Richard Bowere of Knotesford 
Thomas de Brewes 
  Peter de Burle 
  Thomas Capel 
  Thomas Chaumberleyn 
  Thomas Charnels 
  John de la Chaumbre 
  William Cifrewaz 
  Peter Coke 
  Adam Cole of Tamere 
  Richard Colle 
  Richard le Cook of Poselyngworth 
  John Cornwall 
  Hugh Cursoun 
  Theobald Dalkwyne of Outheby 
  Gilber Dele 
  Richard Dockseye 
  Richard Ede 
  John de Etone 
  John Ferour of Bomstede 
  Walter Forest de Lee of Gainsborough 
  Thomas Harewold, citizen of London 
  John de la Haye 
  John de Hoghtone 
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  Roger Holefold of Coggeshale 
  Thomas, son of Adam Kydale of Barton 
  Roger de Lathum 
  Walter Laurence 
  William Lenche 
  Simon de Lincoln 
  Nicholas de Lomere 
  John de Louches 
  Edmund de Malyns, fils 
  William de Murens 
  John Palington 
  William de Penreth 
  William de Pesyndenne 
  Thomas Peytevin 
  William de Pomeray? 
  William de Pountfreyt 
  Richard Raven 
  John de St. Andrew 
  Thomas de St. Edmunds 
  Thomas de St. Omer 
  John Saltere 
  Francis Sarazin 
  Gilbert de Stanford 
  William de Synthwaite 
  Thomas de Thoraldby 
  Richard de Thorpe 
  John Trailly 
  John Tryvet 
  Thomas Tuwe (Tuey) 
  Matthew Uwyn 
William le Vernoun 
Thomas Walssh of Halstede 
Edmond Wancy 
Simon le Webbe of Wandlesworth 
John le Werselee 
Hugh de Wesenham 
Walter Wyght of Gainsborough 
William la Zouche of Lobesthorpe 
       
 
Prince’s Household and Administrators 
 Henry de Aldrington 
 Alexander de Aungre, parson at Wythyngdone 
William Blackwater, Prince’s personal physician 
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 Roger le Cornlee, farrier 
 John Doyly, farrier 
 Robert Egremont, tentmaker 
  John of Hampton, servant 
Thomas de Gerlesthorpe, parson at Collesdone 
 Geoffrey Hamelyn 
 Hankyn, goldsmith 
 Hankyn, minstrel 
 Hanz, taborer 
John Henxteworth, yeoman, keeper of the accounts 
 Hervey (Harvey) Hewe, yeoman of the scullery  
John de Ipswich, clerk 
Jakelyn, minstrel 
Keyfer, minstrel 
Musshonte, herald 
 William de Northwelle, clerk 
 Hankin the Piper, minstrel 
 Thomas Rasene, parson at Scoter 
 John Sauter, crier 
 William Stratton, tailor 
 John de Wengegeld, miles 
  Edmond 
Wengfeld, squire/esquire  
 
 
Other Companies 
 John de Vere, earl of Oxford 
 John de Lisle, KG* 
  Hugh Casom, squire/esquire 
  
Gascons 
 Jean de Grailly, KG*, Captal de Buch4 
 Lord of Caumont 
 Aymery de Biron, lord of Montferrand and the standard bearer 
 Guillaume de Pommiers? 
 
Third Column 
Commanders: 
 Robert de Ufford, KG, earl of Suffolk 
 William de Montacute, KG*, earl of Salisbury 
John Blaunkminster, miles 
Roger Loring, miles5  
                                                
4 He was married to Rose, the daughter of Bertrand de Montferrand. 
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John de Roos, mayor of Bordeaux 
   
  Other 
   Ralph Berne 
   John Camel 
   John de Cauntelough 
   Edmund de Clivedon 
   Nicholas de Dagworth 
   Edmond Domere 
   Nicholas Gouleshulle 
   Walter Guphey 
   Richard Hamsted 
   Edmund de Hethersiud 
   John de Hoo of Tepcroft 
   John de Kirkeby 
Walter Lodelowe 
   John Lodelowe6 
   Henry de Lucy 
   Edward de Montacute 
   Thomas Moraunt 
   William de Morlee 
   Robert de Musseldene 
   Nicholas Panes 
   Walter de Petrestree 
   Nicholas de Pointz 
   Matthew de Poudreham 
   Bartholomew Pygot 
   Gregory de Rokeslee 
   Thomas de Salesbirs  
   Curius le Spicer 
   Brian de Stapleton 
   John Stone 
   Bonaldus Stormy 
   Geoffrey Walssh 
 
 
Gascons 
                                                                                                                                            
5 Loring held the manor of Dounheved in Somerset of Salisbury and was to “render a 
lance of war yearly at midsummer.”  TNA, C 54/192, m. 28v.  CCR, X, 58.  Salisbury 
also owed Loring 500l.  TNA, C 54/193, m. 24v.  CCR, X, 198. 
6 Walter Lodelowe, as per his 6 September 1357 pardon, served under Salisbury.  As 
John Lodelowe was also from Staffordshire and pardoned with Walter for the same 
crimes, it is clear that they knew each other and likely that they served together. 
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 Guillaume (Sancii), lord of Pommiers, leader of the Bearnais 
 
Other7 
 Walter Dufford, miles  
John Norwich, squire/esquire 
John Mohun, KG* 
  Thomas Chandeler 
  John Tirel, squire/esquire 
 Edward Berkeley 
  William Colkardon, groom 
 Matthew Gourney (Gurney) 
  Gentilthorpe 
 James Audley, KG* 
  Laurence Pecche, squire/esquire 
 Alan Cheyne, miles 
  Richard de St. John, squire/esquire 
  chamberlain 
 Roland Daneys, miles 
  Selby, chamberlain 
 Thomas Felton, miles 
  William Somertone, squire/esquire 
 William Skrop, miles 
  Thomas Sutton, squire/esquire 
 John Whalesbrew, miles 
  Squire/esquire 
 Roger Daudley 
  Geoffrey, chamberlain 
 John Botourt 
  William Wingefeld, squire/esquire 
 Edward Despenser 
  John, Chamberlain 
 Stephen de Hales 
  Squire/esquire 
 Warin de Bassingbourne 
  Roger Lagele, squire/esquire 
 John Sharmesfeld (Sarnesfeld) 
  John, chamberlain 
 Howell ap Griffith, miles 
  Squire/esquire 
 John Dymmok, miles 
 Roger de la Ware, miles 
                                                
7 I have been unable to determine in which company these men served. It is most likely 
that they served in the Prince’s retinue. 
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  Robert Mounteny, squire 
 
Other Gascons (company undetermined) 
 Bernard Ezi, lord of Albret and his sons 
 Lord of Capene 
 Petiton Curton 
 Aymeric de Fossade 
  Godfrey, groom 
 Bertrand Frank 
 Guillaume Sans, lord of Lesparre 
 Bascot Mauleon 
 Lord of Monte Pesato 
 Reymond de Montbaden 
 Auger de Montaut, lord of Mussidan 
 Raymond de Pelagria 
 Amanieu de Pommiers 
 Elie de Pommiers 
 Eustace de Pommiers 
 Jean de Pommiers 
 Arnold Raymond 
 Emericus Sonynyak 
 Gerard de Tartas 
 Aymeric de Tastes 
 Soldan de Trau 
 Bernard de Troyes 
 Vicomte de Urtria 
Mercenaries 
 Tiderick van Dale, Alamain 
 John Gunsals, Spaniard 
 Benedict Lopes, Spaniard 
 Ferrand Martyn, Spaniard 
 Daniel van Pesse, Alamain 
 Gotherin Pipard, Alamain 
 William Qwad, Alamain 
 John Rays, Spaniard 
 John Rode, Alamain 
 Deossant of Spain, Spaniard 
 John Strenckin, Alamain 
 Hans Trouer, Alamain 
Bernard van Zedeles, Alamain, miles 
  Fromaldo, Alamain, squire/esquire 
  Seyner Gransekyn, Alamain, squire/esquire 
  John de Landestrene, Alamain, squire/esquire 
 Ingelbrith Zobbe, Alamain, miles 
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  Rankin, squire/esquire 
 
Men contracted/arrayed who did NOT serve for a reason other than desertion 
Chester 
 Roger de Bechyngton, ill 
 Richard de Codyngton, ill 
 Richard de Caldecote, ill 
 William Bakere, ill 
 Utrich’ de Huxlegh, ill 
 Ken’ Seys, ill 
 Howel ap Ll’, ill 
 Thomas, ill 
 John Boidel of Lymme 
 David de Overton 
 Randolf de Baggelegh 
North Wales  
Howel Duy ap Tuder, ill 
 John Steel, ill 
 Atha ap Guyn, ill 
 Gwynnagh ap Ll’, ill 
 David de Ardudo, ill 
Flynt  
Atha Loit ap Mad’ ap Thom’, ill 
Jor’ ap Bleth’ ap David, ill 
Ken’ ap Jor’ ap David, ill 
Bled’ Arow, ill 
Deserters 
Flynt Archers 
 John ap Oweyn 
 Bleth’ ap Mad’ ap Heilyn 
 David ap Madok ap Heilyn 
 David ap Jor’ ap Phil’ 
 Yevan ap Ririth of Kilkeyn 
 Yevan ap Madok ap Th’ 
 Gr’ap Eignon Penbras 
 David ap Bleth’ Gam 
 Ken’ ap Mad’ ap Eign’ 
 Thomas Brand 
 Yevan Vaghan 
 Gruff’ ap Grogh 
 Jor’ ap Eign’ Gogh 
 Eden’ ap Wilyn Gogh 
 Eign’ Vaghan ap Eign’ ap Yevan 
 Ken’ ap Jor’ ap Ll’ 
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 Eden’ ap Yevan ap Ririth 
 Jor’ ap Gron’ Vaughan 
 David ap Mad’ ap Bleth’ 
 Yokyn Gogh ap Yevan ap Howel 
 Margant ap Gruffuth 
 Madok Sair 
Chester Archers 
 William Dodefyn 
  Thomas de Brescy 
  Richard de Wynstanston 
  John de Pulford 
 North Wales Archers 
  Yevan ap Yokyn Gogh 
  Ken’ ap Madok ap Howel 
  Mad’ Lispa 
  Eden’, brother of Mad’ Lispa 
  Yevan Moil ap Yevan 
  Yevan ap David Gogh 
  Yevan ap Mad’ White 
  Yevan Hardy 
  Gron’ Pistodor 
  Eign’ ap Mad’ ap Ken’ 
  Jor’ Duy ap Rees 
  Ken’ ap Howel ap Madok 
  Yevan ap Yevan Bole 
  David ap Madok ap Cadugan 
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Appendix C: The Prince’s March 
 
(Data compiled from Baker, Chronicon, and Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince, 
207–08) 
 
Monday, 5 October  Bordeaux—Villenave-d’Ornon  4 miles  
          (6.4km) 
Tuesday, 6 October  Villenave-d’Ornon—Castets-en-Dorthe 28 miles  
          (45.1km) 
Wednesday, 7 October Rest 
Thursday, 8 October  Castets-en-Dorthe—Bazas   11 miles  
          (17.7km) 
Friday, 9 October  Rest  
Saturday, 10 October  Bazas—Castelnau    13 miles  
          (20.9km) 
Sunday, 11 October  Castelnau—Arouille    25 miles  
          (40.2km) 
Monday, 12 October  Rest    
Tuesday, 13 October  Arouille—Monclar    8 miles  
          (12.9km) 
Wednesday, 14 October Rest 
Thursday, 15 October  Rest  
Friday, 16 October  Monclar—Nogaro    14 miles  
          (22.5km) 
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Saturday, 17 October  Nogaro—Plaisance    13 miles  
          (20.9km) 
Sunday, 18 October  Rest 
Monday, 19 October  Plaisance—Bassoues    12 miles  
          (19.3km) 
Tuesday, 20 October  Rest 
Wednesday, 21 October Bassoues—Mirande    11 miles  
          (17.7km) 
Thursday, 22 October  Rest 
Friday, 23 October  Mirande—Seissan     11 miles  
          (17.7km) 
Saturday, 24 October  Seissan—Simorre    10 miles  
          (16.1km) 
Sunday, 25 October  Simorre—Samatan    12 miles  
          (19.3km) 
Monday, 26 October  Samatan—St-Lys    14 miles  
          (22.5km) 
Tuesday, 27 October  Rest 
Wednesday, 28 October St-Lys—Lacroix-Falgarde   14 miles  
          (22.5km) 
Thursday, 29 October  Lacroix-Falgarde—Montgiscard  12 miles  
          (19.3km) 
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Friday, 30 October  Montgiscard—Avignonet   14 miles  
          (22.5km) 
Saturday, 31 October  Avignonet—Castelnaudary   9 miles  
          (14.5km) 
Sunday, 1 November  Rest  
Monday, 2 November  Castelnaudary—Alzau   15 miles  
          (24.1km) 
Tuesday, 3 November  Alzau—Carcassonne    9 miles  
          (14.5km) 
Wednesday, 4 November Rest  
Thursday, 5 November Rest 
Friday, 6 November  Carcassonne—Rustiques   10 miles  
          (16.1km) 
Saturday, 7 November Rustiques—Canet    21 miles  
          (33.8km) 
Sunday, 8 November  Canet—Narbonne    10 miles  
          (16.1km) 
Monday, 9 November  Rest 
Tuesday, 10 November Narbonne—Aubian    9 miles  
          (14.5km) 
Wednesday, 11 November Aubian—Homps (or its vicinity)  12 miles  
          (19.3km) 
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Thursday, 12 November Homps—Azille    10 miles  
          (16.1km) 
Friday, 13 November  Azille—Villemagne    20 miles  
          (32.2km) 
Saturday, 14 November Villemagne—Pennautier   23 miles  
          (37.0km) 
Sunday, 15 November Pennautier—Prouille    16 miles  
          (25.7km) 
Monday, 16 November Prouille—Belpech    17 miles  
          (27.4km) 
Tuesday, 17 November Belpech—Miremont    25 miles  
          (40.2km) 
Wednesday, 18 November Miremont—Carbonne    14 miles  
          (22.5km) 
Thursday, 19 November Rest 
Friday, 20 November  Carbonne—Mauvezin    19 miles  
          (30.6km) 
Saturday, 21 November Mauvezin—Auradé    19 miles  
          (30.6km) 
Sunday, 22 November Auradé—Aurimont    20 miles  
          (32.2km) 
Monday, 23 November Rest 
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Tuesday, 24 November Aurimont—Montaut-les-Crénaux  14 miles  
          (22.5km) 
Wednesday, 25 November Montaut-les-Crénaux—Réjaumont  12 miles  
          (19.3km) 
Thursday, 26 November Rest  
Friday, 27 November  Réjaumont—Lagardère   15 miles  
          (24.1km) 
Saturday, 28 November Lagardère—Mézin    18 miles  
          (29.0km) 
Sunday, 29 November Rest 
Monday, 30 November Mézin—Casteljaloux    22 miles  
          (35.4km) 
Tuesday, 1 December  Casteljaloux—Meilhan-sur-Garonne  15 miles  
          (24.1km) 
Wednesday, 2 December Meilhan-sur-Garonne—La Réole  6 miles  
          (9.7km) 
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Appendix D: Glossary 
Bachelor (knight bachelor): military rank below that of a banneret 
Ballinger: oared vessel; small, light weight; sea-going; often referred to as a barge in 
Middle English 
Banneret (knight banneret): military rank, a knight with his own banner 
Bascinet: helmet type, very popular in the late Middle Ages; by 1350, most were tight-
fitting, conical, covered the back of the neck and cheeks; some had a moveable 
visor and or a mail coif 
Bushel: unit of weight, defined in the Middle Ages as equal in volume to eight wine 
gallons and weighing 64 tower pounds; the Winchester bushel weighed 35.238 lbs 
Caracal/Carrack: large transport ship, often fitted out for war 
Cog: one-masted ship with a flush-laid keel and a stern rudder; built high fore and aft; 
often used for transport and outfitted for war 
Corder: rope-maker 
Galley: low, oared vessel with one deck 
Havener: harbor master 
Hulk: large, unwieldy transport vessel 
Indenture (1): contract for military service that specified the terms of service, including 
wages and regard, the duration of service, restor, and the responsibilities of the 
contracting parties, e.g., transport 
Indenture (2): contract for goods and/or services 
League: a unit of distance equal to three miles 
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Quarter: a unit of measurement, particularly for grain; equal to eight bushels 
Receiver: official appointed to receive rents, tolls, and other monies, funds, or goods; 
similar to a treasurer 
Regard: bonus payment on top of wages 
Tonne: a unit of weight equal to 2240 lbs or 1000 kg 
Tun: a unit of measurement for a ship’s carrying capacity; based on the wine tun of 252 
gallons 
Water bailiff: officer in a port responsible for enforcing shipping regulations, collecting 
customs, and searching ships as necessary.
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Appendix E: Financial Tables 
 
Table E.1: Henxteworth entries by office, 20 September 1355 through 30 December 
1355.  Data from DCO, Henxteworth Accounts, 20 September–30 December 1355. 
 
Office Count Percentage 
Individuals* 509 57.0% 
Marshalcy 141 15.8% 
Kitchen 52 5.8% 
Unknown 40 4.5% 
Spicery 26 2.9% 
Hall and Chamber 25 2.8% 
Pantry 24 2.7% 
Poultry 23 2.6% 
Scullery 21 2.4% 
Buttery 20 2.2% 
Saucery 6 0.7% 
Church 5 0.6% 
Wardrobe 1 0.1% 
 
*Including loans from individuals. 
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Table E.2: Offices and amounts spent by each office.  Data drawn from DCO, 
Henxteworth accounts, 20 September 1355–30 December 1355. 
 
Office Amount 
Kitchen 183L 12s 0.12d 4.9% 
Buttery 102L 3s 9.96d 2.8% 
Pantry 50L 12s 9.48d 1.4% 
Marshalcy 371L 4s 7.8d   10.0% 
Scullery 24L 12s   0.7% 
Hall 20L 8s 2.16d   0.5% 
Saucery 3L 7s 2.04d   0.1% 
Spicery 34L 15s 8.04d 0.9% 
Unknown 238L 8.16d   6.4% 
Wardrobe 3s 0.004% 
Poultry 40L 12.6s 10.68d   1.1% 
Church/Religious Institution 37L 10s   1.0% 
Individual 2605L 9s 10.56d 70.2% 
Total 3712L 13s 9d 
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Table E.3: Henxteworth entries by budget item.  Data drawn from DCO, Henxteworth 
accounts, 20 September 1355–30 December 1355. 
 
Item Amount 
Wages 497L 9s 6.84d     12.7% 
Victuals and Wine 568L 17s 2.76d   15.3% 
Horses 38L 14s 9.96d   1.0% 
Horse Expenses 344L 17s 0.6d     9.3% 
Transport 166L 11s 6.12d    4.5% 
Gifts and Rewards 228L 11s 11.76d    6.2% 
Alms and Donations to Churches 87L 7s 2.64d    2.4% 
Prince’s Personal Expenses 20L 6s 8.04d    0.5% 
Livery 74L 4s 4.92d   2.0% 
Incomestibles 45L 10s    1.2% 
Unknown 101L 11s 2.4d   2.7% 
Other 7L 13s 7.44d   0.2% 
Reparations 23L 8s   0.6% 
Guides 10L 11s 6d 0.3% 
Money owed* 1521L 18s 11.52d   41.0% 
Total 3712L 13s 9d 
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*This may include wages, but Henxteworth writes only that the payments are for money 
owing according to the book of memoranda.  In the case of wages, he generally specifies 
that the payment is an advance on the recipient’s wages and or fee. 
 
Table E.4: Expenses by Office 
Office Budget Item Entries Amount 52109.88 
Payments to 
Individuals* 
Money Owed 
Wages 
Gifts 
Unknown 
Prince’s Expenses 
Horses 
Reparations 
Guides 
Transport 
Victuals and Wine 
Religious Donations 
Other 
Total 
272 (61.3.%) 
108 (24.3%) 
38 (8.6%%) 
16 (3.6%) 
8 (1.8%) 
6 (1.4%) 
4 (0.9%) 
3 (0.7%) 
3 (0.7%) 
2 (0.5%) 
2 (0.5%) 
1 (0.2%) 
444 
1519L 7s 
11.52d 
347L 15s 1.92d 
228L 1s 11.76d 
35L 7s 3.96d 
17L 16s 8.04d 
34L 16s 9.96d 
23L 8s 
10L 11s 6d 
133L 6s 
216L 14s 3.96d 
36L 17s 6d 
1L 6s 7.44d 
2605L 9s 
10.56d 
58.3% 
13.3% 
8.8% 
1.4% 
0.7% 
1.3% 
0.9% 
0.4% 
5.1% 
8.3% 
1.4% 
0.05% 
 
Kitchen Victuals and Wine 38 (74.5%) 162L 16s 0.12d 88.7% 
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Unknown 
Transport 
Horse Expense 
Incomestibles 
Other 
Total 
8 (15.7%) 
2 (3.9%) 
1 (2.0%) 
1 (2.0%) 
1 (2.0%) 
51 
5L 10s 
5L 
2s 
9L 18s 
6s 
183L 12s 0.12d 
3.0% 
2.7% 
0.05% 
5.4% 
0.2% 
Buttery Victuals and Wine 
Unknown 
Transport 
Total 
13 (65.0%) 
4 (20.0%) 
3 (15.0%) 
20 
95L 12s 
2L 16s 
3L 15s 9.96d 
102L 3s 9.96d 
93.5% 
2.7% 
3.7% 
Pantry Victuals and Wine 
Transport 
Unknown 
Horses 
Horse Expenses 
Incomestibles 
Total 
15 (62.5%) 
4 (16.7%) 
2 (8.3%) 
1 (4.2%) 
1 (4.2%) 
1 (4.2%) 
24 
44L 14s 0.48d 
2L 7s 9.96d 
1L 4s 6.96d 
13s 
1L 6s 8.04d 
6s 8.04d 
50L 12s 9.48d 
88.3% 
4.7% 
2.4% 
1.3% 
2.6% 
0.7% 
Marshalcy Horse Expenses 
Unknown 
Transport 
Horses 
Wages  
103 (73.0%) 
17 (12.1%) 
6 (4/3%) 
4 (2.8%) 
4 (2.8%) 
320L 14s 7.56d 
21L 8s 6.96d 
6L 4s 
3L 5s 
7L 19s 7.32d 
86.4% 
5.8% 
1.7% 
0.9% 
2.1% 
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Other 
Victuals and Wine 
Gifts and Rewards 
Total 
4 (2.8%) 
2 (1.4%) 
1 (0.7%) 
141 
5L 16s 9.96d 
5L 6s 
10s 
371L 4s 7.8d 
1.6% 
1.4% 
0.1% 
Scullery Incomestibles 
Transport 
Unknown 
Horse Expenses 
Total 
11 (52.3%) 
5 (23.8%) 
4 (19.0%) 
1 (4.8%) 
21 
13L 18s 6d 
8L 19s 
1L 8s 6d 
6s 
24L 12s 
56.6% 
36.4% 
5.8% 
1.2% 
Hall and 
Chamber 
Transport 
Unknown 
Religious Donations 
Horse Expenses 
Wages 
Victuals and Wine 
Total  
11 (44.0%) 
5 (20.0%) 
4 (16.0%) 
3 (12.0%) 
1 (4.0%) 
1 (4.0%) 
25 
7L 17s 5.16d 
3L 18s 9d 
4L 10s 3.96d 
18s 2.04d 
2L 10s 
13s 6d 
20L 8s 2.16d 
38.6% 
19.2% 
22.1% 
4.5% 
12.2% 
3.3% 
Saucery Victuals and Wine 
Horse Expenses 
Transport 
Unknown 
Total 
3 (50.0%) 
1 (16.7%) 
1 (16.7%) 
1 (16.7%) 
6 
2L 17s 8.04d 
6s 
2s 
1s 6d 
3L 7s 2.04d 
85.9% 
8.9% 
3.0% 
2.2% 
Spicery Incomestibles 9 (34.6%) 22L 4s 9d 63.9% 
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Victuals and Wine 
Transport 
Unknown 
Wages 
Prince’s Expenses 
Other 
Total 
8 (23.6%) 
3 (11.5%) 
3 (11.5%) 
1 (3.8%) 
1 (3.8%) 
1 (3.8%) 
26 
8L 4s 6.96d 
3s 9d 
1L 3s 6d 
1L 15s 11.04d 
19s 
4s 2.04d 
34L 15s 8.04d 
23.7% 
0.5% 
3.4% 
5.2% 
2.6% 
0.6% 
Wardrobe Transport 
Total  
1 (100%) 
1 
3s 
3s 
100% 
Poultry Victuals and Wine 
Wages 
Total 
21 (91.3%) 
2 (8.7%) 
23 
38L 5s 9.12d 
2L 8s 1.56d 
40L 13s 10.68d 
94.1% 
5.9% 
Churches, 
Convents 
Religious Donations 
Total 
5 (100%) 
5 
37L 10s 
37L 10s 
100% 
Unknown Unknown 
Wages 
Victuals and Wine 
Religious Donations 
Livery+ 
Horse Expenses 
Prince’s Expenses 
Incomestibles 
19 (95.0%) 
7 (17.5%) 
3 (7.5%) 
3 (7.5%) 
3 (7.5%) 
2 (5.0%) 
1 (2.5%) 
1 (2.5%)^ 
203L 12s 5.52d 
9L 6s 8.64d 
6s 8.04d 
6L 6s 3.96d 
10L 16s 
3L 1s 6d 
2L 
 
85.5% 
3.9% 
0.1% 
2.7% 
4.5% 
1.3% 
0.8% 
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Money Owed  
Total 
1 (2.5%) 
40 
2L 11s 
238L 8.16d 
1.1% 
     
     
*Including only payments made to individuals and excluding loans from individuals. 
+The other payments related to livery are included in payments for individuals, as the 
money was granted expressly to the tailor. In these three cases, the money likely was 
given to the tailor or other individual, but the folio here is torn. 
^There is an entry here, but the amount is missing due to the poor condition of the folio. 
 
